From patchwork Mon Jul 1 18:19:58 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jaskaran Singh Khurana X-Patchwork-Id: 11026571 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2861F138B for ; Mon, 1 Jul 2019 18:20:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DD39286F6 for ; Mon, 1 Jul 2019 18:20:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 112AA2873F; Mon, 1 Jul 2019 18:20:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1FB0F286F6 for ; Mon, 1 Jul 2019 18:20:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727240AbfGASUU (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Jul 2019 14:20:20 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:42232 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727210AbfGASUU (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Jul 2019 14:20:20 -0400 Received: from jaskaran-Intel-Server-Board-S1200V3RPS-UEFI-Development-Kit.corp.microsoft.com (unknown [131.107.160.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4A09C205CFD5; Mon, 1 Jul 2019 11:20:18 -0700 (PDT) From: Jaskaran Khurana To: gmazyland@gmail.com, ebiggers@google.com Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, scottsh@microsoft.com, mdsakib@microsoft.com, mpatocka@redhat.com Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation. Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 11:19:58 -0700 Message-Id: <20190701181958.6493-2-jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190701181958.6493-1-jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20190701181958.6493-1-jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com> Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies. One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created. The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed. The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification. Adds CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG which can be turned on if root hash verification is needed. Kernel commandline parameter require_signatures will indicate whether to force (for all dm verity volumes) roothash signature verification. Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana --- Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt | 7 ++ drivers/md/Kconfig | 12 +++ drivers/md/Makefile | 5 + drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 43 +++++++- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h | 60 +++++++++++ drivers/md/dm-verity.h | 2 + 7 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h diff --git a/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt b/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt index b3d2e4a42255..df7ef1d553cc 100644 --- a/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt +++ b/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt @@ -121,6 +121,13 @@ check_at_most_once blocks, and a hash block will not be verified any more after all the data blocks it covers have been verified anyway. +root_hash_sig_key_desc + This is the description of the USER_KEY that the kernel will lookup to get + the pkcs7 signature of the roothash. The pkcs7 signature is used to validate + the root hash during the creation of the device mapper block device. + Verification of roothash depends on the config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + being set in the kernel. + Theory of operation =================== diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig index db269a348b20..9d0bc609582c 100644 --- a/drivers/md/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig @@ -489,6 +489,18 @@ config DM_VERITY If unsure, say N. +config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + def_bool n + bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support" + depends on DM_VERITY + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + The device mapper target created by DM-VERITY can be validated if the + pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7 + signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree. + + If unsure, say N. + config DM_VERITY_FEC bool "Verity forward error correction support" depends on DM_VERITY diff --git a/drivers/md/Makefile b/drivers/md/Makefile index be7a6eb92abc..fe756c0dca14 100644 --- a/drivers/md/Makefile +++ b/drivers/md/Makefile @@ -81,3 +81,8 @@ endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC),y) dm-verity-objs += dm-verity-fec.o endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG),y) +dm-verity-objs += dm-verity-verify-sig.o +endif + diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index f4c31ffaa88e..3dc7f6dcc337 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include "dm-verity.h" #include "dm-verity-fec.h" - +#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" #include #include @@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ #define DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES "ignore_zero_blocks" #define DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE "check_at_most_once" -#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX (2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC) +#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX (2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC + \ + DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS) static unsigned dm_verity_prefetch_cluster = DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE; @@ -714,6 +715,8 @@ static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, args++; if (v->validated_blocks) args++; + if (v->signature_key_desc) + args += DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS; if (!args) return; DMEMIT(" %u", args); @@ -735,6 +738,9 @@ static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, if (v->validated_blocks) DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE); sz = verity_fec_status_table(v, sz, result, maxlen); + if (v->signature_key_desc) + DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY + " %s", v->signature_key_desc); break; } } @@ -800,6 +806,8 @@ static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) verity_fec_dtr(v); + kfree(v->signature_key_desc); + kfree(v); } @@ -855,7 +863,8 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v) return r; } -static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v) +static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, + struct dm_verity_sig_opts *verify_args) { int r; unsigned argc; @@ -904,6 +913,14 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v) if (r) return r; continue; + } else if (verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(arg_name)) { + r = verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(as, v, + verify_args, + &argc, arg_name); + if (r) + return r; + continue; + } ti->error = "Unrecognized verity feature request"; @@ -930,6 +947,7 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v) static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) { struct dm_verity *v; + struct dm_verity_sig_opts verify_args = {0}; struct dm_arg_set as; unsigned int num; unsigned long long num_ll; @@ -937,6 +955,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) int i; sector_t hash_position; char dummy; + char *root_hash_digest_to_validate; v = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity), GFP_KERNEL); if (!v) { @@ -1070,6 +1089,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) r = -EINVAL; goto bad; } + root_hash_digest_to_validate = argv[8]; if (strcmp(argv[9], "-")) { v->salt_size = strlen(argv[9]) / 2; @@ -1095,11 +1115,20 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) as.argc = argc; as.argv = argv; - r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v); + r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v, &verify_args); if (r < 0) goto bad; } + /* Root hash signature is a optional parameter*/ + r = verity_verify_root_hash(root_hash_digest_to_validate, + strlen(root_hash_digest_to_validate), + verify_args.sig, + verify_args.sig_size); + if (r < 0) { + ti->error = "Root hash verification failed"; + goto bad; + } v->hash_per_block_bits = __fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size); @@ -1165,9 +1194,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) ti->per_io_data_size = roundup(ti->per_io_data_size, __alignof__(struct dm_verity_io)); + verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args); + return 0; bad: + + verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args); verity_dtr(ti); return r; @@ -1175,7 +1208,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) static struct target_type verity_target = { .name = "verity", - .version = {1, 4, 0}, + .version = {1, 5, 0}, .module = THIS_MODULE, .ctr = verity_ctr, .dtr = verity_dtr, diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..614e43db93aa --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. + * + * Author: Jaskaran Singh Khurana + * + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "dm-verity.h" +#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" + +#define DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR(s) DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION " " s + +static bool require_signatures; +module_param(require_signatures, bool, false); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(require_signatures, + "Verify the roothash of dm-verity hash tree"); + +#define DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED() \ + (require_signatures != false) + +bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name) +{ + return (!strcasecmp(arg_name, + DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY)); +} + +static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc, + struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts) +{ + struct key *key; + const struct user_key_payload *ukp; + int ret = 0; + + key = request_key(&key_type_user, + key_desc, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + down_read(&key->sem); + + ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key); + if (!ukp) { + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto end; + } + + sig_opts->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig_opts->sig) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto end; + } + sig_opts->sig_size = ukp->datalen; + + memcpy(sig_opts->sig, ukp->data, sig_opts->sig_size); + +end: + up_read(&key->sem); + key_put(key); + + return ret; +} + +int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, + struct dm_verity *v, + struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts, + unsigned int *argc, + const char *arg_name) +{ + struct dm_target *ti = v->ti; + int ret = 0; + const char *sig_key = NULL; + + if (!*argc) { + ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Signature key not specified"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sig_key = dm_shift_arg(as); + (*argc)--; + + ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_opts); + if (ret < 0) + ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Invalid key specified"); + + v->signature_key_desc = kstrdup(sig_key, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!v->signature_key_desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device + * using builtin trusted keys. + * + * @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified. + * @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified. + * @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data. + * @sig_len: Size of the signature. + * + */ +int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len, + const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret; + + if (!root_hash || root_hash_len == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!sig_data || sig_len == 0) { + if (DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED()) + return -ENOKEY; + else + return 0; + } + + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data, + sig_len, NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); + + return ret; +} + +void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts) +{ + kfree(sig_opts->sig); + sig_opts->sig = NULL; + sig_opts->sig_size = 0; +} diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..19b1547aa741 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. + * + * Author: Jaskaran Singh Khurana + * + */ +#ifndef DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H +#define DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H + +#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION "DM Verity Sig Verification" +#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY "root_hash_sig_key_desc" + +struct dm_verity_sig_opts { + unsigned int sig_size; + u8 *sig; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + +#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 2 + +int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len, + const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len); +bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name); + +int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, + struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts, + unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name); + +void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts); + +#else + +#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 0 + +int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len, + const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len) +{ + return 0; +} + +bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name) +{ + return false; +} + +int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, + struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts, + unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG */ +#endif /* DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H */ diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h index 3441c10b840c..42183a3903ae 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct dm_verity { struct dm_verity_fec *fec; /* forward error correction */ unsigned long *validated_blocks; /* bitset blocks validated */ + + char *signature_key_desc; /* signature keyring reference */ }; struct dm_verity_io {