@@ -550,6 +550,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)
__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, hvm_featureset);
__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS, hvm_featureset);
}
+ else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) )
+ /*
+ * If SPEC_CTRL.SSBD is available VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD can be exposed
+ * and implemented using the former. Expose in the max policy only as
+ * the preference is for guests to use SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if available.
+ */
+ __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, hvm_featureset);
/*
* With VT-x, some features are only supported by Xen if dedicated
@@ -1334,6 +1334,7 @@ static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = {
MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES,
MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS,
MSR_IA32_XSS,
+ MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK,
MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK,
MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK,
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct vcpu_msrs
{
/*
* 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)
*
* For PV guests, this holds the guest kernel value. It is accessed on
* every entry/exit path.
@@ -306,6 +307,9 @@ struct vcpu_msrs
* We must clear/restore Xen's value before/after VMRUN to avoid unduly
* influencing the guest. In order to support "behind the guest's back"
* protections, we load this value (commonly 0) before VMRUN.
+ *
+ * Once of such "behind the guest's back" usages is setting SPEC_CTRL.SSBD
+ * if the guest sets VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.
*/
struct {
uint32_t raw;
@@ -381,6 +381,13 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
? K8_HWCR_TSC_FREQ_SEL : 0;
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd )
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ break;
+
case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -666,6 +673,17 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
wrmsr_tsc_aux(val);
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd )
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ /* Only supports SSBD bit, the rest are ignored. */
+ if ( val & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD )
+ msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ else
+ msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ break;
+
case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
/*
* OpenBSD 6.7 will panic if writing to DE_CFG triggers a #GP:
@@ -402,12 +402,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
* mitigation support for guests.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
- printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ||
opt_eager_fpu) ? "" : " None",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ? " RSB" : "",
opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "");
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRS_SAME_MODE, 8*32+19) /*S IBRS provides same-mode protection
XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_LMSL, 8*32+20) /*S EFER.LMSLE no longer supported. */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_PPIN, 8*32+23) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD, 8*32+24) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /*! MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD, 8*32+28) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */
Use the logic to set shadow SPEC_CTRL values in order to implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (signaled by VIRT_SSBD CPUID flag) for HVM guests. This includes using the spec_ctrl vCPU MSR variable to store the guest set value of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD, which will be OR'ed with any SPEC_CTRL values being set by the guest. On hardware having SPEC_CTRL VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will not be offered by default to guests. VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will only be part of the max CPUID policy so it can be enabled for compatibility purposes. Use '!' to annotate the feature in order to express that the presence of the bit is not directly tied to its value in the host policy. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> --- Changes since v3: - Use '!' to annotate the feature. Changes since v2: - Reword reasoning for using '!s'. - Trim comment about only setting SSBD bit in spec_ctrl.raw. Changes since v1: - Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is available on the host. - Revert change to msr-sc= command line option documentation. - Only set or clear the SSBD bit of spec_ctrl. --- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 7 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 4 ++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 3 ++- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)