[v37,11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid

Message ID	20220628005611.13106-12-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive)
State	Handled Elsewhere
Delegated to:	Paul Moore
Headers	show Return-Path: <selinux-owner@kernel.org> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v37 11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20220628005611.13106-12-casey@schaufler-ca.com> In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk
Series	[v37,01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule \| expand [v37,01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule [v37,02/33] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security [v37,03/33] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure. [v37,04/33] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings [v37,05/33] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs [v37,06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match [v37,07/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as [v37,08/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid [v37,09/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx [v37,10/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid [v37,11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid [v37,12/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid [v37,13/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid [v37,14/33] LSM: Specify which LSM to display [v37,15/33] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser [v37,16/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx [v37,17/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx [v37,18/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security [v37,19/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter [v37,20/33] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob [v37,21/33] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation [v37,22/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx module selection [v37,23/33] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names [v37,24/33] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure [v37,25/33] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs [v37,26/33] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer [v37,27/33] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts [v37,28/33] audit: multiple subject lsm values for netlabel [v37,29/33] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts [v37,30/33] netlabel: Use a struct lsmblob in audit data [v37,31/33] LSM: Removed scaffolding function lsmcontext_init [v37,32/33] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context [v37,33/33] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 4ead3360a1c0..f25a867063e5 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -3054,16 +3054,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority = task_nice(current); if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { - u32 secid; struct lsmblob blob; size_t added_size; + u32 secid; security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid); /* - * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will + * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob - * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(), + * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(), * which means that the one expected by * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 029c23719a5c..ce4a4af362f3 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -222,6 +222,24 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob) return 0; } +/** + * lsmblob_first - secid value for the first LSM slot + * @blob: Pointer to the data + * + * Return the secid value from the first LSM slot. + * There may not be any LSM slots. + * + * Return the value in secid[0] if there are any slots, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline u32 lsmblob_first(const struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +#if LSMBLOB_ENTRIES > 0 + return blob->secid[0]; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts); @@ -504,8 +522,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob); +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1201,14 +1219,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } -static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2acf95cf9895..2834e55844db 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2178,19 +2178,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - if (!sid) + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob)) return 0; - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid. - * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted - * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len); if (error) { @@ -2399,6 +2392,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || @@ -2409,7 +2403,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; struct lsmblob blob; pid_t pid; - u32 sid; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_str) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); result = security_audit_rule_match( &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 94537d1feb9a..e5530bbfc83b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, * here even though it always refs * @current's creds */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); need_sid = 0; } - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob - * to sid. This is temporary until - * security_task_getsecid() is converted to - * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in - * this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); @@ -2770,12 +2761,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2791,6 +2785,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsmblob blob; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2802,7 +2797,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2823,7 +2820,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 0a99663e6edb..bbb3b6a4f0d7 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1562,11 +1562,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsmblob blob; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + audit_info.secid = lsmblob_first(&blob); audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index d6c5b31eb4eb..34bb6572f33b 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ */ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid); + struct lsmblob blob; + + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + /* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = lsmblob_first(&blob); audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 1b5d70ac2dc9..f347d63b61e7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); @@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c1e76282b5ee..8c48da6a6583 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @blob: secid(s) of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * */ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data, allowed_algos); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index cdb84dccd24e..9ef8210e901f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -73,15 +73,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, - func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), + &blob, func, mask, + IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 040b03ddc1c7..5d6029ac52f0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, &allowed_algos); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && @@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), + &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -437,9 +438,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsmblob blob; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -447,11 +448,12 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, - &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); + current_cred(), &blob, + MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, + NULL); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) @@ -487,10 +489,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), + &blob, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; @@ -511,10 +514,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -710,7 +713,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -730,9 +733,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_READ, func); } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -760,7 +763,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -773,8 +776,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -900,7 +903,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -923,9 +926,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), - secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, + &blob, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index b04733a5d066..5c2bc6782e17 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: the secid(s) of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL @@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *func_data) { int i; @@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(lsmblob_first(blob), + rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule, rule->lsm[i].rules_lsm); @@ -702,7 +703,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: LSM secid(s) of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -718,8 +719,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) { @@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, func_data)) continue; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1e9c06607c39..1a4741178944 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1916,17 +1916,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj, + list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);

[v37,11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid

Commit Message

Patch