Message ID | 172230458858.1455085.1385987165268927699.stg-ugh@frogsfrogsfrogs (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Accepted, archived |
Headers | show
Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4182E145B35 for <linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org>; Tue, 30 Jul 2024 02:43:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1722307391; cv=none; b=Tx6dYUfNvMpC6phYcM1te4bkBuNNpbZsZjWqvEXsAsIjbLxXt03ms2l0HqRCsienKcFRWucOC9+XSWebdOdW5b+TfHghJEWqljX3j1NOpuzvBml4GF1Yye7HmhlvAN4Zq03Ctqc3JQ7lKlXFfZErcyEZhPnrFa5nPRb8BL/NUOo= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1722307391; c=relaxed/simple; bh=b09U4kGt90aHGUPv4AKsmJ2qQwaBviUXcXmiY6DoWsg=; h=Date:Subject:From:To:Cc:Message-ID:MIME-Version:In-Reply-To: References:Content-Type; b=o82D/ZP3dPgOPIXVeQEiwZ5TrzgxZndkWG+Yo3Hjg8E+oFeeRPph0+87y6i6mgjMYSlc2qtFZ6uNcqrjt7kjDkwM26o16zSEH6S/AozeDurf2fi/dDCHiBCHdIEuGJmISLjKw//UITN3c7TPGgGx29zTLj/My0SMSWF9YUOgczQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=H7c7NHNS; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="H7c7NHNS" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B225FC32786; Tue, 30 Jul 2024 02:43:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1722307390; bh=b09U4kGt90aHGUPv4AKsmJ2qQwaBviUXcXmiY6DoWsg=; h=Date:Subject:From:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=H7c7NHNS5Bj5bFCWEP2av2HYWgohGfrl+qiHQtatIjVAjczXRoAkOqbJ/Q3cDn81l A6reGS3vCMEPV08QEBBxtN9tlpzV8Poz/fcHhmLOKcSgu5nLw2sIRxDa8Dv9QUVzsv Kg0JdqATJFjTj3N7SUIwAZcoyEY5C8tOuxIE0bbMDa0wesqZgeqw73eMuMOzlFtIHt 0himaMzsK32v6OUrpnDKMGSN1DAi/wW10Vj3qXKIYy1b1o7rcxAVhNb0Dss2wH5I8b oKy0NnsRJPnAsk/bUJrS8S3sv/SkulvVwtbks9JYcwch4km3MP6AKsnzS8/AvB9Lgc 0J+HcbRrnxVqQ== Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 19:43:10 -0700 Subject: [GIT PULL 11/23] xfs_scrub: detect deceptive filename extensions From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> To: cem@kernel.org, djwong@kernel.org Cc: hch@lst.de, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Message-ID: <172230458858.1455085.1385987165268927699.stg-ugh@frogsfrogsfrogs> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: <linux-xfs.vger.kernel.org> List-Subscribe: <mailto:linux-xfs+subscribe@vger.kernel.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:linux-xfs+unsubscribe@vger.kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20240730013626.GF6352@frogsfrogsfrogs> References: <20240730013626.GF6352@frogsfrogsfrogs> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit |
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[GIT,PULL,01/23] libxfs: fixes for 6.9
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Hi Carlos, Please pull this branch with changes for xfsprogs for 6.10-rc1. As usual, I did a test-merge with the main upstream branch as of a few minutes ago, and didn't see any conflicts. Please let me know if you encounter any problems. The following changes since commit 474ff27d466c053f1cd51024e6b0c5a741a2d4bd: xfs_scrub: try to repair space metadata before file metadata (2024-07-29 17:01:08 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfsprogs-dev.git tags/scrub-detect-deceptive-extensions-6.10_2024-07-29 for you to fetch changes up to 746ee95b71649b4ae515893ffa3bbe7b5e815d0d: xfs_scrub: dump unicode points (2024-07-29 17:01:09 -0700) ---------------------------------------------------------------- xfs_scrub: detect deceptive filename extensions [v30.9 11/28] In early 2023, malware researchers disclosed a phishing attack that was targeted at people running Linux workstations. The attack vector involved the use of filenames containing what looked like a file extension but instead contained a lookalike for the full stop (".") and a common extension ("pdf"). Enhance xfs_scrub phase 5 to detect these types of attacks and warn the system administrator. This has been running on the djcloud for months with no problems. Enjoy! Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> ---------------------------------------------------------------- Darrick J. Wong (13): xfs_scrub: use proper UChar string iterators xfs_scrub: hoist code that removes ignorable characters xfs_scrub: add a couple of omitted invisible code points xfs_scrub: avoid potential UAF after freeing a duplicate name entry xfs_scrub: guard against libicu returning negative buffer lengths xfs_scrub: hoist non-rendering character predicate xfs_scrub: store bad flags with the name entry xfs_scrub: rename UNICRASH_ZERO_WIDTH to UNICRASH_INVISIBLE xfs_scrub: type-coerce the UNICRASH_* flags xfs_scrub: reduce size of struct name_entry xfs_scrub: rename struct unicrash.normalizer xfs_scrub: report deceptive file extensions xfs_scrub: dump unicode points scrub/unicrash.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 426 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)