diff mbox series

[v5,16/23] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook

Message ID 20231107134012.682009-17-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive)
State Handled Elsewhere
Delegated to: Paul Moore
Headers show
Series security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand

Commit Message

Roberto Sassu Nov. 7, 2023, 1:40 p.m. UTC
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.

At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 fs/posix_acl.c                |  1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h      |  7 +++++++
 security/security.c           | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

Comments

Casey Schaufler Nov. 7, 2023, 5:44 p.m. UTC | #1
On 11/7/2023 5:40 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the inode_post_set_acl hook.
>
> At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
> POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
>
> Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
> change.
>
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> reverted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>


> ---
>  fs/posix_acl.c                |  1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
>  include/linux/security.h      |  7 +++++++
>  security/security.c           | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
> index a05fe94970ce..58e3c1e2fbbc 100644
> --- a/fs/posix_acl.c
> +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
> @@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		error = -EIO;
>  	if (!error) {
>  		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> +		security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
>  		evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index ec5319ec2e85..6a671616196f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	 const char *name)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
> +	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 0c85f0337a9e..d71d0b08e9fe 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
>  			   struct posix_acl *kacl);
> +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> +				 struct posix_acl *kacl);
>  int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
>  int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> @@ -913,6 +915,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
> +					       const char *acl_name,
> +					       struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{ }
> +
>  static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  					 struct dentry *dentry,
>  					 const char *acl_name)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
> + * @dentry: file
> + * @acl_name: acl name
> + * @kacl: acl struct
> + *
> + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
> + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
> + */
> +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> +				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> +		return;
> +	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
>   * @idmap: idmap of the mount
Paul Moore Nov. 16, 2023, 4:33 a.m. UTC | #2
On Nov  7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
> 
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the inode_post_set_acl hook.
> 
> At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
> POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
> 
> Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
> change.
> 
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> reverted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  fs/posix_acl.c                |  1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
>  include/linux/security.h      |  7 +++++++
>  security/security.c           | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

...

> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
> + * @dentry: file
> + * @acl_name: acl name
> + * @kacl: acl struct
> + *
> + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
> + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
> + */
> +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> +				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> +		return;

Another case where the existing evm_inode_post_set_acl() hook doesn't
check S_PRIVATE but this hook does.

> +	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
>   * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> -- 
> 2.34.1

--
paul-moore.com
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index a05fe94970ce..58e3c1e2fbbc 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@  int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		error = -EIO;
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+		security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 		evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 	}
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec5319ec2e85..6a671616196f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
+	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0c85f0337a9e..d71d0b08e9fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -372,6 +372,8 @@  int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 			   struct posix_acl *kacl);
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl);
 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -913,6 +915,11 @@  static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
+					       const char *acl_name,
+					       struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 					 struct dentry *dentry,
 					 const char *acl_name)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ca650c285fd9..d2dbea54a63a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@  int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount