From patchwork Tue Jan 24 15:27:09 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 9535417 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DFA56042D for ; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:30:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FB392818E for ; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:30:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 846D3281B7; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:30:08 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 083D2281A7 for ; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:30:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cW30R-0000aF-PG; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:27:35 +0000 Received: from mail6.bemta5.messagelabs.com ([195.245.231.135]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cW30Q-0000Zj-Nx for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:27:34 +0000 Received: from [85.158.139.211] by server-6.bemta-5.messagelabs.com id 5A/41-15802-66277885; Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:27:34 +0000 X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFprAIsWRWlGSWpSXmKPExsXitHRDpG5SUXu EwZ/V3Bbft0xmcmD0OPzhCksAYxRrZl5SfkUCa8anKRtZC27PZaz4ceEtSwPjqZouRk4OCQF/ iWUzvzGB2GwCOhJTn15i7WLk4BARUJG4vdcAJMwsECIx8eQEVhBbWMBXYs6jdWA2i4CqxNVNW 9lAbF4BN4lvMy+yQYyUkzh//CcziM0p4C7xvOEHI4gtBFTTPamXHcJWkVg/dRZUr6DEyZlPWC B2SUgcfPGCeQIj7ywkqVlIUgsYmVYxqhenFpWlFuka6yUVZaZnlOQmZuboGhqY6uWmFhcnpqf mJCYV6yXn525iBIYOAxDsYNz7z+kQoyQHk5Io7yPz9gghvqT8lMqMxOKM+KLSnNTiQ4wyHBxK EryrCoFygkWp6akVaZk5wCCGSUtw8CiJ8P4rAErzFhck5hZnpkOkTjHqcpy6cfolkxBLXn5eq pQ4bxHIDAGQoozSPLgRsIi6xCgrJczLCHSUEE9BalFuZgmq/CtGcQ5GJWHeZJApPJl5JXCbXg EdwQR0xAVmsCNKEhFSUg2MRfcXxeqpP5kq2nWsvX5CmiXjq/CzTQucg4KjOJvZn29o4QqYtGr NjIb1k2fn6NzxClHKcnQ9mJkSvW/zR5Mt+uyr3sqf/Xf6oqrRqcg4ySYn1ydMrCWKZ/jXv57D OuNX831OOYWqI7uVK/ceuiNVz9EWpVYmdX2NQHzOniNSXJpf9a9bSC9SYinOSDTUYi4qTgQAz Tf6L6MCAAA= X-Env-Sender: prvs=19091db4e=Paul.Durrant@citrix.com X-Msg-Ref: server-10.tower-206.messagelabs.com!1485271648!64387474!1 X-Originating-IP: [66.165.176.89] X-SpamReason: No, hits=0.0 required=7.0 tests=sa_preprocessor: VHJ1c3RlZCBJUDogNjYuMTY1LjE3Ni44OSA9PiAyMDMwMDc=\n, received_headers: No Received headers X-StarScan-Received: X-StarScan-Version: 9.1.1; banners=-,-,- X-VirusChecked: Checked Received: (qmail 61241 invoked from network); 24 Jan 2017 15:27:29 -0000 Received: from smtp.citrix.com (HELO SMTP.CITRIX.COM) (66.165.176.89) by server-10.tower-206.messagelabs.com with RC4-SHA encrypted SMTP; 24 Jan 2017 15:27:29 -0000 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.33,278,1477958400"; d="scan'208";a="401657890" From: Paul Durrant To: Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:27:09 +0000 Message-ID: <1485271630-1860-8-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.4 In-Reply-To: <1485271630-1860-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com> References: <1485271630-1860-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Cc: Paul Durrant , Ian Jackson Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v8 7/8] dm_op: convert HVMOP_inject_trap and HVMOP_inject_msi X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xen.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP NOTE: This patch also modifies the types of the 'vector', 'type' and 'insn_len' arguments of xc_hvm_inject_trap() from uint32_t to uint8_t. In practice the values passed were always truncated to 8 bits. Suggested-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Wei Liu Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper --- Cc: Ian Jackson v8: - Add CHECK macros. v7: - Fix libxc code broken in v6. v6: - s/trap/event as requested by Andy (and adjust struct hvm_vcpu accordingly). v3: - Fixed prefixing and padding. v2: - Addressed several comments from Jan. --- tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 2 +- tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 4 +- tools/libxc/xc_misc.c | 64 ++++++++++------------------ xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 84 ++----------------------------------- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h | 2 +- xen/include/public/hvm/dm_op.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 45 -------------------- xen/include/xlat.lst | 2 + xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 6 --- xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 --- xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 - xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 --- xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 5 +-- 14 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 193 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if index 092a6c5..45e5cea 100644 --- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ define(`device_model', ` allow $1 $2_target:domain { getdomaininfo shutdown }; allow $1 $2_target:mmu { map_read map_write adjust physmap target_hack }; - allow $1 $2_target:hvm { getparam setparam hvmctl cacheattr send_irq dm }; + allow $1 $2_target:hvm { getparam setparam hvmctl cacheattr dm }; ') # make_device_model(priv, dm_dom, hvm_dom) diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h index 6648679..aba69c4 100644 --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h @@ -1641,8 +1641,8 @@ int xc_hvm_set_mem_type( * resumes. */ int xc_hvm_inject_trap( - xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, int vcpu, uint32_t vector, - uint32_t type, uint32_t error_code, uint32_t insn_len, + xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, int vcpu, uint8_t vector, + uint8_t type, uint32_t error_code, uint8_t insn_len, uint64_t cr2); /* diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c b/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c index 5b06d6b..0fc6c22 100644 --- a/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c @@ -527,29 +527,20 @@ int xc_hvm_set_pci_link_route( } int xc_hvm_inject_msi( - xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, uint64_t addr, uint32_t data) + xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, uint64_t msi_addr, uint32_t msi_data) { - DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(struct xen_hvm_inject_msi, arg); - int rc; - - arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(xch, arg, sizeof(*arg)); - if ( arg == NULL ) - { - PERROR("Could not allocate memory for xc_hvm_inject_msi hypercall"); - return -1; - } + struct xen_dm_op op; + struct xen_dm_op_inject_msi *data; - arg->domid = dom; - arg->addr = addr; - arg->data = data; + memset(&op, 0, sizeof(op)); - rc = xencall2(xch->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, - HVMOP_inject_msi, - HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg)); + op.op = XEN_DMOP_inject_msi; + data = &op.u.inject_msi; - xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xch, arg); + data->addr = msi_addr; + data->data = msi_data; - return rc; + return do_dm_op(xch, dom, 1, &op, sizeof(op)); } int xc_hvm_track_dirty_vram( @@ -608,35 +599,26 @@ int xc_hvm_set_mem_type( } int xc_hvm_inject_trap( - xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, int vcpu, uint32_t vector, - uint32_t type, uint32_t error_code, uint32_t insn_len, + xc_interface *xch, domid_t dom, int vcpu, uint8_t vector, + uint8_t type, uint32_t error_code, uint8_t insn_len, uint64_t cr2) { - DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(struct xen_hvm_inject_trap, arg); - int rc; - - arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(xch, arg, sizeof(*arg)); - if ( arg == NULL ) - { - PERROR("Could not allocate memory for xc_hvm_inject_trap hypercall"); - return -1; - } + struct xen_dm_op op; + struct xen_dm_op_inject_event *data; - arg->domid = dom; - arg->vcpuid = vcpu; - arg->vector = vector; - arg->type = type; - arg->error_code = error_code; - arg->insn_len = insn_len; - arg->cr2 = cr2; + memset(&op, 0, sizeof(op)); - rc = xencall2(xch->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, - HVMOP_inject_trap, - HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg)); + op.op = XEN_DMOP_inject_event; + data = &op.u.inject_event; - xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xch, arg); + data->vcpuid = vcpu; + data->vector = vector; + data->type = type; + data->error_code = error_code; + data->insn_len = insn_len; + data->cr2 = cr2; - return rc; + return do_dm_op(xch, dom, 1, &op, sizeof(op)); } int xc_livepatch_upload(xc_interface *xch, diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c index 1fdee0a..b86e0d9 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c @@ -247,6 +247,26 @@ static int set_mem_type(struct domain *d, return rc; } +static int inject_event(struct domain *d, + const struct xen_dm_op_inject_event *data) +{ + struct vcpu *v; + + if ( data->vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || !(v = d->vcpu[data->vcpuid]) ) + return -EINVAL; + + if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.vector != -1 ) + return -EBUSY; + + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.type = data->type; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.insn_len = data->insn_len; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.error_code = data->error_code; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.cr2 = data->cr2; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.vector = data->vector; + + return 0; +} + static int dm_op(domid_t domid, unsigned int nr_bufs, xen_dm_op_buf_t bufs[]) @@ -443,6 +463,31 @@ static int dm_op(domid_t domid, break; } + case XEN_DMOP_inject_event: + { + const struct xen_dm_op_inject_event *data = + &op.u.inject_event; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if ( data->pad0 || data->pad1 ) + break; + + rc = inject_event(d, data); + break; + } + case XEN_DMOP_inject_msi: + { + const struct xen_dm_op_inject_msi *data = + &op.u.inject_msi; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if ( data->pad ) + break; + + rc = hvm_inject_msi(d, data->addr, data->data); + break; + } + default: rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; break; @@ -470,6 +515,8 @@ CHECK_dm_op_set_isa_irq_level; CHECK_dm_op_set_pci_link_route; CHECK_dm_op_modified_memory; CHECK_dm_op_set_mem_type; +CHECK_dm_op_inject_event; +CHECK_dm_op_inject_msi; #define MAX_NR_BUFS 2 diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 5d47923..dc8af05 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -539,12 +539,12 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v) } /* Inject pending hw/sw trap */ - if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 ) + if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.vector != -1 ) { if ( !hvm_event_pending(v) ) - hvm_inject_event(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap); + hvm_inject_event(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event); - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector = -1; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.vector = -1; } if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) && v->arch.monitor.next_interrupt_enabled ) @@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ int hvm_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v) (void(*)(unsigned long))hvm_assert_evtchn_irq, (unsigned long)v); - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector = -1; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_event.vector = -1; if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) { @@ -4188,35 +4188,6 @@ static void hvm_s3_resume(struct domain *d) } } -static int hvmop_inject_msi( - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_hvm_inject_msi_t) uop) -{ - struct xen_hvm_inject_msi op; - struct domain *d; - int rc; - - if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) ) - return -EFAULT; - - rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(op.domid, &d); - if ( rc != 0 ) - return rc; - - rc = -EINVAL; - if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) ) - goto out; - - rc = xsm_hvm_inject_msi(XSM_DM_PRIV, d); - if ( rc ) - goto out; - - rc = hvm_inject_msi(d, op.addr, op.data); - - out: - rcu_unlock_domain(d); - return rc; -} - static int hvmop_flush_tlb_all(void) { struct domain *d = current->domain; @@ -4867,11 +4838,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) guest_handle_cast(arg, xen_hvm_param_t)); break; - case HVMOP_inject_msi: - rc = hvmop_inject_msi( - guest_handle_cast(arg, xen_hvm_inject_msi_t)); - break; - case HVMOP_flush_tlbs: rc = guest_handle_is_null(arg) ? hvmop_flush_tlb_all() : -EINVAL; break; @@ -4928,48 +4894,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) break; } - case HVMOP_inject_trap: - { - xen_hvm_inject_trap_t tr; - struct domain *d; - struct vcpu *v; - - if ( copy_from_guest(&tr, arg, 1 ) ) - return -EFAULT; - - rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(tr.domid, &d); - if ( rc != 0 ) - return rc; - - rc = -EINVAL; - if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) ) - goto injtrap_fail; - - rc = xsm_hvm_control(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, op); - if ( rc ) - goto injtrap_fail; - - rc = -ENOENT; - if ( tr.vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[tr.vcpuid]) == NULL ) - goto injtrap_fail; - - if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector != -1 ) - rc = -EBUSY; - else - { - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.vector = tr.vector; - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.type = tr.type; - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.error_code = tr.error_code; - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.insn_len = tr.insn_len; - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.inject_trap.cr2 = tr.cr2; - rc = 0; - } - - injtrap_fail: - rcu_unlock_domain(d); - break; - } - case HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event: if ( guest_handle_is_null(arg) ) monitor_guest_request(); diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h index 17ab9c0..e5eeb5f 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ struct hvm_vcpu { void *fpu_exception_callback_arg; /* Pending hw/sw interrupt (.vector = -1 means nothing pending). */ - struct x86_event inject_trap; + struct x86_event inject_event; struct viridian_vcpu viridian; }; diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/dm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/dm_op.h index 06c67b8..f54cece 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/dm_op.h +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/dm_op.h @@ -272,6 +272,52 @@ struct xen_dm_op_set_mem_type { uint64_aligned_t first_pfn; }; +/* + * XEN_DMOP_inject_event: Inject an event into a VCPU, which will + * get taken up when it is next scheduled. + * + * Note that the caller should know enough of the state of the CPU before + * injecting, to know what the effect of injecting the event will be. + */ +#define XEN_DMOP_inject_event 13 + +struct xen_dm_op_inject_event { + /* IN - index of vCPU */ + uint32_t vcpuid; + /* IN - interrupt vector */ + uint8_t vector; + /* IN - event type (DMOP_EVENT_* ) */ + uint8_t type; +/* NB. This enumeration precisely matches hvm.h:X86_EVENTTYPE_* */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_ext_int 0 /* external interrupt */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_nmi 2 /* nmi */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_hw_exc 3 /* hardware exception */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_sw_int 4 /* software interrupt (CD nn) */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_pri_sw_exc 5 /* ICEBP (F1) */ +# define XEN_DMOP_EVENT_sw_exc 6 /* INT3 (CC), INTO (CE) */ + /* IN - instruction length */ + uint8_t insn_len; + uint8_t pad0; + /* IN - error code (or ~0 to skip) */ + uint32_t error_code; + uint32_t pad1; + /* IN - CR2 for page faults */ + uint64_aligned_t cr2; +}; + +/* + * XEN_DMOP_inject_msi: Inject an MSI for an emulated device. + */ +#define XEN_DMOP_inject_msi 14 + +struct xen_dm_op_inject_msi { + /* IN - MSI data (lower 32 bits) */ + uint32_t data; + uint32_t pad; + /* IN - MSI address (0xfeexxxxx) */ + uint64_aligned_t addr; +}; + struct xen_dm_op { uint32_t op; uint32_t pad; @@ -288,6 +334,8 @@ struct xen_dm_op { struct xen_dm_op_set_pci_link_route set_pci_link_route; struct xen_dm_op_modified_memory modified_memory; struct xen_dm_op_set_mem_type set_mem_type; + struct xen_dm_op_inject_event inject_event; + struct xen_dm_op_inject_msi inject_msi; } u; }; diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h index d7e2f12..bc00ef0 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h @@ -133,38 +133,6 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_xentrace_t); /* Deprecated by XENMEM_access_op_get_access */ #define HVMOP_get_mem_access 13 -#define HVMOP_inject_trap 14 -/* Inject a trap into a VCPU, which will get taken up on the next - * scheduling of it. Note that the caller should know enough of the - * state of the CPU before injecting, to know what the effect of - * injecting the trap will be. - */ -struct xen_hvm_inject_trap { - /* Domain to be queried. */ - domid_t domid; - /* VCPU */ - uint32_t vcpuid; - /* Vector number */ - uint32_t vector; - /* Trap type (HVMOP_TRAP_*) */ - uint32_t type; -/* NB. This enumeration precisely matches hvm.h:X86_EVENTTYPE_* */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_ext_int 0 /* external interrupt */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_nmi 2 /* nmi */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_hw_exc 3 /* hardware exception */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_sw_int 4 /* software interrupt (CD nn) */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_pri_sw_exc 5 /* ICEBP (F1) */ -# define HVMOP_TRAP_sw_exc 6 /* INT3 (CC), INTO (CE) */ - /* Error code, or ~0u to skip */ - uint32_t error_code; - /* Intruction length */ - uint32_t insn_len; - /* CR2 for page faults */ - uint64_aligned_t cr2; -}; -typedef struct xen_hvm_inject_trap xen_hvm_inject_trap_t; -DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_inject_trap_t); - #endif /* defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) */ #define HVMOP_get_mem_type 15 @@ -184,19 +152,6 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_get_mem_type_t); /* Following tools-only interfaces may change in future. */ #if defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) -/* MSI injection for emulated devices */ -#define HVMOP_inject_msi 16 -struct xen_hvm_inject_msi { - /* Domain to be injected */ - domid_t domid; - /* Data -- lower 32 bits */ - uint32_t data; - /* Address (0xfeexxxxx) */ - uint64_t addr; -}; -typedef struct xen_hvm_inject_msi xen_hvm_inject_msi_t; -DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_inject_msi_t); - /* * Definitions relating to DMOP_create_ioreq_server. (Defined here for * backwards compatibility). diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst index 158d4f0..0f17000 100644 --- a/xen/include/xlat.lst +++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ ? dm_op_create_ioreq_server hvm/dm_op.h ? dm_op_destroy_ioreq_server hvm/dm_op.h ? dm_op_get_ioreq_server_info hvm/dm_op.h +? dm_op_inject_event hvm/dm_op.h +? dm_op_inject_msi hvm/dm_op.h ? dm_op_ioreq_server_range hvm/dm_op.h ? dm_op_modified_memory hvm/dm_op.h ? dm_op_set_ioreq_server_state hvm/dm_op.h diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index d3de4b7..4b27ae7 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -610,12 +610,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_shadow_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint3 return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); } -static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_inject_msi(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) -{ - XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV); - return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); -} - static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_sharing_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op) { XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV); diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index 2e4a3ce..2cf7ac1 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ struct xsm_operations { #ifdef CONFIG_X86 int (*do_mca) (void); int (*shadow_control) (struct domain *d, uint32_t op); - int (*hvm_inject_msi) (struct domain *d); int (*mem_sharing_op) (struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op); int (*apic) (struct domain *d, int cmd); int (*memtype) (uint32_t access); @@ -632,11 +631,6 @@ static inline int xsm_shadow_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint3 return xsm_ops->shadow_control(d, op); } -static inline int xsm_hvm_inject_msi (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) -{ - return xsm_ops->hvm_inject_msi(d); -} - static inline int xsm_mem_sharing_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op) { return xsm_ops->mem_sharing_op(d, cd, op); diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c index f1568dd..1f659c7 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c +++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c @@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ void __init xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops) #ifdef CONFIG_X86 set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, do_mca); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shadow_control); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_inject_msi); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_sharing_op); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, apic); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, machine_memory_map); diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 685cbfa..9332ca1 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -1502,11 +1502,6 @@ static int flask_ioport_mapping(struct domain *d, uint32_t start, uint32_t end, return flask_ioport_permission(d, start, end, access); } -static int flask_hvm_inject_msi(struct domain *d) -{ - return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__SEND_IRQ); -} - static int flask_mem_sharing_op(struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op) { int rc = current_has_perm(cd, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING); @@ -1784,7 +1779,6 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = { .hvm_set_pci_intx_level = flask_hvm_set_pci_intx_level, .hvm_set_isa_irq_level = flask_hvm_set_isa_irq_level, .hvm_set_pci_link_route = flask_hvm_set_pci_link_route, - .hvm_inject_msi = flask_hvm_inject_msi, .mem_sharing_op = flask_mem_sharing_op, .apic = flask_apic, .machine_memory_map = flask_machine_memory_map, diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors index 381f659..36a7df9 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors @@ -263,8 +263,7 @@ class hvm # XEN_DOMCTL_pin_mem_cacheattr cacheattr # HVMOP_get_mem_type, -# HVMOP_set_mem_access, HVMOP_get_mem_access, HVMOP_pagetable_dying, -# HVMOP_inject_trap +# HVMOP_set_mem_access, HVMOP_get_mem_access, HVMOP_pagetable_dying hvmctl # XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op and XENMEM_sharing_op_{share,add_physmap} with: # source = the domain making the hypercall @@ -272,8 +271,6 @@ class hvm mem_sharing # XEN_DOMCTL_audit_p2m audit_p2m -# HVMOP_inject_msi - send_irq # checked in XENMEM_sharing_op_{share,add_physmap} with: # source = domain whose memory is being shared # target = client domain