Message ID | 1488975001-20431-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
>>> On 08.03.17 at 13:10, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote: > v{,u}comis{s,d}, and vcvt{,t}s{s,d}2si are two-operand instructions, while > vzero{all,upper} take no operands, so require vex.reg set to ~0 to avoid > #UD. > > Spotted while fuzzing with AFL > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
On 08/03/17 13:02, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 08.03.17 at 13:10, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote: >> v{,u}comis{s,d}, and vcvt{,t}s{s,d}2si are two-operand instructions, while >> vzero{all,upper} take no operands, so require vex.reg set to ~0 to avoid >> #UD. >> >> Spotted while fuzzing with AFL >> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> > Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > > Thanks, I took this opportunity to test the stub recovery from the point of view of a malicious guest. (XEN) d2v0 exception 6 (ec=0000) in emulation stub (line 6239) (XEN) d2v0 stub: c4 e1 44 77 c3 80 d0 82 ff ff ff d1 90 ec 90 It is good to see that such a bug won't even been a security issue in Xen 4.9! One observation however. It would probably be safer to poison the stub with 0xcc each time (especially if we have a path which omits the ret), instead of leaving partial instructions in place. ~Andrew
>>> On 08.03.17 at 14:24, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote: > One observation however. It would probably be safer to poison the stub > with 0xcc each time (especially if we have a path which omits the ret), > instead of leaving partial instructions in place. I too have been considering this. Jan
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c index e09975c..8134e76 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c @@ -5620,7 +5620,7 @@ x86_emulate( { if ( ctxt->vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) vex.l = 0; - generate_exception_if(vex.l, EXC_UD); + generate_exception_if(vex.l || vex.reg != 0xf, EXC_UD); host_and_vcpu_must_have(avx); get_fpu(X86EMUL_FPU_ymm, &fic); } @@ -5673,6 +5673,7 @@ x86_emulate( } else { + generate_exception_if(vex.reg != 0xf, EXC_UD); host_and_vcpu_must_have(avx); get_fpu(X86EMUL_FPU_ymm, &fic); } @@ -6273,6 +6274,7 @@ x86_emulate( case X86EMUL_OPC_VEX(0x0f, 0x77): /* vzero{all,upper} */ if ( vex.opcx != vex_none ) { + generate_exception_if(vex.reg != 0xf, EXC_UD); host_and_vcpu_must_have(avx); get_fpu(X86EMUL_FPU_ymm, &fic); }
v{,u}comis{s,d}, and vcvt{,t}s{s,d}2si are two-operand instructions, while vzero{all,upper} take no operands, so require vex.reg set to ~0 to avoid #UD. Spotted while fuzzing with AFL Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> --- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)