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(static-72-81-132-2.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net [72.81.132.2]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 165090736101574.01795310864475; Mon, 25 Apr 2022 10:22:41 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: 547a57f6-c4bc-11ec-8fc2-03012f2f19d4 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1650907364; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=Ax7o3r8U6B4PFgzUw5bx5r5LBu41GigSNecUltuuR8dSVKqxbPPtGcByzXoFgDjdADU7QKgB1uZXGmjVUff6lm7NXHWOL9n0sjS2mM6pb823DSF7vTfb/O6zGQ3rz6uISOYXYcmKI4ggGXkHITATaLgqXss6mHvF93u3Bx3ELOs= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1650907364; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Message-ID:References:Subject:To; bh=oWUECp0uPTpkjJDOsexyWnv+2pg/Sqhs5LeSRzZUWDE=; b=EUv11YhBQ0tOe10FRarzQEXENGkwHC6k4Hr+uvouLRTLMaVYAkzXXB5pKl+j07RfbEsFStv0pjQrAd5dxtEFgOpnM9OpFMMME3uPG1+F5mUxjtfmCY7scXme17aR6qDkoH8MUMJbMjKKiBG9K0liFnWhZ8xtszbRJr2Bcwt0PjE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass header.i=apertussolutions.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com; dmarc=pass header.from= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1650907364; s=zoho; d=apertussolutions.com; i=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com; h=From:From:To:To:Cc:Cc:Subject:Subject:Date:Date:Message-Id:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Reply-To; bh=oWUECp0uPTpkjJDOsexyWnv+2pg/Sqhs5LeSRzZUWDE=; b=q7+Vq5H27jfV2rMgnQ1pGolKGQKsX1cUXzzyM5cwDvejg7q1HW84xnh2x5VncO3K aPXYPMuv0zooJEuuyopcldSPizgpKZwRFLqYo+36n1w1rP8417RHaWnQtO+czrWk7zF KOe2jjbkIOJRJjiSNjyRZAgZYkpevehOAOBPc3qE= From: "Daniel P. Smith" To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Volodymyr Babchuk , Wei Liu , "Daniel P. Smith" Cc: scott.davis@starlab.io, jandryuk@gmail.com, Stefano Stabellini , Julien Grall , Bertrand Marquis , Jan Beulich , Andrew Cooper , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= , George Dunlap , Dario Faggioli , Daniel De Graaf Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 13:22:30 -0400 Message-Id: <20220425172231.27401-2-dpsmith@apertussolutions.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20220425172231.27401-1-dpsmith@apertussolutions.com> References: <20220425172231.27401-1-dpsmith@apertussolutions.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-ZohoMailClient: External There are new capabilities, dom0less and hyperlaunch, that introduce internal hypervisor logic which needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM access checks. This creates an issue as a subset of the hypervisor code is executed under a system domain, the idle domain, that is represented by a per-CPU non-privileged struct domain. To enable these new capabilities to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle system domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_set_system_active(), is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type. In the case of SILO, it inherits the default policy's hook for xsm_set_system_active(). For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_set_system_active(). Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk --- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c index d5d0792ed4..dc0bdef6b7 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c @@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, /* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot(); + if ( xsm_set_system_active() != 0 ) + panic("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n"); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active; for_each_domain( d ) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c index 6f20e17892..e7a0ac9183 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void) void *va; unsigned long start, end; + if ( xsm_set_system_active() != 0 ) + panic("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n"); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active; domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0); diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c index 19ab678181..7b1c03a0e1 100644 --- a/xen/common/sched/core.c +++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c @@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us = SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US; } - idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, 0); + /* + * The idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during + * setup and will be demoted by xsm_set_system_active() when setup is + * complete. + */ + idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, CDF_privileged); BUG_ON(IS_ERR(idle_domain)); BUG_ON(nr_cpu_ids > ARRAY_SIZE(idle_vcpu)); idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu; diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index 58afc1d589..3291fb5396 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -101,6 +101,23 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action( } } +static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_system_active(void) +{ + struct domain *d = current->domain; + + ASSERT(d->is_privileged); + + if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE ) + { + printk("xsm_set_system_active: should only be called by idle domain\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + d->is_privileged = false; + + return 0; +} + static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo( struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) { diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index 3e2b7fe3db..8dad03fd3d 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t; * !!! WARNING !!! */ struct xsm_ops { + int (*set_system_active)(void); void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info); int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d, uint32_t ssidref); @@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops; #ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS +static inline int xsm_set_system_active(void) +{ + return alternative_call(xsm_ops.set_system_active); +} + static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo( struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) { diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c index 8c044ef615..e6ffa948f7 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c +++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo, diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 0bf63ffa84..8a62de2fd6 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) return 0; } +static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ + struct domain *d = current->domain; + + if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE ) + { + printk("xsm_set_system_active should only be called by idle domain\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + /* + * While is_privileged has no significant meaning under flask, set to false + * as there are times in hypervisor code privilege checks check this + * directly instead of going through XSM. + */ + d->is_privileged = false; + + return 0; +} + static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d) { struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid; @@ -1766,6 +1786,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send( #endif static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = { + .set_system_active = flask_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = flask_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,