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Smith" , Stewart Hildebrand , Jiqian Chen , Huang Rui Subject: [RFC XEN PATCH v13 6/6] tools: Add new function to do PIRQ (un)map on PVH dom0 Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 19:08:20 +0800 Message-ID: <20240816110820.75672-7-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240816110820.75672-1-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> References: <20240816110820.75672-1-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: BN3PEPF0000B06A:EE_|CH3PR12MB8233:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: e4a13c71-18f9-43dc-f35c-08dcbde3d41a X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0;ARA:13230040|36860700013|1800799024|82310400026|376014|7416014; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230040)(36860700013)(1800799024)(82310400026)(376014)(7416014);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 16 Aug 2024 11:08:59.2904 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: e4a13c71-18f9-43dc-f35c-08dcbde3d41a X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN3PEPF0000B06A.namprd21.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: CH3PR12MB8233 When dom0 is PVH, and passthrough a device to dumU, xl will use the gsi number of device to do a pirq mapping, see pci_add_dm_done->xc_physdev_map_pirq, but the gsi number is got from file /sys/bus/pci/devices//irq, that confuses irq and gsi, they are in different space and are not equal, so it will fail when mapping. To solve this issue, use xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev to get the real gsi and add a new function xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi to get a free pirq for gsi(why not use current function xc_physdev_map_pirq, because it doesn't support to allocate a free pirq, what's more, to prevent changing it and affecting its callers, so add xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi). Besides, PVH dom0 doesn't have PIRQ flag, it doesn't do PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq for each gsi. So grant function callstack pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will fail at function domain_pirq_to_irq. And old hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission requires passing in pirq, it is not suitable for dom0 that doesn't have PIRQs to grant irq permission. To solve this issue, use the new hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant the permission of irq( translate from gsi) to dumU when dom0 has no PIRQs. Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen Signed-off-by: Huang Rui Signed-off-by: Chen Jiqian --- RFC: it needs to wait for the corresponding third patch on linux kernel side to be merged. https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240607075109.126277-4-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com/ --- v12->v13 changes: Deleted patch #6 of v12, and added function xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi to map pirq for gsi. For functions that generate libxl error, changed the return value from -1 to ERROR_*. Instead of declaring "ctx", use the macro "CTX". Add the function libxl__arch_local_romain_ has_pirq_notion to determine if there is a concept of pirq in the domain where xl is located. In the function libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi, before unmap_pirq, use map_pirq to obtain the pirq corresponding to gsi. v11->v12 changes: Nothing. v10->v11 changes: New patch Modification of the tools part of patches#4 and #5 of v10, use privcmd_gsi_from_dev to get gsi, and use XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi. Change the hard-coded 0 to use LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID. Add libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi to distinguish x86 related implementations. Add a list pcidev_pirq_list to record the relationship between sbdf and pirq, which can be used to obtain the corresponding pirq when unmap PIRQ. --- tools/include/xenctrl.h | 10 +++ tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c | 15 +++++ tools/libs/ctrl/xc_physdev.c | 27 ++++++++ tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h | 6 ++ tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c | 15 +++++ tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h index 82de6748f7a7..c798472995f7 100644 --- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h +++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h @@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t pirq, bool allow_access); +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + uint32_t flags); + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, @@ -1637,6 +1642,11 @@ int xc_physdev_map_pirq_msi(xc_interface *xch, int entry_nr, uint64_t table_base); +int xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + int gsi, + int *pirq); + int xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, int pirq); diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c index f2d9d14b4d9f..e3538ec0ba80 100644 --- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c +++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c @@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); } +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + uint32_t gsi, + uint32_t flags) +{ + struct xen_domctl domctl = { + .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, + .domain = domid, + .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi, + .u.gsi_permission.flags = flags, + }; + + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); +} + int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned long first_mfn, diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_physdev.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_physdev.c index 460a8e779ce8..c752cd1f4410 100644 --- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_physdev.c +++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_physdev.c @@ -95,6 +95,33 @@ int xc_physdev_map_pirq_msi(xc_interface *xch, return rc; } +int xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi(xc_interface *xch, + uint32_t domid, + int gsi, + int *pirq) +{ + int rc; + struct physdev_map_pirq map; + + if ( !pirq ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + memset(&map, 0, sizeof(struct physdev_map_pirq)); + map.domid = domid; + map.type = MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_GSI; + map.index = gsi; + map.pirq = *pirq; + + rc = do_physdev_op(xch, PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq, &map, sizeof(map)); + + if ( !rc ) + *pirq = map.pirq; + + return rc; +} + int xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, int pirq) diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h index f88f11d6de1d..c8ef52ddbe7f 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h @@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ void libxl__arch_update_domain_config(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_domain_config *dst, const libxl_domain_config *src); +_hidden +int libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid); +_hidden +int libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid); +_hidden +bool libxl__arch_local_domain_has_pirq_notion(libxl__gc *gc); #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) #define LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS 0xfee00000 diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c index a4029e3ac810..5a9db5e85f6f 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c @@ -1774,6 +1774,21 @@ void libxl__arch_update_domain_config(libxl__gc *gc, { } +int libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid) +{ + return ERROR_INVAL; +} + +int libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid) +{ + return ERROR_INVAL; +} + +bool libxl__arch_local_domain_has_pirq_notion(libxl__gc *gc) +{ + return true; +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c index 96cb4da0794e..2014a67e6e56 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "libxl_osdeps.h" /* must come before any other headers */ #include "libxl_internal.h" +#include "libxl_arch.h" #define PCI_BDF "%04x:%02x:%02x.%01x" #define PCI_BDF_SHORT "%02x:%02x.%01x" @@ -1478,32 +1479,43 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, fclose(f); if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto out_no_irq; - sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, - pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); - f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); - if (f == NULL) { - LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "Couldn't open %s", sysfs_path); - goto out_no_irq; - } - if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq); - if (r < 0) { - LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)", - irq, r); - fclose(f); - rc = ERROR_FAIL; + + /* When dom0 is PVH, should use gsi to map pirq and grant permission */ + rc = libxl__arch_local_domain_has_pirq_notion(gc); + if (!rc) { + rc = libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi(gc, pci_encode_bdf(pci), domid); + if (rc) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi failed"); goto out; } - r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1); - if (r < 0) { - LOGED(ERROR, domainid, - "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, r); - fclose(f); - rc = ERROR_FAIL; - goto out; + } else { + sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, + pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); + f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "Couldn't open %s", sysfs_path); + goto out_no_irq; + } + if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { + r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)", + irq, r); + fclose(f); + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + goto out; + } + r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, + "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, r); + fclose(f); + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + goto out; + } } + fclose(f); } - fclose(f); /* Don't restrict writes to the PCI config space from this VM */ if (pci->permissive) { @@ -2229,33 +2241,43 @@ skip_bar: if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq()) goto skip_legacy_irq; - sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, - pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); - - f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); - if (f == NULL) { - LOGED(ERROR, domid, "Couldn't open %s", sysfs_path); - goto skip_legacy_irq; - } + /* When dom0 is PVH, should use gsi to unmap pirq and deny permission */ + rc = libxl__arch_local_domain_has_pirq_notion(gc); + if (!rc) { + rc = libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi(gc, pci_encode_bdf(pci), domid); + if (rc) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi failed"); + goto out; + } + } else { + sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain, + pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func); - if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { - rc = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq); - if (rc < 0) { - /* - * QEMU may have already unmapped the IRQ. So the error - * may be spurious. For now, still print an error message as - * it is not easy to distinguished between valid and - * spurious error. - */ - LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq irq=%d", irq); + f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "Couldn't open %s", sysfs_path); + goto skip_legacy_irq; } - rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0); - if (rc < 0) { - LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq); + + if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) { + rc = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq); + if (rc < 0) { + /* + * QEMU may have already unmapped the IRQ. So the error + * may be spurious. For now, still print an error message as + * it is not easy to distinguished between valid and + * spurious error. + */ + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq irq=%d", irq); + } + rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0); + if (rc < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq); + } } - } - fclose(f); + fclose(f); + } skip_legacy_irq: diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c index 60643d6f5376..20e3956f09b8 100644 --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c @@ -879,6 +879,78 @@ void libxl__arch_update_domain_config(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_defbool_val(src->b_info.u.hvm.pirq)); } +bool libxl__arch_local_domain_has_pirq_notion(libxl__gc *gc) +{ + int r; + xc_domaininfo_t info; + + r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(CTX->xch, LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID, &info); + if (r == 0) { + if (!(info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest) || + (info.arch_config.emulation_flags & XEN_X86_EMU_USE_PIRQ)) + return true; + } else { + LOGE(ERROR, "getdomaininfo failed ret=%d", r); + } + + return false; +} + +int libxl__arch_hvm_map_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid) +{ + int pirq = -1, gsi, r; + + gsi = xc_pcidev_get_gsi(CTX->xch, sbdf); + if (gsi < 0) { + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + r = xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi(CTX->xch, domid, gsi, &pirq); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi gsi=%d ret=%d", gsi, r); + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(CTX->xch, domid, gsi, XEN_DOMCTL_GSI_GRANT); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d ret=%d", gsi, r); + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int libxl__arch_hvm_unmap_gsi(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t sbdf, uint32_t domid) +{ + int pirq = -1, gsi, r; + + gsi = xc_pcidev_get_gsi(CTX->xch, sbdf); + if (gsi < 0) { + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + /* Before unmapping, use mapping to get the already mapped pirq first */ + r = xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi(CTX->xch, domid, gsi, &pirq); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq_gsi gsi=%d ret=%d", gsi, r); + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + r = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, pirq); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq gsi=%d ret=%d", gsi, r); + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(CTX->xch, domid, gsi, XEN_DOMCTL_GSI_REVOKE); + if (r < 0) { + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d ret=%d", gsi, r); + return ERROR_FAIL; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C