From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:00 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600347 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35BF16CB for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1BA7295EE for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id A5923296F7; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56011295EE for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728111AbeINNQV (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:21 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:46872 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728096AbeINNQV (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:21 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E81B4t113015 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:03 -0400 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg74651vn-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:02 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:02:57 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (mk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E82u6T58392790 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:02:56 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C61D4203F; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:46 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2275642041; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:45 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:44 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 1/6] ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:00 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0008-0000-0000-000002713EEC X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0009-0000-0000-000021D9839D Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-2-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch defines the new arch specific function called arch_ima_get_secureboot() to retrieve the secureboot state of the system. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Suggested-by: Seth Forshee --- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 02d6f5cf4e70..f32406e51424 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -149,3 +149,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) obj-$(CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o obj-y += vsmp_64.o endif + +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima_arch.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bb5a88d2b271 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + */ +#include +#include + +extern struct boot_params boot_params; + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && + (boot_params.secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)) + return true; + else + return false; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 84806b54b50a..4852255aa4f4 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 +extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); +#else +static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + #else static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:01 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600365 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 507026CB for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2972294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id E72DA2B5F1; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:39 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87E88294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728153AbeINNQ0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:26 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:38904 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728149AbeINNQZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:25 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E7x89P094008 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:06 -0400 Received: from e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.103]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg7e9m0bn-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:06 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:00 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (mk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E82xG058851400 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:02:59 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E569342052; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:49 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B8CB42041; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:48 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:48 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 2/6] ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:01 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0028-0000-0000-000002F93DD4 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0029-0000-0000-000023B2E4FF Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-3-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=927 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with secureboot enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dce0a8a217bb..bdb6e5563d05 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -505,20 +505,24 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, */ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { - bool sig_enforce; + bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) - return 0; + ima_enforce = + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; switch (id) { case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: - if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + return -EACCES; +#endif + if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } break; case LOADING_FIRMWARE: - if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) { + if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) { pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } @@ -526,7 +530,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) case LOADING_MODULE: sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { + if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce + && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:02 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600363 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DA01933 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1C524294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 105F52B5EF; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:37 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 972A0294DB for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727820AbeINNQw (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:52 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:54202 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728176AbeINNQ2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:28 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E7xJPB086029 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:10 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg8nv95mu-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:10 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:04 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E833Nw56033514 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:03 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38DB04204B; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:53 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C31E942049; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:51 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:51 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 3/6] ima: refactor ima_init_policy() Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:02 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0016-0000-0000-000002054575 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0017-0000-0000-0000325C19DC Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-4-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining a new function named add_rules(). Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8c9499867c91..b58906a05736 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; +enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; + struct ima_rule_entry { struct list_head list; int action; @@ -473,6 +475,33 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return 0; } +static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list file) +{ + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + + if (file && IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) + list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); + + if (file && IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY) { + entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) + continue; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); + } + if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) + temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func); + if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK) + temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + } +} + /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. * @@ -481,28 +510,23 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) */ void __init ima_init_policy(void) { - int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries; - - /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ - measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0; - appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? - ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; - secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ? - ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0; + int build_appraise_entries; - for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++) - list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); + /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ + if (ima_policy) + add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); switch (ima_policy) { case ORIGINAL_TCB: - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++) - list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); + add_rules(original_measurement_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; case DEFAULT_TCB: - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++) - list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); + add_rules(default_measurement_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); default: break; } @@ -511,38 +535,30 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules. */ - for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) { - list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); - temp_ima_appraise |= - ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func); - } + if (ima_use_secure_boot) + add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); /* * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise - * rules. + * rules. As the secure boot rules includes all of the build time + * rules, include either one or the other set of rules, but not both. */ - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) { - struct ima_rule_entry *entry; - - if (!secure_boot_entries) - list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); - - entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (entry) - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); - build_ima_appraise |= - ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func); + build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); + if (build_appraise_entries) { + if (ima_use_secure_boot) + add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); + else + add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } - for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) { - list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); - if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK) - temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; - } + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) + add_rules(default_appraise_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; ima_update_policy_flag(); From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:03 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600357 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6DEF933 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53CF8294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 47C7B2B5F5; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29B7F294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728199AbeINNQb (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:31 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:48096 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728152AbeINNQ3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:29 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E81CoG113048 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:11 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg746524k-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:11 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:07 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E836vk52232236 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:06 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F7094203F; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:56 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20B3F42056; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:55 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:54 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 4/6] ima: add support for arch specific policies Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:03 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-4275-0000-0000-000002BA3E71 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-4276-0000-0000-000037C37AB9 Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-5-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy. There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules persist after loading a custom policy. This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain - Defined function to convert the arch policy strings to an array of ima_entry_rules. The memory can then be freed after loading a custom policy. - Rename ima_get_arch_policy to arch_get_ima_policy. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar - Modified ima_init_arch_policy() and ima_init_policy() to use add_rules() from previous patch. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 4852255aa4f4..350fa957f8a6 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) } #endif +static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + #else static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index b58906a05736..23f3aa214016 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ima.h" @@ -195,6 +196,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +/* An array of architecture specific rules */ +struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; + static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); @@ -492,7 +496,6 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, if (!entry) continue; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); } if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) @@ -502,6 +505,48 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, } } +static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry); + +static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) +{ + const char * const *arch_rules; + const char * const *rules; + int arch_entries = 0; + int i = 0; + + arch_rules = arch_get_ima_policy(); + if (!arch_rules) + return arch_entries; + + /* Get number of rules */ + for (rules = arch_rules; *rules != NULL; rules++) + arch_entries++; + + arch_policy_entry = kcalloc(arch_entries + 1, + sizeof(*arch_policy_entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!arch_policy_entry) + return 0; + + /* Convert each policy string rules to struct ima_rule_entry format */ + for (rules = arch_rules, i = 0; *rules != NULL; rules++) { + char rule[255]; + int result; + + result = strlcpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule)); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list); + result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]); + if (result) { + pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n", rule); + memset(&arch_policy_entry[i], 0, + sizeof(*arch_policy_entry)); + continue; + } + i++; + } + return i; +} + /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. * @@ -510,7 +555,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, */ void __init ima_init_policy(void) { - int build_appraise_entries; + int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries; /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) @@ -532,6 +577,19 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) } /* + * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement + * and appraise rules requiring file signatures for both the initial + * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. + * (Highest priority) + */ + arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); + if (!arch_entries) + pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); + else + add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); + + /* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules. */ @@ -592,6 +650,14 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) if (ima_rules != policy) { ima_policy_flag = 0; ima_rules = policy; + + /* + * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified + * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules + * on boot. After loading a custom policy, free the + * architecture specific rules stored as an array. + */ + kfree(arch_policy_entry); } ima_update_policy_flag(); } From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:04 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600349 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3912E6CB for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DABF1294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id CC6F42B28B; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:20 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC000294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728224AbeINNQf (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:35 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:50874 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727746AbeINNQe (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:34 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098416.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E7xCYC059296 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:16 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg5u7y3pj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:15 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:14 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.197) by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:10 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E8399U62324896 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:09 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECD0B42052; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:59 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81F854204C; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:58 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:02:58 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] ima: add support for external setting of ima_appraise Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:04 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0020-0000-0000-000002C630D7 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0021-0000-0000-000021139125 Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-6-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The "ima_appraise" mode defaults to enforcing, unless configured to allow the boot command line "ima_appraise" option. This patch explicitly sets the "ima_appraise" mode for the arch specific policy setting. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 588e4813370c..6e5fa7c42809 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +void set_ima_appraise(char *str); #else static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, @@ -290,6 +291,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +static inline void set_ima_appraise(char *str) +{ +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..e061613bcb87 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -18,15 +18,22 @@ #include "ima.h" -static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +void set_ima_appraise(char *str) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = 0; else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG; else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; + else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0) + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; +} + +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM + set_ima_appraise(str); #endif return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 23f3aa214016..c574841bcc9a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -585,9 +585,12 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); if (!arch_entries) pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); - else + else { add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); + if (temp_ima_appraise) + set_ima_appraise("enforce"); + } /* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file From patchwork Fri Sep 14 08:00:05 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10600355 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A64B1750 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 298F0294A1 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 1D266294DB; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3D162B5EF for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728250AbeINNQo (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:44 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:40304 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728226AbeINNQi (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:16:38 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098414.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8E7xqNm133144 for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:19 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mg8w18jsg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 04:03:19 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:03:14 +0100 Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (mk.ibm.com [9.149.105.60]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8E83DBO66519274 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 14 Sep 2018 08:03:13 GMT Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 686C74204C; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:03:03 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF6E042057; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:03:01 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.124.31.41]) by d06av24.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Sep 2018 11:03:01 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, Eric Richter , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:30:05 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180914080005.6138-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091408-0016-0000-0000-00000205457A X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091408-0017-0000-0000-0000325C19E3 Message-Id: <20180914080005.6138-7-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-14_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809140085 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Richter This patch implements an example arch-specific IMA policy for x86 to enable measurement and appraisal of any kernel image loaded for kexec, when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled. For systems with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled, only the measurement rule is enabled, not the IMA-appraisal rule. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter - Removed the policy KEXEC_ORIG_KERNEL_CHECK which was defined to disable the kexec_load syscall. - arch_get_ima_policy() uses arch_ima_get_secureboot() to get secureboot state Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c index bb5a88d2b271..6615321b833c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -15,3 +15,19 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) else return false; } + +/* arch rules for audit and user mode */ +static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { +#ifndef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */ + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", + NULL +}; + +const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + return sb_arch_rules; + return NULL; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 350fa957f8a6..dabd3abdf671 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -39,10 +39,14 @@ static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) } #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) +extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); +#else static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { return NULL; } +#endif #else static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 13b446328dda..97609a76aa14 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -157,6 +157,14 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE If unsure, say N. +config IMA_ARCH_POLICY + bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy" + depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default n + help + This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy + based on run time secure boot flags. + config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY bool "IMA build time configured policy rules" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS