Message ID | 1455792823-29003-1-git-send-email-czuzu@bitdefender.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On 02/18/2016 12:53 PM, Corneliu ZUZU wrote: > This minor patch adds a range-check to avoid left-shift caused undefined > behavior. Also replaces '1 <<' w/ '1U <<' @ x86 monitor.h in an effort to avoid > a future potential '1 << 31' that would cause a similar issue. > > Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@bitdefender.com> > --- > xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++---- > xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 10 +++++----- > 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > index a507edb..b4bd008 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c > @@ -32,10 +32,15 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d, > { > case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG: > { > - unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask = > - monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index); > - bool_t old_status = > - !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask); > + unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask; > + bool_t old_status; > + > + /* sanity check: avoid left-shift undefined behavior */ > + if ( unlikely(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index > 31) ) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + ctrlreg_bitmask = monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index); > + old_status = !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask); > > if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) ) > return -EEXIST; > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h > index c789f71..f1bf4bd 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h > @@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ static inline uint32_t arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d) > if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cpu_has_vmx ) > return capabilities; > > - capabilities = (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) | > - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) | > - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) | > - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST); > + capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) | > + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) | > + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) | > + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST); > > /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */ > if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() ) > - capabilities |= (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP); > + capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP); > > return capabilities; > } Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c index a507edb..b4bd008 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c @@ -32,10 +32,15 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d, { case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG: { - unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask = - monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index); - bool_t old_status = - !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask); + unsigned int ctrlreg_bitmask; + bool_t old_status; + + /* sanity check: avoid left-shift undefined behavior */ + if ( unlikely(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index > 31) ) + return -EINVAL; + + ctrlreg_bitmask = monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(mop->u.mov_to_cr.index); + old_status = !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask); if ( unlikely(old_status == requested_status) ) return -EEXIST; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h index c789f71..f1bf4bd 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h @@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ static inline uint32_t arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d) if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cpu_has_vmx ) return capabilities; - capabilities = (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) | - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) | - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) | - (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST); + capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) | + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) | + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) | + (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST); /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */ if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() ) - capabilities |= (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP); + capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP); return capabilities; }
This minor patch adds a range-check to avoid left-shift caused undefined behavior. Also replaces '1 <<' w/ '1U <<' @ x86 monitor.h in an effort to avoid a future potential '1 << 31' that would cause a similar issue. Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@bitdefender.com> --- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++---- xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)