From patchwork Fri Jun 14 14:01:22 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ard Biesheuvel X-Patchwork-Id: 10995619 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C838614C0 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 14:01:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7A71205FD for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 14:01:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id AB6E4286D0; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 14:01:36 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3905286D1 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 14:01:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727922AbfFNOBc (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Jun 2019 10:01:32 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f66.google.com ([209.85.221.66]:44746 "EHLO mail-wr1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728422AbfFNOB3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Jun 2019 10:01:29 -0400 Received: by mail-wr1-f66.google.com with SMTP id r16so2639886wrl.11 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 07:01:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=mZb2m8Jicq7pxe41avsHdrIYJhBhGMXKjr3QxPKttHY=; b=LWYutGUikimZ/+mhqPniKlZ95/fjcPTV0I+0Pkoc3foeamEpfVQEwXGEKakyGnp3NY pSG5iRIYy5QSwx+Pym6i6pdZ964MeMFxNuFdEXVL88HaFYcoKSrCqoA+98O+zqF0vFAc NTpNqiv0WI1CzgWz5ae2erljqvQv5F82A0A3h0iknfvACyAVBQrlBpCWkypVU5FKUrkT +V2UiwXVOgOmVAI6GvGkpYJQ7ndJV8URy/5JDkEYyvPc3Oc9ehyhILchQgnmd+JZAt35 vZM3VoZeL/3HPdE+gv2hiPQ2uzG8N2/SijfY6r1BuRdgj6J/QyyxohmTIOob4VWRY1IS zneQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=mZb2m8Jicq7pxe41avsHdrIYJhBhGMXKjr3QxPKttHY=; b=o7ChYwOVAWHiDfGy0gdpO9AYXyhApBEor2kjyTqrh98tXfiqIj6X95gXJX5Zm/QP1u tqvY+Q6CPy5pljkcOUaoV42FSeUH65dOaOlBfJhLHBqG6NHpmTvT4f6cShA3veLvo/DW AcNri1teQ8YV5iXjMYbjGBV6mnB/B5J+OXPXFxPrs21v/QSsqdPWsHGkdAPG1I7+mIbw TkXg8LC6AUPl58cf8uWPvI53AdJ1zuTBs2snrwaglfmfQ/OAfVeNN7xoxM7tH4xpPP3y 9gGc6gWaqfzw0N0m+w/RQVFSdBMY0Hagbt5bTUTP7EVLnxplIqscgKArXYzz/mDTHDFn PBWA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWNaQHzDDxNoZsEvgr6wXSMAYltDEe+4S86vm/6kdhrIu5/oWOi vfzjQwbf3rIFzC7tkUskqR1o/w== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzyniPDPZy+uHzgbfNxjbCxF34v13DgdUtfeuprK6jP/vGvPUogE5Jxkd6OPfVkQGMljb9T4Q== X-Received: by 2002:adf:e2c3:: with SMTP id d3mr36601593wrj.314.1560520886323; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 07:01:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sudo.home ([2a01:cb1d:112:6f00:e99d:7886:2d7f:9b24]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d1sm2400665wru.41.2019.06.14.07.01.24 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 14 Jun 2019 07:01:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Ard Biesheuvel To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ebiggers@kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru, yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org, jbaron@akamai.com, cpaasch@apple.com, David.Laight@aculab.com, Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH v2] net: ipv4: move tcp_fastopen server side code to SipHash library Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 16:01:22 +0200 Message-Id: <20190614140122.20934-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Using a bare block cipher in non-crypto code is almost always a bad idea, not only for security reasons (and we've seen some examples of this in the kernel in the past), but also for performance reasons. In the TCP fastopen case, we call into the bare AES block cipher one or two times (depending on whether the connection is IPv4 or IPv6). On most systems, this results in a call chain such as crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx, dst, src) crypto_cipher_crt(tfm)->cit_encrypt_one(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), ...); aesni_encrypt kernel_fpu_begin(); aesni_enc(ctx, dst, src); // asm routine kernel_fpu_end(); It is highly unlikely that the use of special AES instructions has a benefit in this case, especially since we are doing the above twice for IPv6 connections, instead of using a transform which can process the entire input in one go. We could switch to the cbcmac(aes) shash, which would at least get rid of the duplicated overhead in *some* cases (i.e., today, only arm64 has an accelerated implementation of cbcmac(aes), while x86 will end up using the generic cbcmac template wrapping the AES-NI cipher, which basically ends up doing exactly the above). However, in the given context, it makes more sense to use a light-weight MAC algorithm that is more suitable for the purpose at hand, such as SipHash. Since the output size of SipHash already matches our chosen value for TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE, and given that it accepts arbitrary input sizes, this greatly simplifies the code as well. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- v2: rebase onto net-next reverse order of operands in BUILD_BUG_ON() comparison expression include/linux/tcp.h | 7 +- include/net/tcp.h | 10 +- net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 97 +++++++------------- 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index c23019a3b264..9ea0e71f5c6a 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -58,12 +58,7 @@ static inline unsigned int tcp_optlen(const struct sk_buff *skb) /* TCP Fast Open Cookie as stored in memory */ struct tcp_fastopen_cookie { - union { - u8 val[TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX]; -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - struct in6_addr addr; -#endif - }; + u64 val[TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX / sizeof(u64)]; s8 len; bool exp; /* In RFC6994 experimental option format */ }; diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 49a178b8d5b2..16c6745e30c1 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1628,9 +1628,9 @@ bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock *sk, int *err); /* Fastopen key context */ struct tcp_fastopen_context { - struct crypto_cipher *tfm[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX]; - __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH]; - struct rcu_head rcu; + __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX][TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH]; + int num; + struct rcu_head rcu; }; extern unsigned int sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout; @@ -1665,9 +1665,7 @@ bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_match(const struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc, static inline int tcp_fastopen_context_len(const struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx) { - if (ctx->tfm[1]) - return 2; - return 1; + return ctx->num; } /* Latencies incurred by various limits for a sender. They are diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c index 7d19fa4c8121..46b67128e1ca 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -37,14 +38,8 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head) { struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx = container_of(head, struct tcp_fastopen_context, rcu); - int i; - /* We own ctx, thus no need to hold the Fastopen-lock */ - for (i = 0; i < TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX; i++) { - if (ctx->tfm[i]) - crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm[i]); - } - kfree(ctx); + kzfree(ctx); } void tcp_fastopen_destroy_cipher(struct sock *sk) @@ -72,41 +67,6 @@ void tcp_fastopen_ctx_destroy(struct net *net) call_rcu(&ctxt->rcu, tcp_fastopen_ctx_free); } -static struct tcp_fastopen_context *tcp_fastopen_alloc_ctx(void *primary_key, - void *backup_key, - unsigned int len) -{ - struct tcp_fastopen_context *new_ctx; - void *key = primary_key; - int err, i; - - new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new_ctx) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - for (i = 0; i < TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX; i++) - new_ctx->tfm[i] = NULL; - for (i = 0; i < (backup_key ? 2 : 1); i++) { - new_ctx->tfm[i] = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(new_ctx->tfm[i])) { - err = PTR_ERR(new_ctx->tfm[i]); - new_ctx->tfm[i] = NULL; - pr_err("TCP: TFO aes cipher alloc error: %d\n", err); - goto out; - } - err = crypto_cipher_setkey(new_ctx->tfm[i], key, len); - if (err) { - pr_err("TCP: TFO cipher key error: %d\n", err); - goto out; - } - memcpy(&new_ctx->key[i * TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH], key, len); - key = backup_key; - } - return new_ctx; -out: - tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(&new_ctx->rcu); - return ERR_PTR(err); -} - int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, void *primary_key, void *backup_key, unsigned int len) @@ -115,11 +75,20 @@ int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct fastopen_queue *q; int err = 0; - ctx = tcp_fastopen_alloc_ctx(primary_key, backup_key, len); - if (IS_ERR(ctx)) { - err = PTR_ERR(ctx); + ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + + memcpy(ctx->key[0], primary_key, len); + if (backup_key) { + memcpy(ctx->key[1], backup_key, len); + ctx->num = 2; + } else { + ctx->num = 1; + } + spin_lock(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock); if (sk) { q = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq; @@ -141,31 +110,30 @@ int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req, struct sk_buff *syn, - struct crypto_cipher *tfm, + const u8 *key, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc) { + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH != sizeof(siphash_key_t)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != sizeof(u64)); + if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET) { const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(syn); - __be32 path[4] = { iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0, 0 }; - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, foc->val, (void *)path); + foc->val[0] = siphash(&iph->saddr, + sizeof(iph->saddr) + + sizeof(iph->daddr), + (const siphash_key_t *)key); foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE; return true; } - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET6) { const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(syn); - struct tcp_fastopen_cookie tmp; - struct in6_addr *buf; - int i; - - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, tmp.val, - (void *)&ip6h->saddr); - buf = &tmp.addr; - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) - buf->s6_addr32[i] ^= ip6h->daddr.s6_addr32[i]; - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, foc->val, (void *)buf); + + foc->val[0] = siphash(&ip6h->saddr, + sizeof(ip6h->saddr) + + sizeof(ip6h->daddr), + (const siphash_key_t *)key); foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE; return true; } @@ -173,11 +141,8 @@ static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req, return false; } -/* Generate the fastopen cookie by doing aes128 encryption on both - * the source and destination addresses. Pad 0s for IPv4 or IPv4-mapped-IPv6 - * addresses. For the longer IPv6 addresses use CBC-MAC. - * - * XXX (TFO) - refactor when TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != AES_BLOCK_SIZE. +/* Generate the fastopen cookie by applying SipHash to both the source and + * destination addresses. */ static void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req, @@ -189,7 +154,7 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct sock *sk, rcu_read_lock(); ctx = tcp_fastopen_get_ctx(sk); if (ctx) - __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->tfm[0], foc); + __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->key[0], foc); rcu_read_unlock(); } @@ -253,7 +218,7 @@ static int tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_check(struct sock *sk, if (!ctx) goto out; for (i = 0; i < tcp_fastopen_context_len(ctx); i++) { - __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->tfm[i], foc); + __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(req, syn, ctx->key[i], foc); if (tcp_fastopen_cookie_match(foc, orig)) { ret = i + 1; goto out;