From patchwork Thu May 16 09:52:35 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Chen, Jiqian" X-Patchwork-Id: 13665965 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D29A8C25B79 for ; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from list by lists.xenproject.org with outflank-mailman.722964.1127429 (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1s7Xnf-0000dg-OK; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:23 +0000 X-Outflank-Mailman: Message body and most headers restored to incoming version Received: by outflank-mailman (output) from mailman id 722964.1127429; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:23 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1s7Xnf-0000dT-KY; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:23 +0000 Received: by outflank-mailman (input) for mailman id 722964; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:22 +0000 Received: from se1-gles-flk1-in.inumbo.com ([94.247.172.50] helo=se1-gles-flk1.inumbo.com) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1s7Xne-0007bz-3w for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:22 +0000 Received: from NAM12-MW2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-mw2nam12on20601.outbound.protection.outlook.com [2a01:111:f403:200a::601]) by se1-gles-flk1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 1fa43e0b-136a-11ef-b4bb-af5377834399; Thu, 16 May 2024 11:53:20 +0200 (CEST) Received: from PH0PR07CA0076.namprd07.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:510:f::21) by SA3PR12MB8438.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:2f6::21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.7587.28; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:14 +0000 Received: from SN1PEPF00036F3D.namprd05.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:510:f:cafe::54) by PH0PR07CA0076.outlook.office365.com (2603:10b6:510:f::21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.7587.30 via Frontend Transport; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:14 +0000 Received: from SATLEXMB04.amd.com (165.204.84.17) by SN1PEPF00036F3D.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.167.248.21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.20.7587.21 via Frontend Transport; Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:13 +0000 Received: from cjq-desktop.amd.com (10.180.168.240) by SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.35; Thu, 16 May 2024 04:53:09 -0500 X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: 1fa43e0b-136a-11ef-b4bb-af5377834399 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=en+yW7As1fcorNDSSKNdqp/lo4/ntiAwgEZsAEfxu0oUpnPGcGuk3Id5RiUJzn7deIGBXY/HTE+qGwWk360k8s4sawPgUgTtpaHnkwjaXp/jH13smz72YSrH6VwZWlHAEkW0qB0PJh0ugH2LTP+OoR2xzqkPVi5sB2yX9O68x3lRDerAYDBl5ULvZGexurbgFh0BXKJdD1BtWkb0GA64nRwoFh2tTU1T39AF3xePURCyPlQ9yf5Qi9uNitfZVCO2dkMLcKktXc/+GslO2xNP4JQGu3LBNtuaOeG16VJjSli7th3zVGFed2bbpy7gowTVJl1pDdQozr1CQeYC5cV0XQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=+PVXKQu58hDwgfbrYDE/kcfnEXNdd+32q921wt8QLfU=; b=lHkeH8k6mbKH92U2607Xz0G2Hjm42ShQQYelsYxbjn6wCRdReEaLGMApvNtyIKo/jISMHhEtdkNOnoGrEBeEkkv/C/SaO+umcwtawEas/ssS/a9H0yWqpQL7xF26yxLcXWU4KDlzkA1d4bIS61Me3VKtUk9EkfR/rykS+sBUWwaJwWNYS4dOxxv1auaJPpWYPwcRCK7wozrY26oOev5TpXVSEUVP3TrzVTOu/B1xky3DmwnBqBjCqr1rq3PfJWwInCPQivIX4+zOQEt9hDyEWSi1MexxwvLf628As2tKU+u9FxQpK4fVzS1WMl/IIhhvUackp4A65IXP4KLhs3vbDg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass (sender ip is 165.204.84.17) smtp.rcpttodomain=lists.xenproject.org smtp.mailfrom=amd.com; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine sp=quarantine pct=100) action=none header.from=amd.com; dkim=none (message not signed); arc=none (0) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=amd.com; s=selector1; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=+PVXKQu58hDwgfbrYDE/kcfnEXNdd+32q921wt8QLfU=; b=ZaHjO+b19cD9IVru6l5lmSlLGZJ6CY/Gt/u/86G7RLUdttvyIN7pZrdKo4VMrbltn12lRAs2s3u8Hd6q1+QAqg0MkCALMXVKRS7/qy74Tms3yecnUTI+BtrkguMUArhLKMBKql2NjlgqjZltzokQHA1wT2ovTadqkYbf0MQmgGM= X-MS-Exchange-Authentication-Results: spf=pass (sender IP is 165.204.84.17) smtp.mailfrom=amd.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;dmarc=pass action=none header.from=amd.com; Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C From: Jiqian Chen To: CC: Jan Beulich , Andrew Cooper , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= , Wei Liu , George Dunlap , Julien Grall , Stefano Stabellini , Anthony PERARD , "Anthony PERARD" , Juergen Gross , "Daniel P . Smith" , Stewart Hildebrand , Huang Rui , Jiqian Chen , Huang Rui Subject: [RFC XEN PATCH v8 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 17:52:35 +0800 Message-ID: <20240516095235.64128-6-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240516095235.64128-1-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> References: <20240516095235.64128-1-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: SN1PEPF00036F3D:EE_|SA3PR12MB8438:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 6e1f936c-5b6c-4433-bbde-08dc758e00dd X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0;ARA:13230031|376005|1800799015|7416005|36860700004|82310400017; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230031)(376005)(1800799015)(7416005)(36860700004)(82310400017);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 16 May 2024 09:53:13.9480 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 6e1f936c-5b6c-4433-bbde-08dc758e00dd X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: SN1PEPF00036F3D.namprd05.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SA3PR12MB8438 Some type of domain don't have PIRQ, like PVH, when passthrough a device to guest on PVH dom0, callstack pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will failed at domain_pirq_to_irq. So, add a new hypercall to grant/revoke gsi permission when dom0 is not PV or dom0 has not PIRQ flag. Signed-off-by: Huang Rui Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen --- tools/include/xenctrl.h | 5 +++ tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c | 15 ++++++++ tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/domctl.h | 9 +++++ xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h index 841db41ad7e4..c21a79d74be3 100644 --- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h +++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h @@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t pirq, bool allow_access); +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + bool allow_access); + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c index f2d9d14b4d9f..8540e84fda93 100644 --- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c +++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c @@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); } +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + bool allow_access) +{ + struct xen_domctl domctl = { + .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, + .domain = domid, + .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi, + .u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access, + }; + + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); +} + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c index 7e44d4c3ae2b..1d1b81dd2844 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c @@ -1412,6 +1412,37 @@ static bool pci_supp_legacy_irq(void) #define PCI_SBDF(seg, bus, devfn) \ ((((uint32_t)(seg)) << 16) | (PCI_DEVID(bus, devfn))) +static int pci_device_set_gsi(libxl_ctx *ctx, + libxl_domid domid, + libxl_device_pci *pci, + bool map, + int *gsi_back) +{ + int r, gsi, pirq; + uint32_t sbdf; + + sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); + r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); + *gsi_back = r; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + gsi = r; + pirq = r; + if (map) + r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, &pirq); + else + r = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, pirq); + if (r) + return r; + + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, map); + if (r && errno == EOPNOTSUPP) + r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, map); + + return r; +} + static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, pci_add_state *pas, int rc) @@ -1424,10 +1455,10 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, unsigned long long start, end, flags, size; int irq, i; int r; - uint32_t sbdf; uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED; uint32_t domainid = domid; bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid); + int gsi; /* Convenience aliases */ bool starting = pas->starting; @@ -1485,6 +1516,19 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, fclose(f); if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto out_no_irq; + + r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 1, &gsi); + if (gsi >= 0) { + if (r < 0) { + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, + "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno); + goto out; + } else { + goto process_permissive; + } + } + /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */ sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); @@ -1493,13 +1537,6 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, goto out_no_irq; } if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, - (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); - r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); - /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */ - if (r != -1) { - irq = r; - } r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq); if (r < 0) { LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)", @@ -1519,6 +1556,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, } fclose(f); +process_permissive: /* Don't restrict writes to the PCI config space from this VM */ if (pci->permissive) { if ( sysfs_write_bdf(gc, SYSFS_PCIBACK_DRIVER"/permissive", @@ -2186,10 +2224,10 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc, int irq = 0, i, stubdomid = 0; const char *sysfs_path; FILE *f; - uint32_t sbdf; uint32_t domainid = prs->domid; bool isstubdom; int r; + int gsi; /* Convenience aliases */ libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci; @@ -2245,6 +2283,15 @@ skip_bar: if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto skip_legacy_irq; + r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 0, &gsi); + if (gsi >= 0) { + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, + "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno); + } + goto skip_legacy_irq; + } + /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */ sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); @@ -2255,13 +2302,6 @@ skip_bar: } if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, - (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func))); - r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf); - /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */ - if (r != -1) { - irq = r; - } rc = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq); if (rc < 0) { /* diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c index 9a72d57333e9..9b8a08b2a81d 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c @@ -237,6 +237,37 @@ long arch_do_domctl( break; } + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: + { + unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi; + int allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access; + + if ( is_pv_domain(current->domain) || has_pirq(current->domain) ) + { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } + + if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi ) + { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, gsi) || + xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, gsi, allow) ) + { + ret = -EPERM; + break; + } + + if ( allow ) + ret = irq_permit_access(d, gsi); + else + ret = irq_deny_access(d, gsi); + break; + } + case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3: { unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num; diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h index a33f9ec32b08..47e95f9ee824 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h @@ -447,6 +447,13 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission { }; +/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */ +struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission { + uint32_t gsi; + uint8_t allow_access; /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi access */ +}; + + /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */ struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission { uint64_aligned_t first_mfn;/* first page (physical page number) in range */ @@ -1277,6 +1284,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { #define XEN_DOMCTL_vmtrace_op 84 #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size 85 #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size 86 +#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission 87 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio 1000 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu 1001 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu 1002 @@ -1299,6 +1307,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle setdomainhandle; struct xen_domctl_setdebugging setdebugging; struct xen_domctl_irq_permission irq_permission; + struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission gsi_permission; struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission iomem_permission; struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission; struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init hypercall_init; diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 5e88c71b8e22..a5b134c91101 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd) case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op: case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission: case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping: + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH /*