From patchwork Thu Apr 30 07:15:21 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Budankov X-Patchwork-Id: 11519295 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55BF814DD for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:15:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4940920838 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:15:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726616AbgD3HPq (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:15:46 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:42192 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726476AbgD3HPq (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:15:46 -0400 IronPort-SDR: Q2MYjqK/DWU2uBBjpP5LMybLyroO7l3FjiTQc5dcrq/Cg0+85lYJCM9A4x6SNZjOLrYOvKrmBf nMf3WX0S1oFg== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Apr 2020 00:15:45 -0700 IronPort-SDR: n91qNzkX1l82MhoicLietInMyXKYMW9JTz+X32HY2znoZXSR+IlKxECRjzEqNA7wScoLvfkA1I zx0N07yLJvOQ== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.73,334,1583222400"; d="scan'208";a="249668452" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 30 Apr 2020 00:15:45 -0700 Received: from [10.249.229.126] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.249.229.126]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32F63580646; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 00:15:21 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v3 1/3] perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed From: Alexey Budankov To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Alexander Shishkin , Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" References: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <3b19cf79-f02d-04b4-b8b1-0039ac023b2c@linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 10:15:21 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON in the docs. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt index 456fdcbf26ac..832408a54c1c 100644 --- a/tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt +++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ The v4.2 kernel introduced support for a context switch metadata event, PERF_RECORD_SWITCH, which allows unprivileged users to see when their processes are scheduled out and in, just not by whom, which is left for the PERF_RECORD_SWITCH_CPU_WIDE, that is only accessible in system wide context, -which in turn requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. +which in turn requires CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Please see the 45ac1403f564 ("perf: Add PERF_RECORD_SWITCH to indicate context switches") commit, that introduces these metadata events for further info. From patchwork Thu Apr 30 07:15:57 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Budankov X-Patchwork-Id: 11519297 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7223815AB for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:16:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6446420838 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:16:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726476AbgD3HQE (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:16:04 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:28453 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726420AbgD3HQE (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:16:04 -0400 IronPort-SDR: 9xMGMNaUYrczB0xGHi7ocA5dickWwud1WKeUCb9VS4+Yw7ag3Vk6n/RNXXGoWXeGffGzXf6Njk 32AQBHw9APtQ== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Apr 2020 00:16:03 -0700 IronPort-SDR: fUD0gyVvzpYJBfzFPfp1dgMiGx+PpiFKZUmUCEeVOlrroMQyYvNrWRkNwADKEXKq4R/Jo0uUsz wK5j7ZOygVAg== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.73,334,1583222400"; d="scan'208";a="405307891" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 30 Apr 2020 00:16:01 -0700 Received: from [10.249.229.126] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.249.229.126]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 526905805EB; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 00:15:58 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control From: Alexey Budankov To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Alexander Shishkin , Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" References: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <819338ce-d160-4a2f-f1aa-d756a2e7c6fc@linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 10:15:57 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Implement selinux sysfs check to see the system is in enforcing mode and print warning message with pointer to check audit logs. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) return 1; } - WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY, + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) if (fd >= 0) close(fd); - if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY, + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) return -1; diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c index 9fa92649adb4..bf437c059c2b 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c @@ -2514,32 +2514,41 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, int err, char *msg, size_t size) { char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; - int printed = 0; + int printed = 0, enforced = 0; switch (err) { case EPERM: case EACCES: + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, + "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n"); + + if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) { + if (enforced) { + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, + "Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance\n" + "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for\n" + "more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n"); + } + } + if (err == EPERM) - printed = scnprintf(msg, size, + printed += scnprintf(msg, size, "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", perf_evsel__name(evsel)); return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, - "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" - "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" - "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" - "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" - "The current value is %d:\n\n" + "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n" + "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n" + "without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.\n" + "perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" - "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" - " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , - target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", - perf_event_paranoid()); + ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n" + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n" + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n" + "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n" + "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = )", + perf_event_paranoid()); case ENOENT: return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", perf_evsel__name(evsel)); From patchwork Thu Apr 30 07:16:34 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Budankov X-Patchwork-Id: 11519303 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18F2114DD for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:16:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3BF820784 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:16:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726463AbgD3HQk (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:16:40 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:42245 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726412AbgD3HQk (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 03:16:40 -0400 IronPort-SDR: g/j6h5NrqiF1yPgrixPDNaYkFIUq8SA3oBMeSPd72TQRj6yzTe7RUEJGcRH0iZ+u8FGShs06rs yQS/4EJaRZKQ== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Apr 2020 00:16:39 -0700 IronPort-SDR: qHHWkc+9M95y1R8WPEqSsCj6qDPnk5ksoDzUPUGQX2riAcgfQiA/gRtuM3rGPIDcRoR6i3iPdd FiaaRu8QPCLA== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.73,334,1583222400"; d="scan'208";a="368053163" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga001.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 30 Apr 2020 00:16:39 -0700 Received: from [10.249.229.126] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.249.229.126]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63AB4580646; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 00:16:36 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues From: Alexey Budankov To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Alexander Shishkin , Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" References: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <290ded0a-c422-3749-5180-918fed1ee30f@linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 10:16:34 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Publish instructions on how to apply LSM hooks for access control to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora distro with Targeted SELinux policy and then manage access to the syscall. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt | 237 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 237 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4fe3b8b1958f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +Overview +======== + +For general security related questions of perf_event_open() syscall usage, +performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf see here: +https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html + +Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall +============================================================================== + +LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be +used starting from Linux v5.3. Below are the steps to extend Fedora (v31) with +Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities: + +1. Download selinux-policy SRPM package (e.g. selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on FC31) + and install it so rpmbuild directory would exist in the current working directory: + + # rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm + +2. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and unpack the source code: + + # rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec + +3. Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02 + directory and apply it: + + # patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch + patching file policy/flask/access_vectors + patching file policy/flask/security_classes + # cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch +diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors +--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 ++++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300 +@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ + wake_alarm + block_suspend + audit_read ++ perfmon + } + + # +@@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@ + + class xdp_socket + inherits socket ++ ++class perf_event ++{ ++ open ++ cpu ++ kernel ++ tracepoint ++ read ++ write ++} ++ ++ +diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes +--- a/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 ++++ b/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300 +@@ -200,4 +200,6 @@ + + class xdp_socket + ++class perf_event ++ + # FLASK + +4. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and build policy packages from patched sources: + + # rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec + + so you have this: + + # ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/ + total 33M + drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 . + drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .. + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + +5. Install SELinux packages from Fedora repo, if not already done so, and + update with the patched rpms above: + + # rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-* + +6. Enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so: + + # cat /etc/selinux/config + + # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system. + # SELINUX= can take one of these three values: + # enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. + # permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. + # disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded. + SELINUX=permissive + # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values: + # targeted - Targeted processes are protected, + # minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected. + # mls - Multi Level Security protection. + SELINUXTYPE=targeted + +7. Enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot: + + # touch /.autorelabel + +8. Reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel; + +9. Login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem; + +10. Check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode + + # getenforce + Permissive + +11. Turn SELinux into Enforcing mode: + + # setenforce 1 + # getenforce + Enforcing + +Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux +================================================================== + +Access to performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf +can be limited for superuser or CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged +processes. MAC policy settings (e.g. SELinux) can be loaded into the kernel +and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case +Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below: + + # perf stat + Error: + Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. + Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance + monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for + more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. + Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open + access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users + without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability. + perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: + -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users + Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK + >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access + >= 1: Disallow CPU event access + >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling + To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it + in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = ) + +To make sure that access is limited by MAC policy settings inspect system +audit records using journalctl command or /var/log/audit/audit.log so the +output would contain AVC denied records related to perf_event: + + # journalctl --reverse --no-pager | grep perf_event + + python3[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. + If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. + setroubleshoot[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 4595ce5b-e58f-462c-9d86-3bc2074935de + audit[1318098]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=1318098 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 + +In order to open access to perf_event_open() syscall MAC policy settings can +require to be extended. On SELinux system this can be done by loading a special +policy module extending base policy settings. Perf related policy module can +be generated using the system audit records about blocking perf_event access. +Run the command below to generate my-perf.te policy extension file with +perf_event related rules: + + # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te + + module my-perf 1.0; + + require { + type unconfined_t; + class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; + } + + #============= unconfined_t ============== + allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; + +Now compile, pack and load my-perf.pp extension module into the kernel: + + # checkmodule -M -m -o my-perf.mod my-perf.te + # semodule_package -o my-perf.pp -m my-perf.mod + # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp + +After all those taken steps above access to perf_event_open() syscall should +now be allowed by the policy settings. Check access running Perf like this: + + # perf stat + ^C + Performance counter stats for 'system wide': + + 36,387.41 msec cpu-clock # 7.999 CPUs utilized + 2,629 context-switches # 0.072 K/sec + 57 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec + 1 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec + 263,721,559 cycles # 0.007 GHz + 175,746,713 instructions # 0.67 insn per cycle + 19,628,798 branches # 0.539 M/sec + 1,259,201 branch-misses # 6.42% of all branches + + 4.549061439 seconds time elapsed + +The generated perf-event.pp related policy extension module can be removed +from the kernel using this command: + + # semodule -X 300 -r my-perf + +Alternatively the module can be temporarily disabled and enabled back using +these two commands: + + # semodule -d my-perf + # semodule -e my-perf + +If something went wrong +======================= + +To turn SELinux into Permissive mode: + # setenforce 0 + +To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter selinux=0 + +To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems: + # find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux + +To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot; + +Links +===== + +[1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm +[2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html +[3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html