diff mbox series

xfs: avoid LR buffer overrun due to crafted h_len

Message ID 20200902141012.24605-1-hsiangkao@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show
Series xfs: avoid LR buffer overrun due to crafted h_len | expand

Commit Message

Gao Xiang Sept. 2, 2020, 2:10 p.m. UTC
Currently, crafted h_len has been blocked for the log
header of the tail block in commit a70f9fe52daa ("xfs:
detect and handle invalid iclog size set by mkfs").

However, each log record could still have crafted
h_len and cause log record buffer overrun. So let's
check h_len for each log record as well instead.

Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
---
something random when I read log recovery code...

 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
index e2ec91b2d0f4..2d9195fb9367 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -2904,7 +2904,8 @@  STATIC int
 xlog_valid_rec_header(
 	struct xlog		*log,
 	struct xlog_rec_header	*rhead,
-	xfs_daddr_t		blkno)
+	xfs_daddr_t		blkno,
+	int			hsize)
 {
 	int			hlen;
 
@@ -2920,10 +2921,39 @@  xlog_valid_rec_header(
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
-	/* LR body must have data or it wouldn't have been written */
+	/*
+	 * LR body must have data (or it wouldn't have been written) and
+	 * h_len must not be greater than h_size with one exception.
+	 *
+	 * That is that xfsprogs has a bug where record length is based on
+	 * lsunit but h_size (iclog size) is hardcoded to 32k. This means
+	 * the log buffer allocated can be too small for the record to
+	 * cause an overrun.
+	 *
+	 * Detect this condition here. Use lsunit for the buffer size as
+	 * long as this looks like the mkfs case. Otherwise, return an
+	 * error to avoid a buffer overrun.
+	 */
 	hlen = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_len);
-	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp, hlen <= 0 || hlen > INT_MAX))
+	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp, hlen <= 0))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+	if (hsize && XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
+				    hsize < be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_size)))
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	hsize = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_size);
+
+	if (unlikely(hlen >= hsize)) {
+		if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp, hlen > log->l_mp->m_logbsize ||
+				   rhead->h_num_logops != cpu_to_be32(1)))
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+		xfs_warn(log->l_mp,
+		"invalid iclog size (%d bytes), using lsunit (%d bytes)",
+			 hsize, log->l_mp->m_logbsize);
+		rhead->h_size = cpu_to_be32(log->l_mp->m_logbsize);
+	}
+
 	if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(log->l_mp,
 			   blkno > log->l_logBBsize || blkno > INT_MAX))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
@@ -2951,7 +2981,7 @@  xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	xfs_daddr_t		rhead_blk;
 	char			*offset;
 	char			*hbp, *dbp;
-	int			error = 0, h_size, h_len;
+	int			error = 0, h_size;
 	int			error2 = 0;
 	int			bblks, split_bblks;
 	int			hblks, split_hblks, wrapped_hblks;
@@ -2984,37 +3014,11 @@  xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 			goto bread_err1;
 
 		rhead = (xlog_rec_header_t *)offset;
-		error = xlog_valid_rec_header(log, rhead, tail_blk);
+		error = xlog_valid_rec_header(log, rhead, tail_blk, 0);
 		if (error)
 			goto bread_err1;
 
-		/*
-		 * xfsprogs has a bug where record length is based on lsunit but
-		 * h_size (iclog size) is hardcoded to 32k. Now that we
-		 * unconditionally CRC verify the unmount record, this means the
-		 * log buffer can be too small for the record and cause an
-		 * overrun.
-		 *
-		 * Detect this condition here. Use lsunit for the buffer size as
-		 * long as this looks like the mkfs case. Otherwise, return an
-		 * error to avoid a buffer overrun.
-		 */
 		h_size = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_size);
-		h_len = be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_len);
-		if (h_len > h_size) {
-			if (h_len <= log->l_mp->m_logbsize &&
-			    be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_num_logops) == 1) {
-				xfs_warn(log->l_mp,
-		"invalid iclog size (%d bytes), using lsunit (%d bytes)",
-					 h_size, log->l_mp->m_logbsize);
-				h_size = log->l_mp->m_logbsize;
-			} else {
-				XFS_ERROR_REPORT(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
-						log->l_mp);
-				error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
-				goto bread_err1;
-			}
-		}
 
 		if ((be32_to_cpu(rhead->h_version) & XLOG_VERSION_2) &&
 		    (h_size > XLOG_HEADER_CYCLE_SIZE)) {
@@ -3096,7 +3100,7 @@  xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 			}
 			rhead = (xlog_rec_header_t *)offset;
 			error = xlog_valid_rec_header(log, rhead,
-						split_hblks ? blk_no : 0);
+					split_hblks ? blk_no : 0, h_size);
 			if (error)
 				goto bread_err2;
 
@@ -3177,7 +3181,7 @@  xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 			goto bread_err2;
 
 		rhead = (xlog_rec_header_t *)offset;
-		error = xlog_valid_rec_header(log, rhead, blk_no);
+		error = xlog_valid_rec_header(log, rhead, blk_no, h_size);
 		if (error)
 			goto bread_err2;