diff mbox series

[XEN,v1,09/15] x86/traps: guard vmx specific functions with CONFIG_VMX

Message ID 20240416063740.3469592-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series x86: make cpu virtualization support configurable | expand

Commit Message

Sergiy Kibrik April 16, 2024, 6:37 a.m. UTC 
From: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>

The functions vmx_vmcs_enter() and vmx_vmcs_exit() are VT-x specific.
Guard their calls with CONFIG_VMX.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index d554c9d41e..218eb5b322 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@  void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v)
 
     vcpu_pause(v); /* acceptably dangerous */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
     /*
      * For VMX special care is needed: Reading some of the register state will
      * require VMCS accesses. Engaging foreign VMCSes involves acquiring of a
@@ -684,12 +683,11 @@  void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v)
      * region. Despite this being a layering violation, engage the VMCS right
      * here. This then also avoids doing so several times in close succession.
      */
-    if ( cpu_has_vmx && is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx && is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
     {
         ASSERT(!in_irq());
         vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
     }
-#endif
 
     /* Prevent interleaving of output. */
     flags = console_lock_recursive_irqsave();
@@ -714,10 +712,8 @@  void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v)
         console_unlock_recursive_irqrestore(flags);
     }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
-    if ( cpu_has_vmx && is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx && is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
         vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-#endif
 
     vcpu_unpause(v);
 }