From patchwork Wed Oct 16 05:14:52 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sumit Garg X-Patchwork-Id: 11192373 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91E3F15AB for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 05:15:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59FE12168B for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 05:15:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="rC/IwiVH" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726717AbfJPFPc (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Oct 2019 01:15:32 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-f195.google.com ([209.85.210.195]:43859 "EHLO mail-pf1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727524AbfJPFPa (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Oct 2019 01:15:30 -0400 Received: by mail-pf1-f195.google.com with SMTP id a2so13917162pfo.10 for ; Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=ucr524PubIUeoyxQUnnL5Q//zujjntBJWHUxIzHERf0=; b=rC/IwiVHFPw48T2bd68tOe7YqIQfFm27wpmbFYkpJZcj8mEH4ZKEP8azd6OrzvVNHT UzMn5z21OIldsIx3901U+bBgMWEVn+FJrI4gjGB7ogXqee+HLvHnuH34Fpw8aP+/mopM qH9lJaYQNJns3s3aPZc9g7/4xQZSDK9HRVaBLvEB9/rV9ek47aamzrgpn1+JPQbcXqyS dr/wu4qOnIb27rPfVYwHuNYqf0CQKnCBUyRK9o/cvn4uijJl0e3VsxLWCS4OWwXx623Q akavkxB+uGtg7olPh+jIqgNfSjJGfLV+/X0xlmEY4ghGVV8Hg3uU1TBWBkrbU7wVb66o xwXw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=ucr524PubIUeoyxQUnnL5Q//zujjntBJWHUxIzHERf0=; b=ujfe2CZMFbxI/x1LE4mAM+IGh167fzgMgJlEDRUmJpD+WEmYxbdDeFUm0x/CflElfj bCS42RV8CVWZmXwob4AhouVQ4V0iqZLTjCCx/Nvbi2Inj94P7va/SBfn+l5DMBf2rin7 8ub/osFe6EOa1tFEb+bpDtArugB9ghaSXMQswDcK/hYaIx4cIFVtf9pIweiIpGLGHdBN SPuVOwvvpqEByB5N3fV1bhSFAbN9mTklbiCaQs0+pWrqsqVmKusCCB1Qc7o4Uuv03OXm rZmu9gQDZqLiLzONTU2VNahHEB3mzMNzpoUEikDsR7aJ8pqGldQLdn/HqFDGjQbv6yPJ QgMA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXZ8aHXyM1vUbYC5mhEGWKDBg6qjAWjIqnq6Z/tdYuAw5eMT3YF EIcKInapxymZ4bcWY/ZsOmF9ZA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwHFW5zbXmI5JJKbCuG+WtIF6tc1eRH4sAIkTnA9WJK2SUH3yoXunfBrz35lV5xH3zfR6UnEQ== X-Received: by 2002:a62:870c:: with SMTP id i12mr42655922pfe.247.1571202928103; Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.252.65.194]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r81sm953297pgr.17.2019.10.15.22.15.20 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, dhowells@redhat.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jgg@ziepe.ca, arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, jsnitsel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [Patch v8 1/4] tpm: Move tpm_buf code to include/linux/ Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 10:44:52 +0530 Message-Id: <1571202895-32651-2-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc. Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 12 +-- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 212 -------------------------------------- include/keys/trusted.h | 12 +-- include/linux/tpm.h | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted.c | 12 +-- 5 files changed, 230 insertions(+), 230 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 76d2ce3..b88968d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ /* * Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace */ -static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb, +static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen, uint32_t *newhandle) @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb, /* * Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command */ -static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) +static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) { INIT_BUF(tb); store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) * Decrypt a blob provided by userspace using a specific key handle. * The handle is a well known handle or previously loaded by e.g. LoadKey2 */ -static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, void *out, uint32_t outlen) @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm_buf *tb, * up to key_length_in_bytes - 11 and not be limited to size 20 like the * TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1 signature scheme. */ -static int tpm_sign(struct tpm_buf *tb, +static int tpm_sign(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, void *out, uint32_t outlen) @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; + struct tpm1_buf *tb; uint32_t keyhandle; uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk, struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; + struct tpm1_buf *tb; uint32_t keyhandle; uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 0d1fd37..b174cf4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #ifdef CONFIG_X86 @@ -58,124 +57,6 @@ enum tpm_addr { #define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7 #define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38 -#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 - -enum tpm2_const { - TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR = 24, - TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN = ((TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR + 7) / 8), -}; - -enum tpm2_timeouts { - TPM2_TIMEOUT_A = 750, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_B = 2000, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_C = 200, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_D = 30, - TPM2_DURATION_SHORT = 20, - TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM = 750, - TPM2_DURATION_LONG = 2000, - TPM2_DURATION_LONG_LONG = 300000, - TPM2_DURATION_DEFAULT = 120000, -}; - -enum tpm2_structures { - TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS = 0x8001, - TPM2_ST_SESSIONS = 0x8002, -}; - -/* Indicates from what layer of the software stack the error comes from */ -#define TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT 16 -#define TSS2_RESMGR_TPM_RC_LAYER (11 << TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT) - -enum tpm2_return_codes { - TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000, - TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */ - TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B, - TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */ - TPM2_RC_FAILURE = 0x0101, - TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120, - TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE = 0x0143, - TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */ - TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910, - TPM2_RC_RETRY = 0x0922, -}; - -enum tpm2_command_codes { - TPM2_CC_FIRST = 0x011F, - TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL = 0x0121, - TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CHANGE_AUTH = 0x0129, - TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, - TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x013E, - TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, - TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, - TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145, - TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, - TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, - TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, - TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C, - TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, - TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, - TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, - TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, - TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, - TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, - TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, - TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, - TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, - TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, - TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, - TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, - TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ -}; - -enum tpm2_permanent_handles { - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, -}; - -enum tpm2_capabilities { - TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1, - TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2, - TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5, - TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6, -}; - -enum tpm2_properties { - TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129, -}; - -enum tpm2_startup_types { - TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000, - TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001, -}; - -enum tpm2_cc_attrs { - TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25, - TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28, -}; - -#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086 -#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050 -#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A - -enum tpm_chip_flags { - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED = BIT(5), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_FIRMWARE_POWER_MANAGED = BIT(6), -}; - -#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) - -struct tpm_header { - __be16 tag; - __be32 length; - union { - __be32 ordinal; - __be32 return_code; - }; -} __packed; - #define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193 struct stclear_flags_t { @@ -272,99 +153,6 @@ enum tpm_sub_capabilities { * compiler warnings about stack frame size. */ #define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA 128 -/* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the - * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based - * in order to keep the stack usage minimal. - */ - -enum tpm_buf_flags { - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), -}; - -struct tpm_buf { - unsigned int flags; - u8 *data; -}; - -static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); - head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); - head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); -} - -static inline int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) -{ - buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf->data) - return -ENOMEM; - - buf->flags = 0; - tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); - return 0; -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - free_page((unsigned long)buf->data); -} - -static inline u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - return be32_to_cpu(head->length); -} - -static inline u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, - const unsigned char *new_data, - unsigned int new_len) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - u32 len = tpm_buf_length(buf); - - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) - return; - - if ((len + new_len) > PAGE_SIZE) { - WARN(1, "tpm_buf: overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; - return; - } - - memcpy(&buf->data[len], new_data, new_len); - head->length = cpu_to_be32(len + new_len); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) -{ - tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) -{ - __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); - - tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 2); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) -{ - __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); - - tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); -} - extern struct class *tpm_class; extern struct class *tpmrm_class; extern dev_t tpm_devt; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted.h index 0071298..841ae11 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) -struct tpm_buf { +struct tpm1_buf { int len; unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; }; @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int keylen, ...); int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); +int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); #define TPM_DEBUG 0 @@ -110,24 +110,24 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) } #endif -static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) +static inline void store8(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) { buf->data[buf->len++] = value; } -static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) +static inline void store16(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) { *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); buf->len += sizeof value; } -static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) +static inline void store32(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) { *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); buf->len += sizeof value; } -static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, const int len) { memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index bb1d1ac..c78119f 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ @@ -163,6 +164,217 @@ struct tpm_chip { int locality; }; +#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 + +enum tpm2_const { + TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR = 24, + TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN = ((TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR + 7) / 8), +}; + +enum tpm2_timeouts { + TPM2_TIMEOUT_A = 750, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_B = 2000, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_C = 200, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_D = 30, + TPM2_DURATION_SHORT = 20, + TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM = 750, + TPM2_DURATION_LONG = 2000, + TPM2_DURATION_LONG_LONG = 300000, + TPM2_DURATION_DEFAULT = 120000, +}; + +enum tpm2_structures { + TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS = 0x8001, + TPM2_ST_SESSIONS = 0x8002, +}; + +/* Indicates from what layer of the software stack the error comes from */ +#define TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT 16 +#define TSS2_RESMGR_TPM_RC_LAYER (11 << TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT) + +enum tpm2_return_codes { + TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000, + TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */ + TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B, + TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */ + TPM2_RC_FAILURE = 0x0101, + TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120, + TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE = 0x0143, + TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */ + TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910, + TPM2_RC_RETRY = 0x0922, +}; + +enum tpm2_command_codes { + TPM2_CC_FIRST = 0x011F, + TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL = 0x0121, + TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CHANGE_AUTH = 0x0129, + TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, + TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x013E, + TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, + TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, + TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145, + TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, + TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, + TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, + TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C, + TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, + TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, + TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, + TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, + TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, + TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, + TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, + TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, + TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, + TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, + TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, + TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, + TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ +}; + +enum tpm2_permanent_handles { + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, +}; + +enum tpm2_capabilities { + TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1, + TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2, + TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5, + TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6, +}; + +enum tpm2_properties { + TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129, +}; + +enum tpm2_startup_types { + TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000, + TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001, +}; + +enum tpm2_cc_attrs { + TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25, + TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28, +}; + +#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086 +#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050 +#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A + +enum tpm_chip_flags { + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED = BIT(5), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_FIRMWARE_POWER_MANAGED = BIT(6), +}; + +#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) + +struct tpm_header { + __be16 tag; + __be32 length; + union { + __be32 ordinal; + __be32 return_code; + }; +} __packed; + +/* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the + * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based + * in order to keep the stack usage minimal. + */ + +enum tpm_buf_flags { + TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), +}; + +struct tpm_buf { + unsigned int flags; + u8 *data; +}; + +static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); + head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); +} + +static inline int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf->data) + return -ENOMEM; + + buf->flags = 0; + tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); + return 0; +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + free_page((unsigned long)buf->data); +} + +static inline u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + return be32_to_cpu(head->length); +} + +static inline u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, + const unsigned char *new_data, + unsigned int new_len) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 len = tpm_buf_length(buf); + + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + return; + + if ((len + new_len) > PAGE_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: overflow\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + return; + } + + memcpy(&buf->data[len], new_data, new_len); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(len + new_len); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) +{ + tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) +{ + __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 2); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) +{ + __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); +} + #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 1fbd778..4cfae208 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) /* * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session */ -static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, +static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) { unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, /* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret; @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ struct tpm_digests { * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, /* * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob */ -static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; + struct tpm1_buf *tb; int ret; tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; 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Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.252.65.194]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r81sm953297pgr.17.2019.10.15.22.15.28 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, dhowells@redhat.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jgg@ziepe.ca, arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, jsnitsel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [Patch v8 2/4] KEYS: Use common tpm_buf for trusted and asymmetric keys Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 10:44:53 +0530 Message-Id: <1571202895-32651-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++---------------------- include/keys/trusted.h | 37 +------------ security/keys/trusted.c | 98 +++++++++++++++------------------- 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 153 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index b88968d..a2b2a61 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -21,17 +21,13 @@ #define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65 #define TPM_ORD_UNBIND 30 #define TPM_ORD_SIGN 60 -#define TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE 59 -#define TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE 18 -#define TPM_UNBIND_SIZE 63 -#define TPM_SIGN_SIZE 63 #define TPM_RT_KEY 0x00000001 /* * Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace */ -static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb, +static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen, uint32_t *newhandle) @@ -68,16 +64,13 @@ static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb, return ret; /* build the request buffer */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE + keybloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, keyblob, keybloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, keyblob, keybloblen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { @@ -99,14 +92,11 @@ static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb, /* * Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command */ -static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) +static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) { - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC); - store32(tb, handle); - store32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY); return trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); } @@ -115,7 +105,7 @@ static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) * Decrypt a blob provided by userspace using a specific key handle. * The handle is a well known handle or previously loaded by e.g. LoadKey2 */ -static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, void *out, uint32_t outlen) @@ -155,17 +145,14 @@ static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb, return ret; /* build the request buffer */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_UNBIND_SIZE + bloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNBIND); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - store32(tb, bloblen); - storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNBIND); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { @@ -201,7 +188,7 @@ static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb, * up to key_length_in_bytes - 11 and not be limited to size 20 like the * TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1 signature scheme. */ -static int tpm_sign(struct tpm1_buf *tb, +static int tpm_sign(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen, void *out, uint32_t outlen) @@ -241,17 +228,14 @@ static int tpm_sign(struct tpm1_buf *tb, return ret; /* build the request buffer */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_SIGN_SIZE + bloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SIGN); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - store32(tb, bloblen); - storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SIGN); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { @@ -519,7 +503,7 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; uint32_t keyhandle; uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -533,14 +517,14 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1")) return -ENOPKG; - tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; + r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (r) + return r; /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */ memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth)); - r = tpm_loadkey2(tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, + r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle); if (r < 0) { pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r); @@ -550,16 +534,16 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk, /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */ memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth)); - r = tpm_unbind(tb, keyhandle, keyauth, + r = tpm_unbind(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, params->in_len, out, params->out_len); if (r < 0) pr_devel("tpm_unbind failed (%d)\n", r); - if (tpm_flushspecific(tb, keyhandle) < 0) + if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0) pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r); error: - kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r); return r; } @@ -643,7 +627,7 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk, struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; uint32_t keyhandle; uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -681,15 +665,14 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk, goto error_free_asn1_wrapped; } - r = -ENOMEM; - tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) + r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (r) goto error_free_asn1_wrapped; /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */ memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth)); - r = tpm_loadkey2(tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, + r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth, tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle); if (r < 0) { pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r); @@ -699,15 +682,15 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk, /* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */ memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth)); - r = tpm_sign(tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, in_len, out, params->out_len); + r = tpm_sign(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, in_len, out, params->out_len); if (r < 0) pr_devel("tpm_sign failed (%d)\n", r); - if (tpm_flushspecific(tb, keyhandle) < 0) + if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0) pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r); error_free_tb: - kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); error_free_asn1_wrapped: kfree(asn1_wrapped); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r); diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted.h index 841ae11..29e3e9b 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted.h @@ -5,10 +5,6 @@ /* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 -#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 -#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 -#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 -#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 #define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 #define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 #define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 @@ -17,13 +13,6 @@ #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) -struct tpm1_buf { - int len; - unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; -}; - -#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) - struct osapsess { uint32_t handle; unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -46,7 +35,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int keylen, ...); int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); -int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); #define TPM_DEBUG 0 @@ -109,28 +98,4 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { } #endif - -static inline void store8(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) -{ - buf->data[buf->len++] = value; -} - -static inline void store16(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) -{ - *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void store32(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) -{ - *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void storebytes(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, - const int len) -{ - memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); - buf->len += len; -} #endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 4cfae208..7071011 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) /* * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session */ -static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, +static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) { unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; @@ -406,13 +406,10 @@ static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) return ret; - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); - store16(tb, type); - store32(tb, handle); - storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); + tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) @@ -430,17 +427,14 @@ static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, /* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret; if (!chip) return -ENODEV; - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OIAP); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -464,7 +458,7 @@ struct tpm_digests { * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, @@ -535,20 +529,17 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; /* build and send the TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, pcrinfosize); - storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); - store32(tb, datalen); - storebytes(tb, data, datalen); - store32(tb, sess.handle); - storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SEAL); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, pcrinfosize); + tpm_buf_append(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, datalen); + tpm_buf_append(tb, data, datalen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, sess.handle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) @@ -579,7 +570,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, /* * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob */ -static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, @@ -628,20 +619,17 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, return ret; /* build and send TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle1); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, authhandle2); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle1); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle2); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { @@ -670,23 +658,23 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; int ret; - tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); return ret; } @@ -696,14 +684,14 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; int ret; - tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); @@ -711,7 +699,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; - kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); return ret; } From patchwork Wed Oct 16 05:14:54 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sumit Garg X-Patchwork-Id: 11192383 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0687715AB for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 05:15:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DBB1A20872 for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 05:15:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="p4Ig7iBt" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731311AbfJPFPq (ORCPT ); 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Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/Kbuild | 1 - include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 7 +++++-- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 +++++++ security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c} | 2 +- 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (96%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c} (99%) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index a2b2a61..d16d893 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include diff --git a/include/Kbuild b/include/Kbuild index ffba794..6f9ec5a 100644 --- a/include/Kbuild +++ b/include/Kbuild @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ header-test- += keys/asymmetric-subtype.h header-test- += keys/asymmetric-type.h header-test- += keys/big_key-type.h header-test- += keys/request_key_auth-type.h -header-test- += keys/trusted.h header-test- += kvm/arm_arch_timer.h header-test- += kvm/arm_pmu.h header-test-$(CONFIG_ARM) += kvm/arm_psci.h diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h similarity index 96% rename from include/keys/trusted.h rename to include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 29e3e9b..7b9d7b4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H -#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H +#ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H +#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H + +#include +#include /* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 9cef540..074f275 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o # Key types # obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o -obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted-keys/ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a24680 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Makefile for trusted keys +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c similarity index 99% rename from security/keys/trusted.c rename to security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 7071011..e3155fd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include #include -#include +#include static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; 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Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.252.65.194]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r81sm953297pgr.17.2019.10.15.22.15.45 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:15:53 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, dhowells@redhat.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jgg@ziepe.ca, arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, jsnitsel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [Patch v8 4/4] KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 10:44:55 +0530 Message-Id: <1571202895-32651-5-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1571202895-32651-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely. Also, utilize existing tpm_send() exported API which wraps the internal tpm_transmit_cmd() API. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 56 ------ drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 11 -- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 307 ----------------------------- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 7 + include/linux/tpm.h | 36 ++-- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 394 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 7f10549..a438b12 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -459,62 +459,6 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random); -/** - * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * - * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in - * the keyring subsystem. - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) - return -ENODEV; - - rc = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted); - -/** - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * - * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in - * the keyring subsystem. - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) - return -ENODEV; - - rc = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_unseal_trusted); - static int __init tpm_init(void) { int rc; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index b174cf4..b9e1547 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -212,11 +212,6 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) } #endif -static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) -{ - return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc; -} - int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest, u16 *digest_size_ptr); @@ -224,12 +219,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max); void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); -int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); -int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value, const char *desc); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5817dfe..fdb4577 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -13,20 +13,6 @@ #include "tpm.h" #include -#include - -enum tpm2_object_attributes { - TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), -}; - -enum tpm2_session_attributes { - TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION = BIT(0), -}; - -struct tpm2_hash { - unsigned int crypto_id; - unsigned int tpm_id; -}; static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, @@ -377,299 +363,6 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); } -/** - * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. - * - * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance - * @session_handle: session handle - * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used - * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used - * @attributes: the session attributes - * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used - * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used - */ -static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, - const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, - u8 attributes, - const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); - - if (nonce && nonce_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); - - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); - - if (hmac && hmac_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); -} - -/** - * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * - * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success. - */ -int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - unsigned int blob_len; - struct tpm_buf buf; - u32 hash; - int i; - int rc; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { - if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { - hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; - break; - } - } - - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) - return -EINVAL; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - 0 /* session_attributes */, - options->keyauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); - - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); - - /* public */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); - - /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, - options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } - - /* public parameters */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - - /* outside info */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - - /* creation PCR */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); - if (rc) - goto out; - - blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - if (rc > 0) { - if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) - rc = -EINVAL; - else - rc = -EPERM; - } - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: returned blob handle - * - * Return: 0 on success. - * -E2BIG on wrong payload size. - * -EPERM on tpm error status. - * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd. - */ -static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u32 *blob_handle) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - unsigned int private_len; - unsigned int public_len; - unsigned int blob_len; - int rc; - - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) - return -E2BIG; - - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); - blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; - if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) - return -E2BIG; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - 0 /* session_attributes */, - options->keyauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); - - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); - if (!rc) - *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( - (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: blob handle - * - * Return: 0 on success - * -EPERM on tpm error status - * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd - */ -static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u32 blob_handle) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - u16 data_len; - u8 *data; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, - options->policyhandle ? - options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, - options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; - - if (!rc) { - data_len = be16_to_cpup( - (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; - } - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * - * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. - */ -int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - u32 blob_handle; - int rc; - - rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); - if (rc) - return rc; - - rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); - return rc; -} - struct tpm2_get_cap_out { u8 more_data; __be32 subcap_id; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 7b9d7b4..a56d8e1 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); +int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); +int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); + #define TPM_DEBUG 0 #if TPM_DEBUG diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index c78119f..0d6e949 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -296,6 +296,19 @@ struct tpm_buf { u8 *data; }; +enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), +}; + +enum tpm2_session_attributes { + TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION = BIT(0), +}; + +struct tpm2_hash { + unsigned int crypto_id; + unsigned int tpm_id; +}; + static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) { struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; @@ -375,6 +388,11 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); } +static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) +{ + return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc; +} + #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -384,12 +402,6 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests); extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); -extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); -extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); #else static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) @@ -418,18 +430,6 @@ static inline int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max) return -ENODEV; } -static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - return -ENODEV; -} -static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - return -ENODEV; -} static inline struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void) { return NULL; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 1a24680..7b73ceb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index e3155fd..eb5074e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); else ret = key_unseal(payload, options); dump_payload(payload); @@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); else ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9810ac --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { + {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512}, + {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, +}; + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. + * + * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance + * @session_handle: session handle + * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used + * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used + * @attributes: the session attributes + * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used + * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used + */ +static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, + const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, + u8 attributes, + const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) +{ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); + + if (nonce && nonce_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); + + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); + + if (hmac && hmac_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); +} + +/** + * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * + * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success. + */ +int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + unsigned int blob_len; + struct tpm_buf buf; + u32 hash; + int i; + int rc; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { + if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { + hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; + break; + } + } + + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + /* sensitive */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); + + /* public */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + + /* policy */ + if (options->policydigest_len) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, + options->policydigest_len); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + } + + /* public parameters */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* outside info */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* creation PCR */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); + payload->blob_len = blob_len; + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) { + if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + rc = -EPERM; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @blob_handle: returned blob handle + * + * Return: 0 on success. + * -E2BIG on wrong payload size. + * -EPERM on tpm error status. + * < 0 error from tpm_send. + */ +static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 *blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + unsigned int private_len; + unsigned int public_len; + unsigned int blob_len; + int rc; + + private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); + if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; + if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) + return -E2BIG; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (!rc) + *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( + (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @blob_handle: blob handle + * + * Return: 0 on success + * -EPERM on tpm error status + * < 0 error from tpm_send + */ +static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + u16 data_len; + u8 *data; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, + options->policyhandle ? + options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + options->blobauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (!rc) { + data_len = be16_to_cpup( + (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; + + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * + * Return: Same as with tpm_send. + */ +int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + u32 blob_handle; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); + + return rc; +}