From patchwork Thu Jul 9 00:12:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 11653005 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB451739 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:21:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B632C20772 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:21:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="HcERmM75" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725848AbgGIAVM (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:21:12 -0400 Received: from sonic310-23.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com ([74.6.135.197]:36839 "EHLO sonic310-23.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725982AbgGIAVM (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:21:12 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1594254069; bh=i2QQRg79JdkzCREajGgn17V+iiB1eOsUqVCsHE62TT4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=HcERmM75/M2p1YqJrmAANzSZIH5oarzpRPvuCYGCr//DHZ0G2dQm6YGQ/5cqtX/R4uI5NWZvoDG4G5xIRs1Zx2+0rQoCnf1JfOppdphTtpisQK/rLF26vPHMlh+rRN74LxjrdS6hOi8mNAAHMntvYl9Kd4Wq4SFt7pgmHaTfCLoLQN1nlb+Smh1bB5YOy0uMhvJS8UjFzZb+VNU6SkIUgq++D51emCC3luTaN+QTSEvxSy14hONzE5iHad2I+QvZaEMEnD2dKHQQcHIgG4tMPEdQx1PU8aoADZnBYVttuGTP/kHRG08ci2vPrppaXicxExQiU7uEOGC5KJDSgs+Jkg== X-YMail-OSG: pqarv7AVM1mxbAGLyjq8FXmVkDQDAg4NCpVMrIr8VrtlXCd240PXfS7LNWm4oWn SwWsWviLSISSLWakqbLCp0VP44LykSflmZeT2SMJqWsxM0rCsXRGL168yvQSl4udTPfojL_8NO5E xPUL55l0mL_9AQfS2kvZNG7BeP87h4oo8C_KJr2lMR4bFkP3XAytR96_6W9Tu_trYFPmpJejCU8Z 5p9WI3PoevCKsukzErUpO877qRpAnlm0AAmVPzNhd2kFERHDijNnN1Iahzwr6yV2O3oqJCp5XY.c aFonXqc0EY6LnGCkAdGXNcjynL1F4Gc_Z7oCwgOVdyVEhj_rHR0ORMnjjP_xYj9rXlbdMwLdQ05V xo2.pzZjch_59B9fhxo0drzRoMgHNo0R0J_aWBxkfEF3F2hgBABlwOx2rgaucmHsxx1g2YMFZo1Z acwQdPKQLfgbrhKVs4gmg1dUmmYzJdJUby_RPWq9xSRFTgU7Xih_SSZEfvNvSpSAIhigZbd4754W KL5cSgEBwjLMhjjCfwVTY7PP9BVzy92C9mXAs8Pu68M6HJ8e7uxuFSF2YNH3FiBM2BAOYmLbRUah OCspf.youcrcWjXF3DVf0lDeWyppsA06JBDEDgmmfSFPKTdax2RxMj_EEXY4gntW_F9G._nT_BhS 1zXAlRHIjusBeRWBhmFqqRf.7FSRQ.3fmxudMfqZCxQcwaNBf8K8RxigaS1kz1bZ0WU5gUdBZWg0 I8QEOX77zG9IyuOK9b0qOUalVEWmeJMG7G2YLYx7G_Smg0S7QCku9ECkG4iiX9w7FG4RKZ4Q.4DF m5Q.C.0tsQ9X07BVv9aupb.cAMftVnVYhVaU3V1rqLDcIO71gzPF_Mho7LnVLOic48QZqwPv14dR bNSDJ7tTsj0g5XltQjCZ8TFSS1M3LVuDJD3DxWYaYD9h3dsbcwiCoMoaHnjUVxmIxIpZh7uE1JyQ rqWhpYLqnvHEHZQImElM.F03PHebMKku7Erlh9qrHaXsZ52bLbxUrxG8OdUX28FryjPXQbw9DFmM asfOGbtd_WM8skNhXpceNQJMCdyX6C768gEngcvZs8F.2LfozpP1qpPaUA6HJL4jM0GaNoVOp1Mw eRdPYctW9PlpZsFNcUTOaVSkzIc8.fhV5xzguLfx68ZTrDWWup.TeiXrZLutcRoMdBoMWBgFYWZ4 5Uuf3ZsGRz5aaSVyZP4rXLgIzS.GKcHE4nA0KnlcEzvunGOiuT0clawmZBRq5cDW5MQkH0ZJmaHO QLXlu_0dbu4fdIqKjmEwYx0na0qRynXDBZOjtfTVRvgix5TFQgCGOXRYTiczOmUD2Dugba3KbyJZ 3xbPh6kaovX3VKEXXBJz.nEwdJnKEwCSL.TsI51BsbdyLuYr62A.9FwjuMrIV_twOJhIrnMGAY2h stSPozy3Vb4nP4KGB1M7utKW4ho80laxy1w-- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic310.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com with HTTP; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:21:09 +0000 Received: by smtp420.mail.bf1.yahoo.com (VZM Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID d0befc6873b4b43b784f5f3267220a61; Thu, 09 Jul 2020 00:21:07 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v18 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 17:12:14 -0700 Message-Id: <20200709001234.9719-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 In-Reply-To: <20200709001234.9719-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20200709001234.9719-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 591dae299c6f..294410533b51 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1878,7 +1878,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule); #else @@ -1894,8 +1895,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void **lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f9a632ae7be1..15a7fb80d6a7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index bafa03a5c866..975c3b8c8d0d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -654,7 +655,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } @@ -669,15 +672,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_isset) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) { @@ -689,7 +694,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index df93ac258e01..64bff42f5d56 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a442b8940e93..9a0f462e8891 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob lsmdata; if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) { if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); @@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d05090bf63c6..3bbd01e8192e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2527,11 +2527,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -2539,7 +2542,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc;