diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5ede1bf55f9a..80590b99399a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2004,22 +2004,6 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
 	return av;
 }
 
-/*
- * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
- * open permission.
- */
-static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
-{
-	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
-	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
-	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
-		av |= FILE__OPEN;
-
-	return av;
-}
-
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
@@ -3198,7 +3182,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
-	__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, av, requested;
+	u16 sclass;
+	int rc;
 
 	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
@@ -3212,13 +3202,41 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
-	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
-	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
-	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
-		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+	/*
+	 * The following is an inlined version of dentry_has_perm()->
+	 * inode_has_perm()->cred_tsid_has_perm() in order to specialize
+	 * the requested permissions based on the open_perms policycap
+	 * value in each namespace.
+	 */
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+	isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+	tsid = isec->sid;
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	av = FILE__WRITE;
+
+	do {
+		tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+		ssid = tsec->sid;
+		state = tsec->state;
+		requested = av;
+
+		if (selinux_policycap_openperm(state) &&
+			inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
+			(ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
+			!(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
+			requested |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(state, ssid, tsid, sclass, requested, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		cred = tsec->parent_cred;
+	} while (cred);
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
@@ -4038,11 +4056,17 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
 
 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, av, requested;
+	u16 sclass;
+	int rc;
 
-	fsec = selinux_file(file);
-	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
 	/*
 	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
 	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@@ -4060,7 +4084,38 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+	/*
+	 * The following is an inlined version of file_path_has_perm()->
+	 * inode_has_perm()->cred_tsid_has_perm() in order to specialize
+	 * the requested permissions based on the open_perms policycap
+	 * value in each namespace.
+	 */
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+	cred = file->f_cred;
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+	tsid = isec->sid;
+	sclass = isec->sclass;
+	av = file_to_av(file);
+
+	do {
+		tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+		ssid = tsec->sid;
+		state = tsec->state;
+		requested = av;
+
+		if (selinux_policycap_openperm(state) &&
+			inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+			requested |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(state, ssid, tsid, sclass, requested, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		cred = tsec->parent_cred;
+	} while (cred);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index adba67b074e4..4b2ebe31467b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -215,10 +215,9 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
 		current_selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]);
 }
 
-static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return READ_ONCE(
-		current_selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
+	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
