From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:34 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299595 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54276921 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:33:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DD2C20717 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:33:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="vAfIGxh4" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725810AbfLRGdM (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:33:12 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42478 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRGdM (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:33:12 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D201C8EE193; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:33:10 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576650790; bh=fhgsfg4kR+gaOUG7u33JkOXCj+nmDGyvVFiO8Qz7AmI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=vAfIGxh4HfrMgaII6PQNCAj2ofoudf1BkHGCxDaKvhYpZvFZ3HH4Y0ONxYIobrqf9 34l2Mw0cNn4k9+L8VrxHBwewPJs6QVIKCZv2WQXVHSzBo3oyfISD7weoQNM/nes1JD pBietzcEoO25nrtdoT/LXBbwnVQbQo0OY5q5BhXI= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZL1l8wGN4ke9; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:32:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A88C58EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:32:51 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 1/9] lib: add asn.1 encoder Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:34 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-2-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org We have a need in the TPM trusted keys to return the ASN.1 form of the TPM key blob so it can be operated on by tools outside of the kernel. To do that, we have to be able to read and write the key format. The current ASN.1 decoder does fine for reading, but we need pieces of an ASN.1 encoder to return the key blob. The current implementation only encodes the ASN.1 bits we actually need. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v2: updated API to use indefinite length, and made symbol exports gpl v3: add data length error handling --- include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 24 +++ lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/asn1_encoder.c | 367 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 392 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f4afe5ad79a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H +#define _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define asn1_oid_len(oid) (sizeof(oid)/sizeof(u32)) +int asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, + s64 integer); +int asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, + u32 oid[], int oid_len); +int asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, u32 tag, + const unsigned char *string, int len); +int asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len); +int asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, + const unsigned char *seq, int len); +int asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, bool val); + +#endif diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index c2f0e2a4e4e8..515b35f92c3c 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o asn1_encoder.o obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ diff --git a/lib/asn1_encoder.c b/lib/asn1_encoder.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..edce59d2ede9 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/asn1_encoder.c @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Simple encoder primitives for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * asn1_encode_integer - encode positive integer to ASN.1 + * @_data: pointer to the pointer to the data + * @data_len: length of buffer remaining + * @integer: integer to be encoded + * + * This is a simplified encoder: it only currently does + * positive integers, but it should be simple enough to add the + * negative case if a use comes along. + */ +int asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, s64 integer) +{ + unsigned char *data = *_data, *d = &data[2]; + int i; + bool found = false; + + if (WARN(integer < 0, + "BUG: integer encode only supports positive integers")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (*data_len < 3) + return -EINVAL; + + *data_len -= 2; + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, INT); + if (integer == 0) { + *d++ = 0; + goto out; + } + for (i = sizeof(integer); i > 0 ; i--) { + int byte = integer >> (8*(i-1)); + + if (!found && byte == 0) + continue; + /* + * for a positive number the first byte must have bit + * 7 clear in two's complement (otherwise it's a + * negative number) so prepend a leading zero if + * that's not the case + */ + if (!found && (byte & 0x80)) { + /* + * no check needed here, we already know we + * have len >= 1 + */ + *d++ = 0; + (*data_len)--; + } + found = true; + if (*data_len == 0) + return -EINVAL; + *d++ = byte; + (*data_len)--; + } + out: + data[1] = d - data - 2; + *_data = d; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_integer); + +/* calculate the base 128 digit values setting the top bit of the first octet */ +static int asn1_encode_oid_digit(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, u32 oid) +{ + int start = 7 + 7 + 7 + 7; + unsigned char *data = *_data; + int ret = 0; + + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + /* quick case */ + if (oid == 0) { + *data++ = 0x80; + (*data_len)--; + goto out; + } + + while (oid >> start == 0) + start -= 7; + + while (start > 0 && *data_len > 0) { + u8 byte; + + byte = oid >> start; + oid = oid - (byte << start); + start -= 7; + byte |= 0x80; + *data++ = byte; + (*data_len)--; + } + if (*data_len > 0) { + *data++ = oid; + (*data_len)--; + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; + } + + out: + *_data = data; + return ret; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_oid - encode an oid to ASN.1 + * @_data: position to begin encoding at + * @data_len: remaining bytes in @_data + * @oid: array of oids + * @oid_len: length of oid array + * + * this encodes an OID up to ASN.1 when presented as an array of OID values + */ +int asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, + u32 oid[], int oid_len) +{ + unsigned char *data = *_data; + unsigned char *d = data + 2; + int i, ret; + + if (WARN(oid_len < 2, "OID must have at least two elements")) + return -EINVAL; + if (WARN(oid_len > 32, "OID is too large")) + return -EINVAL; + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OID); + *d++ = oid[0] * 40 + oid[1]; + *data_len -= 2; + ret = 0; + for (i = 2; i < oid_len; i++) { + ret = asn1_encode_oid_digit(&d, data_len, oid[i]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + data[1] = d - data - 2; + *_data = d; + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_oid); + +static int asn1_encode_length(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, int len) +{ + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + if (len < 0) { + *((*data)++) = ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + if (len <= 0x7f) { + *((*data)++) = len; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + if (len <= 0xff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x81; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 2; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 3) + return -EINVAL; + if (len <= 0xffff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x82; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 3; + return 0; + } + + if (WARN(len > 0xffffff, "ASN.1 length can't be > 0xffffff")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (*data_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + *((*data)++) = 0x83; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 16) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 4; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_tag - add a tag for optional or explicit value + * @data: pointer to place tag at + * @data_len: remaining size of @data buffer + * @tag: tag to be placed + * @string: the data to be tagged + * @len: the length of the data to be tagged + * + * Note this currently only handles short form tags < 31. To encode + * in place pass a NULL @string and -1 for @len; all this will do is + * add an indefinite length tag and update the data pointer to the + * place where the tag contents should be placed. After the data is + * placed, repeat the prior statement but now with the known length. + * In order to avoid having to keep both before and after pointers, + * the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to where the + * first encode placed it. For the recode case, set @data_len to NULL + */ +int asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, u32 tag, + const unsigned char *string, int len) +{ + int ret, dummy_len = 2; + + if (WARN(tag > 30, "ASN.1 tag can't be > 30")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!string && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode tag is too big (>127)")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!string && len > 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * tag and install a dummy length because the real + * data_len should be NULL + */ + *data -= 2; + data_len = &dummy_len; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + *((*data)++) = _tagn(CONT, CONS, tag); + (*data_len)--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(data, data_len, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (!string) + return 0; + if (*data_len < len) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(*data, string, len); + *data += len; + *data_len -= len; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_tag); + +/** + * asn1_encode_octet_string - encode an ASN.1 OCTET STRING + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: bytes remaining in @data buffer + * @string: string to be encoded + * @len: length of string + * + * Note ASN.1 octet strings may contain zeros, so the length is obligatory. + */ +int asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len) +{ + int ret; + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + *((*data)++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OTS); + (*data_len)--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(data, data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (*data_len < len) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(*data, string, len); + *data += len; + *data_len -= len; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_octet_string); + +/** + * asn1_encode_sequence - wrap a byte stream in an ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: remaining size of @data pointer + * @seq: data to be encoded as a sequence + * @len: length of the data to be encoded as a sequence + * + * Fill in a sequence. To encode in place, pass NULL for @seq and -1 + * for @len; then call again once the length is known (still with NULL + * for @seq). In order to avoid having to keep both before and after + * pointers, the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to + * where the first encode placed it. The recode case should pass NULL + * to @data_size + */ +int asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, + const unsigned char *seq, int len) +{ + int ret, dummy_len = 2; + + if (!seq && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode sequence is too big (>127)")) + return -EINVAL; + if (!seq && len >= 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * sequence and install a dummy length because the + * real length should be NULL + */ + *data -= 2; + data_len = &dummy_len; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + *((*data)++) = _tag(UNIV, CONS, SEQ); + (*data_len)--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(data, data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!seq) + return 0; + + if (*data_len < len) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(*data, seq, len); + *data += len; + *data_len -= len; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_sequence); + +/** + * asn1_encode_boolean - encode a boolean value to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: bytes remaining in @data buffer + * @val: the boolean true/false value + */ +int asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, bool val) +{ + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + *((*data)++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, BOOL); + asn1_encode_length(data, data_len, 1); + (*data_len)--; + *((*data)++) = val ? 1 : 0; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_boolean); From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:35 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299599 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44D3813B6 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:36:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21F1720717 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:35:59 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="JwxNSSOk" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726520AbfLRGf6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:35:58 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42552 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRGf6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:35:58 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADBD28EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:35:57 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576650957; bh=BrL9WCSiC0doIu3zn5H0OUNJMewKg4VlnEqgh6BKJn8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JwxNSSOkl/7V/Z6Gk9XGKzmj73Zy9QvT8qRPpUWzxqvcc3rEpCDcRO2Bt4v4Kabjy Eb0g93CUGCxEawB5luYvkmK+k14pP3MnNTMeUuegSCl40YJGDr2ZczePSK++qstssg C15MrP9JzsjwvvQfjo2ZgHVERYgmmhyR+cyn6WoM= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nIAZw8An3KAT; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:35:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9DC68EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:35:54 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 2/9] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:35 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-3-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org The TCG has defined an OID prefix "2.23.133.10.1" for the various TPM key uses. We've defined three of the available numbers: 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Load() operation. 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Import() operation. Both loadable and importable keys are specific to a given TPM, the difference is that a loadable key is wrapped with the symmetric secret, so must have been created by the TPM itself. An importable key is wrapped with a DH shared secret, and may be created without access to the TPM provided you know the public part of the parent key. 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before use. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v3: correct OID_TPMImportableKey name --- include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 657d6bf2c064..f6e2276e5f30 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ enum OID { OID_gostTC26Sign512B, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.2 */ OID_gostTC26Sign512C, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3 */ + /* TCG defined OIDS for TPM based keys */ + OID_TPMLoadableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.3 */ + OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ + OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ + OID__NR }; From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:36 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299603 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55231921 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:36:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EB3720716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:36:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="P78UF3Bd" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725955AbfLRGgz (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:36:55 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42596 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725881AbfLRGgz (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:36:55 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61FCD8EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:36:55 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651015; bh=kHgALg3dHZKld9Ss/YmiXtNNlBxNNKf9el3/b5FJPFI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=P78UF3BdpzkxcdfgcjmGDYL0q8lHh3eIpz8fYOAQ1QqUlcaT8H802AYkKsKcb4bgv JqWLEJpkm8fVinRMLlqYtqoZnxvF4j9o7d0j3t3wRuyGw3xZPrkoJOxXYJxftIHWYh iiI5k343uzo1NbqE5W42jPH6F+TuH9Z2lTNJ43YM= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y4DUma1L4vTv; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:36:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46E2D8EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:36:54 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 3/9] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:36 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Modify the tpm2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for tpm2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two tpm2b quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools. The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley v2: Updated encode API, added length checks --- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 23 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 7b73cebbb378..e0198641eff2 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1851b7c80f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +--- +--- Note: This isn't quite the definition in the standard +--- However, the Linux asn.1 parser doesn't understand +--- [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OPTIONAL +--- So there's an extra intermediate TPMPolicySequence +--- definition to work around this + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpmkey_type}), + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + policy [1] EXPLICIT TPMPolicySequence OPTIONAL, + secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER ({tpmkey_parent}), + pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpmkey_pub}), + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpmkey_priv}) + } + +TPMPolicySequence ::= SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy + +TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, + commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING + } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index d2c5ec1e040b..d744a0d1cb89 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - if (!options->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..cf10fea5410a 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation */ +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -12,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -20,6 +26,160 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 }; + +static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = scratch, *work1; + int work_len = SCRATCH_SIZE, work1_len; + u8 *priv, *pub; + u16 priv_len, pub_len; + + priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src); + src += 2; + priv = src; + src += priv_len; + pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src); + src += 2; + pub = src; + + if (!scratch) + return -ENOMEM; + + asn1_encode_oid(&work, &work_len, tpm2key_oid, + asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); + if (options->blobauth[0] == 0) { + unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; + int bool_len = sizeof(bool); + /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ + if (WARN(asn1_encode_boolean(&w, &bool_len, true) < 0, + "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) + return 0; + asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 0, bool, w - bool); + } + asn1_encode_integer(&work, &work_len, options->keyhandle); + /* + * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never + * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + */ + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 8 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return 0; + asn1_encode_octet_string(&work, &work_len, pub, pub_len); + asn1_encode_octet_string(&work, &work_len, priv, priv_len); + + work1 = payload->blob; + work1_len = MAX_BLOB_SIZE; + if (WARN(asn1_encode_sequence(&work1, &work1_len, scratch, + work - scratch) < 0, + "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) + return 0; + + return work1 - payload->blob; +} + +struct tpm2key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 **buf) +{ + int ret; + struct tpm2key_context ctx; + u8 *blob; + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, + payload->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + *buf = blob; + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + put_unaligned_be16(ctx.priv_len, blob); + blob += 2; + memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + blob += ctx.priv_len; + put_unaligned_be16(ctx.pub_len, blob); + blob += 2; + memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + + return 0; +} + +int tpmkey_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2key_context *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + return 0; +} + +int tpmkey_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +int tpmkey_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + return 0; +} + +int tpmkey_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -79,6 +239,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) return -EINVAL; + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -144,8 +307,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; + payload->blob_len = + tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -156,6 +321,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, else rc = -EPERM; } + if (payload->blob_len < 0) + return payload->blob_len; return rc; } @@ -182,13 +349,23 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; + u8 *blob; int rc; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) + /* old form */ + blob = payload->blob; + + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + + private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &blob[0]); if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); + public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &blob[2 + private_len]); blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -204,7 +381,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->keyauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG; @@ -217,6 +394,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: + if (blob != payload->blob) + kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:37 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299607 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1198213B6 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:37:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9D6620716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:37:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="wWM8n/Ft" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725930AbfLRGh1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:37:27 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42636 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725799AbfLRGh1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:37:27 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21B088EE193; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:27 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651047; bh=i28LmYkA01BOUs5IMbQLN6R5ef/jnBcB3tiVRSK8BQY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=wWM8n/FtJtLHIxfX4zKJZCSSvmYp6tK2tGU670o6QshC1rbrXqJsBvmcymTaxxCPz s1ISTKC4Zu3FDVggHvKN2T5S2F7rABPqVdNLAFQmNfsE5oKm2F2I57YMPQqfNvWzxj ass3ES//OtjSuw0oWGv1zA5SWSmf+DV0Yi/3dGDE= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SCOoZhgqo9_C; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 035968EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:25 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:37 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't load. Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from the last byte of old format keys. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v2: added length checks to untrusted payload --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + include/linux/tpm.h | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a61d8f..4728e13aada8 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 03e9b184411b..cd46ab27baa5 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ struct tpm_buf { }; enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1), + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4), TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index cf10fea5410a..de83f43d2f7a 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -61,16 +61,17 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return 0; asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 0, bool, w - bool); } - asn1_encode_integer(&work, &work_len, options->keyhandle); /* * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length * * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on */ - if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 8 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) - return 0; + return -EINVAL; + + asn1_encode_integer(&work, &work_len, options->keyhandle); asn1_encode_octet_string(&work, &work_len, pub, pub_len); asn1_encode_octet_string(&work, &work_len, priv, priv_len); @@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int blob_len; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; + u32 flags; int i; int rc; @@ -254,29 +256,30 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); /* public */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + /* key properties */ + flags = 0; + flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0; + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags); + /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + if (options->policydigest_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -349,23 +352,42 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob; + u8 *blob, *pub; int rc; + u32 attrs; rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); - if (rc) + if (rc) { /* old form */ blob = payload->blob; + payload->old_format = 1; + } /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ + if (payload->blob_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); + /* must be big enough for following public_len */ + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &blob[2 + private_len]); + public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) + return -E2BIG; + + pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2; + /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */ + attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4); + if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) == + (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) + payload->migratable = 0; + else + payload->migratable = 1; + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -446,7 +468,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!rc) { data_len = be16_to_cpup( (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -457,9 +479,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + if (payload->old_format) { + /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } else { + /* + * migratable flag already collected from key + * attributes + */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len); + payload->key_len = data_len; + } } out: From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:38 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299611 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEB0C921 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:37:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B722F20716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:37:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="cfcqi0ZH" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725930AbfLRGhr (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:37:47 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42670 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725799AbfLRGhr (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:37:47 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01BA88EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651067; bh=BfIZgdkb6Ei9rubp/en9i0/nhFzt/JFF+17+GsPufK8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=cfcqi0ZH6c3GavU1Ify3VVjbK4MIjpgsi5k7aIupky1hNuiKoYnJRFZpamRa07vqi urgWlHq7J3GJmBt04eIqyT3yvzkjn/t1zH+2sOu7LGrXMhjPlwJwkF3Afi/KF/Y+7K Nfk0xKRpTebcSV16oALrncwMfM4Vb2cliCm/3LCE= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V99lu6POCiO6; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:46 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDB5D8EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:37:45 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 5/9] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:38 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org This commit adds the ability to specify a PCR lock policy to TPM2 keys. There is a complexity in that the creator of the key must chose either to use a PCR lock policy or to use authentication. At the current time they can't use both due to a complexity with the way authentication works when policy registers are in use. The way to construct a pcrinfo statement for a key is simply to use the TPMS_PCR_SELECT structure to specify the PCRs and follow this by a hash of all their values in order of ascending PCR number. For simplicity, we require the policy name hash and the hash used for the PCRs to be the same. Thus to construct a policy around the value of the resettable PCR 16 using the sha1 bank, first reset the pcr to zero giving a hash of all zeros as: 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f Then the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for PCR 16 is 03000001 So create a new 32 byte key with a policy policy locking the key to this value of PCR 16 with a parent key of 81000001 would be: keyctl new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 pcrinfo=030000016768033e216468247bd 031a0a2d9876d79818f8f" @u Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v2: fix for new ASN.1 API eliminating hack in place and check lengths --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 19 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 5 +- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 + security/keys/Kconfig | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 30 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 89 +++++- 10 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 50ac8bcd6970..053344c4df5b 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ Usage:: (40 ascii zeros) blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros) - pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no + default) on TPM 1.2 and a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION + coupled with a hash of all the selected PCRs on + TPM 2.0 using the selected hash. pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) @@ -151,6 +154,20 @@ Load a trusted key from the saved blob:: f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba +Create a trusted key on TPM 2.0 using an all zero value of PCR16 and +using the NV storage root 81000001 as the parent:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 pcrinfo=030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f" @u + +Note the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for PCR 16 is 03000001 because all +current TPMs have 24 PCRs, so the initial 03 says there are three +following bytes of selection and then because the bytes are big +endian, 16 is bit zero of byte 2. the hash is the sha1 sum of all +zeros (the value of PCR 16):: + + $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=20 2>/dev/null|sha1sum + 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f + Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:: $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 4728e13aada8..fc9c13802c06 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ #define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 -#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 128 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 +#define TPM2_MAX_POLICIES 16 + struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; unsigned int key_len; @@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; + struct tpm2_policies *policies; }; struct trusted_key_options { diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index cd46ab27baa5..e32e9728adce 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -222,10 +222,14 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE = 0x016B, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER = 0x016D, + TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS = 0x0176, TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, @@ -234,6 +238,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { }; enum tpm2_permanent_handles { + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index dd313438fecf..6c2f2c22b284 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA512 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index e0198641eff2..194febacf362 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o tpm2-policy.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8afbe90eed1b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" +#include "tpm2-policy.h" + +int tpmkey_code(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2key_context *ctx = context; + u32 code = 0; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + code <<= 8; + code |= v[i]; + } + + ctx->policy_code[ctx->policy_count] = code; + + return 0; +} + +int tpmkey_policy(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->policies[ctx->policy_count] = value; + ctx->policy_len[ctx->policy_count++] = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +/* we only support a limited number of policy statement so + * make sure we don't have anything we can't support + */ +static int tpm2_validate_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols) +{ + int i; + + if (pols->count == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + switch (pols->code[i]) { + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER: + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR: + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE: + break; + default: + printk(KERN_INFO "tpm2 policy 0x%x is unsupported", + pols->code[i]); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tpmkey_process_policy - collect the policty from the context + * @ctx: the context to collect from + * @payload: the payload structure to place it in + * + * THis function sizes the policy statements and allocates space + * within the payload to receive them before copying them over. It + * should be used after the ber decoder has completed successfully + */ +int tpmkey_policy_process(struct tpm2key_context *ctx, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload) +{ + int tot_len = 0; + u8 *buf; + int i, ret, len = 0; + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + + if (ctx->policy_count == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++) + tot_len += ctx->policy_len[i]; + tot_len += sizeof(*pols); + + pols = kmalloc(tot_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + payload->policies = pols; + buf = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++) { + pols->policies[i] = &buf[len]; + pols->len[i] = ctx->policy_len[i]; + pols->code[i] = ctx->policy_code[i]; + if (pols->len[i]) + memcpy(pols->policies[i], ctx->policies[i], + ctx->policy_len[i]); + len += ctx->policy_len[i]; + } + pols->count = ctx->policy_count; + + ret = tpm2_validate_policy(pols); + if (ret) { + kfree(pols); + payload->policies = NULL; + } + + /* capture the hash and size */ + + /* the hash is the second algorithm */ + pols->hash = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[2]); + /* and the digest appears after the attributes */ + pols->hash_size = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[8]); + + return ret; +} + +int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 hash, u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen) +{ + int i; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int rc; + + if (pols->count == 0) + return 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + rc = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + if (WARN(rc > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, + "BUG: trusted key code has alg %s with digest too large (%d)", + hash_algo_name[hash], rc)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + pols->hash = hash; + pols->hash_size = rc; + *plen = rc; + + /* policy digests always start out all zeros */ + memset(policydigest, 0, rc); + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u8 *policy = pols->policies[i]; + int len = pols->len[i]; + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 code[4]; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(sdesc, tfm); + + sdesc->tfm = tfm; + rc = crypto_shash_init(sdesc); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* first hash the previous digest */ + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policydigest, *plen); + /* then hash the command code */ + put_unaligned_be32(cmd, code); + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, code, 4); + + /* commands that need special handling */ + if (cmd == TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER) { + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(sdesc1, tfm); + + sdesc1->tfm = tfm; + + /* counter timer policies are double hashed */ + crypto_shash_digest(sdesc1, policy, len, + digest); + policy = digest; + len = *plen; + } + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); + /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */ + crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest); + + } + rc = 0; + + err: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return rc; +} + +int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *buf = kmalloc(2 * SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = buf + SCRATCH_SIZE, *ptr; + int i, work_len = SCRATCH_SIZE; + + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u8 *seq, *tag; + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + + if (WARN(work - buf + 14 + pols->len[i] > 2 * SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + asn1_encode_sequence(&work, &work_len, NULL, -1); + seq = work; + + asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 0, NULL, -1); + tag = work; + asn1_encode_integer(&work, &work_len, cmd); + asn1_encode_tag(&tag, NULL, 0, NULL, work - tag); + + asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 1, NULL, -1); + tag = work; + asn1_encode_octet_string(&work, &work_len, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i]); + asn1_encode_tag(&tag, NULL, 1, NULL, work - tag); + + asn1_encode_sequence(&seq, NULL, NULL, work - seq); + } + ptr = buf; + work_len = SCRATCH_SIZE; + asn1_encode_sequence(&ptr, &work_len, buf + PAGE_SIZE, + work - buf - PAGE_SIZE); + *data = buf; + *len = ptr - buf; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_start_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 hash, u32 *handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + int i; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* NULL salt key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* NULL bind key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* empty nonce caller */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 20); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0); + /* empty auth */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + /* session type policy */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0x01); + + /* symmetric encryption parameters */ + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); + /* hash algorithm for session */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + *handle = get_unaligned_be32(buf.data + TPM_HEADER_SIZE); + out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc <= 0 ? rc : -EPERM; +} + +int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 *handle) +{ + int i, rc; + const char *failure; + + rc = tpm2_start_policy_session(chip, pols->hash, handle); + if (rc) + return rc; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + struct tpm_buf buf; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, *handle); + + switch (cmd) { + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR: + failure = "PCR"; + /* + * for reasons best known to the TCG we have + * to reverse the two arguments to send to the + * policy command + */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, pols->hash_size); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + pols->len[i] - + pols->hash_size, pols->hash_size); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size); + break; + default: + failure = "unknown policy"; + break; + } + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_NOTICE "TPM policy %s failed, rc=%d\n", + failure, rc); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, *handle); + *handle = 0; + return -EPERM; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..152c948743f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +struct tpm2key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; + const u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u32 policy_code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u16 policy_len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 policy_count; +}; + +struct tpm2_policies { + u32 code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u16 len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 count; + u16 hash; + u16 hash_size; +}; + +int tpmkey_policy_process(struct tpm2key_context *ctx, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload); +int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash, + u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen); +int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len); +int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 *handle); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 index 1851b7c80f08..f930fd812db3 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -18,6 +18,6 @@ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { TPMPolicySequence ::= SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { - commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, - commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING + commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER ({tpmkey_code}), + commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING ({tpmkey_policy}) } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index d744a0d1cb89..b1b487c2c72e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) struct trusted_key_payload *p; p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + kzfree(p->policies); kzfree(p); } @@ -1164,7 +1165,11 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = key->payload.data[0]; + kzfree(p->policies); + kzfree(p); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index de83f43d2f7a..82004273f8d4 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include "tpm2key.asn1.h" +#include "tpm2-policy.h" static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, @@ -61,6 +62,22 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return 0; asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 0, bool, w - bool); } + + if (payload->policies) { + u8 *encoded_pols; + u32 encoded_pol_len; + int ret; + + ret = tpm2_encode_policy(payload->policies, &encoded_pols, + &encoded_pol_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + asn1_encode_tag(&work, &work_len, 1, encoded_pols, + encoded_pol_len); + kfree(encoded_pols); + } + /* * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length * @@ -85,14 +102,6 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return work1 - payload->blob; } -struct tpm2key_context { - u32 parent; - const u8 *pub; - u32 pub_len; - const u8 *priv; - u32 priv_len; -}; - static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) @@ -101,6 +110,8 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct tpm2key_context ctx; u8 *blob; + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, payload->blob_len); if (ret < 0) @@ -113,6 +124,12 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, if (!blob) return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpmkey_policy_process(&ctx, payload); + if (ret) { + kfree(blob); + return ret; + } + *buf = blob; options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; put_unaligned_be16(ctx.priv_len, blob); @@ -244,6 +261,42 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; + if (options->pcrinfo_len != 0) { + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + static u8 *scratch; + /* 4 array len, 2 hash alg */ + const int len = 4 + 2 + options->pcrinfo_len; + + pols = kmalloc(sizeof(*pols) + len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + pols->count = 1; + pols->len[0] = len; + scratch = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + pols->policies[0] = scratch; + pols->code[0] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR; + + put_unaligned_be32(1, &scratch[0]); + put_unaligned_be16(hash, &scratch[4]); + memcpy(&scratch[6], options->pcrinfo, options->pcrinfo_len); + payload->policies = pols; + } + + if (options->policydigest_len != 0 && payload->policies) { + /* can't specify both a digest and a policy */ + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (payload->policies) { + rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies, + options->hash, + options->policydigest, + &options->policydigest_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -447,21 +500,37 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 data_len; u8 *data; int rc; + u32 policyhandle; + + if (payload->policies && options->policyhandle) + /* can't have both a passed in policy and a key resident one */ + return -EINVAL; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); if (rc) return rc; + if (payload->policies) { + rc = tpm2_get_policy_session(chip, payload->policies, + &policyhandle); + if (rc) + return rc; + } else { + policyhandle = options->policyhandle; + } + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, - options->policyhandle ? - options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, + policyhandle ? + policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (payload->policies) + tpm2_flush_context(chip, policyhandle); if (rc > 0) rc = -EPERM; From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:39 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299615 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B777513B6 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92A5020716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="BumC7n+g" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725912AbfLRGis (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:38:48 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42718 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRGis (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:38:48 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E016E8EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651127; bh=Qj8FiwoNkP6qE4ZFNyqt26A4rkvXJSzNBIkuZ2vveQQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BumC7n+gisrKj5xgungKfXc5bqFWPvhqwX4ivSE7qYtcvDkV+paadzJPkuB8L4cNQ pCKcsKqnfSrP7gV8Xme8AA7CUyTrhRayoFIGtRR1BOaf9DOHzgUN4O3Zz3tHKjEfGw L7dkBVkX1UOxqdvZi5xTz1LuarovoFqSm3+VadfQ= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mrW0Ky52knug; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C51438EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:46 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 6/9] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:39 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org This patch adds a policy= argument to key creation. The policy is the standard tss policymaker format and each separate policy line must have a newline after it. Thus to construct a policy requiring authorized value and pcr 16 locking using a sha256 hash, the policy (policy.txt) file would be two lines: 0000017F00000001000B03000001303095B49BE85E381E5B20E557E46363EF55B0F43B132C2D8E3DE9AC436656F2 0000016b This can be inserted into the key with keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 policy=`cat policy.txt` keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha256" @u Note that although a few policies work like this, most require special handling which must be added to the kernel policy construction routine. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 16 ++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 13 +++++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 053344c4df5b..b68d3eb73f00 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ Usage:: policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to seal the key. + policy= specify an arbitrary set of policies. These must + be in policymaker format with each separate + policy line newline terminated. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. @@ -168,6 +171,19 @@ zeros (the value of PCR 16):: $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=20 2>/dev/null|sha1sum 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f +You can also specify arbitrary policy in policymaker format, so a two +value policy (the pcr example above and authvalue) would look like +this in policymaker format:: + + 0000017F000000010004030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f + 0000016b + +This can be placed in a file (say policy.txt) and then added to the key as:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 policy=`cat policy.txt`" @u + +The newlines in the file policy.txt will be automatically processed. + Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:: $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 8afbe90eed1b..2606d3bb5b82 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -339,3 +339,49 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, } return 0; } + +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str) +{ + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + char *p; + u8 *ptr; + int i = 0, left = PAGE_SIZE, res; + + pols = kmalloc(left, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + ptr = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + left -= ptr - (u8 *)pols; + + while ((p = strsep(&str, "\n"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n') + continue; + pols->len[i] = strlen(p)/2; + if (pols->len[i] > left) { + res = -E2BIG; + goto err; + } + res = hex2bin(ptr, p, pols->len[i]); + if (res) + goto err; + /* get command code and skip past */ + pols->code[i] = get_unaligned_be32(ptr); + pols->policies[i] = ptr + 4; + ptr += pols->len[i]; + left -= pols->len[i]; + pols->len[i] -= 4; + /* + * FIXME: this does leave the code embedded in dead + * regions of the memory, but it's easier than + * hexdumping to a temporary or copying over + */ + i++; + } + pols->count = i; + *ppols = pols; + return 0; + err: + kfree(pols); + return res; +} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h index 152c948743f3..cb804a544ced 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h @@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash, int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len); int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 *handle); +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b1b487c2c72e..668cbdc675b8 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include +#include "tpm2-policy.h" + static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; @@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ enum { Opt_hash, Opt_policydigest, Opt_policyhandle, + Opt_policy, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -724,6 +727,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_policy, "policy=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -834,6 +838,15 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->policyhandle = handle; break; + case Opt_policy: + if (pay->policies) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = tpm2_parse_policies(&pay->policies, args[0].from); + if (res) + return res; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:40 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299621 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1EC617EF for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:39:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D27524650 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:39:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="acPOSna1" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726613AbfLRGjX (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:39:23 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42762 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRGjX (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:39:23 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C78FA8EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651162; bh=UVsrWmNfLJsIHXR/kDlaqUyC8jUL+StD4OB643+XEZs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=acPOSna1gIbmo+5lShyzUPzkqLQ4PGKVjHthL22NjuxPfRI0IGiO2ZNUNWdiUm6n2 Y0jX8LEJ0XRCgei43mQ0eedDM+jUFfIs1pc+73e0K4TY7gbi/tzbEXRmQzdDXZHNjY 5jUixZaEnVWnqAvYoVwOSerpfoXKH8g2zguURIVc= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id U5ORrC1Io16Z; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0EC88EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:21 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 7/9] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:40 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-8-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like the reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart count. The most useful comparison is against the millisecond count for expiring keys. However, you have to remember that currently Linux doesn't try to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the expiration is actually measured in how long the TPM itself has been powered on ... the TPM timer doesn't count while the system is powered down. The millisecond counter is a u64 quantity found at offset 8 in the timer structure, and the <= comparision operand is 9, so a policy set to expire after the TPM has been up for 100 seconds would look like 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 in hex. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 19 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index b68d3eb73f00..53a6196c7df9 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -241,3 +241,32 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + +Appendix +-------- + +TPM 2.0 Policies +---------------- + +The current TPM supports PCR lock policies as documented above and +CounterTimer policies which can be used to create expiring keys. One +caveat with expiring keys is that the TPM millisecond counter does not +update while a system is powered off and Linux does not sync the TPM +millisecond count with its internal clock, so the best you can expire +in is in terms of how long any given TPM has been powered on. (FIXME: +Linux should simply update the millisecond clock to the current number +of seconds past the epoch on boot). + +A CounterTimer policy is expressed in terms of length and offset +against the TPM clock structure (TPMS_TIME_INFO), which looks like the +packed structure:: + + struct tpms_time_info { + u64 uptime; /* time in ms since last start or reset */ + u64 clock; /* cumulative uptime in ms */ + u32 resetcount; /* numer of times the TPM has been reset */ + u32 restartcount; /* number of times the TPM has been restarted */ + u8 safe /* time was safely loaded from NVRam */ + }; + +The usual comparison for expiring keys is against clock, at offset 8. diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 2606d3bb5b82..5698475b30cb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -323,6 +323,25 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size); break; + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER: { + /* + * the format of this is the last two u16 + * quantities are the offset and operation + * respectively. The rest is operandB which + * must be zero padded in a hash digest + */ + u16 opb_len = pols->len[i] - 4; + + if (opb_len > pols->hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, opb_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], opb_len); + /* offset and operand*/ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + opb_len, 4); + failure = "Counter Timer"; + break; + } default: failure = "unknown policy"; break; From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:41 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299625 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00E4417EF for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:39:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D34E320716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:39:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="QQega7UM" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726698AbfLRGju (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:39:50 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42794 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725799AbfLRGju (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:39:50 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C63C8EE193; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:50 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651190; bh=VqwZ/3+z22mHG8djxbT81BfP7Dswb0A9A7olkdrIdt4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=QQega7UM8OY0jDE1PkD/JMSxgnSlubcbBwvcS6/nV4KH+0EhWCLoE9NpiQr009QnM ImGCAFKwvcA9KZsAACEjCRT80NE/Yba2RET5V14RZm9K3jN0My6qLSP/YkjdQcoC3V kLcrNEGSyyYG7nVnEz8iTttvBPumGHSXPIyBDboU= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id t5W7xdDkVtbG; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05EB08EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:39:48 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 8/9] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:41 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-9-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" after: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index fc9c13802c06..c117bf598230 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 668cbdc675b8..af269f4774de 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -785,12 +785,26 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes + * passed in as hex strings. TPM 2.0 + * authorizations are simple passwords + * (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + } else if (tpm2 && + opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + } else { return -EINVAL; + } break; case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:42 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299627 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFF8113B6 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:40:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B430E2465E for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:40:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="v9o7EPEd" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726701AbfLRGko (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:40:44 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42842 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725810AbfLRGko (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:40:44 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF27A8EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:40:43 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651243; bh=ohxY8YLRxu1Tn8IBmrbxO4uzyOFwciDdtq97iGB0+UY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=v9o7EPEdG840qiuG5MihIlWCejf6xOAmIYsudd0ngGXexzWr3XS/5kjkTX5sWIgyG NekB6cr9d5ZXs2NAkkGe2PVQ1OY202gsub7eRWEAbJMqN5pvYJvBJ4PAhykzBBT+WD Ax8W+MiJMRMlesrtfE4MToSHrAjtp+Gim+FKc4+Q= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id unBPwhQQPbC1; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:40:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A49218EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:40:42 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 9/9] security: keys: trusted: add password based authorizations to policy keys Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:42 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-10-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org TPM 2.0 has a trick where you can turn off the usual HMAC password session requirement using TPM2_PolicyPassword, so everywhere we see a TPM2_PolicyAuthValue (which does require HMAC password), we replace with the TPM2_PolicyPassword command instead. This allows us to use passwords with TPM 2.0 trusted keys that also have a policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 16 ++++++++++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index e32e9728adce..5026a06977e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD = 0x018c, TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 5698475b30cb..56b99419ce90 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -193,7 +193,8 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, policy = digest; len = *plen; } - crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); + if (len) + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */ crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest); @@ -303,6 +304,16 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; struct tpm_buf buf; + if (cmd == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) + /* + * both PolicyAuthValue and PolicyPassword + * hash to the same thing, but one triggers + * HMAC authentication and the other simple + * authentication. Since we have no HMAC + * code, we're choosing the simple + */ + cmd = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd); if (rc) return rc; @@ -344,6 +355,9 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, } default: failure = "unknown policy"; + if (pols->len[i]) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i]); break; } rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 82004273f8d4..085d09c4a4ed 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, asn1_encode_oid(&work, &work_len, tpm2key_oid, asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); - if (options->blobauth[0] == 0) { + if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; int bool_len = sizeof(bool); /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ @@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 flags; int i; int rc; + static const int POLICY_SIZE = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { @@ -267,7 +268,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* 4 array len, 2 hash alg */ const int len = 4 + 2 + options->pcrinfo_len; - pols = kmalloc(sizeof(*pols) + len, GFP_KERNEL); + pols = kmalloc(POLICY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!pols) return -ENOMEM; @@ -288,6 +289,37 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, return -EINVAL; } + /* + * if we already have a policy, we have to add authorization + * to it. If we don't, we can simply follow the usual + * non-policy route. + */ + if (options->blobauth_len != 0 && payload->policies) { + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + static u8 *scratch; + int i; + bool found = false; + + pols = payload->policies; + + /* make sure it's not already in policy */ + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + if (pols->code[i] == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + i = pols->count++; + scratch = pols->policies[i - 1] + pols->len[i - 1]; + /* the TPM2_PolicyPassword command has no payload */ + pols->policies[i] = scratch; + pols->len[i] = 0; + pols->code[i] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE; + } + } + if (payload->policies) { rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies, options->hash, @@ -526,7 +558,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + options->blobauth_len); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); if (payload->policies)