From patchwork Tue May 12 23:32:48 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11544281 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BABE15E6 for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7464020784 for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326568; bh=/L5xK29ViM6H3K9diQ/RKFdZi3A2yxf+q63QlofvZKw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=s8NfkQMkQBBo27aPRwiS6UTzvfH0RCg5LNWPBZ/GaROJWzYNJFe3X3kGH/Oy6lDCc BgzsPSaJztBQ92kdbC5eDKDRzmAhC4ETWYCqYzVcTMlhTkIkE0r7nKG+0w4bTKFBmZ AtH1DmJcx0yaePDwrcxfFAk11A7b5sQJryEYfbmI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731618AbgELXgI (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:08 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33920 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725938AbgELXgH (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:07 -0400 Received: from sol.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (c-107-3-166-239.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [107.3.166.239]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6C09620769; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326567; bh=/L5xK29ViM6H3K9diQ/RKFdZi3A2yxf+q63QlofvZKw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SITX0Uc6cMqd/Nx4GmNh0VLRUjEvlCxuKD67PPh8tGhogHIO8Tac4vLmagL3S5tek xnJqA+d98BFL7TRYI+7VEKSZNKuWmBGbrMI9mjHKr/wrjKCPjP0k/vBUGEcssM1Qf4 C1jbi5q9p7UHDRxUrzBVEqdWLDAidSecKoRobD28= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Jaegeuk Kim , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH 1/4] linux/parser.h: add include guards Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 16:32:48 -0700 Message-Id: <20200512233251.118314-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers is missing include guards. Add them. This is needed to allow declaring a function in that takes a substring_t parameter. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim --- include/linux/parser.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/parser.h b/include/linux/parser.h index 12fc3482f5fc7a..89e2b23fb888e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/parser.h +++ b/include/linux/parser.h @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ * but could potentially be used anywhere else that simple option=arg * parsing is required. */ - +#ifndef _LINUX_PARSER_H +#define _LINUX_PARSER_H /* associates an integer enumerator with a pattern string. */ struct match_token { @@ -34,3 +35,5 @@ int match_hex(substring_t *, int *result); bool match_wildcard(const char *pattern, const char *str); size_t match_strlcpy(char *, const substring_t *, size_t); char *match_strdup(const substring_t *); + +#endif /* _LINUX_PARSER_H */ From patchwork Tue May 12 23:32:49 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11544283 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D77992A for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 734902312A for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326570; bh=EEakLHov+/y1Y/0O8Mqo/Itjd8dO5abxKpeHqQD/g6g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=J+nbyQFcoI6NM+AtGpwfVL2dkQCrqlD/2iu9cSc1XysE0zh7heexw+J3hqQtt+zHo euR8b/oALd9ifNadz6PdDX4wepFhHRADef+tvAfkJ2V2PWsj/6dz9qjBcNkG47ePDa uPRxJxyFXJVjzJ1JPOcOL59vyygDtJLcPt/ya6nA= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731322AbgELXgK (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:10 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33962 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725938AbgELXgJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:09 -0400 Received: from sol.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (c-107-3-166-239.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [107.3.166.239]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B066C20753; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326568; bh=EEakLHov+/y1Y/0O8Mqo/Itjd8dO5abxKpeHqQD/g6g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=nVaPAYOdAT7VQ6IeMYWKeDPJih9Y81YQfL3bwHVeYmSiAAXwqn6aOm4FYDbqISAdQ U4XKzf1y8c6HI7uPFKgdiQUsONFGxqB1cFBtTWCkYN+QNaVsihpMqeulbTpO5/vxwo gINS5mhH3s4YN2cZJG5h4zZFlrY9NkAAIVdgfM7E= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Jaegeuk Kim , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH 2/4] fscrypt: add fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 16:32:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20200512233251.118314-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Currently, the test_dummy_encryption mount option (which is used for encryption I/O testing with xfstests) uses v1 encryption policies, and it relies on userspace inserting a test key into the session keyring. We need test_dummy_encryption to support v2 encryption policies too. Requiring userspace to add the test key doesn't work well with v2 policies, since v2 policies only support the filesystem keyring (not the session keyring), and keys in the filesystem keyring are lost when the filesystem is unmounted. Hooking all test code that unmounts and re-mounts the filesystem would be difficult. Instead, let's make the filesystem automatically add the test key to its keyring when test_dummy_encryption is enabled. That puts the responsibility for choosing the test key on the kernel. We could just hard-code a key. But out of paranoia, let's first try using a per-boot random key, to prevent this code from being misused. A per-boot key will work as long as no one expects dummy-encrypted files to remain accessible after a reboot. (gce-xfstests doesn't.) Therefore, this patch adds a function fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() which implements the above. The next patch will use it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 + fs/crypto/keyring.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index dbced2937ec895..1bdb4a3a9b9fd6 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ extern struct key * fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb, const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec); +int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb, + struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec); + extern int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb, const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index ab41b25d4fa1ba..c983ddfde8ad8d 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include "fscrypt_private.h" @@ -424,9 +425,9 @@ static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, return 0; } -static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb, - struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret, - const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec) +static int do_add_master_key(struct super_block *sb, + struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret, + const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec) { static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_add_key_mutex); struct key *key; @@ -465,6 +466,35 @@ static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb, return err; } +static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb, + struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret, + struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec) +{ + int err; + + if (key_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) { + err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret->hkdf, secret->raw, + secret->size); + if (err) + return err; + + /* + * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no + * longer needed. + */ + memzero_explicit(secret->raw, secret->size); + + /* Calculate the key identifier */ + err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret->hkdf, + HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, NULL, 0, + key_spec->u.identifier, + FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE); + if (err) + return err; + } + return do_add_master_key(sb, secret, key_spec); +} + static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { const struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload *payload = prep->data; @@ -609,6 +639,15 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg) if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved))) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary descriptor + * rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since otherwise a malicious + * user could add the wrong key. + */ + if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); if (arg.key_id) { if (arg.raw_size != 0) @@ -626,54 +665,46 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg) goto out_wipe_secret; } - switch (arg.key_spec.type) { - case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR: - /* - * Only root can add keys that are identified by an arbitrary - * descriptor rather than by a cryptographic hash --- since - * otherwise a malicious user could add the wrong key. - */ - err = -EACCES; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - goto out_wipe_secret; - break; - case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER: - err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret.hkdf, secret.raw, secret.size); - if (err) - goto out_wipe_secret; - - /* - * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no - * longer needed. - */ - memzero_explicit(secret.raw, secret.size); - - /* Calculate the key identifier and return it to userspace. */ - err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret.hkdf, - HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - NULL, 0, arg.key_spec.u.identifier, - FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE); - if (err) - goto out_wipe_secret; - err = -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier, - arg.key_spec.u.identifier, - FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE)) - goto out_wipe_secret; - break; - default: - WARN_ON(1); - err = -EINVAL; + err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec); + if (err) goto out_wipe_secret; - } - err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec); + /* Return the key identifier to userspace, if applicable */ + err = -EFAULT; + if (arg.key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER && + copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier, arg.key_spec.u.identifier, + FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE)) + goto out_wipe_secret; + err = 0; out_wipe_secret: wipe_master_key_secret(&secret); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key); +/* + * Add the key for '-o test_dummy_encryption' to the filesystem keyring. + * + * Use a per-boot random key to prevent people from misusing this option. + */ +int fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(struct super_block *sb, + struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec) +{ + static u8 test_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret; + int err; + + get_random_once(test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE); + + memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); + secret.size = FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE; + memcpy(secret.raw, test_key, FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE); + + err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, key_spec); + wipe_master_key_secret(&secret); + return err; +} + /* * Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier * (returns -ENOKEY if not). This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting From patchwork Tue May 12 23:32:50 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11544287 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D98E90 for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 385E220784 for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326572; bh=2Oy4XlX8cEwdetwoMF2kSmuS76lQyMcQt777S9k/iUE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=yDUFb1uhHFqi7dWqVahzJbOsKrwiB7FultlIgamDXU8pehQttiJ206VWwqo4VGBUX Gekr66Ba5MFY+/aeGWzhprjpQ4vTSsjL701MXTnzC1A4y1I/BqrqVFUll/tbRItMy8 X+vcWYBPfyz1mqIcsp9AUACnRiYfwueuOgm1lRwQ= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731665AbgELXgL (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:11 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33980 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731645AbgELXgL (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:11 -0400 Received: from sol.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (c-107-3-166-239.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [107.3.166.239]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1948223126; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326569; bh=2Oy4XlX8cEwdetwoMF2kSmuS76lQyMcQt777S9k/iUE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=s1wbQahL8Gvo4C1rOfuVcrDnmnDqFHDhVnL8r1aksuuo/zmwWj/Lt5oxC/40c7DV4 pRLhyT3RmJ6nLtYSDeN9XC3W4wchJ33YQQfVx1nVBiL7YLNrF5jib/LGS9tcB12pu4 T4iklMN4avCRxGGrOqZbNMN3YeWf91AAyoEIqv6Q= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Jaegeuk Kim , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH 3/4] fscrypt: support test_dummy_encryption=v2 Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 16:32:50 -0700 Message-Id: <20200512233251.118314-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers v1 encryption policies are deprecated in favor of v2, and some new features (e.g. encryption+casefolding) are only being added for v2. Therefore, the "test_dummy_encryption" mount option (which is used for encryption I/O testing with xfstests) needs to support v2 policies. To do this, extend its syntax to be "test_dummy_encryption=v1" or "test_dummy_encryption=v2". The existing "test_dummy_encryption" (no argument) also continues to be accepted, to specify the default setting -- currently v1, but the next patch changes it to v2. To cleanly support both v1 and v2 while also making it easy to support specifying other encryption settings in the future (say, accepting "$contents_mode:$filenames_mode:v2"), make ext4 and f2fs maintain a pointer to the dummy fscrypt_context rather than using mount flags. To avoid concurrency issues, don't allow test_dummy_encryption to be set or changed during a remount. (The former restriction is new, but xfstests doesn't run into it, so no one should notice.) Tested with 'gce-xfstests -c {ext4,f2fs}/encrypt -g auto'. On ext4, there are two regressions, both of which are test bugs: ext4/023 and ext4/028 fail because they set an xattr and expect it to be stored inline, but the increase in size of the fscrypt_context from 24 to 40 bytes causes this xattr to be spilled into an external block. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o --- Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst | 6 +- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 15 ++-- fs/crypto/policy.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/ext4.h | 7 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 68 ++++++++++++---- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 4 +- fs/f2fs/super.c | 85 ++++++++++++++------ include/linux/fscrypt.h | 52 ++++++++++-- 8 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst index 87d794bc75a479..4218ac65862934 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst @@ -225,8 +225,12 @@ fsync_mode=%s Control the policy of fsync. Currently supports "posix", pass, but the performance will regress. "nobarrier" is based on "posix", but doesn't issue flush command for non-atomic files likewise "nobarrier" mount option. -test_dummy_encryption Enable dummy encryption, which provides a fake fscrypt +test_dummy_encryption +test_dummy_encryption=%s + Enable dummy encryption, which provides a fake fscrypt context. The fake fscrypt context is used by xfstests. + The argument may be either "v1" or "v2", in order to + select the corresponding fscrypt policy version. checkpoint=%s[:%u[%]] Set to "disable" to turn off checkpointing. Set to "enable" to reenable checkpointing. Is enabled by default. While disabled, any unmounting or unexpected shutdowns will cause diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 302375e9f719eb..cbfb3c7c4a13a6 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -395,21 +395,18 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); if (res < 0) { - if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) || - IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = + fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { fscrypt_warn(inode, "Error %d getting encryption context", res); return res; } /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ - memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - ctx.version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1; - ctx.v1.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; - ctx.v1.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; - memset(ctx.v1.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, - FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); - res = sizeof(ctx.v1); + res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); + memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); } crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 10ccf945020ce5..ca0ee337c9627f 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include "fscrypt_private.h" @@ -605,3 +606,127 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context); + +/** + * fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() - handle '-o test_dummy_encryption' + * @sb: the filesystem on which test_dummy_encryption is being specified + * @arg: the argument to the test_dummy_encryption option. + * If no argument was specified, then @arg->from == NULL. + * @dummy_ctx: the filesystem's current dummy context (input/output, see below) + * + * Handle the test_dummy_encryption mount option by creating a dummy encryption + * context, saving it in @dummy_ctx, and adding the corresponding dummy + * encryption key to the filesystem. If the @dummy_ctx is already set, then + * instead validate that it matches @arg. Don't support changing it via + * remount, as that is difficult to do safely. + * + * The reason we use an fscrypt_context rather than an fscrypt_policy is because + * we mustn't generate a new nonce each time we access a dummy-encrypted + * directory, as that would change the way filenames are encrypted. + * + * Return: 0 on success (dummy context set, or the same context is already set); + * -EEXIST if a different dummy context is already set; + * or another -errno value. + */ +int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + const substring_t *arg, + struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) +{ + const char *argstr = "v1"; + const char *argstr_to_free = NULL; + struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec = { 0 }; + int version; + union fscrypt_context *ctx = NULL; + int err; + + if (arg->from) { + argstr = argstr_to_free = match_strdup(arg); + if (!argstr) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (!strcmp(argstr, "v1")) { + version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1; + key_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR; + memset(key_spec.u.descriptor, 0x42, + FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); + } else if (!strcmp(argstr, "v2")) { + version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2; + key_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER; + /* key_spec.u.identifier gets filled in when adding the key */ + } else { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (dummy_ctx->ctx) { + /* + * Note: if we ever make test_dummy_encryption support + * specifying other encryption settings, such as the encryption + * modes, we'll need to compare those settings here. + */ + if (dummy_ctx->ctx->version == version) + err = 0; + else + err = -EEXIST; + goto out; + } + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + err = fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(sb, &key_spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + ctx->version = version; + switch (ctx->version) { + case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1: + ctx->v1.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; + ctx->v1.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; + memcpy(ctx->v1.master_key_descriptor, key_spec.u.descriptor, + FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); + break; + case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2: + ctx->v2.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; + ctx->v2.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; + memcpy(ctx->v2.master_key_identifier, key_spec.u.identifier, + FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE); + break; + default: + WARN_ON(1); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + dummy_ctx->ctx = ctx; + ctx = NULL; + err = 0; +out: + kfree(ctx); + kfree(argstr_to_free); + return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption); + +/** + * fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption() - show '-o test_dummy_encryption' + * @seq: the seq_file to print the option to + * @sep: the separator character to use + * @sb: the filesystem whose options are being shown + * + * Show the test_dummy_encryption mount option, if it was specified. + * This is mainly used for /proc/mounts. + */ +void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, char sep, + struct super_block *sb) +{ + const union fscrypt_context *ctx = fscrypt_get_dummy_context(sb); + + if (!ctx) + return; + seq_printf(seq, "%ctest_dummy_encryption=v%d", sep, ctx->version); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption); diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 91eb4381cae5b7..546504cba84211 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1357,11 +1357,9 @@ struct ext4_super_block { */ #define EXT4_MF_MNTDIR_SAMPLED 0x0001 #define EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED 0x0002 /* Fatal error detected */ -#define EXT4_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION 0x0004 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (unlikely((sbi)->s_mount_flags & \ - EXT4_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION)) +#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) ((sbi)->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx != NULL) #else #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0) #endif @@ -1551,6 +1549,9 @@ struct ext4_sb_info { struct ratelimit_state s_warning_ratelimit_state; struct ratelimit_state s_msg_ratelimit_state; + /* Encryption context for '-o test_dummy_encryption' */ + struct fscrypt_dummy_context s_dummy_enc_ctx; + /* * Barrier between writepages ops and changing any inode's JOURNAL_DATA * or EXTENTS flag. diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index bf5fcb477f6672..4a3d21972011bb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -1106,6 +1106,7 @@ static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb) crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver); kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock); fs_put_dax(sbi->s_daxdev); + fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE utf8_unload(sbi->s_encoding); #endif @@ -1389,9 +1390,10 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len, return res; } -static bool ext4_dummy_context(struct inode *inode) +static const union fscrypt_context * +ext4_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) { - return DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)); + return EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx; } static bool ext4_has_stable_inodes(struct super_block *sb) @@ -1410,7 +1412,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations ext4_cryptops = { .key_prefix = "ext4:", .get_context = ext4_get_context, .set_context = ext4_set_context, - .dummy_context = ext4_dummy_context, + .get_dummy_context = ext4_get_dummy_context, .empty_dir = ext4_empty_dir, .max_namelen = EXT4_NAME_LEN, .has_stable_inodes = ext4_has_stable_inodes, @@ -1605,6 +1607,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_init_itable, "init_itable"}, {Opt_noinit_itable, "noinit_itable"}, {Opt_max_dir_size_kb, "max_dir_size_kb=%u"}, + {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, "test_dummy_encryption=%s"}, {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, "test_dummy_encryption"}, {Opt_nombcache, "nombcache"}, {Opt_nombcache, "no_mbcache"}, /* for backward compatibility */ @@ -1816,7 +1819,7 @@ static const struct mount_opts { {Opt_jqfmt_vfsv0, QFMT_VFS_V0, MOPT_QFMT}, {Opt_jqfmt_vfsv1, QFMT_VFS_V1, MOPT_QFMT}, {Opt_max_dir_size_kb, 0, MOPT_GTE0}, - {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, 0, MOPT_GTE0}, + {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, 0, MOPT_STRING}, {Opt_nombcache, EXT4_MOUNT_NO_MBCACHE, MOPT_SET}, {Opt_err, 0, 0} }; @@ -1851,6 +1854,48 @@ static int ext4_sb_read_encoding(const struct ext4_super_block *es, } #endif +static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + const char *opt, + const substring_t *arg, + bool is_remount) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); + int err; + + /* + * This mount option is just for testing, and it's not worthwhile to + * implement the extra complexity (e.g. RCU protection) that would be + * needed to allow it to be set or changed during remount. We do allow + * it to be specified during remount, but only if there is no change. + */ + if (is_remount && !sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + return -1; + } + err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, arg, &sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); + if (err) { + if (err == -EEXIST) + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Can't change test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + else if (err == -EINVAL) + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Value of option \"%s\" is unrecognized", opt); + else + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Error processing option \"%s\" [%d]", + opt, err); + return -1; + } + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); +#else + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored"); +#endif + return 1; +} + static int handle_mount_opt(struct super_block *sb, char *opt, int token, substring_t *args, unsigned long *journal_devnum, unsigned int *journal_ioprio, int is_remount) @@ -2047,14 +2092,8 @@ static int handle_mount_opt(struct super_block *sb, char *opt, int token, *journal_ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, arg); } else if (token == Opt_test_dummy_encryption) { -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - sbi->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_TEST_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION; - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, - "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); -#else - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, - "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored"); -#endif + return ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, opt, &args[0], + is_remount); } else if (m->flags & MOPT_DATAJ) { if (is_remount) { if (!sbi->s_journal) @@ -2311,8 +2350,8 @@ static int _ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct super_block *sb, SEQ_OPTS_PRINT("max_dir_size_kb=%u", sbi->s_max_dir_size_kb); if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT)) SEQ_OPTS_PUTS("data_err=abort"); - if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) - SEQ_OPTS_PUTS("test_dummy_encryption"); + + fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(seq, sep, sb); ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb); return 0; @@ -4780,6 +4819,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(get_qf_name(sb, sbi, i)); #endif + fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi); brelse(bh); out_fail: diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index ba470d5687fe04..157eec34897046 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ struct f2fs_mount_info { int fsync_mode; /* fsync policy */ int fs_mode; /* fs mode: LFS or ADAPTIVE */ int bggc_mode; /* bggc mode: off, on or sync */ - bool test_dummy_encryption; /* test dummy encryption */ + struct fscrypt_dummy_context dummy_enc_ctx; /* test dummy encryption */ block_t unusable_cap; /* Amount of space allowed to be * unusable when disabling checkpoint */ @@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@ enum fsync_mode { #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) \ - (unlikely(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).test_dummy_encryption)) + (unlikely(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx != NULL)) #else #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0) #endif diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index f2dfc21c6abb0a..8a9955902d849c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = { {Opt_whint, "whint_mode=%s"}, {Opt_alloc, "alloc_mode=%s"}, {Opt_fsync, "fsync_mode=%s"}, + {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, "test_dummy_encryption=%s"}, {Opt_test_dummy_encryption, "test_dummy_encryption"}, {Opt_checkpoint_disable, "checkpoint=disable"}, {Opt_checkpoint_disable_cap, "checkpoint=disable:%u"}, @@ -394,7 +395,52 @@ static int f2fs_check_quota_options(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) } #endif -static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) +static int f2fs_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + const char *opt, + const substring_t *arg, + bool is_remount) +{ + struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + int err; + + if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(sbi)) { + f2fs_err(sbi, "Encrypt feature is off"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * This mount option is just for testing, and it's not worthwhile to + * implement the extra complexity (e.g. RCU protection) that would be + * needed to allow it to be set or changed during remount. We do allow + * it to be specified during remount, but only if there is no change. + */ + if (is_remount && !F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + return -EINVAL; + } + err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption( + sb, arg, &F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); + if (err) { + if (err == -EEXIST) + f2fs_warn(sbi, + "Can't change test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + else if (err == -EINVAL) + f2fs_warn(sbi, "Value of option \"%s\" is unrecognized", + opt); + else + f2fs_warn(sbi, "Error processing option \"%s\" [%d]", + opt, err); + return -EINVAL; + } + f2fs_warn(sbi, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); +#else + f2fs_warn(sbi, "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored"); +#endif + return 0; +} + +static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options, bool is_remount) { struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb); substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; @@ -403,9 +449,7 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) int arg = 0, ext_cnt; kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; -#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA int ret; -#endif if (!options) return 0; @@ -778,17 +822,10 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) kvfree(name); break; case Opt_test_dummy_encryption: -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(sbi)) { - f2fs_err(sbi, "Encrypt feature is off"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - F2FS_OPTION(sbi).test_dummy_encryption = true; - f2fs_info(sbi, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); -#else - f2fs_info(sbi, "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored"); -#endif + ret = f2fs_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, p, &args[0], + is_remount); + if (ret) + return ret; break; case Opt_checkpoint_disable_cap_perc: if (args->from && match_int(args, &arg)) @@ -1213,6 +1250,7 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb) for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) kvfree(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_qf_names[i]); #endif + fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); destroy_percpu_info(sbi); for (i = 0; i < NR_PAGE_TYPE; i++) kvfree(sbi->write_io[i]); @@ -1543,10 +1581,8 @@ static int f2fs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) seq_printf(seq, ",whint_mode=%s", "user-based"); else if (F2FS_OPTION(sbi).whint_mode == WHINT_MODE_FS) seq_printf(seq, ",whint_mode=%s", "fs-based"); -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - if (F2FS_OPTION(sbi).test_dummy_encryption) - seq_puts(seq, ",test_dummy_encryption"); -#endif + + fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(seq, ',', sbi->sb); if (F2FS_OPTION(sbi).alloc_mode == ALLOC_MODE_DEFAULT) seq_printf(seq, ",alloc_mode=%s", "default"); @@ -1575,7 +1611,6 @@ static void default_options(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) F2FS_OPTION(sbi).whint_mode = WHINT_MODE_OFF; F2FS_OPTION(sbi).alloc_mode = ALLOC_MODE_DEFAULT; F2FS_OPTION(sbi).fsync_mode = FSYNC_MODE_POSIX; - F2FS_OPTION(sbi).test_dummy_encryption = false; F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, F2FS_DEF_RESUID); F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, F2FS_DEF_RESGID); F2FS_OPTION(sbi).compress_algorithm = COMPRESS_LZ4; @@ -1734,7 +1769,7 @@ static int f2fs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) default_options(sbi); /* parse mount options */ - err = parse_options(sb, data); + err = parse_options(sb, data, true); if (err) goto restore_opts; checkpoint_changed = @@ -2410,9 +2445,10 @@ static int f2fs_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len, ctx, len, fs_data, XATTR_CREATE); } -static bool f2fs_dummy_context(struct inode *inode) +static const union fscrypt_context * +f2fs_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) { - return DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(F2FS_I_SB(inode)); + return F2FS_OPTION(F2FS_SB(sb)).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx; } static bool f2fs_has_stable_inodes(struct super_block *sb) @@ -2431,7 +2467,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations f2fs_cryptops = { .key_prefix = "f2fs:", .get_context = f2fs_get_context, .set_context = f2fs_set_context, - .dummy_context = f2fs_dummy_context, + .get_dummy_context = f2fs_get_dummy_context, .empty_dir = f2fs_empty_dir, .max_namelen = F2FS_NAME_LEN, .has_stable_inodes = f2fs_has_stable_inodes, @@ -3366,7 +3402,7 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto free_sb_buf; } - err = parse_options(sb, options); + err = parse_options(sb, options, false); if (err) goto free_options; @@ -3769,6 +3805,7 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) kvfree(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_qf_names[i]); #endif + fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); kvfree(options); free_sb_buf: kvfree(raw_super); diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index e3c2d2a155250a..13672564564894 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -15,12 +15,15 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE 16 +union fscrypt_context; struct fscrypt_info; +struct seq_file; struct fscrypt_str { unsigned char *name; @@ -58,7 +61,8 @@ struct fscrypt_operations { const char *key_prefix; int (*get_context)(struct inode *, void *, size_t); int (*set_context)(struct inode *, const void *, size_t, void *); - bool (*dummy_context)(struct inode *); + const union fscrypt_context *(*get_dummy_context)( + struct super_block *sb); bool (*empty_dir)(struct inode *); unsigned int max_namelen; bool (*has_stable_inodes)(struct super_block *sb); @@ -87,10 +91,12 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(const struct inode *inode) return IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode); } -static inline bool fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(struct inode *inode) +static inline const union fscrypt_context * +fscrypt_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) { - return inode->i_sb->s_cop->dummy_context && - inode->i_sb->s_cop->dummy_context(inode); + if (!sb->s_cop->get_dummy_context) + return NULL; + return sb->s_cop->get_dummy_context(sb); } /* @@ -143,6 +149,23 @@ extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *); extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *, void *, bool); + +struct fscrypt_dummy_context { + const union fscrypt_context *ctx; +}; + +int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + const substring_t *arg, + struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx); +void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, char sep, + struct super_block *sb); +static inline void +fscrypt_free_dummy_context(struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) +{ + kfree(dummy_ctx->ctx); + dummy_ctx->ctx = NULL; +} + /* keyring.c */ extern void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb); extern int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); @@ -222,9 +245,10 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(const struct inode *inode) return false; } -static inline bool fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(struct inode *inode) +static inline const union fscrypt_context * +fscrypt_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) { - return false; + return NULL; } static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move(struct dentry *dentry) @@ -319,6 +343,20 @@ static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +struct fscrypt_dummy_context { +}; + +static inline void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, + char sep, + struct super_block *sb) +{ +} + +static inline void +fscrypt_free_dummy_context(struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) +{ +} + /* keyring.c */ static inline void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) { @@ -676,7 +714,7 @@ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int max_len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) { - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(dir)) + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb) != NULL) return __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(dir, len, max_len, disk_link); disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; From patchwork Tue May 12 23:32:51 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11544285 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD92C92A for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC1042312A for ; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326571; bh=BMIktPcgJbdPblvIseR4lM4hwfbtMoRDGR8MWk2qSuA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=K+yBnWtF+Y4K+LIk0korfiyhXBOS/Zk3lXFYnF5CsN/MT6rV8rvIWyjl6ixuvBndq 1bO4TpIydjptDAcJ95uEhY1AF2501/ylHUoMz3OeZWS000HuyMdDwsEUIRS02gkb0r CUcpqf6flpiXurVASRN2jSPFkbQaktsZlSWCMYz4= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731660AbgELXgL (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:11 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33990 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725938AbgELXgL (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 May 2020 19:36:11 -0400 Received: from sol.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (c-107-3-166-239.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [107.3.166.239]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8CF1723129; Tue, 12 May 2020 23:36:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589326570; bh=BMIktPcgJbdPblvIseR4lM4hwfbtMoRDGR8MWk2qSuA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JZUdY+nHskjaq8Rsyn8OOMyKPHfjHj9JfV6Acwi+Pma0bvRssHQzAdfIvl+EIT/Dy +psLT83lyG4cNCQ7eI5/F4O3Yasm/+j3M7hxHcDOmv+55sx1xtHVwfWgMmbYPEx7/v zAV3sSEE8wyJr+mJq0JhLATesRFun5o3llaIdmxc= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Jaegeuk Kim , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fscrypt: make test_dummy_encryption use v2 by default Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 16:32:51 -0700 Message-Id: <20200512233251.118314-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200512233251.118314-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Since v1 encryption policies are deprecated, make test_dummy_encryption test v2 policies by default. Note that this causes ext4/023 and ext4/028 to start failing due to known bugs in those tests (see previous commit). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/crypto/policy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index ca0ee337c9627f..cb7fd8f7f0eca1 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, const substring_t *arg, struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) { - const char *argstr = "v1"; + const char *argstr = "v2"; const char *argstr_to_free = NULL; struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec = { 0 }; int version;