diff mbox series

[v2,2/2] selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans

Message ID 20210401155913.1693097-3-omosnace@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: Paul Moore
Headers show
Series selinux: fix changing booleans | expand

Commit Message

Ondrej Mosnacek April 1, 2021, 3:59 p.m. UTC
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.

To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.

The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
    # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off

On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True

While on the broken kernels, it will be different:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True

While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
makes the sequence more consistent.

Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 88 +++++++++----------------------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++---
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

Comments

Paul Moore April 1, 2021, 11:02 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 11:59 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
> conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
> cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
> avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
> often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
> being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.
>
> To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
> individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
> approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
> av_lists exactly once.
>
> The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:
>
>     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
>     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
>     allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
>     # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off
>
> On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
> command:
>
>     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
>     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
>     allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
>
> While on the broken kernels, it will be different:
>
>     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
>     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
>     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
>     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
>
> While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
> nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
> makes the sequence more consistent.
>
> Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 88 +++++++++----------------------
>  security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++---
>  3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

...

> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> index 2aee4c965c25..f9d60010041e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> @@ -333,59 +319,37 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
>
>         h->nslot = nslot;
>         h->mask = nslot - 1;
> -
> -avtab_alloc_out:
> -       pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
> -              h->nslot, nrules);
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> -int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig)
> +int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
>  {
> -       int i;
> -       struct avtab_node *node, *tmp, *tail;
> -
> -       memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
> -
> -       new->htable = kvcalloc(orig->nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
> -       if (!new->htable)
> -               return -ENOMEM;
> -       new->nslot = orig->nslot;
> -       new->mask = orig->mask;
> -
> -       for (i = 0; i < orig->nslot; i++) {
> -               tail = NULL;
> -               for (node = orig->htable[i]; node; node = node->next) {
> -                       tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> -                       if (!tmp)
> -                               goto error;
> -                       tmp->key = node->key;
> -                       if (tmp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> -                               tmp->datum.u.xperms =
> -                                       kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep,
> -                                                       GFP_KERNEL);
> -                               if (!tmp->datum.u.xperms) {
> -                                       kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, tmp);
> -                                       goto error;
> -                               }
> -                               tmp->datum.u.xperms = node->datum.u.xperms;
> -                       } else
> -                               tmp->datum.u.data = node->datum.u.data;
> -
> -                       if (tail)
> -                               tail->next = tmp;
> -                       else
> -                               new->htable[i] = tmp;
> -
> -                       tail = tmp;
> -                       new->nel++;
> +       int rc;
> +       u32 nslot = 0;
> +
> +       if (nrules != 0) {
> +               u32 shift = 1;
> +               u32 work = nrules >> 3;
> +               while (work) {
> +                       work >>= 1;
> +                       shift++;
>                 }
> +               nslot = 1 << shift;
> +               if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
> +                       nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
>         }
>
> +       rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
> +       if (rc)
> +               return rc;

Now that all of the avtab initialization is done in avtab_init(),
thanks to patch 1/2, it doesn't really make sense to call
avtab_alloc_common() here when 'nrules == 0', right?  Granted it is
safe since you check for zero rules in the function, but making the
call in the first place seems a bit pointless.  I would suggest either
moving the avtab_alloc_common() call up into the if body above it or
checking for 'nrules == 0' at the top of the function and jumping down
to the pr_debug()/return if true.

> +       pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
>         return 0;
> -error:
> -       avtab_destroy(new);
> -       return -ENOMEM;
> +}
Ondrej Mosnacek April 2, 2021, 8:58 a.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Apr 2, 2021 at 1:02 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 11:59 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
> > conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
> > cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
> > avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
> > often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
> > being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.
> >
> > To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
> > individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
> > approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
> > av_lists exactly once.
> >
> > The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:
> >
> >     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
> >     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
> >     allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
> >     # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off
> >
> > On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
> > command:
> >
> >     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
> >     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
> >     allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
> >
> > While on the broken kernels, it will be different:
> >
> >     # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
> >     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
> >     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
> >     allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
> >
> > While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
> > nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
> > makes the sequence more consistent.
> >
> > Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 88 +++++++++----------------------
> >  security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  2 +-
> >  security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++---
> >  3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> > index 2aee4c965c25..f9d60010041e 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> > @@ -333,59 +319,37 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
> >
> >         h->nslot = nslot;
> >         h->mask = nslot - 1;
> > -
> > -avtab_alloc_out:
> > -       pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
> > -              h->nslot, nrules);
> >         return 0;
> >  }
> >
> > -int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig)
> > +int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
> >  {
> > -       int i;
> > -       struct avtab_node *node, *tmp, *tail;
> > -
> > -       memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
> > -
> > -       new->htable = kvcalloc(orig->nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
> > -       if (!new->htable)
> > -               return -ENOMEM;
> > -       new->nslot = orig->nslot;
> > -       new->mask = orig->mask;
> > -
> > -       for (i = 0; i < orig->nslot; i++) {
> > -               tail = NULL;
> > -               for (node = orig->htable[i]; node; node = node->next) {
> > -                       tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> > -                       if (!tmp)
> > -                               goto error;
> > -                       tmp->key = node->key;
> > -                       if (tmp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> > -                               tmp->datum.u.xperms =
> > -                                       kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep,
> > -                                                       GFP_KERNEL);
> > -                               if (!tmp->datum.u.xperms) {
> > -                                       kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, tmp);
> > -                                       goto error;
> > -                               }
> > -                               tmp->datum.u.xperms = node->datum.u.xperms;
> > -                       } else
> > -                               tmp->datum.u.data = node->datum.u.data;
> > -
> > -                       if (tail)
> > -                               tail->next = tmp;
> > -                       else
> > -                               new->htable[i] = tmp;
> > -
> > -                       tail = tmp;
> > -                       new->nel++;
> > +       int rc;
> > +       u32 nslot = 0;
> > +
> > +       if (nrules != 0) {
> > +               u32 shift = 1;
> > +               u32 work = nrules >> 3;
> > +               while (work) {
> > +                       work >>= 1;
> > +                       shift++;
> >                 }
> > +               nslot = 1 << shift;
> > +               if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
> > +                       nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
> >         }
> >
> > +       rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
> > +       if (rc)
> > +               return rc;
>
> Now that all of the avtab initialization is done in avtab_init(),
> thanks to patch 1/2, it doesn't really make sense to call
> avtab_alloc_common() here when 'nrules == 0', right?  Granted it is
> safe since you check for zero rules in the function, but making the
> call in the first place seems a bit pointless.  I would suggest either
> moving the avtab_alloc_common() call up into the if body above it or
> checking for 'nrules == 0' at the top of the function and jumping down
> to the pr_debug()/return if true.

Ok, moved it under the conditional in v3.

>
> > +       pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
> >         return 0;
> > -error:
> > -       avtab_destroy(new);
> > -       return -ENOMEM;
> > +}
>
> --
> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 2aee4c965c25..f9d60010041e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -308,24 +308,10 @@  void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
 	h->mask = 0;
 }
 
-int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+static int avtab_alloc_common(struct avtab *h, u32 nslot)
 {
-	u32 shift = 0;
-	u32 work = nrules;
-	u32 nslot;
-
-	if (nrules == 0)
-		goto avtab_alloc_out;
-
-	while (work) {
-		work  = work >> 1;
-		shift++;
-	}
-	if (shift > 2)
-		shift = shift - 2;
-	nslot = 1 << shift;
-	if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
-		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
+	if (!nslot)
+		return 0;
 
 	h->htable = kvcalloc(nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!h->htable)
@@ -333,59 +319,37 @@  int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 
 	h->nslot = nslot;
 	h->mask = nslot - 1;
-
-avtab_alloc_out:
-	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
-	       h->nslot, nrules);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig)
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 {
-	int i;
-	struct avtab_node *node, *tmp, *tail;
-
-	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
-
-	new->htable = kvcalloc(orig->nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!new->htable)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	new->nslot = orig->nslot;
-	new->mask = orig->mask;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < orig->nslot; i++) {
-		tail = NULL;
-		for (node = orig->htable[i]; node; node = node->next) {
-			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!tmp)
-				goto error;
-			tmp->key = node->key;
-			if (tmp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
-				tmp->datum.u.xperms =
-					kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep,
-							GFP_KERNEL);
-				if (!tmp->datum.u.xperms) {
-					kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, tmp);
-					goto error;
-				}
-				tmp->datum.u.xperms = node->datum.u.xperms;
-			} else
-				tmp->datum.u.data = node->datum.u.data;
-
-			if (tail)
-				tail->next = tmp;
-			else
-				new->htable[i] = tmp;
-
-			tail = tmp;
-			new->nel++;
+	int rc;
+	u32 nslot = 0;
+
+	if (nrules != 0) {
+		u32 shift = 1;
+		u32 work = nrules >> 3;
+		while (work) {
+			work >>= 1;
+			shift++;
 		}
+		nslot = 1 << shift;
+		if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+			nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
 	}
 
+	rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
 	return 0;
-error:
-	avtab_destroy(new);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
+{
+	return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
 }
 
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 4c4445ca9118..f2eeb36265d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@  struct avtab {
 
 void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
-int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig);
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
 struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 0b32f3ab025e..1ef74c085f2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -605,7 +605,6 @@  static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
 			struct cond_av_list *orig,
 			struct avtab *avtab)
 {
-	struct avtab_node *avnode;
 	u32 i;
 
 	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
@@ -615,10 +614,11 @@  static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
-		avnode = avtab_search_node(avtab, &orig->nodes[i]->key);
-		if (WARN_ON(!avnode))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		new->nodes[i] = avnode;
+		new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
+						       &orig->nodes[i]->key,
+						       &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+		if (!new->nodes[i])
+			return -ENOMEM;
 		new->len++;
 	}
 
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@  static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
 {
 	int rc, i, j;
 
-	rc = avtab_duplicate(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
+	rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;