From patchwork Wed Jun 12 14:42:14 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ard Biesheuvel X-Patchwork-Id: 10990171 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D299876 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:42:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C03AC284C3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:42:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B454828A0F; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:42:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D56E3284C3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:42:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2439766AbfFLOmX (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:42:23 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f68.google.com ([209.85.221.68]:44040 "EHLO mail-wr1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2439755AbfFLOmW (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:42:22 -0400 Received: by mail-wr1-f68.google.com with SMTP id b17so17200526wrq.11 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:42:20 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=LIn3brFDzT/vRMPNSDZzXSuINUR/zkXOzysr6PyiAHo=; b=hY9kwNel+wd39Al75P2qomnmbJM1pswDAWaVdTKEZMxSZnR+VAQjSdaCDovczcy1oH TkPvpdDQyzmCb5TNCwXiUalvoMhXfGwguf5P5aO1O0tdrf7qbvBZPf6efC+oPggIbZtK DStrMj1lACSt5IpSK4l/wCTmN57LQca0ehyG4kG2LTL/464VlOnRhAcRbWXs+uNuNwhj /3pJQxCbhnpU6IYKClhc+ql0k7xeHTliGWiK2MkUk59pHMcIg1ZEN4Lilzbcho+jnwUm yrxjfGh1g9549TEV+3PSvGlNrBP1zRCMzOOAGzq2NngxtTD8I7PzLtj592q4Mt+GGhT2 Xhvg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=LIn3brFDzT/vRMPNSDZzXSuINUR/zkXOzysr6PyiAHo=; b=fDVbMH4uVHgccCDmK/PTRoUJInmHaD8rZ81TxnYY5cDRX6RNY6TKjNzLnKJI1XmIZ3 S881oJCgmnsVnwvUyArG+nm3wqq+WPLkd836EEFtrKdWGjHdmtA9mJVU2rsqqAN+euJY DYUTMs4uYj62fuIeF60Ny4E0IaiAjUleAD+nT6AA9IuzSceQ/ORrh4e2oMnkFP2TxCIW POPxNYQQB8xCFstN/Vk+m1eGSDpmcXf+unE3Dtji77DQfr9sqhRaqHuyMv/0ORF6QgVn jOs6IFf3rKy06LRMAa6kMvp55OEZuW0oSVTjTtyiZ3RgfZhhCf9w358YwcwvqS5KV6X9 dJog== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVE2mOqbXapTg2zhaF+PqG6yfOhvGYu/UxDXqpjVlRv6pu1OQKY w0qfFlx/9NhWpkwNm48F1DjctjGxauEEvg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqx0TnEyvgR6d1Ug3l1gl+wtjjMRCi+uVkkYBuVL5SIQtIf2c0SaHJX4ZnjOXdlSV2xIkK5xIA== X-Received: by 2002:adf:ef0a:: with SMTP id e10mr38447288wro.303.1560350539103; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:42:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sudo.home ([2a01:cb1d:112:6f00:353a:f33a:a393:3ada]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id v18sm18146956wrs.80.2019.06.12.07.42.17 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:42:18 -0700 (PDT) From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ebiggers@kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH] wusb: switch to cbcmac transform Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 16:42:14 +0200 Message-Id: <20190612144214.15288-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The wusb code takes a very peculiar approach at implementing CBC-MAC, by using plain CBC into a scratch buffer, and taking the output IV as the MAC. We can clean up this code substantially by switching to the cbcmac shash, as exposed by the CCM template. To ensure that the module is loaded on demand, add the cbcmac template name as a module alias. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- crypto/ccm.c | 1 + drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c | 149 +++++++++------------------------- 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ccm.c b/crypto/ccm.c index 8c24605c791e..380eb619f657 100644 --- a/crypto/ccm.c +++ b/crypto/ccm.c @@ -1009,3 +1009,4 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Counter with CBC MAC"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm_base"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rfc4309"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac"); diff --git a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c index edb7263bff40..17a54f6cbb26 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c +++ b/drivers/usb/wusbcore/crypto.c @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ * funneled through AES are...16 bytes in size! */ +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -109,16 +111,6 @@ struct aes_ccm_a { __be16 counter; /* Value of x */ } __attribute__((packed)); -static void bytewise_xor(void *_bo, const void *_bi1, const void *_bi2, - size_t size) -{ - u8 *bo = _bo; - const u8 *bi1 = _bi1, *bi2 = _bi2; - size_t itr; - for (itr = 0; itr < size; itr++) - bo[itr] = bi1[itr] ^ bi2[itr]; -} - /* Scratch space for MAC calculations. */ struct wusb_mac_scratch { struct aes_ccm_b0 b0; @@ -189,44 +181,24 @@ struct wusb_mac_scratch { * NOTE: blen is not aligned to a block size, we'll pad zeros, that's * what sg[4] is for. Maybe there is a smarter way to do this. */ -static int wusb_ccm_mac(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm_cbc, - struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, +static int wusb_ccm_mac(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cbcmac, struct wusb_mac_scratch *scratch, void *mic, const struct aes_ccm_nonce *n, const struct aes_ccm_label *a, const void *b, size_t blen) { - int result = 0; - SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm_cbc); - struct scatterlist sg[4], sg_dst; - void *dst_buf; - size_t dst_size; - u8 *iv; - size_t zero_padding; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm_cbcmac); + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* * These checks should be compile time optimized out * ensure @a fills b1's mac_header and following fields */ - WARN_ON(sizeof(*a) != sizeof(scratch->b1) - sizeof(scratch->b1.la)); - WARN_ON(sizeof(scratch->b0) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); - WARN_ON(sizeof(scratch->b1) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); - WARN_ON(sizeof(scratch->ax) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); - - result = -ENOMEM; - zero_padding = blen % sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block); - if (zero_padding) - zero_padding = sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block) - zero_padding; - dst_size = blen + sizeof(scratch->b0) + sizeof(scratch->b1) + - zero_padding; - dst_buf = kzalloc(dst_size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dst_buf) - goto error_dst_buf; - - iv = kzalloc(crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm_cbc), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!iv) - goto error_iv; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*a) != sizeof(scratch->b1) - sizeof(scratch->b1.la)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(scratch->b0) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(scratch->b1) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(scratch->ax) != sizeof(struct aes_ccm_block)); /* Setup B0 */ scratch->b0.flags = 0x59; /* Format B0 */ @@ -243,46 +215,30 @@ static int wusb_ccm_mac(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm_cbc, scratch->b1.la = cpu_to_be16(blen + 14); memcpy(&scratch->b1.mac_header, a, sizeof(*a)); - sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &scratch->b0, sizeof(scratch->b0)); - sg_set_buf(&sg[1], &scratch->b1, sizeof(scratch->b1)); - sg_set_buf(&sg[2], b, blen); - /* 0 if well behaved :) */ - sg_set_page(&sg[3], ZERO_PAGE(0), zero_padding, 0); - sg_init_one(&sg_dst, dst_buf, dst_size); - - skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm_cbc); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, &sg_dst, dst_size, iv); - result = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); - skcipher_request_zero(req); - if (result < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't compute CBC-MAC tag (MIC): %d\n", - result); - goto error_cbc_crypt; - } + desc->tfm = tfm_cbcmac; + crypto_shash_init(desc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&scratch->b0, sizeof(scratch->b0)); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&scratch->b1, sizeof(scratch->b1)); + crypto_shash_update(desc, b, blen); + crypto_shash_final(desc, iv); /* Now we crypt the MIC Tag (*iv) with Ax -- values per WUSB1.0[6.5] * The procedure is to AES crypt the A0 block and XOR the MIC * Tag against it; we only do the first 8 bytes and place it * directly in the destination buffer. - * - * POS Crypto API: size is assumed to be AES's block size. - * Thanks for documenting it -- tip taken from airo.c */ scratch->ax.flags = 0x01; /* as per WUSB 1.0 spec */ scratch->ax.ccm_nonce = *n; scratch->ax.counter = 0; - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm_aes, (void *)&scratch->ax, - (void *)&scratch->ax); - bytewise_xor(mic, &scratch->ax, iv, 8); - result = 8; -error_cbc_crypt: - kfree(iv); -error_iv: - kfree(dst_buf); -error_dst_buf: - return result; + + /* reuse the CBC-MAC transform to perform the single block encryption */ + crypto_shash_init(desc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&scratch->ax, sizeof(scratch->ax)); + crypto_shash_final(desc, (u8 *)&scratch->ax); + + crypto_xor_cpy(mic, (u8 *)&scratch->ax, iv, 8); + + return 8; } /* @@ -298,45 +254,28 @@ ssize_t wusb_prf(void *out, size_t out_size, { ssize_t result, bytes = 0, bitr; struct aes_ccm_nonce n = *_n; - struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm_cbc; - struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; - struct wusb_mac_scratch *scratch; + struct crypto_shash *tfm_cbcmac; + struct wusb_mac_scratch scratch; u64 sfn = 0; __le64 sfn_le; - tfm_cbc = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("cbc(aes)", 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm_cbc)) { - result = PTR_ERR(tfm_cbc); - printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't load CBC(AES): %d\n", (int)result); - goto error_alloc_cbc; - } - result = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(tfm_cbc, key, 16); - if (result < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't set CBC key: %d\n", (int)result); - goto error_setkey_cbc; + tfm_cbcmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cbcmac(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm_cbcmac)) { + result = PTR_ERR(tfm_cbcmac); + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't load CBCMAC-AES: %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_alloc_cbcmac; } - tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { - result = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); - printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't load AES: %d\n", (int)result); - goto error_alloc_aes; - } - result = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm_aes, key, 16); + result = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm_cbcmac, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); if (result < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't set AES key: %d\n", (int)result); - goto error_setkey_aes; - } - scratch = kmalloc(sizeof(*scratch), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!scratch) { - result = -ENOMEM; - goto error_alloc_scratch; + printk(KERN_ERR "E: can't set CBCMAC-AES key: %d\n", (int)result); + goto error_setkey_cbcmac; } for (bitr = 0; bitr < (len + 63) / 64; bitr++) { sfn_le = cpu_to_le64(sfn++); memcpy(&n.sfn, &sfn_le, sizeof(n.sfn)); /* n.sfn++... */ - result = wusb_ccm_mac(tfm_cbc, tfm_aes, scratch, out + bytes, + result = wusb_ccm_mac(tfm_cbcmac, &scratch, out + bytes, &n, a, b, blen); if (result < 0) goto error_ccm_mac; @@ -344,15 +283,10 @@ ssize_t wusb_prf(void *out, size_t out_size, } result = bytes; - kfree(scratch); -error_alloc_scratch: error_ccm_mac: -error_setkey_aes: - crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); -error_alloc_aes: -error_setkey_cbc: - crypto_free_sync_skcipher(tfm_cbc); -error_alloc_cbc: +error_setkey_cbcmac: + crypto_free_shash(tfm_cbcmac); +error_alloc_cbcmac: return result; } @@ -457,11 +391,8 @@ static int wusb_key_derive_verify(void) { int result = 0; struct wusb_keydvt_out keydvt_out; - /* These come from WUSB1.0[A.1] + 2006/12 errata - * NOTE: can't make this const or global -- somehow it seems - * the scatterlists for crypto get confused and we get - * bad data. There is no doc on this... */ - struct wusb_keydvt_in stv_keydvt_in_a1 = { + /* These come from WUSB1.0[A.1] + 2006/12 errata */ + static const struct wusb_keydvt_in stv_keydvt_in_a1 = { .hnonce = { 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f