| Message ID | 20170322180733.14102-1-tamas.lengyel@zentific.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 12:07:33PM -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > Currently setting altp2mhvm=1 in the domain configuration allows access to the > altp2m interface for both in-guest and external privileged tools. This poses > a problem for use-cases where only external access should be allowed, requiring > the user to compile Xen with XSM enabled to be able to appropriately restrict > access. > > In this patch we deprecate the altp2mhvm domain configuration option and > introduce the altp2m option, which allows specifying if by default the altp2m > interface should be external-only. The information is stored in > HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M which we now define with specific XEN_ALTP2M_* modes. > If external mode is selected, the XSM check is shifted to use XSM_DM_PRIV > type check, thus restricting access to the interface by the guest itself. Note > that we keep the default XSM policy untouched. Users of XSM who wish to enforce > external mode for altp2m can do so by adjusting their XSM policy directly, > as this domain config option does not override an active XSM policy. > > Also, as part of this patch we adjust the hvmop handler to require > HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M to be of a type other then disabled for all ops. This has been > previously only required for get/set altp2m domain state, all other options > were gated on altp2m_enabled. Since altp2m_enabled only gets set during set > altp2m domain state, this change introduces no new requirements to the other > ops but makes it more clear that it is required for all ops. > > Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> > Signed-off-by: Sergej Proskurin <proskurin@sec.in.tum.de> > --- > Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> > Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> > Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> > > v4: Take patch out of ARM altp2m series. No hypervisor-side changes > other then not touching ARM code anymore. Toolstack side introduces the > altp2m config field such that it will require minimal churn once > ARM altp2m is added. > > v5: Add "limited" mode where the guest only has access to enable/disable > VMFUNC and #VE features. > --- > docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 6 ++++-- > tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 18 +++++++++++++++-- > tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 14 ++++++++++++++ > tools/xl/xl_parse.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++- Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
On 03/22/2017 02:07 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > Currently setting altp2mhvm=1 in the domain configuration allows access to the > altp2m interface for both in-guest and external privileged tools. This poses > a problem for use-cases where only external access should be allowed, requiring > the user to compile Xen with XSM enabled to be able to appropriately restrict > access. > > In this patch we deprecate the altp2mhvm domain configuration option and > introduce the altp2m option, which allows specifying if by default the altp2m > interface should be external-only. The information is stored in > HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M which we now define with specific XEN_ALTP2M_* modes. > If external mode is selected, the XSM check is shifted to use XSM_DM_PRIV > type check, thus restricting access to the interface by the guest itself. Note > that we keep the default XSM policy untouched. Users of XSM who wish to enforce > external mode for altp2m can do so by adjusting their XSM policy directly, > as this domain config option does not override an active XSM policy. > > Also, as part of this patch we adjust the hvmop handler to require > HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M to be of a type other then disabled for all ops. This has been > previously only required for get/set altp2m domain state, all other options > were gated on altp2m_enabled. Since altp2m_enabled only gets set during set > altp2m domain state, this change introduces no new requirements to the other > ops but makes it more clear that it is required for all ops. > > Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> > Signed-off-by: Sergej Proskurin <proskurin@sec.in.tum.de> I think the XSM-enabled case using the default types should have the same flexibility as the XSM-disabled case. I agree that it is useful to be able to restrict the p2m features based on policy, and I don't think that it's useful to expand the number of XSM permissions here. In that case, the best way to proceed would be to require that both the domain configuration and XSM policy must allow the action (similar to how SELinux file controls and UNIX permissions interact). Currently, enabling XSM effectively forces the value of this setting to "mixed", and "limited" is impossible to use with XSM.
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 12:59 PM, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > On 03/22/2017 02:07 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >> >> Currently setting altp2mhvm=1 in the domain configuration allows access to >> the >> altp2m interface for both in-guest and external privileged tools. This >> poses >> a problem for use-cases where only external access should be allowed, >> requiring >> the user to compile Xen with XSM enabled to be able to appropriately >> restrict >> access. >> >> In this patch we deprecate the altp2mhvm domain configuration option and >> introduce the altp2m option, which allows specifying if by default the >> altp2m >> interface should be external-only. The information is stored in >> HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M which we now define with specific XEN_ALTP2M_* modes. >> If external mode is selected, the XSM check is shifted to use XSM_DM_PRIV >> type check, thus restricting access to the interface by the guest itself. >> Note >> that we keep the default XSM policy untouched. Users of XSM who wish to >> enforce >> external mode for altp2m can do so by adjusting their XSM policy directly, >> as this domain config option does not override an active XSM policy. >> >> Also, as part of this patch we adjust the hvmop handler to require >> HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M to be of a type other then disabled for all ops. This has >> been >> previously only required for get/set altp2m domain state, all other >> options >> were gated on altp2m_enabled. Since altp2m_enabled only gets set during >> set >> altp2m domain state, this change introduces no new requirements to the >> other >> ops but makes it more clear that it is required for all ops. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> >> Signed-off-by: Sergej Proskurin <proskurin@sec.in.tum.de> > > > I think the XSM-enabled case using the default types should have the same > flexibility as the XSM-disabled case. I agree that it is useful to be able > to restrict the p2m features based on policy, and I don't think that it's > useful to expand the number of XSM permissions here. In that case, the best > way to proceed would be to require that both the domain configuration and > XSM policy must allow the action (similar to how SELinux file controls and > UNIX permissions interact). Currently, enabling XSM effectively forces the > value of this setting to "mixed", and "limited" is impossible to use with > XSM. I agree, however unfortunately due to the development effort to do that I will have to drop this patch. An earlier version only lacked the toolside ack so I thought it was about ready to go in. Hopefully one day in the future we will have XSM enabled by default and then we won't have to do things like this patch. Tamas
On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 3:24 PM, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 12:59 PM, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> On 03/22/2017 02:07 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >>> >>> Currently setting altp2mhvm=1 in the domain configuration allows access to >>> the >>> altp2m interface for both in-guest and external privileged tools. This >>> poses >>> a problem for use-cases where only external access should be allowed, >>> requiring >>> the user to compile Xen with XSM enabled to be able to appropriately >>> restrict >>> access. >>> >>> In this patch we deprecate the altp2mhvm domain configuration option and >>> introduce the altp2m option, which allows specifying if by default the >>> altp2m >>> interface should be external-only. The information is stored in >>> HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M which we now define with specific XEN_ALTP2M_* modes. >>> If external mode is selected, the XSM check is shifted to use XSM_DM_PRIV >>> type check, thus restricting access to the interface by the guest itself. >>> Note >>> that we keep the default XSM policy untouched. Users of XSM who wish to >>> enforce >>> external mode for altp2m can do so by adjusting their XSM policy directly, >>> as this domain config option does not override an active XSM policy. >>> >>> Also, as part of this patch we adjust the hvmop handler to require >>> HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M to be of a type other then disabled for all ops. This has >>> been >>> previously only required for get/set altp2m domain state, all other >>> options >>> were gated on altp2m_enabled. Since altp2m_enabled only gets set during >>> set >>> altp2m domain state, this change introduces no new requirements to the >>> other >>> ops but makes it more clear that it is required for all ops. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com> >>> Signed-off-by: Sergej Proskurin <proskurin@sec.in.tum.de> >> >> >> I think the XSM-enabled case using the default types should have the same >> flexibility as the XSM-disabled case. I agree that it is useful to be able >> to restrict the p2m features based on policy, and I don't think that it's >> useful to expand the number of XSM permissions here. In that case, the best >> way to proceed would be to require that both the domain configuration and >> XSM policy must allow the action (similar to how SELinux file controls and >> UNIX permissions interact). Currently, enabling XSM effectively forces the >> value of this setting to "mixed", and "limited" is impossible to use with >> XSM. > > I agree, however unfortunately due to the development effort to do > that I will have to drop this patch. An earlier version only lacked > the toolside ack so I thought it was about ready to go in. Hopefully > one day in the future we will have XSM enabled by default and then we > won't have to do things like this patch. > Daniel pointed out off-list that this can actually be achieved with a minor adjustment in the flask function. I'll send v6 shortly. Tamas
diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in index 52802d5d60..5349c642ba 100644 --- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in +++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in @@ -1283,6 +1283,43 @@ enabled by default and you should usually omit it. It may be necessary to disable the HPET in order to improve compatibility with guest Operating Systems (X86 only) +=item B<altp2m=MODE> + +Specifies access mode to the alternate-p2m capability. Alternate-p2m allows a +guest to manage multiple p2m guest physical "memory views" (as opposed to a +single p2m). This option is disabled by default and is available to x86 hvm +domains. You may want this option if you want to access-control/isolate +access to specific guest physical memory pages accessed by the guest, e.g. for +domain memory introspection or for isolation/access-control of memory between +components within a single guest domain. + +The valid values are as follows: + +=over 4 + +=item B<"disabled"> + +Altp2m is disabled for the domain (default). + +=item B<"mixed"> + +The mixed mode allows access to the altp2m interface for both in-guest +and external tools as well. + +=item B<"external"> + +Enables access to the alternate-p2m capability for hvm guests only +by external privileged tools. Note: When XSM is enabled the XSM policy +overrides this option. + +=item B<"limited"> + +Enables limited access to the alternate-p2m capability for hvm guests only, +ie. giving the guest access only to enable/disable the VMFUNC and #VE features. +Note: When XSM is enabled the XSM policy overrides this option. + +=back + =item B<altp2mhvm=BOOLEAN> Enables or disables hvm guest access to alternate-p2m capability. @@ -1293,7 +1330,11 @@ You may want this option if you want to access-control/isolate access to specific guest physical memory pages accessed by the guest, e.g. for HVM domain memory introspection or for isolation/access-control of memory between components within -a single guest hvm domain. +a single guest hvm domain. This option is deprecated, use the option +"altp2m" instead. + +Note: While the option "altp2mhvm" is deprecated, legacy applications for +x86 systems will continue to work using it. =item B<nestedhvm=BOOLEAN> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c index 25389e13f8..327f427b5e 100644 --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c @@ -899,14 +899,16 @@ static void initiate_domain_create(libxl__egc *egc, if (d_config->c_info.type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM && (libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.u.hvm.nested_hvm) && - libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.u.hvm.altp2m))) { + (libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.u.hvm.altp2m) || + (d_config->b_info.altp2m != LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_DISABLED)))) { ret = ERROR_INVAL; LOGD(ERROR, domid, "nestedhvm and altp2mhvm cannot be used together"); goto error_out; } if (d_config->c_info.type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM && - libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.u.hvm.altp2m) && + (libxl_defbool_val(d_config->b_info.u.hvm.altp2m) || + (d_config->b_info.altp2m != LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_DISABLED)) && pod_enabled) { ret = ERROR_INVAL; LOGD(ERROR, domid, "Cannot enable PoD and ALTP2M at the same time"); diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c index e133962db3..464c0067e0 100644 --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c @@ -291,8 +291,6 @@ static void hvm_set_conf_params(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid, libxl_defbool_val(info->u.hvm.vpt_align)); xc_hvm_param_set(handle, domid, HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM, libxl_defbool_val(info->u.hvm.nested_hvm)); - xc_hvm_param_set(handle, domid, HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M, - libxl_defbool_val(info->u.hvm.altp2m)); } int libxl__build_pre(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, @@ -441,6 +439,22 @@ int libxl__build_pre(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, #endif } + /* Alternate p2m support on x86 is available only for HVM guests. */ + if (info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) { + /* The config parameter "altp2m" replaces the parameter "altp2mhvm". For + * legacy reasons, both parameters are accepted on x86 HVM guests. + * + * If the legacy field info->u.hvm.altp2m is set, activate altp2m. + * Otherwise set altp2m based on the field info->altp2m. */ + if (info->altp2m == LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_DISABLED && + libxl_defbool_val(info->u.hvm.altp2m)) + xc_hvm_param_set(ctx->xch, domid, HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M, + libxl_defbool_val(info->u.hvm.altp2m)); + else + xc_hvm_param_set(ctx->xch, domid, HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M, + info->altp2m); + } + rc = libxl__arch_domain_create(gc, d_config, domid); return rc; diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl index 2475a4df8d..e745ae7367 100644 --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl @@ -440,6 +440,14 @@ libxl_rdm_reserve = Struct("rdm_reserve", [ ("policy", libxl_rdm_reserve_policy), ]) +# Consistent with the values defined for HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M +libxl_altp2m_mode = Enumeration("altp2m_mode", [ + (0, "disabled"), + (1, "mixed"), + (2, "external"), + (3, "limited"), + ], init_val = "LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_DISABLED") + libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[ ("max_vcpus", integer), ("avail_vcpus", libxl_bitmap), @@ -517,6 +525,9 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[ ("mmio_hole_memkb", MemKB), ("timer_mode", libxl_timer_mode), ("nested_hvm", libxl_defbool), + # The u.hvm.altp2m field is used solely + # for x86 HVM guests and is maintained + # for legacy purposes. ("altp2m", libxl_defbool), ("system_firmware", string), ("smbios_firmware", string), @@ -567,6 +578,9 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain_build_info",[ ("arch_arm", Struct(None, [("gic_version", libxl_gic_version), ])), + # Alternate p2m is not bound to any architecture or guest type, as it is + # supported by x86 HVM and ARM support is planned. + ("altp2m", libxl_altp2m_mode), ], dir=DIR_IN ) diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_parse.c b/tools/xl/xl_parse.c index b72f99059e..1605345455 100644 --- a/tools/xl/xl_parse.c +++ b/tools/xl/xl_parse.c @@ -1155,7 +1155,9 @@ void parse_config_data(const char *config_source, xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "nestedhvm", &b_info->u.hvm.nested_hvm, 0); - xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "altp2mhvm", &b_info->u.hvm.altp2m, 0); + if (!xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "altp2mhvm", &b_info->u.hvm.altp2m, 0)) + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Specifying \"altp2mhvm\" is deprecated. " + "Please use \"altp2m\" instead.\n"); xlu_cfg_replace_string(config, "smbios_firmware", &b_info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware, 0); @@ -1215,6 +1217,22 @@ void parse_config_data(const char *config_source, abort(); } + if (!xlu_cfg_get_long(config, "altp2m", &l, 1)) { + if (l < LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_DISABLED || + l > LIBXL_ALTP2M_MODE_LIMITED) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: invalid value %ld for \"altp2m\"\n", l); + exit (1); + } + + b_info->altp2m = l; + } else if (!xlu_cfg_get_string(config, "altp2m", &buf, 0)) { + if (libxl_altp2m_mode_from_string(buf, &b_info->altp2m)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: invalid value \"%s\" for \"altp2m\"\n", + buf); + exit (1); + } + } + if (!xlu_cfg_get_list(config, "ioports", &ioports, &num_ioports, 0)) { b_info->num_ioports = num_ioports; b_info->ioports = calloc(num_ioports, sizeof(*b_info->ioports)); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 0282986738..fd77e3e7b8 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -4110,7 +4110,7 @@ static int hvmop_set_param( rc = xsm_hvm_param_altp2mhvm(XSM_PRIV, d); if ( rc ) break; - if ( a.value > 1 ) + if ( a.value > XEN_ALTP2M_limited ) rc = -EINVAL; if ( a.value && d->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM] ) @@ -4324,6 +4324,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op( struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op a; struct domain *d = NULL; int rc = 0; + uint64_t mode; if ( !hvm_altp2m_supported() ) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -4370,18 +4371,20 @@ static int do_altp2m_op( goto out; } - if ( (rc = xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(XSM_TARGET, d)) ) + mode = d->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M]; + + if ( XEN_ALTP2M_disabled == mode ) + { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if ( (rc = xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(XSM_OTHER, d, mode, a.cmd)) ) goto out; switch ( a.cmd ) { case HVMOP_altp2m_get_domain_state: - if ( !d->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M] ) - { - rc = -EINVAL; - break; - } - a.u.domain_state.state = altp2m_active(d); rc = __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) ? -EFAULT : 0; break; @@ -4391,8 +4394,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op( struct vcpu *v; bool_t ostate; - if ( !d->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M] || - nestedhvm_enabled(d) ) + if ( nestedhvm_enabled(d) ) { rc = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/params.h b/xen/include/public/hvm/params.h index 58c8478ad5..0b3e7c649f 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/params.h +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/params.h @@ -228,8 +228,18 @@ /* Location of the VM Generation ID in guest physical address space. */ #define HVM_PARAM_VM_GENERATION_ID_ADDR 34 -/* Boolean: Enable altp2m */ +/* + * Set mode for altp2m: + * disabled: don't activate altp2m (default) + * mixed: allow access to all altp2m ops for both in-guest and external tools + * external: allow access to external privileged tools only + * limited: guest only has limited access (ie. control VMFUNC and #VE) + */ #define HVM_PARAM_ALTP2M 35 +#define XEN_ALTP2M_disabled 0 +#define XEN_ALTP2M_mixed 1 +#define XEN_ALTP2M_external 2 +#define XEN_ALTP2M_limited 3 /* * Size of the x87 FPU FIP/FDP registers that the hypervisor needs to diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index ff730391d5..56a8814d82 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -555,10 +555,27 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param_altp2mhvm(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); } -static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op) { - XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET); - return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); + xsm_default_t a; + XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER); + + switch ( mode ) + { + case XEN_ALTP2M_mixed: + a = XSM_TARGET; + break; + case XEN_ALTP2M_external: + a = XSM_DM_PRIV; + break; + case XEN_ALTP2M_limited: + a = (HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_enable_notify == op) ? XSM_TARGET : XSM_DM_PRIV; + break; + default: + return -EPERM; + }; + + return xsm_default_action(a, current->domain, d); } static XSM_INLINE int xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op) diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index 2cf7ac10db..60c0fd6a62 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct xsm_operations { int (*hvm_control) (struct domain *d, unsigned long op); int (*hvm_param_nested) (struct domain *d); int (*hvm_param_altp2mhvm) (struct domain *d); - int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op) (struct domain *d); + int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op) (struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op); int (*get_vnumainfo) (struct domain *d); int (*vm_event_control) (struct domain *d, int mode, int op); @@ -579,9 +579,9 @@ static inline int xsm_hvm_param_altp2mhvm (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) return xsm_ops->hvm_param_altp2mhvm(d); } -static inline int xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) +static inline int xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op) { - return xsm_ops->hvm_altp2mhvm_op(d); + return xsm_ops->hvm_altp2mhvm_op(d, mode, op); } static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 4baed39890..7aa8e11843 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int flask_hvm_param_altp2mhvm(struct domain *d) return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM); } -static int flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(struct domain *d) +static int flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op) { return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM_OP); }