From patchwork Thu Mar 26 18:14:56 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Daniel Colascione X-Patchwork-Id: 11460789 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B69715AB for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 18:15:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E02292073E for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 18:15:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="De+vdbSm" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728466AbgCZSP1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Mar 2020 14:15:27 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-f201.google.com ([209.85.214.201]:53544 "EHLO mail-pl1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728463AbgCZSP0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Mar 2020 14:15:26 -0400 Received: by mail-pl1-f201.google.com with SMTP id 2so4856629plb.20 for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:15:26 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=REBj1fgB1itW3afNpdBeCKHTfmMER4muP4nMI9CXCW4=; b=De+vdbSmZ4eV+CJ+UxFZBhShe8zH/Qk26KK8CRGODde3/2Qi8B5S/N2lYhGdR9yD2U hPM6WHzB1LTjWX/roz7FcosVAFpwn9uha+5en/xMUBaugZcCu/YIBgBvQGtBUpZUwWZQ Yi7CBHzjA1yN9GVu/Z7i9C+4Xry+g5D46J3/OZB/pkaasGKOwmkWPkmFiuWRffJrTY8Z kTsCbX7z3IaVClheuxQ8416BFeCjQSRbWgs1GcEoe6K1yA68Zeue9kMNA9Id9SjEM81w iXBmQJlFNC0CXF/4xW50ke/+f3lnOzc0rz+264IkbICCJIlYAFn96I220W+S6izkKbst kpMQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=REBj1fgB1itW3afNpdBeCKHTfmMER4muP4nMI9CXCW4=; b=KasZzeKdTF6SDP4DY1ClKCKYeVtXou5PbZO4bTGhGE7q3WbIhoBrxkvr9kN/D7/k+B bEmsbmyxWyACtEk7MXDwV0kCrHnrQhOZhY4w/2v6ZPaySi6yHHkvqfjmEPKrpj7+KpKz gRhtKmkui1Yw+2g3D27thmTnZ+FQFaQkM/xByOfPcSzflO3mRRFs98ksM4TL/ITL9bnT jGY2sPmezXQwsE0gSnYvmg8ivs+Rx117fSeU5ZhZWI2NP0cbnnbHOAhY1o/48u+h+/In 71weY7M5Qma0agiuns69XeQNGQnnnefVi9BZHYm3vn0oEMVteZFfgozQkZgL9E6RIeNS X8Hw== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ097zxeaVHB9ig5isYlv+uCJ9RQFJQtV2ZqpzugBqwklcjZNVhP nC6YGmzKbm/HLkFnXPEbncnqd6idIZ0= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vuC4qedai97AsQzom+MPyQbpmPdnQ6oRFaE8QGT9W4/tlMA0F0FEEUIYjLnEYqJfkFHHc97xMWVyOA= X-Received: by 2002:a63:ff53:: with SMTP id s19mr9927452pgk.247.1585246525869; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:15:25 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:14:56 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20200326181456.132742-1-dancol@google.com> Message-Id: <20200326181456.132742-4-dancol@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20200214032635.75434-1-dancol@google.com> <20200326181456.132742-1-dancol@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1.696.g5e7596f4ac-goog Subject: [PATCH v3 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux From: Daniel Colascione To: timmurray@google.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paul@paul-moore.com, nnk@google.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, lokeshgidra@google.com, jmorris@namei.org Cc: Daniel Colascione Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org This change gives userfaultfd file descriptors a real security context, allowing policy to act on them. Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index 07b0f6e03849..78ff5d898733 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ struct userfaultfd_ctx { bool mmap_changing; /* mm with one ore more vmas attached to this userfaultfd_ctx */ struct mm_struct *mm; + /* The inode that owns this context --- not a strong reference. */ + const struct inode *owner; }; struct userfaultfd_fork_ctx { @@ -1014,14 +1016,18 @@ static __poll_t userfaultfd_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) } } +static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_fops; + static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, struct userfaultfd_ctx *new, struct uffd_msg *msg) { int fd; - fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, - O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)); + fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure( + "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, + O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), + ctx->owner); if (fd < 0) return fd; @@ -1918,7 +1924,7 @@ static void userfaultfd_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f) } #endif -const struct file_operations userfaultfd_fops = { +static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_fops = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS .show_fdinfo = userfaultfd_show_fdinfo, #endif @@ -1943,6 +1949,7 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem) SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) { + struct file *file; struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx; int fd; @@ -1972,8 +1979,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) /* prevent the mm struct to be freed */ mmgrab(ctx->mm); - fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, - O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)); + file = anon_inode_getfile_secure( + "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, + O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + fd = PTR_ERR(file); + goto out; + } + + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) { + fput(file); + goto out; + } + + ctx->owner = file_inode(file); + fd_install(fd, file); + +out: if (fd < 0) { mmdrop(ctx->mm); kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);