@@ -277,12 +277,11 @@ static int fd_do_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct file *fd,
else
ret = vfs_iter_read(fd, &iter, &pos);
- kfree(bvec);
-
if (is_write) {
if (ret < 0 || ret != data_length) {
pr_err("%s() write returned %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return (ret < 0 ? ret : -EINVAL);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else {
/*
@@ -295,17 +294,27 @@ static int fd_do_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct file *fd,
pr_err("%s() returned %d, expecting %u for "
"S_ISBLK\n", __func__, ret,
data_length);
- return (ret < 0 ? ret : -EINVAL);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("%s() returned %d for non S_ISBLK\n",
__func__, ret);
- return ret;
+ } else if (ret != data_length) {
+ /*
+ * Short read case:
+ * Probably some one truncate file under us.
+ * We must explicitly zero sg-pages to prevent
+ * expose uninizialized pages to userspace.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(ret > data_length);
+ ret += iov_iter_zero(data_length - ret, &iter);
}
}
}
- return 1;
+ kfree(bvec);
+ return ret;
}
static sense_reason_t
If we failed to read data from backing file (probably because some one truncate file under us), we must zerofill cmd's data, otherwise it will be returned as is. Most likely cmd's data are unitialized pages from page cache. This result in information leak. testcase: https://github.com/dmonakhov/xfstests/commit/e11a1b7b907ca67b1be51a1594025600767366d5 Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org> --- drivers/target/target_core_file.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)