Message ID | 20231107134012.682009-17-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Handled Elsewhere |
Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
Headers | show |
Series | security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On 11/7/2023 5:40 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce > the inode_post_set_acl hook. > > At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At > inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified > POSIX ACL and other file metadata. > > Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL > change. > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be > reverted. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > fs/posix_acl.c | 1 + > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ > security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c > index a05fe94970ce..58e3c1e2fbbc 100644 > --- a/fs/posix_acl.c > +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c > @@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, > error = -EIO; > if (!error) { > fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > + security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); > } > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index ec5319ec2e85..6a671616196f 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, > const char *name) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 0c85f0337a9e..d71d0b08e9fe 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > struct posix_acl *kacl); > +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > + struct posix_acl *kacl); > int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name); > int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > @@ -913,6 +915,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > return 0; > } > > +static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, > + const char *acl_name, > + struct posix_acl *kacl) > +{ } > + > static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > struct dentry *dentry, > const char *acl_name) > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > } > > +/** > + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set > + * @dentry: file > + * @acl_name: acl name > + * @kacl: acl struct > + * > + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry. > + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. > + */ > +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > + struct posix_acl *kacl) > +{ > + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > + return; > + call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > +} > + > /** > * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed > * @idmap: idmap of the mount
On Nov 7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote: > > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce > the inode_post_set_acl hook. > > At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At > inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified > POSIX ACL and other file metadata. > > Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL > change. > > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be > reverted. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > fs/posix_acl.c | 1 + > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ > security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+) ... > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > } > > +/** > + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set > + * @dentry: file > + * @acl_name: acl name > + * @kacl: acl struct > + * > + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry. > + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. > + */ > +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, > + struct posix_acl *kacl) > +{ > + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) > + return; Another case where the existing evm_inode_post_set_acl() hook doesn't check S_PRIVATE but this hook does. > + call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl); > +} > + > /** > * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed > * @idmap: idmap of the mount > -- > 2.34.1 -- paul-moore.com
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index a05fe94970ce..58e3c1e2fbbc 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, error = -EIO; if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index ec5319ec2e85..6a671616196f 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 0c85f0337a9e..d71d0b08e9fe 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl); +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl); int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name); int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, @@ -913,6 +915,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } +static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); } +/** + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * @kacl: acl struct + * + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry. + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. + */ +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl); +} + /** * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed * @idmap: idmap of the mount