From patchwork Wed Sep 25 02:41:26 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Marek_Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11159937 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 854C01599 for ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:43:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 557522064A for ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:43:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=messagingengine.com header.i=@messagingengine.com header.b="NOOzlYJ/" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 557522064A Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=invisiblethingslab.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1iCxFV-0000vE-23; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:41:49 +0000 Received: from all-amaz-eas1.inumbo.com ([34.197.232.57] helo=us1-amaz-eas2.inumbo.com) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1iCxFT-0000ux-F7 for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:41:47 +0000 X-Inumbo-ID: fff168c0-df3d-11e9-9627-12813bfff9fa Received: from new1-smtp.messagingengine.com (unknown [66.111.4.221]) by localhost (Halon) with ESMTPS id fff168c0-df3d-11e9-9627-12813bfff9fa; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:41:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from compute7.internal (compute7.nyi.internal [10.202.2.47]) by mailnew.nyi.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8DE61AC0; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 22:41:38 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mailfrontend2 ([10.202.2.163]) by compute7.internal (MEProxy); Tue, 24 Sep 2019 22:41:38 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type :date:from:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references :subject:to:x-me-proxy:x-me-proxy:x-me-sender:x-me-sender :x-sasl-enc; s=fm3; bh=56HX9QWMCTOordPBpOUNx2/N7BYQBZwgA4GsfLolr ew=; b=NOOzlYJ/Md86GE8/ahL/vzyt/hsjXijoCVYhhqehQssD1Mqs0kAuyeY/B QBylCkdo4YyegQzSgIu1fgWaKmTZEZ1NvQ1RSh/4k9Kf3OR20d8gv1aFYrNEeJfQ Gfm6GKcVczz5FHh/LF5PTNFPInxmuukGB3N3cfeQp0fNOK1isVj6/m8gWWf6EDQU GX9lpgM6IZQkDNPGtM6c2fSZAmg71wV0V27BGhOHccnEzi2jfcpBgu7OQWGKs6JY sOORCZDmlNB51iWri+vgXc0s/aj4JmWW+adqa+ccyj2OoUbEdHOdNf625UHumzL4 tC24+fzeNOlFAQK7Tg/7GmGqd651Q== X-ME-Sender: X-ME-Proxy-Cause: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedufedrfedugdeivdcutefuodetggdotefrodftvf curfhrohhfihhlvgemucfhrghsthforghilhdpqfgfvfdpuffrtefokffrpgfnqfghnecu uegrihhlohhuthemuceftddtnecusecvtfgvtghiphhivghnthhsucdlqddutddtmdenuc fjughrpefhvffufffkofgjfhggtgfgsehtkeertdertdejnecuhfhrohhmpeforghrvghk ucforghrtgiihihkohifshhkihdqifpkrhgvtghkihcuoehmrghrmhgrrhgvkhesihhnvh hishhisghlvghthhhinhhgshhlrggsrdgtohhmqeenucffohhmrghinhepghhithhhuhgs rdgtohhmnecukfhppeeluddrieehrdefgedrfeefnecurfgrrhgrmhepmhgrihhlfhhroh hmpehmrghrmhgrrhgvkhesihhnvhhishhisghlvghthhhinhhgshhlrggsrdgtohhmnecu vehluhhsthgvrhfuihiivgeptd X-ME-Proxy: Received: from localhost.localdomain (ip5b412221.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [91.65.34.33]) by mail.messagingengine.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id AF841D60062; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 22:41:36 -0400 (EDT) From: =?utf-8?q?Marek_Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?= To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 04:41:26 +0200 Message-Id: <7d011094eed3f5c3cf6971cc8760874fd56ca443.1569379186.git-series.marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 4/4] xen/x86: Allow stubdom access to irq created for msi. X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Kevin Tian , Stefano Stabellini , Suravee Suthikulpanit , Wei Liu , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , George Dunlap , Andrew Cooper , Ian Jackson , =?utf-8?q?Marek_Marczykowski-G?= =?utf-8?q?=C3=B3recki?= , Tim Deegan , Simon Gaiser , Julien Grall , Jan Beulich , Brian Woods , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" Stubdomains need to be given sufficient privilege over the guest which it provides emulation for in order for PCI passthrough to work correctly. When a HVM domain try to enable MSI, QEMU in stubdomain calls PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq, but later it needs to call XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq as part of xc_domain_update_msi_irq. Allow for that as part of PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq. This is not needed for PCI INTx, because IRQ in that case is known beforehand and the stubdomain is given permissions over this IRQ by libxl__device_pci_add (there's a do_pci_add against the stubdomain). create_irq() already grant IRQ access to hardware_domain, with assumption the device model (something managing this IRQ) lives there. Modify create_irq() to take additional parameter pointing at device model domain - which may be dom0 or stubdomain. Save ID of the domain given permission, to revoke it in destroy_irq() - easier and cleaner than replaying logic of create_irq() parameter. Use domid instead of actual reference to the domain, because it might get destroyed before destroying IRQ (stubdomain is destroyed before its target domain). And it is not an issue, because IRQ permissions live within domain structure, so destroying a domain also implicitly revoke the permission. Potential domid reuse is detected by by checking if that domain does have permission over the IRQ being destroyed. Then, adjust all callers to provide the parameter. In case of calls not related to stubdomain-initiated allocations, give it either hardware_domain (so the behavior is unchanged there), or NULL for interrupts used by Xen internally. Inspired by https://github.com/OpenXT/xenclient-oe/blob/5e0e7304a5a3c75ef01240a1e3673665b2aaf05e/recipes-extended/xen/files/stubdomain-msi-irq-access.patch by Eric Chanudet . Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné --- Changes in v3: - extend commit message Changes in v4: - add missing destroy_irq on error path Changes in v5: - move irq_{grant,revoke}_access() to {create,destroy}_irq(), which basically make it a different patch - add get_dm_domain() helper - do not give hardware_domain permission over IRQs used in Xen internally - rename create_irq argument to just 'd', to avoid confusion when it's called by hardware domain - verify that device is de-assigned before pci_remove_device call - save ID of domain given permission in create_irq(), to revoke it in destroy_irq() - drop domain parameter from destroy_irq() and msi_free_irq() - do not give hardware domain permission over IRQ created in iommu_set_interrupt() Changes in v6: - do not give permission over hpet irq to hardware_domain - move creator_domid to arch_irq_desc - fix creator_domid initialization - always give current->domain permission instead of using get_dm_domain() helper. Analysis of all its use cases tells that it is the only value it returns. - drop unrelated change Changes in v7: - Code style improvements (spaces, use %pd etc) - use bool parameter to create_irq, as it's only getting current->domain or NULL - remove redundant irq_access_permitted() --- xen/arch/x86/hpet.c | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/irq.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++-------- xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c | 2 +- xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c | 2 +- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 3 +- xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h | 7 +++- 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c index 4b08488..57f68fa 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ static int __init hpet_assign_irq(struct hpet_event_channel *ch) { int irq; - if ( (irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE)) < 0 ) + if ( (irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE, false)) < 0 ) return irq; ch->msi.irq = irq; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c index 0ee3346..256dd02 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c @@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ void __init clear_irq_vector(int irq) /* * Dynamic irq allocate and deallocation for MSI */ -int create_irq(nodeid_t node) + +int create_irq(nodeid_t node, bool grant_access) { int irq, ret; struct irq_desc *desc; @@ -282,18 +283,23 @@ int create_irq(nodeid_t node) } ret = assign_irq_vector(irq, mask); } + + ASSERT(desc->arch.creator_domid == DOMID_INVALID); + if (ret < 0) { desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED; irq = ret; } - else if ( hardware_domain ) + else if ( grant_access ) { - ret = irq_permit_access(hardware_domain, irq); + ret = irq_permit_access(current->domain, irq); if ( ret ) printk(XENLOG_G_ERR - "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n", - irq, ret); + "Could not grant %pd access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n", + current->domain, irq, ret); + else + desc->arch.creator_domid = current->domain->domain_id; } return irq; @@ -307,14 +313,23 @@ void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq) BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq)); - if ( hardware_domain ) + if ( desc->arch.creator_domid != DOMID_INVALID ) { - int err = irq_deny_access(hardware_domain, irq); + struct domain *d = get_domain_by_id(desc->arch.creator_domid); - if ( err ) - printk(XENLOG_G_ERR - "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n", - irq, err); + if ( d ) + { + int err = irq_deny_access(d, irq); + if ( err ) + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR + "Could not revoke %pd access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n", + d, irq, err); + } + + if ( d ) + put_domain(d); + + desc->arch.creator_domid = DOMID_INVALID; } spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags); @@ -381,6 +396,7 @@ int arch_init_one_irq_desc(struct irq_desc *desc) desc->arch.vector = IRQ_VECTOR_UNASSIGNED; desc->arch.old_vector = IRQ_VECTOR_UNASSIGNED; + desc->arch.creator_domid = DOMID_INVALID; return 0; } @@ -2133,7 +2149,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq( spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags); info = NULL; - irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); + irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE, true); ret = irq >= 0 ? prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq + nr, &info) : irq; if ( ret < 0 ) @@ -2818,7 +2834,7 @@ int allocate_and_map_msi_pirq(struct domain *d, int index, int *pirq_p, if ( irq == -1 ) { case MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MULTI_MSI: - irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); + irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE, true); } if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs ) diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c index 8667de6..fcd3979 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c +++ b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c @@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ static void __init ns16550_init_irq(struct serial_port *port) struct ns16550 *uart = port->uart; if ( uart->msi ) - uart->irq = create_irq(0); + uart->irq = create_irq(0, false); #endif } diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c index bb9f33e..233a8ae 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c @@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static bool_t __init set_iommu_interrupt_handler(struct amd_iommu *iommu) { int irq, ret; - irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); + irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE, false); if ( irq <= 0 ) { dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "IOMMU: no irqs\n"); diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c index 5d72270..24a1e92 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -1138,7 +1138,8 @@ static int __init iommu_set_interrupt(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd) struct irq_desc *desc; irq = create_irq(rhsa ? pxm_to_node(rhsa->proximity_domain) - : NUMA_NO_NODE); + : NUMA_NO_NODE, + false); if ( irq <= 0 ) { dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "IOMMU: no irq available!\n"); diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h index bc0c0c1..79853d0 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h @@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ struct arch_irq_desc { unsigned move_cleanup_count; u8 move_in_progress : 1; s8 used; + /* + * Weak reference to domain having permission over this IRQ (which can + * be different from the domain actually havint the IRQ assigned) + */ + domid_t creator_domid; }; /* For use with irq_desc.arch.used */ @@ -161,7 +166,7 @@ int init_irq_data(void); void clear_irq_vector(int irq); int irq_to_vector(int irq); -int create_irq(nodeid_t node); +int create_irq(nodeid_t node, bool grant_access); void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq); int assign_irq_vector(int irq, const cpumask_t *);