From patchwork Thu Apr 30 16:18:16 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mauro Carvalho Chehab X-Patchwork-Id: 11520877 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59310912 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:19:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37BF2208DB for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:19:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263558; bh=EC4tuha4eyObXyca8s8m64P9S1kJsNH5N7AYCJltKEY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=c7CKvGNf0ccGAqPunQ/VQt0AWUZTr4EIereMnsc0TopWManJukffByg9pvvrkHDNL MlVYjmCj1TDtQ5TO9iQSYbkdy6bD1onh8/qkSIYy+Bj0ZsMmBGxj/lK7rsLadmc7IK ys9tX1b0WTcMlbBrL/+5G0+0wJssLmCEop1SDzDA= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726366AbgD3QTR (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:19:17 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58750 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728115AbgD3QSk (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:40 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org (ip5f5ad5c5.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [95.90.213.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B67322137B; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263518; bh=EC4tuha4eyObXyca8s8m64P9S1kJsNH5N7AYCJltKEY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=l5Cmhv1Eaa4fU1sLGCrferD+jl3C71QeCNUK9sjktmQ9ElgRYFJ1JnDjztvQ271TZ S/Qbh/j360PfidVd+LdK7Shb1/3hQQT7J5QbW8bkc2HuwJl3oZhW+bnXgNDnqCA2fs gwbcj2FfD2MCQEL57tCeXu1amC8spKzAxkN0qoAc= Received: from mchehab by mail.kernel.org with local (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from ) id 1jUBtT-00Axgj-T9; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:35 +0200 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab To: Linux Doc Mailing List Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jarkko Sakkinen , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 02/19] docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReST Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:16 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes were needed: - Adjust document and titles markups; - Adjust numbered list markups; - Add a comments markup for the Contents section; - Add markups for literal blocks. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab --- ...symmetric-keys.txt => asymmetric-keys.rst} | 91 +++++++++---------- Documentation/crypto/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 2 +- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +- include/crypto/public_key.h | 2 +- include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h | 2 +- include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 2 +- include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 2 +- 11 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) rename Documentation/crypto/{asymmetric-keys.txt => asymmetric-keys.rst} (91%) diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst similarity index 91% rename from Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt rename to Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst index 8763866b11cf..349f44a29392 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ - ============================================= - ASYMMETRIC / PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY KEY TYPE - ============================================= +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -Contents: +============================================= +Asymmetric / Public-key Cryptography Key Type +============================================= + +.. Contents: - Overview. - Key identification. @@ -13,8 +15,7 @@ Contents: - Keyring link restrictions. -======== -OVERVIEW +Overview ======== The "asymmetric" key type is designed to be a container for the keys used in @@ -42,8 +43,7 @@ key, or it may interpret it as a reference to a key held somewhere else in the system (for example, a TPM). -================== -KEY IDENTIFICATION +Key Identification ================== If a key is added with an empty name, the instantiation data parsers are given @@ -57,49 +57,48 @@ The asymmetric key type's match function can then perform a wider range of comparisons than just the straightforward comparison of the description with the criterion string: - (1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:" then the match + 1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:" then the match function will examine a key's fingerprint to see if the hex digits given - after the "id:" match the tail. For instance: + after the "id:" match the tail. For instance:: keyctl search @s asymmetric id:5acc2142 - will match a key with fingerprint: + will match a key with fingerprint:: 1A00 2040 7601 7889 DE11 882C 3823 04AD 5ACC 2142 - (2) If the criterion string is of the form ":" then the + 2) If the criterion string is of the form ":" then the match will match the ID as in (1), but with the added restriction that only keys of the specified subtype (e.g. tpm) will be matched. For - instance: + instance:: keyctl search @s asymmetric tpm:5acc2142 Looking in /proc/keys, the last 8 hex digits of the key fingerprint are -displayed, along with the subtype: +displayed, along with the subtype:: 1a39e171 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 asymmetric modsign.0: DSA 5acc2142 [] -========================= -ACCESSING ASYMMETRIC KEYS +Accessing Asymmetric Keys ========================= For general access to asymmetric keys from within the kernel, the following -inclusion is required: +inclusion is required:: #include This gives access to functions for dealing with asymmetric / public keys. Three enums are defined there for representing public-key cryptography -algorithms: +algorithms:: enum pkey_algo -digest algorithms used by those: +digest algorithms used by those:: enum pkey_hash_algo -and key identifier representations: +and key identifier representations:: enum pkey_id_type @@ -110,25 +109,25 @@ PGP-specific metadata, whereas X.509 has arbitrary certificate identifiers. The operations defined upon a key are: - (1) Signature verification. + 1) Signature verification. Other operations are possible (such as encryption) with the same key data required for verification, but not currently supported, and others (eg. decryption and signature generation) require extra key data. -SIGNATURE VERIFICATION +Signature Verification ---------------------- An operation is provided to perform cryptographic signature verification, using -an asymmetric key to provide or to provide access to the public key. +an asymmetric key to provide or to provide access to the public key:: int verify_signature(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig); The caller must have already obtained the key from some source and can then use it to check the signature. The caller must have parsed the signature and -transferred the relevant bits to the structure pointed to by sig. +transferred the relevant bits to the structure pointed to by sig:: struct public_key_signature { u8 *digest; @@ -159,8 +158,7 @@ data; or -ENOMEM if an allocation can't be performed. -EINVAL can be returned if the key argument is the wrong type or is incompletely set up. -======================= -ASYMMETRIC KEY SUBTYPES +Asymmetric Key Subtypes ======================= Asymmetric keys have a subtype that defines the set of operations that can be @@ -171,11 +169,11 @@ The subtype is selected by the key data parser and the parser must initialise the data required for it. The asymmetric key retains a reference on the subtype module. -The subtype definition structure can be found in: +The subtype definition structure can be found in:: #include -and looks like the following: +and looks like the following:: struct asymmetric_key_subtype { struct module *owner; @@ -198,39 +196,37 @@ the subtype. Currently, the name is only used for print statements. There are a number of operations defined by the subtype: - (1) describe(). + 1) describe(). Mandatory. This allows the subtype to display something in /proc/keys against the key. For instance the name of the public key algorithm type could be displayed. The key type will display the tail of the key identity string after this. - (2) destroy(). + 2) destroy(). Mandatory. This should free the memory associated with the key. The asymmetric key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the reference on the subtype module. - (3) query(). + 3) query(). Mandatory. This is a function for querying the capabilities of a key. - (4) eds_op(). + 4) eds_op(). Optional. This is the entry point for the encryption, decryption and signature creation operations (which are distinguished by the operation ID in the parameter struct). The subtype may do anything it likes to implement an operation, including offloading to hardware. - (5) verify_signature(). + 5) verify_signature(). Optional. This is the entry point for signature verification. The subtype may do anything it likes to implement an operation, including offloading to hardware. - -========================== -INSTANTIATION DATA PARSERS +Instantiation Data Parsers ========================== The asymmetric key type doesn't generally want to store or to deal with a raw @@ -254,11 +250,11 @@ Examples of blob formats for which parsers could be implemented include: During key instantiation each parser in the list is tried until one doesn't return -EBADMSG. -The parser definition structure can be found in: +The parser definition structure can be found in:: #include -and looks like the following: +and looks like the following:: struct asymmetric_key_parser { struct module *owner; @@ -273,7 +269,7 @@ the parser. There is currently only a single operation defined by the parser, and it is mandatory: - (1) parse(). + 1) parse(). This is called to preparse the key from the key creation and update paths. In particular, it is called during the key creation _before_ a key is @@ -282,7 +278,7 @@ mandatory: The caller passes a pointer to the following struct with all of the fields cleared, except for data, datalen and quotalen [see - Documentation/security/keys/core.rst]. + Documentation/security/keys/core.rst]:: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; @@ -321,7 +317,7 @@ mandatory: public-key algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable hex version of the key's fingerprint. -Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers: +Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers:: int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser); void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *subtype); @@ -330,8 +326,7 @@ Parsers may not have the same name. The names are otherwise only used for displaying in debugging messages. -========================= -KEYRING LINK RESTRICTIONS +Keyring Link Restrictions ========================= Keyrings created from userspace using add_key can be configured to check the @@ -340,7 +335,7 @@ allowed to link. Several restriction methods are available: - (1) Restrict using the kernel builtin trusted keyring + 1) Restrict using the kernel builtin trusted keyring - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: - "builtin_trusted" @@ -350,7 +345,7 @@ Several restriction methods are available: rejected. The ca_keys kernel parameter also affects which keys are used for signature verification. - (2) Restrict using the kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings + 2) Restrict using the kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: - "builtin_and_secondary_trusted" @@ -361,7 +356,7 @@ Several restriction methods are available: kernel parameter also affects which keys are used for signature verification. - (3) Restrict using a separate key or keyring + 3) Restrict using a separate key or keyring - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: - "key_or_keyring:[:chain]" @@ -378,7 +373,7 @@ Several restriction methods are available: certificate in order (starting closest to the root) to a keyring. For instance, one keyring can be populated with links to a set of root certificates, with a separate, restricted keyring set up for each - certificate chain to be validated: + certificate chain to be validated:: # Create and populate a keyring for root certificates root_id=`keyctl add keyring root-certs "" @s` @@ -400,7 +395,7 @@ Several restriction methods are available: one of the root certificates. A single keyring can be used to verify a chain of signatures by - restricting the keyring after linking the root certificate: + restricting the keyring after linking the root certificate:: # Create a keyring for the certificate chain and add the root chain2_id=`keyctl add keyring chain2 "" @s` diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst index c4ff5d791233..2bcaf422731e 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ for cryptographic use cases, as well as programming examples. intro architecture + asymmetric-keys devel-algos userspace-if crypto_engine diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst index 0154721b20b2..615331c7f0ec 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are: One application of restricted keyrings is to verify X.509 certificate chains or individual certificate signatures using the asymmetric key type. - See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt for specific restrictions + See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst for specific restrictions applicable to the asymmetric key type. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index b0cf6c358136..bc849ca40b87 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -2798,7 +2798,7 @@ ASYMMETRIC KEYS M: David Howells L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -F: Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt +F: Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst F: crypto/asymmetric_keys/ F: include/crypto/pkcs7.h F: include/crypto/public_key.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 6e5fc8e31f01..33e77d846caa 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key type * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index d7f43d4ea925..da4d0b82d018 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c index e24a031db1e4..4aff3eebec17 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Signature verification with an asymmetric key * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 0588ef3bc6ff..11f535cfb810 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Asymmetric public-key algorithm definitions * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h index 8a21d6a613ab..c47dc5405f79 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Asymmetric public-key cryptography data parser * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h index 21407815d9c3..d55171f640a0 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key subtype * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h index 91cfd9bd9385..a29d3ff2e7e8 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Asymmetric Public-key cryptography key type interface * - * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) From patchwork Thu Apr 30 16:18:17 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mauro Carvalho Chehab X-Patchwork-Id: 11520899 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 251B5912 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:20:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 09005208C3 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:20:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263612; bh=ORjljVOjhf/2+iwPRot8U36ehoPt3y93WEknPAl6A+o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=GAuKsE2SIIQBV7eHU/Kw4MyztuqUFrJG75BQABjkCtZJd3XAGnkKfulALYe5uo2pJ X4TSOKjWUUEa4QMIq5SK/w6Ybu3dLn9hV2K+dmiMpAKxXJhcCJsJm/MAGAua+jBdOo LaWFOFkNVVIStSaTtqqkvk4FQV+zQN841/PPCzso= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728103AbgD3QSj (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:39 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58534 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726309AbgD3QSi (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:38 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org (ip5f5ad5c5.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [95.90.213.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A6EE3208C3; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263517; bh=ORjljVOjhf/2+iwPRot8U36ehoPt3y93WEknPAl6A+o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=E8HOAePBXi6WI+jzMe8alh7NPftqSNmZllGrIna0V9+8gVsCkxSEctza4NQfjYFrg PDc92ajWS6VHX3K0N7wiY/mDUQxz68+dHpsPWN3xy4mlhU/tKzi/370OrediB6aX/a fv51/qsAaKLzJhFChZ7+yl+EXRhaRhPPYkU7l5bo= Received: from mchehab by mail.kernel.org with local (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from ) id 1jUBtT-00Axgm-U6; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:35 +0200 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab To: Linux Doc Mailing List Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 03/19] docs: crypto: convert api-intro.txt to ReST format Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:17 +0200 Message-Id: <112b12acb7b6c7ea339171c88c3cf93a183b11ac.1588263270.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org - Change title markups; - Mark literal blocks; - Use list markups at authors/credits; - Add blank lines when needed; - Remove trailing whitespaces. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab --- .../crypto/{api-intro.txt => api-intro.rst} | 186 ++++++++++-------- Documentation/crypto/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) rename Documentation/crypto/{api-intro.txt => api-intro.rst} (70%) diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt b/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.rst similarity index 70% rename from Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt rename to Documentation/crypto/api-intro.rst index 45d943fcae5b..bcff47d42189 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt +++ b/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.rst @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 - Scatterlist Cryptographic API - -INTRODUCTION +============================= +Scatterlist Cryptographic API +============================= + +Introduction +============ The Scatterlist Crypto API takes page vectors (scatterlists) as arguments, and works directly on pages. In some cases (e.g. ECB @@ -13,22 +17,23 @@ so that processing can be applied to paged skb's without the need for linearization. -DETAILS +Details +======= At the lowest level are algorithms, which register dynamically with the API. 'Transforms' are user-instantiated objects, which maintain state, handle all -of the implementation logic (e.g. manipulating page vectors) and provide an -abstraction to the underlying algorithms. However, at the user +of the implementation logic (e.g. manipulating page vectors) and provide an +abstraction to the underlying algorithms. However, at the user level they are very simple. -Conceptually, the API layering looks like this: +Conceptually, the API layering looks like this:: [transform api] (user interface) [transform ops] (per-type logic glue e.g. cipher.c, compress.c) [algorithm api] (for registering algorithms) - + The idea is to make the user interface and algorithm registration API very simple, while hiding the core logic from both. Many good ideas from existing APIs such as Cryptoapi and Nettle have been adapted for this. @@ -44,21 +49,21 @@ one block while the former can operate on an arbitrary amount of data, subject to block size requirements (i.e., non-stream ciphers can only process multiples of blocks). -Here's an example of how to use the API: +Here's an example of how to use the API:: #include #include #include - + struct scatterlist sg[2]; char result[128]; struct crypto_ahash *tfm; struct ahash_request *req; - + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) fail(); - + /* ... set up the scatterlists ... */ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -67,18 +72,19 @@ Here's an example of how to use the API: ahash_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, result, 2); - + if (crypto_ahash_digest(req)) fail(); ahash_request_free(req); crypto_free_ahash(tfm); - + Many real examples are available in the regression test module (tcrypt.c). -DEVELOPER NOTES +Developer Notes +=============== Transforms may only be allocated in user context, and cryptographic methods may only be called from softirq and user contexts. For @@ -91,7 +97,8 @@ size (typically 8 bytes). This prevents having to do any copying across non-aligned page fragment boundaries. -ADDING NEW ALGORITHMS +Adding New Algorithms +===================== When submitting a new algorithm for inclusion, a mandatory requirement is that at least a few test vectors from known sources (preferably @@ -119,132 +126,137 @@ Also check the TODO list at the web site listed below to see what people might already be working on. -BUGS +Bugs +==== Send bug reports to: -linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org -Cc: Herbert Xu , + linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org + +Cc: + Herbert Xu , David S. Miller -FURTHER INFORMATION +Further Information +=================== For further patches and various updates, including the current TODO list, see: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/crypto/ -AUTHORS +Authors +======= -James Morris -David S. Miller -Herbert Xu +- James Morris +- David S. Miller +- Herbert Xu -CREDITS +Credits +======= The following people provided invaluable feedback during the development of the API: - Alexey Kuznetzov - Rusty Russell - Herbert Valerio Riedel - Jeff Garzik - Michael Richardson - Andrew Morton - Ingo Oeser - Christoph Hellwig + - Alexey Kuznetzov + - Rusty Russell + - Herbert Valerio Riedel + - Jeff Garzik + - Michael Richardson + - Andrew Morton + - Ingo Oeser + - Christoph Hellwig Portions of this API were derived from the following projects: - + Kerneli Cryptoapi (http://www.kerneli.org/) - Alexander Kjeldaas - Herbert Valerio Riedel - Kyle McMartin - Jean-Luc Cooke - David Bryson - Clemens Fruhwirth - Tobias Ringstrom - Harald Welte + - Alexander Kjeldaas + - Herbert Valerio Riedel + - Kyle McMartin + - Jean-Luc Cooke + - David Bryson + - Clemens Fruhwirth + - Tobias Ringstrom + - Harald Welte and; - + Nettle (http://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/) - Niels Möller + - Niels Möller Original developers of the crypto algorithms: - Dana L. How (DES) - Andrew Tridgell and Steve French (MD4) - Colin Plumb (MD5) - Steve Reid (SHA1) - Jean-Luc Cooke (SHA256, SHA384, SHA512) - Kazunori Miyazawa / USAGI (HMAC) - Matthew Skala (Twofish) - Dag Arne Osvik (Serpent) - Brian Gladman (AES) - Kartikey Mahendra Bhatt (CAST6) - Jon Oberheide (ARC4) - Jouni Malinen (Michael MIC) - NTT(Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) (Camellia) + - Dana L. How (DES) + - Andrew Tridgell and Steve French (MD4) + - Colin Plumb (MD5) + - Steve Reid (SHA1) + - Jean-Luc Cooke (SHA256, SHA384, SHA512) + - Kazunori Miyazawa / USAGI (HMAC) + - Matthew Skala (Twofish) + - Dag Arne Osvik (Serpent) + - Brian Gladman (AES) + - Kartikey Mahendra Bhatt (CAST6) + - Jon Oberheide (ARC4) + - Jouni Malinen (Michael MIC) + - NTT(Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) (Camellia) SHA1 algorithm contributors: - Jean-Francois Dive - + - Jean-Francois Dive + DES algorithm contributors: - Raimar Falke - Gisle Sælensminde - Niels Möller + - Raimar Falke + - Gisle Sælensminde + - Niels Möller Blowfish algorithm contributors: - Herbert Valerio Riedel - Kyle McMartin + - Herbert Valerio Riedel + - Kyle McMartin Twofish algorithm contributors: - Werner Koch - Marc Mutz + - Werner Koch + - Marc Mutz SHA256/384/512 algorithm contributors: - Andrew McDonald - Kyle McMartin - Herbert Valerio Riedel - + - Andrew McDonald + - Kyle McMartin + - Herbert Valerio Riedel + AES algorithm contributors: - Alexander Kjeldaas - Herbert Valerio Riedel - Kyle McMartin - Adam J. Richter - Fruhwirth Clemens (i586) - Linus Torvalds (i586) + - Alexander Kjeldaas + - Herbert Valerio Riedel + - Kyle McMartin + - Adam J. Richter + - Fruhwirth Clemens (i586) + - Linus Torvalds (i586) CAST5 algorithm contributors: - Kartikey Mahendra Bhatt (original developers unknown, FSF copyright). + - Kartikey Mahendra Bhatt (original developers unknown, FSF copyright). TEA/XTEA algorithm contributors: - Aaron Grothe - Michael Ringe + - Aaron Grothe + - Michael Ringe Khazad algorithm contributors: - Aaron Grothe + - Aaron Grothe Whirlpool algorithm contributors: - Aaron Grothe - Jean-Luc Cooke + - Aaron Grothe + - Jean-Luc Cooke Anubis algorithm contributors: - Aaron Grothe + - Aaron Grothe Tiger algorithm contributors: - Aaron Grothe + - Aaron Grothe VIA PadLock contributors: - Michal Ludvig + - Michal Ludvig Camellia algorithm contributors: - NTT(Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) (Camellia) + - NTT(Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) (Camellia) Generic scatterwalk code by Adam J. Richter Please send any credits updates or corrections to: Herbert Xu - diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst index 2bcaf422731e..b2eeab3c8631 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ for cryptographic use cases, as well as programming examples. :maxdepth: 2 intro + api-intro architecture asymmetric-keys devel-algos From patchwork Thu Apr 30 16:18:18 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mauro Carvalho Chehab X-Patchwork-Id: 11520881 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B47A17EF for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:19:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15B29208C3 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:19:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263575; bh=c5rGfIVc6nKN+2qYEHMgvGqnFyObN9KqjtBkbeJ52nM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=MfoIilwzbbrtcn/sAkrEV3yCQWTeS4e5Htj3kacQUcL/flciCeM/Q/RggmYdrqzKw VqyHn79jMFM3cUdlrWId35n5gf4JLe9ZY2EtKDbD8zhALJCMyuDLly9uw3Oyc5cFgZ tfQMpPwjvjYbA+QS94hYPrugbqfF8T5isNjnJ4YA= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728234AbgD3QTR (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:19:17 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58742 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727771AbgD3QSk (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:40 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org (ip5f5ad5c5.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [95.90.213.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B6106208DB; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263518; bh=c5rGfIVc6nKN+2qYEHMgvGqnFyObN9KqjtBkbeJ52nM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=O9g83dHbWXsf7oCrWhtpfHlrfITkDagdMesqOK2F/Xds4ERpdwbBO96oca67Rh8Ht G/OFIMUrX60IWp+40xU8Z+T9d2mlFXE32hsFX+wYh2LUcVSOZ6SMe0Psoc8UBv19YX zrY89ODlD+HB2q6DNkywIrSJopsshfbT59QO7+Es= Received: from mchehab by mail.kernel.org with local (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from ) id 1jUBtT-00Axgq-V5; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:35 +0200 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab To: Linux Doc Mailing List Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , Dan Williams , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Vinod Koul , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, dmaengine@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 04/19] docs: crypto: convert async-tx-api.txt to ReST format Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:18 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org - Place the txt index inside a comment; - Use title and chapter markups; - Adjust markups for numbered list; - Mark literal blocks as such; - Use tables markup. - Adjust indentation when needed. Acked-By: Vinod Koul # dmaengine Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab --- .../{async-tx-api.txt => async-tx-api.rst} | 253 +++++++++++------- Documentation/crypto/index.rst | 2 + Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst | 2 +- .../driver-api/dmaengine/provider.rst | 2 +- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 5 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) rename Documentation/crypto/{async-tx-api.txt => async-tx-api.rst} (55%) diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt b/Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst similarity index 55% rename from Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt rename to Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst index 7bf1be20d93a..bfc773991bdc 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt +++ b/Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst @@ -1,27 +1,32 @@ - Asynchronous Transfers/Transforms API +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -1 INTRODUCTION +===================================== +Asynchronous Transfers/Transforms API +===================================== -2 GENEALOGY +.. Contents -3 USAGE -3.1 General format of the API -3.2 Supported operations -3.3 Descriptor management -3.4 When does the operation execute? -3.5 When does the operation complete? -3.6 Constraints -3.7 Example + 1. INTRODUCTION -4 DMAENGINE DRIVER DEVELOPER NOTES -4.1 Conformance points -4.2 "My application needs exclusive control of hardware channels" + 2 GENEALOGY -5 SOURCE + 3 USAGE + 3.1 General format of the API + 3.2 Supported operations + 3.3 Descriptor management + 3.4 When does the operation execute? + 3.5 When does the operation complete? + 3.6 Constraints + 3.7 Example ---- + 4 DMAENGINE DRIVER DEVELOPER NOTES + 4.1 Conformance points + 4.2 "My application needs exclusive control of hardware channels" -1 INTRODUCTION + 5 SOURCE + +1. Introduction +=============== The async_tx API provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional @@ -31,7 +36,8 @@ that is written to the API can optimize for asynchronous operation and the API will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources. -2 GENEALOGY +2.Genealogy +=========== The API was initially designed to offload the memory copy and xor-parity-calculations of the md-raid5 driver using the offload engines @@ -39,40 +45,52 @@ present in the Intel(R) Xscale series of I/O processors. It also built on the 'dmaengine' layer developed for offloading memory copies in the network stack using Intel(R) I/OAT engines. The following design features surfaced as a result: -1/ implicit synchronous path: users of the API do not need to know if + +1. implicit synchronous path: users of the API do not need to know if the platform they are running on has offload capabilities. The operation will be offloaded when an engine is available and carried out in software otherwise. -2/ cross channel dependency chains: the API allows a chain of dependent +2. cross channel dependency chains: the API allows a chain of dependent operations to be submitted, like xor->copy->xor in the raid5 case. The API automatically handles cases where the transition from one operation to another implies a hardware channel switch. -3/ dmaengine extensions to support multiple clients and operation types +3. dmaengine extensions to support multiple clients and operation types beyond 'memcpy' -3 USAGE +3. Usage +======== -3.1 General format of the API: -struct dma_async_tx_descriptor * -async_(, struct async_submit ctl *submit) +3.1 General format of the API +----------------------------- -3.2 Supported operations: -memcpy - memory copy between a source and a destination buffer -memset - fill a destination buffer with a byte value -xor - xor a series of source buffers and write the result to a +:: + + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor * + async_(, struct async_submit ctl *submit) + +3.2 Supported operations +------------------------ + +======== ==================================================================== +memcpy memory copy between a source and a destination buffer +memset fill a destination buffer with a byte value +xor xor a series of source buffers and write the result to a destination buffer -xor_val - xor a series of source buffers and set a flag if the +xor_val xor a series of source buffers and set a flag if the result is zero. The implementation attempts to prevent writes to memory -pq - generate the p+q (raid6 syndrome) from a series of source buffers -pq_val - validate that a p and or q buffer are in sync with a given series of +pq generate the p+q (raid6 syndrome) from a series of source buffers +pq_val validate that a p and or q buffer are in sync with a given series of sources -datap - (raid6_datap_recov) recover a raid6 data block and the p block +datap (raid6_datap_recov) recover a raid6 data block and the p block from the given sources -2data - (raid6_2data_recov) recover 2 raid6 data blocks from the given +2data (raid6_2data_recov) recover 2 raid6 data blocks from the given sources +======== ==================================================================== + +3.3 Descriptor management +------------------------- -3.3 Descriptor management: The return value is non-NULL and points to a 'descriptor' when the operation has been queued to execute asynchronously. Descriptors are recycled resources, under control of the offload engine driver, to be reused as @@ -82,12 +100,15 @@ before the dependency is submitted. This requires that all descriptors be acknowledged by the application before the offload engine driver is allowed to recycle (or free) the descriptor. A descriptor can be acked by one of the following methods: -1/ setting the ASYNC_TX_ACK flag if no child operations are to be submitted -2/ submitting an unacknowledged descriptor as a dependency to another + +1. setting the ASYNC_TX_ACK flag if no child operations are to be submitted +2. submitting an unacknowledged descriptor as a dependency to another async_tx call will implicitly set the acknowledged state. -3/ calling async_tx_ack() on the descriptor. +3. calling async_tx_ack() on the descriptor. 3.4 When does the operation execute? +------------------------------------ + Operations do not immediately issue after return from the async_ call. Offload engine drivers batch operations to improve performance by reducing the number of mmio cycles needed to @@ -98,12 +119,15 @@ channels since the application has no knowledge of channel to operation mapping. 3.5 When does the operation complete? +------------------------------------- + There are two methods for an application to learn about the completion of an operation. -1/ Call dma_wait_for_async_tx(). This call causes the CPU to spin while + +1. Call dma_wait_for_async_tx(). This call causes the CPU to spin while it polls for the completion of the operation. It handles dependency chains and issuing pending operations. -2/ Specify a completion callback. The callback routine runs in tasklet +2. Specify a completion callback. The callback routine runs in tasklet context if the offload engine driver supports interrupts, or it is called in application context if the operation is carried out synchronously in software. The callback can be set in the call to @@ -111,83 +135,95 @@ of an operation. unknown length it can use the async_trigger_callback() routine to set a completion interrupt/callback at the end of the chain. -3.6 Constraints: -1/ Calls to async_ are not permitted in IRQ context. Other +3.6 Constraints +--------------- + +1. Calls to async_ are not permitted in IRQ context. Other contexts are permitted provided constraint #2 is not violated. -2/ Completion callback routines cannot submit new operations. This +2. Completion callback routines cannot submit new operations. This results in recursion in the synchronous case and spin_locks being acquired twice in the asynchronous case. -3.7 Example: +3.7 Example +----------- + Perform a xor->copy->xor operation where each operation depends on the -result from the previous operation: - -void callback(void *param) -{ - struct completion *cmp = param; - - complete(cmp); -} - -void run_xor_copy_xor(struct page **xor_srcs, - int xor_src_cnt, - struct page *xor_dest, - size_t xor_len, - struct page *copy_src, - struct page *copy_dest, - size_t copy_len) -{ - struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx; - addr_conv_t addr_conv[xor_src_cnt]; - struct async_submit_ctl submit; - addr_conv_t addr_conv[NDISKS]; - struct completion cmp; - - init_async_submit(&submit, ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DST, NULL, NULL, NULL, - addr_conv); - tx = async_xor(xor_dest, xor_srcs, 0, xor_src_cnt, xor_len, &submit) - - submit->depend_tx = tx; - tx = async_memcpy(copy_dest, copy_src, 0, 0, copy_len, &submit); - - init_completion(&cmp); - init_async_submit(&submit, ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DST | ASYNC_TX_ACK, tx, - callback, &cmp, addr_conv); - tx = async_xor(xor_dest, xor_srcs, 0, xor_src_cnt, xor_len, &submit); - - async_tx_issue_pending_all(); - - wait_for_completion(&cmp); -} +result from the previous operation:: + + void callback(void *param) + { + struct completion *cmp = param; + + complete(cmp); + } + + void run_xor_copy_xor(struct page **xor_srcs, + int xor_src_cnt, + struct page *xor_dest, + size_t xor_len, + struct page *copy_src, + struct page *copy_dest, + size_t copy_len) + { + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx; + addr_conv_t addr_conv[xor_src_cnt]; + struct async_submit_ctl submit; + addr_conv_t addr_conv[NDISKS]; + struct completion cmp; + + init_async_submit(&submit, ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DST, NULL, NULL, NULL, + addr_conv); + tx = async_xor(xor_dest, xor_srcs, 0, xor_src_cnt, xor_len, &submit) + + submit->depend_tx = tx; + tx = async_memcpy(copy_dest, copy_src, 0, 0, copy_len, &submit); + + init_completion(&cmp); + init_async_submit(&submit, ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DST | ASYNC_TX_ACK, tx, + callback, &cmp, addr_conv); + tx = async_xor(xor_dest, xor_srcs, 0, xor_src_cnt, xor_len, &submit); + + async_tx_issue_pending_all(); + + wait_for_completion(&cmp); + } See include/linux/async_tx.h for more information on the flags. See the ops_run_* and ops_complete_* routines in drivers/md/raid5.c for more implementation examples. -4 DRIVER DEVELOPMENT NOTES +4. Driver Development Notes +=========================== + +4.1 Conformance points +---------------------- -4.1 Conformance points: There are a few conformance points required in dmaengine drivers to accommodate assumptions made by applications using the async_tx API: -1/ Completion callbacks are expected to happen in tasklet context -2/ dma_async_tx_descriptor fields are never manipulated in IRQ context -3/ Use async_tx_run_dependencies() in the descriptor clean up path to + +1. Completion callbacks are expected to happen in tasklet context +2. dma_async_tx_descriptor fields are never manipulated in IRQ context +3. Use async_tx_run_dependencies() in the descriptor clean up path to handle submission of dependent operations 4.2 "My application needs exclusive control of hardware channels" +----------------------------------------------------------------- + Primarily this requirement arises from cases where a DMA engine driver is being used to support device-to-memory operations. A channel that is performing these operations cannot, for many platform specific reasons, be shared. For these cases the dma_request_channel() interface is provided. -The interface is: -struct dma_chan *dma_request_channel(dma_cap_mask_t mask, - dma_filter_fn filter_fn, - void *filter_param); +The interface is:: -Where dma_filter_fn is defined as: -typedef bool (*dma_filter_fn)(struct dma_chan *chan, void *filter_param); + struct dma_chan *dma_request_channel(dma_cap_mask_t mask, + dma_filter_fn filter_fn, + void *filter_param); + +Where dma_filter_fn is defined as:: + + typedef bool (*dma_filter_fn)(struct dma_chan *chan, void *filter_param); When the optional 'filter_fn' parameter is set to NULL dma_request_channel simply returns the first channel that satisfies the @@ -207,19 +243,28 @@ private. Alternatively, it is set when dma_request_channel() finds an unused "public" channel. A couple caveats to note when implementing a driver and consumer: -1/ Once a channel has been privately allocated it will no longer be + +1. Once a channel has been privately allocated it will no longer be considered by the general-purpose allocator even after a call to dma_release_channel(). -2/ Since capabilities are specified at the device level a dma_device +2. Since capabilities are specified at the device level a dma_device with multiple channels will either have all channels public, or all channels private. -5 SOURCE +5. Source +--------- -include/linux/dmaengine.h: core header file for DMA drivers and api users -drivers/dma/dmaengine.c: offload engine channel management routines -drivers/dma/: location for offload engine drivers -include/linux/async_tx.h: core header file for the async_tx api -crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c: async_tx interface to dmaengine and common code -crypto/async_tx/async_memcpy.c: copy offload -crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c: xor and xor zero sum offload +include/linux/dmaengine.h: + core header file for DMA drivers and api users +drivers/dma/dmaengine.c: + offload engine channel management routines +drivers/dma/: + location for offload engine drivers +include/linux/async_tx.h: + core header file for the async_tx api +crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c: + async_tx interface to dmaengine and common code +crypto/async_tx/async_memcpy.c: + copy offload +crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c: + xor and xor zero sum offload diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst index b2eeab3c8631..22a6870bf356 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ for cryptographic use cases, as well as programming examples. intro api-intro architecture + + async-tx-api asymmetric-keys devel-algos userspace-if diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst index 2104830a99ae..b0f32cfc38c2 100644 --- a/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ DMA Engine API Guide Vinod Koul .. note:: For DMA Engine usage in async_tx please see: - ``Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt`` + ``Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst`` Below is a guide to device driver writers on how to use the Slave-DMA API of the diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/provider.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/provider.rst index 56e5833e8a07..954422c2b704 100644 --- a/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/provider.rst +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/provider.rst @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ accommodates that API in some cases, and made some design choices to ensure that it stayed compatible. For more information on the Async TX API, please look the relevant -documentation file in Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt. +documentation file in Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst. DMAEngine APIs ============== diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bc849ca40b87..2f9bdcc80ef2 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -2808,7 +2808,7 @@ ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFERS/TRANSFORMS (IOAT) API R: Dan Williams S: Odd fixes W: http://sourceforge.net/projects/xscaleiop -F: Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.txt +F: Documentation/crypto/async-tx-api.rst F: crypto/async_tx/ F: drivers/dma/ F: include/linux/async_tx.h From patchwork Thu Apr 30 16:18:19 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mauro Carvalho Chehab X-Patchwork-Id: 11520865 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B09C7913 for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89106208CA for ; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:43 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263523; bh=86FBZ/o/74//Z9rtzkpcPDOWTqMZ84B8l6RhI+cNJP0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=H9PbczY6js4vxQRr1XgI7I/eAfeXYLObPnrvwNLEzLBoUPahh+INl3cGAregc5IYv Yu9ofcxJkr6C5Z52prgcn+MCdlEkJYgsSN+zjYWQt+G1yimM75TRk+/uszrELkO+0W i+VuFZxxGnIUBKu+DbG9qIz+nbli/oeYYJx1ZFg4= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728198AbgD3QSm (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:42 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58754 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728120AbgD3QSk (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Apr 2020 12:18:40 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org (ip5f5ad5c5.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [95.90.213.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C4EC124954; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 16:18:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588263518; bh=86FBZ/o/74//Z9rtzkpcPDOWTqMZ84B8l6RhI+cNJP0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=uwfYgUY6A8sXcwWCUXNCVK3l3WnohKtRPuDZXNwn5p3EkmoS1LnGMFJndot/XSDvP 2jwSdl+SXI0Qf8CBByeMBgQQsCSSFBHllJZCuzvE+CsH1rkB3fwQ5uECv0EvzUjauT SyUZ/iKDxHd2GGx7kn92hfURCJ5GuTfCeM4l7nZM= Received: from mchehab by mail.kernel.org with local (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from ) id 1jUBtT-00Axgy-W2; Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:35 +0200 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab To: Linux Doc Mailing List Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 05/19] docs: crypto: descore-readme.txt: convert to ReST format Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 18:18:19 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Convert this readme file to ReST file format, preserving its contents as-is as much as possible. The only changes are: - Added chapter and title markups; - Added blank lines where needed; - Added list markups where needed; - Use a table markup; - replace markups like `foo' to ``foo``; - add one extra literal markup to avoid warnings. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab --- ...{descore-readme.txt => descore-readme.rst} | 152 ++++++++++++------ Documentation/crypto/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) rename Documentation/crypto/{descore-readme.txt => descore-readme.rst} (81%) diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.txt b/Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.rst similarity index 81% rename from Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.txt rename to Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.rst index 16e9e6350755..45bd9c8babf4 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.txt +++ b/Documentation/crypto/descore-readme.rst @@ -1,8 +1,20 @@ -Below is the original README file from the descore.shar package. +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. include:: + +=========================================== +Fast & Portable DES encryption & decryption +=========================================== + +.. note:: + + Below is the original README file from the descore.shar package, + converted to ReST format. + ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ des - fast & portable DES encryption & decryption. -Copyright (C) 1992 Dana L. How + +Copyright |copy| 1992 Dana L. How This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public License as published by @@ -20,13 +32,12 @@ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Author's address: how@isl.stanford.edu -$Id: README,v 1.15 1992/05/20 00:25:32 how E $ - - -==>> To compile after untarring/unsharring, just `make' <<== +.. README,v 1.15 1992/05/20 00:25:32 how E +==>> To compile after untarring/unsharring, just ``make`` <<== This package was designed with the following goals: + 1. Highest possible encryption/decryption PERFORMANCE. 2. PORTABILITY to any byte-addressable host with a 32bit unsigned C type 3. Plug-compatible replacement for KERBEROS's low-level routines. @@ -36,7 +47,7 @@ register-starved machines. My discussions with Richard Outerbridge, 71755.204@compuserve.com, sparked a number of these enhancements. To more rapidly understand the code in this package, inspect desSmallFips.i -(created by typing `make') BEFORE you tackle desCode.h. The latter is set +(created by typing ``make``) BEFORE you tackle desCode.h. The latter is set up in a parameterized fashion so it can easily be modified by speed-daemon hackers in pursuit of that last microsecond. You will find it more illuminating to inspect one specific implementation, @@ -47,11 +58,13 @@ performance comparison to other available des code which i could compile on a SPARCStation 1 (cc -O4, gcc -O2): this code (byte-order independent): - 30us per encryption (options: 64k tables, no IP/FP) - 33us per encryption (options: 64k tables, FIPS standard bit ordering) - 45us per encryption (options: 2k tables, no IP/FP) - 48us per encryption (options: 2k tables, FIPS standard bit ordering) - 275us to set a new key (uses 1k of key tables) + + - 30us per encryption (options: 64k tables, no IP/FP) + - 33us per encryption (options: 64k tables, FIPS standard bit ordering) + - 45us per encryption (options: 2k tables, no IP/FP) + - 48us per encryption (options: 2k tables, FIPS standard bit ordering) + - 275us to set a new key (uses 1k of key tables) + this has the quickest encryption/decryption routines i've seen. since i was interested in fast des filters rather than crypt(3) and password cracking, i haven't really bothered yet to speed up @@ -63,15 +76,20 @@ this code (byte-order independent): are highly variable because of cache effects). kerberos des replacement from australia (version 1.95): - 53us per encryption (uses 2k of tables) - 96us to set a new key (uses 2.25k of key tables) + + - 53us per encryption (uses 2k of tables) + - 96us to set a new key (uses 2.25k of key tables) + so despite the author's inclusion of some of the performance improvements i had suggested to him, this package's encryption/decryption is still slower on the sparc and 68000. more specifically, 19-40% slower on the 68020 and 11-35% slower on the sparc, depending on the compiler; in full gory detail (ALT_ECB is a libdes variant): + + =============== ============== =============== ================= compiler machine desCore libdes ALT_ECB slower by + =============== ============== =============== ================= gcc 2.1 -O2 Sun 3/110 304 uS 369.5uS 461.8uS 22% cc -O1 Sun 3/110 336 uS 436.6uS 399.3uS 19% cc -O2 Sun 3/110 360 uS 532.4uS 505.1uS 40% @@ -79,10 +97,15 @@ kerberos des replacement from australia (version 1.95): gcc 2.1 -O2 Sun 4/50 48 uS 53.4uS 57.5uS 11% cc -O2 Sun 4/50 48 uS 64.6uS 64.7uS 35% cc -O4 Sun 4/50 48 uS 64.7uS 64.9uS 35% + =============== ============== =============== ================= + (my time measurements are not as accurate as his). + the comments in my first release of desCore on version 1.92: - 68us per encryption (uses 2k of tables) - 96us to set a new key (uses 2.25k of key tables) + + - 68us per encryption (uses 2k of tables) + - 96us to set a new key (uses 2.25k of key tables) + this is a very nice package which implements the most important of the optimizations which i did in my encryption routines. it's a bit weak on common low-level optimizations which is why @@ -91,48 +114,60 @@ kerberos des replacement from australia (version 1.95): speed up the key-setting routines with impressive results. (at some point i may do the same in my package). he also implements the rest of the mit des library. + (code from eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au via comp.sources.misc) fast crypt(3) package from denmark: + the des routine here is buried inside a loop to do the crypt function and i didn't feel like ripping it out and measuring performance. his code takes 26 sparc instructions to compute one des iteration; above, Quick (64k) takes 21 and Small (2k) takes 37. he claims to use 280k of tables but the iteration calculation seems to use only 128k. his tables and code are machine independent. + (code from glad@daimi.aau.dk via alt.sources or comp.sources.misc) swedish reimplementation of Kerberos des library - 108us per encryption (uses 34k worth of tables) - 134us to set a new key (uses 32k of key tables to get this speed!) + + - 108us per encryption (uses 34k worth of tables) + - 134us to set a new key (uses 32k of key tables to get this speed!) + the tables used seem to be machine-independent; he seems to have included a lot of special case code - so that, e.g., `long' loads can be used instead of 4 `char' loads + so that, e.g., ``long`` loads can be used instead of 4 ``char`` loads when the machine's architecture allows it. + (code obtained from chalmers.se:pub/des) crack 3.3c package from england: + as in crypt above, the des routine is buried in a loop. it's also very modified for crypt. his iteration code uses 16k of tables and appears to be slow. + (code obtained from aem@aber.ac.uk via alt.sources or comp.sources.misc) -``highly optimized'' and tweaked Kerberos/Athena code (byte-order dependent): - 165us per encryption (uses 6k worth of tables) - 478us to set a new key (uses <1k of key tables) +``highly optimized`` and tweaked Kerberos/Athena code (byte-order dependent): + + - 165us per encryption (uses 6k worth of tables) + - 478us to set a new key (uses <1k of key tables) + so despite the comments in this code, it was possible to get faster code AND smaller tables, as well as making the tables machine-independent. (code obtained from prep.ai.mit.edu) UC Berkeley code (depends on machine-endedness): - 226us per encryption -10848us to set a new key + - 226us per encryption + - 10848us to set a new key + table sizes are unclear, but they don't look very small (code obtained from wuarchive.wustl.edu) motivation and history +====================== a while ago i wanted some des routines and the routines documented on sun's man pages either didn't exist or dumped core. i had heard of kerberos, @@ -142,10 +177,10 @@ it was too convoluted, the code had been written without taking advantage of the regular structure of operations such as IP, E, and FP (i.e. the author didn't sit down and think before coding), it was excessively slow, the author had attempted to clarify the code -by adding MORE statements to make the data movement more `consistent' +by adding MORE statements to make the data movement more ``consistent`` instead of simplifying his implementation and cutting down on all data movement (in particular, his use of L1, R1, L2, R2), and it was full of -idiotic `tweaks' for particular machines which failed to deliver significant +idiotic ``tweaks`` for particular machines which failed to deliver significant speedups but which did obfuscate everything. so i took the test data from his verification program and rewrote everything else. @@ -167,12 +202,13 @@ than versions hand-written in assembly for the sparc! porting notes +============= one thing i did not want to do was write an enormous mess which depended on endedness and other machine quirks, and which necessarily produced different code and different lookup tables for different machines. see the kerberos code for an example -of what i didn't want to do; all their endedness-specific `optimizations' +of what i didn't want to do; all their endedness-specific ``optimizations`` obfuscate the code and in the end were slower than a simpler machine independent approach. however, there are always some portability considerations of some kind, and i have included some options @@ -184,8 +220,8 @@ perhaps some will still regard the result as a mess! i assume word pointers can be freely cast to and from char pointers. note that 99% of C programs make these assumptions. i always use unsigned char's if the high bit could be set. -2) the typedef `word' means a 32 bit unsigned integral type. - if `unsigned long' is not 32 bits, change the typedef in desCore.h. +2) the typedef ``word`` means a 32 bit unsigned integral type. + if ``unsigned long`` is not 32 bits, change the typedef in desCore.h. i assume sizeof(word) == 4 EVERYWHERE. the (worst-case) cost of my NOT doing endedness-specific optimizations @@ -195,40 +231,46 @@ the input and output work areas do not need to be word-aligned. OPTIONAL performance optimizations +================================== -1) you should define one of `i386,' `vax,' `mc68000,' or `sparc,' +1) you should define one of ``i386,`` ``vax,`` ``mc68000,`` or ``sparc,`` whichever one is closest to the capabilities of your machine. see the start of desCode.h to see exactly what this selection implies. note that if you select the wrong one, the des code will still work; these are just performance tweaks. -2) for those with functional `asm' keywords: you should change the +2) for those with functional ``asm`` keywords: you should change the ROR and ROL macros to use machine rotate instructions if you have them. this will save 2 instructions and a temporary per use, or about 32 to 40 instructions per en/decryption. + note that gcc is smart enough to translate the ROL/R macros into machine rotates! these optimizations are all rather persnickety, yet with them you should be able to get performance equal to assembly-coding, except that: + 1) with the lack of a bit rotate operator in C, rotates have to be synthesized - from shifts. so access to `asm' will speed things up if your machine + from shifts. so access to ``asm`` will speed things up if your machine has rotates, as explained above in (3) (not necessary if you use gcc). 2) if your machine has less than 12 32-bit registers i doubt your compiler will generate good code. - `i386' tries to configure the code for a 386 by only declaring 3 registers + + ``i386`` tries to configure the code for a 386 by only declaring 3 registers (it appears that gcc can use ebx, esi and edi to hold register variables). however, if you like assembly coding, the 386 does have 7 32-bit registers, - and if you use ALL of them, use `scaled by 8' address modes with displacement + and if you use ALL of them, use ``scaled by 8`` address modes with displacement and other tricks, you can get reasonable routines for DesQuickCore... with about 250 instructions apiece. For DesSmall... it will help to rearrange des_keymap, i.e., now the sbox # is the high part of the index and the 6 bits of data is the low part; it helps to exchange these. + since i have no way to conveniently test it i have not provided my shoehorned 386 version. note that with this release of desCore, gcc is able to put everything in registers(!), and generate about 370 instructions apiece for the DesQuickCore... routines! coding notes +============ the en/decryption routines each use 6 necessary register variables, with 4 being actively used at once during the inner iterations. @@ -236,15 +278,18 @@ if you don't have 4 register variables get a new machine. up to 8 more registers are used to hold constants in some configurations. i assume that the use of a constant is more expensive than using a register: + a) additionally, i have tried to put the larger constants in registers. registering priority was by the following: - anything more than 12 bits (bad for RISC and CISC) - greater than 127 in value (can't use movq or byte immediate on CISC) - 9-127 (may not be able to use CISC shift immediate or add/sub quick), - 1-8 were never registered, being the cheapest constants. + + - anything more than 12 bits (bad for RISC and CISC) + - greater than 127 in value (can't use movq or byte immediate on CISC) + - 9-127 (may not be able to use CISC shift immediate or add/sub quick), + - 1-8 were never registered, being the cheapest constants. + b) the compiler may be too stupid to realize table and table+256 should be assigned to different constant registers and instead repetitively - do the arithmetic, so i assign these to explicit `m' register variables + do the arithmetic, so i assign these to explicit ``m`` register variables when possible and helpful. i assume that indexing is cheaper or equivalent to auto increment/decrement, @@ -253,25 +298,31 @@ this assumption is reversed for 68k and vax. i assume that addresses can be cheaply formed from two registers, or from a register and a small constant. -for the 68000, the `two registers and small offset' form is used sparingly. +for the 68000, the ``two registers and small offset`` form is used sparingly. all index scaling is done explicitly - no hidden shifts by log2(sizeof). the code is written so that even a dumb compiler should never need more than one hidden temporary, increasing the chance that everything will fit in the registers. KEEP THIS MORE SUBTLE POINT IN MIND IF YOU REWRITE ANYTHING. + (actually, there are some code fragments now which do require two temps, but fixing it would either break the structure of the macros or require declaring another temporary). special efficient data format +============================== + +bits are manipulated in this arrangement most of the time (S7 S5 S3 S1):: -bits are manipulated in this arrangement most of the time (S7 S5 S3 S1): 003130292827xxxx242322212019xxxx161514131211xxxx080706050403xxxx + (the x bits are still there, i'm just emphasizing where the S boxes are). -bits are rotated left 4 when computing S6 S4 S2 S0: +bits are rotated left 4 when computing S6 S4 S2 S0:: + 282726252423xxxx201918171615xxxx121110090807xxxx040302010031xxxx + the rightmost two bits are usually cleared so the lower byte can be used as an index into an sbox mapping table. the next two x'd bits are set to various values to access different parts of the tables. @@ -288,7 +339,7 @@ datatypes: must be long-aligned. DesQuickInit() - call this before using any other routine with `Quick' in its name. + call this before using any other routine with ``Quick`` in its name. it generates the special 64k table these routines need. DesQuickDone() frees this table @@ -298,6 +349,7 @@ DesMethod(m, k) which must have odd parity (or -1 is returned) and which must not be a (semi-)weak key (or -2 is returned). normally DesMethod() returns 0. + m is filled in from k so that when one of the routines below is called with m, the routine will act like standard des en/decryption with the key k. if you use DesMethod, @@ -308,19 +360,26 @@ DesMethod(m, k) will be set to magic constants which speed up the encryption/decryption on some machines. and yes, each byte controls a specific sbox during a specific iteration. + you really shouldn't use the 768bit format directly; i should provide a routine that converts 128 6-bit bytes (specified in S-box mapping order or something) into the right format for you. this would entail some byte concatenation and rotation. Des{Small|Quick}{Fips|Core}{Encrypt|Decrypt}(d, m, s) - performs des on the 8 bytes at s into the 8 bytes at d. (d,s: char *). + performs des on the 8 bytes at s into the 8 bytes at + ``d. (d,s: char *)``. + uses m as a 768bit key as explained above. + the Encrypt|Decrypt choice is obvious. + Fips|Core determines whether a completely standard FIPS initial and final permutation is done; if not, then the data is loaded and stored in a nonstandard bit order (FIPS w/o IP/FP). + Fips slows down Quick by 10%, Small by 9%. + Small|Quick determines whether you use the normal routine or the crazy quick one which gobbles up 64k more of memory. Small is 50% slower then Quick, but Quick needs 32 times as much @@ -329,15 +388,17 @@ Des{Small|Quick}{Fips|Core}{Encrypt|Decrypt}(d, m, s) Getting it to compile on your machine +===================================== there are no machine-dependencies in the code (see porting), -except perhaps the `now()' macro in desTest.c. +except perhaps the ``now()`` macro in desTest.c. ALL generated tables are machine independent. you should edit the Makefile with the appropriate optimization flags for your compiler (MAX optimization). Speeding up kerberos (and/or its des library) +============================================= note that i have included a kerberos-compatible interface in desUtil.c through the functions des_key_sched() and des_ecb_encrypt(). @@ -347,6 +408,7 @@ you should not need to #include desCore.h; just include the header file provided with the kerberos library. Other uses +========== the macros in desCode.h would be very useful for putting inline des functions in more complicated encryption routines. diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst index 22a6870bf356..21338fa92642 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/index.rst @@ -27,3 +27,4 @@ for cryptographic use cases, as well as programming examples. crypto_engine api api-samples + descore-readme