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[46.102.197.194]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c36-20020a509fa7000000b0056bdec673c3sm3353969edf.38.2024.03.25.11.18.31 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Mar 2024 11:18:31 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: 171c0e48-ead4-11ee-a1ef-f123f15fe8a2 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=citrix.com; s=google; t=1711390712; x=1711995512; darn=lists.xenproject.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=mCQaZ2vEVw3LDT3hBoi3CjYKe2i19cOeP080dPUKgzQ=; b=TmTvo0/jXZvjuJP5Et2/3vaZHUqa5r6wNcZsgAOCA+j6ijWfkVzsk4W4VnzvLeOBgH CWahUA+aYhnnIhVuextDZHgbxjJwx57/tZETz8cjT2MRFddRmS8zE0I1eK89cOA1BhNg oHUxL64Tsd8ojCDL7HoBrUkmVLA3CKeYWbZJs= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1711390712; x=1711995512; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=mCQaZ2vEVw3LDT3hBoi3CjYKe2i19cOeP080dPUKgzQ=; b=O2GvZ87a9ujObbQFRAsez2nKQUxvowVcrF5l+PnNkhNz0wvEcmRQHPMG4pa9qm5hSx sACahciacoINLy8MSGLbDMDygJ2Hte1XTRVA4TzUXUWkI2f5v5r1V67NZAt7AIhCar+x Ho1HoenGzRolYgTudPZfEabd7WItBKLzxFlAnm3Jiq/sQGldZ4K6DMKkbYHor3OTT0BE txCYMKnoP+zWgvzS3ffrjHEUf39nCIrVsKq6+Yti0kglETskDjvlHR4PCPR3HzpQkxTh TT3XpCBq1ag7htX1kaWCEMPnGOvmnQknk5k+ZxiTuiWvHwUQHo+qZYkZ/Zr7HZIUiPXr Dx8g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwYGap/leAn8v4ILfzy05ATkRby8nVBQcYhcNry7jbN0vVdEgpx PmUzIXxsrKxR2tH/etAy5jw1/9Xg9SmlTIbFE/PrLnA+E7CIXf/9vGEW6jwVChPo/HPSLlNHQ3b w X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IG1rKPZ+DgNqS+fD/u8DIaVGb/O+3r9gcOk0odwEJqwnrNMVbAB1vJ+dlwm+FAkBQhflMOw+A== X-Received: by 2002:a50:8e5d:0:b0:56b:a155:4b39 with SMTP id 29-20020a508e5d000000b0056ba1554b39mr5202593edx.28.1711390712366; Mon, 25 Mar 2024 11:18:32 -0700 (PDT) From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel Cc: Andrew Cooper , Jan Beulich , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= Subject: [PATCH] x86/spec-ctrl: Support for SRSO_US_NO and SRSO_MSR_FIX Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 18:18:30 +0000 Message-Id: <20240325181830.638680-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 AMD have updated the SRSO whitepaper[1] with further information. There's a new SRSO_U/S_NO enumeration saying that SRSO attacks can't cross the user/supervisor boundary. i.e. we don't need to use IBPB-on-entry for PV. There's also a new SRSO_MSR_FIX identifying that the BP_SPEC_REDUCE bit is available in MSR_BP_CFG. When set, SRSO attacks can't cross the host/guest boundary. i.e. we don't need to use IBPB-on-entry for HVM. Extend ibpb_calculations() to account for these when calculating opt_ibpb_entry_{pv,hvm} defaults. Add a bp-spec-reduce option to control the use of BP_SPEC_REDUCE, but activate it by default. Because MSR_BP_CFG is core-scoped with a race condition updating it, repurpose amd_check_erratum_1485() into amd_check_bp_cfg() and calculate all updates at once. Fix a typo in the SRSO_NO's comment. [1] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/corporate/cr/speculative-return-stack-overflow-whitepaper.pdf Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Roger Pau Monné Slightly RFC. This is all speculative coding. --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 9 ++++- tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 27 ++++++++++---- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++----- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 4 ++- 7 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) base-commit: 6f6de10ade5ade907f9e3f3c72b7b18f7852d9ff diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc index 14cafb462a9a..5d114514cc8f 100644 --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -2377,7 +2377,8 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). > {msr-sc,rsb,verw,ibpb-entry}=|{pv,hvm}=, > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, > eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock, -> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden}= ]` +> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden, +> bp-spec-reduce}= ]` Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, @@ -2509,6 +2510,12 @@ boolean can be used to force or prevent Xen from using speculation barriers to protect lock critical regions. This mitigation won't be engaged by default, and needs to be explicitly enabled on the command line. +On hardware supporting SRSO_MSR_FIX, the `bp-spec-reduce=` option can be used +to force or prevent Xen from using MSR_BP_CFG.BP_SPEC_REDUCE to mitigate the +SRSO (Speculative Return Stack Overflow) vulnerability. By default, Xen will +use bp-spec-reduce when available, as it preferable to using `ibpb-entry=hvm` +to mitigate SRSO. + ### sync_console > `= ` diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c index 8893547bebce..ec24a16086c6 100644 --- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ static const char *const str_e21a[32] = /* 26 */ [27] = "sbpb", [28] = "ibpb-brtype", [29] = "srso-no", + [30] = "srso-us-no", [31] = "srso-msr-fix", }; static const char *const str_7b1[32] = diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index ab92333673b9..9247a4e65734 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -1009,16 +1009,31 @@ static void cf_check fam17_disable_c6(void *arg) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD_CSTATE_CFG, val & mask); } -static void amd_check_erratum_1485(void) +static void amd_check_bp_cfg(void) { - uint64_t val, chickenbit = (1 << 5); + uint64_t val, new = 0; - if (cpu_has_hypervisor || boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x19 || !is_zen4_uarch()) + /* + * AMD Erratum #1485. Set bit 5, as instructed. + */ + if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch()) + new |= (1 << 5); + + /* + * On hardware supporting SRSO_MSR_FIX, we prefer BP_SPEC_REDUCE to + * IBPB-on-entry to mitigate SRSO for HVM guests. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_US_NO) && + opt_bp_spec_reduce) + new |= BP_CFG_SPEC_REDUCE; + + /* Avoid reading BP_CFG if we don't intend to change anything. */ + if (!new) return; rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BP_CFG, val); - if (val & chickenbit) + if ((val & new) == new) return; /* @@ -1027,7 +1042,7 @@ static void amd_check_erratum_1485(void) * same time before the chickenbit is set. It's benign because the * value being written is the same on both. */ - wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BP_CFG, val | chickenbit); + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BP_CFG, val | new); } static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -1297,7 +1312,7 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) disable_c1_ramping(); amd_check_zenbleed(); - amd_check_erratum_1485(); + amd_check_bp_cfg(); if (fam17_c6_disabled) fam17_disable_c6(NULL); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 92dd9fa4962c..c6b11c8c96dc 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE (_AC(1, ULL) << 1) #define MSR_AMD64_EX_CFG 0xc001102cU #define MSR_AMD64_BP_CFG 0xc001102eU +#define BP_CFG_SPEC_REDUCE (_AC(1, ULL) << 4) #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 0xc00110e3U #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011027U diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h index 011ab1db2709..58e47cac57db 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ extern int8_t opt_xpti_hwdom, opt_xpti_domu; extern bool cpu_has_bug_l1tf; extern int8_t opt_pv_l1tf_hwdom, opt_pv_l1tf_domu; +extern bool opt_bp_spec_reduce; /* * The L1D address mask, which might be wider than reported in CPUID, and the diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index 0b670c3ca753..abd778e7f992 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static bool __initdata opt_unpriv_mmio; static bool __ro_after_init opt_verw_mmio; static int8_t __initdata opt_gds_mit = -1; static int8_t __initdata opt_div_scrub = -1; +bool __ro_after_init opt_bp_spec_reduce = true; static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) { @@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) opt_unpriv_mmio = false; opt_gds_mit = 0; opt_div_scrub = 0; + opt_bp_spec_reduce = false; } else if ( val > 0 ) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -306,6 +308,8 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) opt_gds_mit = val; else if ( (val = parse_boolean("div-scrub", s, ss)) >= 0 ) opt_div_scrub = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("bp-spec-reduce", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_bp_spec_reduce = val; else rc = -EINVAL; @@ -1053,7 +1057,7 @@ static void __init div_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled) static void __init ibpb_calculations(void) { - bool def_ibpb_entry = false; + bool def_ibpb_entry_pv = false, def_ibpb_entry_hvm = false; /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ) @@ -1078,22 +1082,41 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(void) * Confusion. Mitigate with IBPB-on-entry. */ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO) ) - def_ibpb_entry = true; + def_ibpb_entry_pv = def_ibpb_entry_hvm = true; /* - * Further to BTC, Zen3/4 CPUs suffer from Speculative Return Stack - * Overflow in most configurations. Mitigate with IBPB-on-entry if we - * have the microcode that makes this an effective option. + * Further to BTC, Zen3 and later CPUs suffer from Speculative Return + * Stack Overflow in most configurations. Mitigate with IBPB-on-entry + * if we have the microcode that makes this an effective option, + * except where there are other mitigating factors available. */ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) ) - def_ibpb_entry = true; + { + /* + * SRSO_U/S_NO is a subset of SRSO_NO, identifying that SRSO isn't + * possible across the user/supervisor boundary. We only need to + * use IBPB-on-entry for PV guests on hardware which doesn't + * enumerate SRSO_US_NO. + */ + if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_US_NO) ) + def_ibpb_entry_pv = true; + + /* + * SRSO_MSR_FIX enumerates that we can use MSR_BP_CFG.SPEC_REDUCE + * to mitigate SRSO across the host/guest boundary. We only need + * to use IBPB-on-entry for HVM guests if we haven't enabled this + * control. + */ + if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_MSR_FIX) || !opt_bp_spec_reduce ) + def_ibpb_entry_hvm = true; + } } if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv == -1 ) - opt_ibpb_entry_pv = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) && def_ibpb_entry; + opt_ibpb_entry_pv = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) && def_ibpb_entry_pv; if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm == -1 ) - opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) && def_ibpb_entry; + opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) && def_ibpb_entry_hvm; if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv ) { diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h index 3de7c0383f0e..815fedc1a93e 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h @@ -304,7 +304,9 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(FSRSC, 11*32+19) /*A Fast Short REP SCASB */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_PREFETCHI, 11*32+20) /*A PREFETCHIT{0,1} Instructions */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SBPB, 11*32+27) /*A Selective Branch Predictor Barrier */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_BRTYPE, 11*32+28) /*A IBPB flushes Branch Type predictions too */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(SRSO_NO, 11*32+29) /*A Hardware not vulenrable to Speculative Return Stack Overflow */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(SRSO_NO, 11*32+29) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to Speculative Return Stack Overflow */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(SRSO_US_NO, 11*32+30) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SRSO across the User/Supervisor boundary */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(SRSO_MSR_FIX, 11*32+31) /* MSR_BP_CFG.BP_SPEC_REDUCE available */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1.ebx, word 12 */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(INTEL_PPIN, 12*32+ 0) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */