From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:22 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608121 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 133A0912 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:02:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E7FB82098B for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:02:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="Ip4/YvkQ" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732641AbgFPQCq (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:02:46 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42498 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732471AbgFPQCo (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:02:44 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F5D88EE2F6; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323364; bh=k/ZZidYLMsvKxjMIBixhl+/LZL2U0DqMsohtWFJ/Qjw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Ip4/YvkQIrgTPZvtNyH8xRxdgmXZDE5a83UBc/50IHlA76BJzGpxljFrloqovsFdp gm5+ojxHVozi/KWkfOxQCl4ffu1cwc8LVNWoVzv0s1P5InV5eQ8VF6/24TNzcc8glq K4dgqqm9BbOjXAW9YW079JaZKQU2eP36/huMEd8w= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 54uwhpW0m41S; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D9158EE2A2; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:43 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 1/8] lib: add ASN.1 encoder Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:22 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-2-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org We have a need in the TPM2 trusted keys to return the ASN.1 form of the TPM key blob so it can be operated on by tools outside of the kernel. The specific tools are the openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and the Intel tpm2-tss-engine. To do that, we have to be able to read and write the same binary key format the tools use. The current ASN.1 decoder does fine for reading, but we need pieces of an ASN.1 encoder to write the key blob in binary compatible form. For backwards compatibility, the trusted key reader code will still accept the two TPM2B quantities that it uses today, but the writer will only output the ASN.1 form. The current implementation only encodes the ASN.1 bits we actually need. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: updated API to use indefinite length, and made symbol exports gpl v3: add data length error handling v4: use end_data instead of data_len pointer v5: mention tools and space out code v7: reverse christmas tree variable definitions and better spacing v9: update comments, remove indefinite length, make encoder config dependent --- include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 +++ lib/Kconfig | 3 + lib/Makefile | 1 + lib/asn1_encoder.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 490 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..08cd0c2ad34f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H +#define _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define asn1_oid_len(oid) (sizeof(oid)/sizeof(u32)) +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val); + +#endif diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index df3f3da95990..1a03ba702169 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -676,3 +676,6 @@ config GENERIC_LIB_CMPDI2 config GENERIC_LIB_UCMPDI2 bool + +config ASN1_ENCODER + tristate diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index b1c42c10073b..624575da9b60 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ diff --git a/lib/asn1_encoder.c b/lib/asn1_encoder.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..41e71aae3ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/asn1_encoder.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Simple encoder primitives for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * asn1_encode_integer() - encode positive integer to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to the pointer to the data + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @integer: integer to be encoded + * + * This is a simplified encoder: it only currently does + * positive integers, but it should be simple enough to add the + * negative case if a use comes along. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = &data[2]; + bool found = false; + int i; + + if (WARN(integer < 0, + "BUG: integer encode only supports positive integers")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and integer encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* remaining length where at d (the start of the integer encoding) */ + data_len -= 2; + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, INT); + if (integer == 0) { + *d++ = 0; + goto out; + } + + for (i = sizeof(integer); i > 0 ; i--) { + int byte = integer >> (8 * (i - 1)); + + if (!found && byte == 0) + continue; + + /* + * for a positive number the first byte must have bit + * 7 clear in two's complement (otherwise it's a + * negative number) so prepend a leading zero if + * that's not the case + */ + if (!found && (byte & 0x80)) { + /* + * no check needed here, we already know we + * have len >= 1 + */ + *d++ = 0; + data_len--; + } + + found = true; + if (data_len == 0) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *d++ = byte; + data_len--; + } + + out: + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_integer); + +/* calculate the base 128 digit values setting the top bit of the first octet */ +static int asn1_encode_oid_digit(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, u32 oid) +{ + unsigned char *data = *_data; + int start = 7 + 7 + 7 + 7; + int ret = 0; + + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + /* quick case */ + if (oid == 0) { + *data++ = 0x80; + (*data_len)--; + goto out; + } + + while (oid >> start == 0) + start -= 7; + + while (start > 0 && *data_len > 0) { + u8 byte; + + byte = oid >> start; + oid = oid - (byte << start); + start -= 7; + byte |= 0x80; + *data++ = byte; + (*data_len)--; + } + + if (*data_len > 0) { + *data++ = oid; + (*data_len)--; + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; + } + + out: + *_data = data; + return ret; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_oid() - encode an oid to ASN.1 + * @data: position to begin encoding at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @oid: array of oids + * @oid_len: length of oid array + * + * this encodes an OID up to ASN.1 when presented as an array of OID values + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = data + 2; + int i, ret; + + if (WARN(oid_len < 2, "OID must have at least two elements")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (WARN(oid_len > 32, "OID is too large")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and OID encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OID); + *d++ = oid[0] * 40 + oid[1]; + + data_len -= 3; + + ret = 0; + + for (i = 2; i < oid_len; i++) { + ret = asn1_encode_oid_digit(&d, &data_len, oid[i]); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_oid); + +/** + * asn1_encode_length() - encode a length to follow an ASN.1 tag + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: pointer to remaning length (adjusted by routine) + * @len: length to encode + * + * This routine can encode lengths up to 65535 using the ASN.1 rules. + * It will accept a negative length and place a zero length tag + * instead (to keep the ASN.1 valid). This convention allows other + * encoder primitives to accept negative lengths as singalling the + * sequence will be re-encoded when the length is known. + */ +static int asn1_encode_length(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, int len) +{ + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len < 0) { + *((*data)++) = 0; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (len <= 0x7f) { + *((*data)++) = len; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x81; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 2; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 3) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xffff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x82; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 3; + return 0; + } + + if (WARN(len > 0xffffff, "ASN.1 length can't be > 0xffffff")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (*data_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + *((*data)++) = 0x83; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 16) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 4; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_tag() - add a tag for optional or explicit value + * @data: pointer to place tag at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @tag: tag to be placed + * @string: the data to be tagged + * @len: the length of the data to be tagged + * + * Note this currently only handles short form tags < 31. + * + * Standard usage is to pass in a @tag, @string and @length and the + * @string will be ASN.1 encoded with @tag and placed into @data. If + * the encoding would put data past @end_data then an error is + * returned, otherwise a pointer to a position one beyond the encoding + * is returned. + * + * To encode in place pass a NULL @string and -1 for @len and the + * maximum allowable beginning and end of the data; all this will do + * is add the current maximum length and update the data pointer to + * the place where the tag contents should be placed is returned. The + * data should be copied in by the calling routine which should then + * repeat the prior statement but now with the known length. In order + * to avoid having to keep both before and after pointers, the repeat + * expects to be called with @data pointing to where the first encode + * returned it and still NULL for @string but the real length in @len. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (WARN(tag > 30, "ASN.1 tag can't be > 30")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (!string && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode tag is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!string && len > 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * tag and install a dummy length because the real + * data_len should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tagn(CONT, CONS, tag); + data_len--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!string) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_tag); + +/** + * asn1_encode_octet_string() - encode an ASN.1 OCTET STRING + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @string: string to be encoded + * @len: length of string + * + * Note ASN.1 octet strings may contain zeros, so the length is obligatory. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need minimum of 2 bytes for tag and length of zero length string */ + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OTS); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_octet_string); + +/** + * asn1_encode_sequence() - wrap a byte stream in an ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @seq: data to be encoded as a sequence + * @len: length of the data to be encoded as a sequence + * + * Fill in a sequence. To encode in place, pass NULL for @seq and -1 + * for @len; then call again once the length is known (still with NULL + * for @seq). In order to avoid having to keep both before and after + * pointers, the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to + * where the first encode placed it. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (!seq && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode sequence is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!seq && len >= 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * sequence and install a dummy length because the + * real length should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, CONS, SEQ); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!seq) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, seq, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_sequence); + +/** + * asn1_encode_boolean() - encode a boolean value to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @val: the boolean true/false value + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* booleans are 3 bytes: tag, length == 1 and value == 0 or 1 */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, BOOL); + data_len--; + + asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, 1); + + if (val) + *(data++) = 1; + else + *(data++) = 0; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_boolean); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:23 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608125 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B68A913 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2294B2098B for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="l1PY5mij" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732751AbgFPQDD (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:03:03 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42532 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732605AbgFPQC7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:02:59 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5FF08EE2A2; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323378; bh=Fz12vh02KycNYIOJCKhsfJaZIhTY3QwTSSkaJlEmPFE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=l1PY5mijlXlAG4y+tYUSVV/gnqgWfGxqS92SnzR4Oh/GpW2fYKcNG4kvCW9rnkg4P OjnZiZV0DS+Y83QnRngkazcxBnum8fMR0RZqFeLlh70mNhBCnCOmVirK4VV6ouQ08j Tp5xQn9OfdmkD8wXdWD9b2l441Fz7sCDWzHsA274= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8ZUCiuvilyCe; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E44A88EE188; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:57 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 2/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:23 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-3-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The TCG has defined an OID prefix "2.23.133.10.1" for the various TPM key uses. We've defined three of the available numbers: 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Load() operation. 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Import() operation. Both loadable and importable keys are specific to a given TPM, the difference is that a loadable key is wrapped with the symmetric secret, so must have been created by the TPM itself. An importable key is wrapped with a DH shared secret, and may be created without access to the TPM provided you know the public part of the parent key. 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before use. The ASN.1 binary key form starts of with this OID as the first element of a sequence, giving the binary form a unique recognizable identity marker regardless of encoding. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: David Howells --- v3: correct OID_TPMImportableKey name v7: add ack v9: add review --- include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 657d6bf2c064..f6e2276e5f30 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ enum OID { OID_gostTC26Sign512B, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.2 */ OID_gostTC26Sign512C, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3 */ + /* TCG defined OIDS for TPM based keys */ + OID_TPMLoadableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.3 */ + OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ + OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ + OID__NR }; From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:24 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608131 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE07D912 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4FF3207C4 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="N17m6tTg" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731773AbgFPQDM (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:03:12 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42556 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731902AbgFPQDJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:03:09 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E1ADD8EE304; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323389; bh=dcTYm2eDo/Rli3g8QsLQKfc66TqV7Wxpckdl2s1XiEo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=N17m6tTgmetCUk8aN9iaqg79Ph3mrRcvyJ20yPZNBTX1LDeijbW74WS5YwFJ8QXrx vHwClBV/mVauielwCgHt/hx88uj0oKmVc5A6xmCP+NPsD/wX4xzFQTjWhgtKpj+Fth R9x8HNjGPljr199OgbltgsgG7ttWsIxza+IPxoHM= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4iCFIUBSouUd; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20EF38EE2CA; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:09 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 3/8] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:24 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f keyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v6: change comment, eliminate else clauses and add fixes tag v7: fixes before signoff v10: wrap some lines --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 11 +++++--- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 8001ab07e63b..594c9ebb47d5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -781,13 +781,34 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as + * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple + * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + return 0; + } + + if (tpm2 && + opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + return 0; + } + + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') pay->migratable = 0; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..e65a11d3efd3 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -91,10 +91,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + + payload->key_len + 1); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); + if (options->blobauth_len) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); @@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + options->blobauth_len); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:25 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608133 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C40CD913 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A00272098B for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:03:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="Sk3aCbH/" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731436AbgFPQDr (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:03:47 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42636 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732375AbgFPQDq (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:03:46 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 496AF8EE2BD; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323426; bh=fJrc5Zu0ZDA63RNTWPQ6Ozl1ulKLDbS8g3KE1rD0cXQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Sk3aCbH/I9Kr2rAp+Igqz+sE8k0lqVckSk3XwrlNAavel4UwrjNSUZbLYZtzZla8w T9S0u8bQqq0xbT0B6jE6FHBbHJ3jFJ8hAu2wVzAmzJhm8JbQ/p/pYVRyRFVYkf3DiA Iub4a4VWh1Kta2g71/O4SHfCyWIFJglZCivubMho= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LWX-V5WczM10; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A4DF8EE188; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:03:45 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:25 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: Updated encode API, added length checks v5: correct export format after doing interoperability checks v7: use prefix tpm2_key_ instead of tpmkey_ for functions v8: resplit commit v9: select ASN1_ENCODER v10: add reviw/tested tags --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/Kconfig | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 23 +++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2ed3481c6a0..b2d87ad21714 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 83bc23409164..8fbfedf6d1cc 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 7b73cebbb378..e0198641eff2 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..660b3fa917ae --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +--- +--- Note: This isn't quite the definition in the standard +--- However, the Linux asn.1 parser doesn't understand +--- [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OPTIONAL +--- So there's an extra intermediate TPMPolicySequence +--- definition to work around this + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}), + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + policy [1] EXPLICIT TPMPolicySequence OPTIONAL, + secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), + pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) + } + +TPMPolicySequence ::= SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy + +TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, + commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING + } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 594c9ebb47d5..d35ec16f5b4e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - if (!options->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e65a11d3efd3..51d845da8728 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation */ +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -12,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 }; + +static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = scratch, *work1; + u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; + u8 *priv, *pub; + u16 priv_len, pub_len; + + priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + priv = src; + + src += priv_len; + + pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + pub = src; + + if (!scratch) + return -ENOMEM; + + work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, + asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); + + if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; + /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ + w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) + return PTR_ERR(w); + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); + } + + /* + * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never + * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + */ + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); + + work1 = payload->blob; + work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), + scratch, work - scratch); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) + return PTR_ERR(work1); + + return work1 - payload->blob; +} + +struct tpm2_key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 **buf) +{ + int ret; + struct tpm2_key_context ctx; + u8 *blob; + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, + payload->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + *buf = blob; + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + blob += ctx.priv_len; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -79,6 +244,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) return -EINVAL; + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -147,8 +315,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; + payload->blob_len = + tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -159,6 +329,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, else rc = -EPERM; } + if (payload->blob_len < 0) + return payload->blob_len; return rc; } @@ -185,13 +357,34 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; + u8 *blob; int rc; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) { + /* old form */ + blob = payload->blob; + payload->old_format = 1; + } + + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + + /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ + if (payload->blob_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + + private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); + + /* must be big enough for following public_len */ + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -207,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->keyauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG; @@ -220,6 +413,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: + if (blob != payload->blob) + kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:26 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608141 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F3F014DD for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:04:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38EE9207C4 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:04:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="tRklJJ0v" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732446AbgFPQEl (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:04:41 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42686 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732520AbgFPQEk (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:04:40 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDCD88EE2F6; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:04:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323479; bh=N3D2OlORAXbnFM5X2kMs3tQSUG+86DbQrt8pUrVopo4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tRklJJ0vs9NW6vtlyczi4rra9SjPYfLMKUv+iLmrxLymZlzLXs9RkyQVbW8BIRvQn zbsxDmVDaD3+5hGsnai9Yujq8Au741KfNLuPSKyMKmKvdjS3uYPb/VKYp16XjAkrcy QWv+ycIO7P7ZkNZru5AsbDRePUK9mzukXTUSGgMI= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id k4jmiIdey9zo; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:04:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4DBF8EE2BD; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:04:38 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:26 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't load. Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from the last byte of old format keys. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: added length checks to untrusted payload v8: recover patch --- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 03e9b184411b..cd46ab27baa5 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ struct tpm_buf { }; enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1), + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4), TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 51d845da8728..905c5ca4d51c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int blob_len; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; + u32 flags; int i; int rc; @@ -259,32 +260,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + - payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); if (options->blobauth_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); /* public */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + /* key properties */ + flags = 0; + flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0; + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags); + /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + if (options->policydigest_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -357,8 +358,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob; + u8 *blob, *pub; int rc; + u32 attrs; rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); if (rc) { @@ -385,6 +387,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; + pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2; + /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */ + attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4); + + if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) == + (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) + payload->migratable = 0; + else + payload->migratable = 1; + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -465,7 +477,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!rc) { data_len = be16_to_cpup( (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -476,9 +488,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + if (payload->old_format) { + /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } else { + /* + * migratable flag already collected from key + * attributes + */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len); + payload->key_len = data_len; + } } out: From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:27 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608145 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE2C9159A for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:06:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87AC42071A for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:06:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="bX84tp8T" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732553AbgFPQGJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:06:09 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42752 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1733245AbgFPQGG (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:06:06 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49D4A8EE2A2; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:06:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323566; bh=2l1PvueqBLhWlNzrv3WTKrEeKvKgrTSXNVzUYRO4HII=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=bX84tp8T0QrWiKEnxWsogx/jK0kcKrJE1jqdd3q5DSaPymoY57nb1fjn12ialC3Cy ny6VVZUonIZE0RSZTuiB2poOK+1Rv2TleGjlfagEJjnhDs/iHv0oN8Hfgto93fdytJ XwbDZJ94/jIsSWDt827Qxf7Qy95fip3V3RPCd5AE= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id K49cHsLsZzsN; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:06:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E38B8EE188; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:06:05 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:27 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This commit adds the ability to specify a PCR lock policy to TPM2 keys. There is a complexity in that the creator of the key must chose either to use a PCR lock policy or to use authentication. At the current time they can't use both due to a complexity with the way authentication works when policy registers are in use. The way to construct a pcrinfo statement for a key is simply to use the TPMS_PCR_SELECT structure to specify the PCRs and follow this by a hash of all their values in order of ascending PCR number. For simplicity, we require the policy name hash and the hash used for the PCRs to be the same. Thus to construct a policy around the value of the resettable PCR 16 using the sha1 bank, first reset the pcr to zero giving a hash of all zeros as: 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f Then the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for PCR 16 is 03000001 So create a new 32 byte key with a policy policy locking the key to this value of PCR 16 with a parent key of 81000001 would be: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 pcrinfo=030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f" @u Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v2: fix for new ASN.1 API eliminating hack in place and check lengths v8: recover patch and fix offsets for hash and size v9: fix cut and paste error in commit log --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 19 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 5 +- include/linux/tpm.h | 5 + security/keys/Kconfig | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 372 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 30 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 86 +++- 10 files changed, 516 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 50ac8bcd6970..053344c4df5b 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ Usage:: (40 ascii zeros) blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros) - pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no + default) on TPM 1.2 and a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION + coupled with a hash of all the selected PCRs on + TPM 2.0 using the selected hash. pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) @@ -151,6 +154,20 @@ Load a trusted key from the saved blob:: f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba +Create a trusted key on TPM 2.0 using an all zero value of PCR16 and +using the NV storage root 81000001 as the parent:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 pcrinfo=030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f" @u + +Note the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for PCR 16 is 03000001 because all +current TPMs have 24 PCRs, so the initial 03 says there are three +following bytes of selection and then because the bytes are big +endian, 16 is bit zero of byte 2. the hash is the sha1 sum of all +zeros (the value of PCR 16):: + + $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=20 2>/dev/null|sha1sum + 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f + Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:: $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2d87ad21714..c117bf598230 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ #define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 -#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 128 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 +#define TPM2_MAX_POLICIES 16 + struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; unsigned int key_len; @@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; + struct tpm2_policies *policies; }; struct trusted_key_options { diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index cd46ab27baa5..e32e9728adce 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -222,10 +222,14 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE = 0x016B, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER = 0x016D, + TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS = 0x0176, TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, @@ -234,6 +238,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { }; enum tpm2_permanent_handles { + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 8fbfedf6d1cc..d9977359b8a6 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA512 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select ASN1_ENCODER help diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index e0198641eff2..194febacf362 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o tpm2-policy.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..080a76e879fd --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" +#include "tpm2-policy.h" + +int tpm2_key_code(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + u32 code = 0; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + code <<= 8; + code |= v[i]; + } + + ctx->policy_code[ctx->policy_count] = code; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_policy(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->policies[ctx->policy_count] = value; + ctx->policy_len[ctx->policy_count++] = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +/* we only support a limited number of policy statement so + * make sure we don't have anything we can't support + */ +static int tpm2_validate_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols) +{ + int i; + + if (pols->count == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + switch (pols->code[i]) { + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER: + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR: + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE: + break; + default: + printk(KERN_INFO "tpm2 policy 0x%x is unsupported", + pols->code[i]); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * tpm2_key_process_policy - collect the policty from the context + * @ctx: the context to collect from + * @payload: the payload structure to place it in + * + * THis function sizes the policy statements and allocates space + * within the payload to receive them before copying them over. It + * should be used after the ber decoder has completed successfully + */ +int tpm2_key_policy_process(struct tpm2_key_context *ctx, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload) +{ + int tot_len = 0; + u8 *buf; + int i, ret, len = 0; + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + + if (ctx->policy_count == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++) + tot_len += ctx->policy_len[i]; + tot_len += sizeof(*pols); + + pols = kmalloc(tot_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + payload->policies = pols; + buf = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++) { + pols->policies[i] = &buf[len]; + pols->len[i] = ctx->policy_len[i]; + pols->code[i] = ctx->policy_code[i]; + if (pols->len[i]) + memcpy(pols->policies[i], ctx->policies[i], + ctx->policy_len[i]); + len += ctx->policy_len[i]; + } + pols->count = ctx->policy_count; + + ret = tpm2_validate_policy(pols); + if (ret) { + kfree(pols); + payload->policies = NULL; + } + + /* capture the hash and size */ + + /* the hash is the second algorithm */ + pols->hash = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[4]); + /* and the digest appears after the attributes */ + pols->hash_size = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[10]); + + return ret; +} + +int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 hash, u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen) +{ + int i; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int rc; + + if (pols->count == 0) + return 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + rc = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + if (WARN(rc > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, + "BUG: trusted key code has alg %s with digest too large (%d)", + hash_algo_name[hash], rc)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + pols->hash = hash; + pols->hash_size = rc; + *plen = rc; + + /* policy digests always start out all zeros */ + memset(policydigest, 0, rc); + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u8 *policy = pols->policies[i]; + int len = pols->len[i]; + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 code[4]; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(sdesc, tfm); + + sdesc->tfm = tfm; + rc = crypto_shash_init(sdesc); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* first hash the previous digest */ + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policydigest, *plen); + + /* then hash the command code */ + put_unaligned_be32(cmd, code); + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, code, 4); + + /* commands that need special handling */ + if (cmd == TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER) { + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(sdesc1, tfm); + + sdesc1->tfm = tfm; + + /* counter timer policies are double hashed */ + crypto_shash_digest(sdesc1, policy, len, + digest); + policy = digest; + len = *plen; + } + + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); + + /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */ + crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest); + + } + rc = 0; + + err: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return rc; +} + +int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *buf = kmalloc(2 * SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = buf + SCRATCH_SIZE; + u8 *ptr; + u8 *end_work = work + SCRATCH_SIZE; + int i, ret; + + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u8 *seq, *tag; + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + + if (WARN(work - buf + 14 + pols->len[i] > 2 * SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + work = asn1_encode_sequence(work, end_work, NULL, -1); + seq = work; + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, NULL, -1); + tag = work; + + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, cmd); + asn1_encode_tag(tag, end_work, 0, NULL, work - tag); + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 1, NULL, -1); + tag = work; + + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, + pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i]); + + asn1_encode_tag(tag, end_work, 1, NULL, work - tag); + + seq = asn1_encode_sequence(seq, end_work, NULL, work - seq); + if (IS_ERR(seq)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(seq); + goto err; + } + } + ptr = asn1_encode_sequence(buf, buf + SCRATCH_SIZE, buf + PAGE_SIZE, + work - buf - PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(ptr)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ptr); + goto err; + } + + *data = buf; + *len = ptr - buf; + + return 0; + + err: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +int tpm2_start_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 hash, u32 *handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + int i; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* NULL salt key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + + /* NULL bind key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + + /* empty nonce caller */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 20); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0); + + /* empty auth */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* session type policy */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0x01); + + /* symmetric encryption parameters */ + + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); + + /* hash algorithm for session */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + *handle = get_unaligned_be32(buf.data + TPM_HEADER_SIZE); + + out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc <= 0 ? rc : -EPERM; +} + +int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 *handle) +{ + int i, rc; + const char *failure; + + rc = tpm2_start_policy_session(chip, pols->hash, handle); + if (rc) + return rc; + + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; + struct tpm_buf buf; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, *handle); + + switch (cmd) { + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR: + failure = "PCR"; + /* + * for reasons best known to the TCG we have + * to reverse the two arguments to send to the + * policy command + */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, pols->hash_size); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + pols->len[i] - + pols->hash_size, pols->hash_size); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size); + break; + default: + failure = "unknown policy"; + break; + } + + rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_NOTICE "TPM policy %s failed, rc=%d\n", + failure, rc); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, *handle); + *handle = 0; + return -EPERM; + } + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..46bf1f0a9325 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +struct tpm2_key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; + const u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u32 policy_code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u16 policy_len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 policy_count; +}; + +struct tpm2_policies { + u32 code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u16 len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES]; + u8 count; + u16 hash; + u16 hash_size; +}; + +int tpm2_key_policy_process(struct tpm2_key_context *ctx, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload); +int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash, + u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen); +int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len); +int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, + u32 *handle); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 index 660b3fa917ae..93e442d713fc 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -18,6 +18,6 @@ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { TPMPolicySequence ::= SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { - commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, - commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING + commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER ({tpm2_key_code}), + commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_policy}) } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index d35ec16f5b4e..9f735bbe9eef 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) struct trusted_key_payload *p; p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + kzfree(p->policies); kzfree(p); } @@ -1175,7 +1176,11 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = key->payload.data[0]; + kzfree(p->policies); + kzfree(p); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 905c5ca4d51c..98c65431ca75 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include "tpm2key.asn1.h" +#include "tpm2-policy.h" static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, @@ -62,6 +63,21 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); } + if (payload->policies) { + u8 *encoded_pols; + u32 encoded_pol_len; + int ret; + + ret = tpm2_encode_policy(payload->policies, &encoded_pols, + &encoded_pol_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 1, encoded_pols, + encoded_pol_len); + kfree(encoded_pols); + } + /* * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length * @@ -85,14 +101,6 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return work1 - payload->blob; } -struct tpm2_key_context { - u32 parent; - const u8 *pub; - u32 pub_len; - const u8 *priv; - u32 priv_len; -}; - static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) @@ -115,6 +123,12 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, if (!blob) return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm2_key_policy_process(&ctx, payload); + if (ret) { + kfree(blob); + return ret; + } + *buf = blob; options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; @@ -248,6 +262,42 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; + if (options->pcrinfo_len != 0) { + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + static u8 *scratch; + /* 4 array len, 2 hash alg */ + const int len = 4 + 2 + options->pcrinfo_len; + + pols = kmalloc(sizeof(*pols) + len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + pols->count = 1; + pols->len[0] = len; + scratch = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + pols->policies[0] = scratch; + pols->code[0] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR; + + put_unaligned_be32(1, &scratch[0]); + put_unaligned_be16(hash, &scratch[4]); + memcpy(&scratch[6], options->pcrinfo, options->pcrinfo_len); + payload->policies = pols; + } + + if (options->policydigest_len != 0 && payload->policies) { + /* can't specify both a digest and a policy */ + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (payload->policies) { + rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies, + options->hash, + options->policydigest, + &options->policydigest_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -456,21 +506,37 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 data_len; u8 *data; int rc; + u32 policyhandle; + + if (payload->policies && options->policyhandle) + /* can't have both a passed in policy and a key resident one */ + return -EINVAL; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); if (rc) return rc; + if (payload->policies) { + rc = tpm2_get_policy_session(chip, payload->policies, + &policyhandle); + if (rc) + return rc; + } else { + policyhandle = options->policyhandle; + } + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, - options->policyhandle ? - options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, + policyhandle ? + policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, options->blobauth_len); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + if (payload->policies) + tpm2_flush_context(chip, policyhandle); if (rc > 0) rc = -EPERM; From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:28 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608147 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2D17913 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:08:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 969F8214DB for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:08:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="qdUR/4w/" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732599AbgFPQIR (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:08:17 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42876 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732678AbgFPQIQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:08:16 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BC7C8EE2A2; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:08:16 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323696; bh=uMGaSmZBnBLyo5Ip5SSU2UOO614t+MkZrnTC+AU7YWQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qdUR/4w/rHCUo6tyJCiNGz+QetRnQ7WLXw/ZZoD4KTUCGDTiDh22F1QHDj1C/ltuH lIiit53AiYneJmVV1O9jd+YrOldTrjXtDLWjsduXA/NIJrMQoiXnkECVsuIoaDCFCo 0LuMrfjH3V6C0juZpCZUBd+AaW2yByD+2OzU2NVg= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Al423jV7VF8G; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:08:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9740C8EE188; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:08:15 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-8-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch adds a policy= argument to key creation. The policy is the standard tss policymaker format and each separate policy line must have a newline after it. Thus to construct a policy requiring authorized value and pcr 16 locking using a sha256 hash, the policy (policy.txt) file would be two lines: 0000017F00000001000B03000001303095B49BE85E381E5B20E557E46363EF55B0F43B132C2D8E3DE9AC436656F2 0000016b This can be inserted into the key with keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 policy=`cat policy.txt` keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha256" @u Note that although a few policies work like this, most require special handling which must be added to the kernel policy construction routine. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 16 ++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 15 ++++++ 4 files changed, 85 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 053344c4df5b..b68d3eb73f00 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ Usage:: policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to seal the key. + policy= specify an arbitrary set of policies. These must + be in policymaker format with each separate + policy line newline terminated. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. @@ -168,6 +171,19 @@ zeros (the value of PCR 16):: $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=20 2>/dev/null|sha1sum 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f +You can also specify arbitrary policy in policymaker format, so a two +value policy (the pcr example above and authvalue) would look like +this in policymaker format:: + + 0000017F000000010004030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f + 0000016b + +This can be placed in a file (say policy.txt) and then added to the key as:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 policy=`cat policy.txt`" @u + +The newlines in the file policy.txt will be automatically processed. + Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:: $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 080a76e879fd..87a13e607eca 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -370,3 +370,56 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, return 0; } + +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str) +{ + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + char *p; + u8 *ptr; + int i = 0, left = PAGE_SIZE, res; + + pols = kmalloc(left, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + ptr = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + left -= ptr - (u8 *)pols; + + while ((p = strsep(&str, "\n"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n') + continue; + + pols->len[i] = strlen(p)/2; + if (pols->len[i] > left) { + res = -E2BIG; + goto err; + } + + res = hex2bin(ptr, p, pols->len[i]); + if (res) + goto err; + + /* get command code and skip past */ + pols->code[i] = get_unaligned_be32(ptr); + pols->policies[i] = ptr + 4; + ptr += pols->len[i]; + left -= pols->len[i]; + pols->len[i] -= 4; + + /* + * FIXME: this does leave the code embedded in dead + * regions of the memory, but it's easier than + * hexdumping to a temporary or copying over + */ + i++; + } + + pols->count = i; + *ppols = pols; + + return 0; + + err: + kfree(pols); + return res; +} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h index 46bf1f0a9325..0da013116c1c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h @@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash, int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len); int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 *handle); +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 9f735bbe9eef..d8b073ebe167 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include +#include "tpm2-policy.h" + static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; @@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ enum { Opt_hash, Opt_policydigest, Opt_policyhandle, + Opt_policy, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -724,6 +727,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_policy, "policy=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -855,6 +859,17 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->policyhandle = handle; break; + + case Opt_policy: + if (pay->policies) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = tpm2_parse_policies(&pay->policies, args[0].from); + if (res) + return res; + break; + default: return -EINVAL; } From patchwork Tue Jun 16 16:02:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11608153 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0324014DD for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:09:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E0981208D5 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:09:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="p2ihQV6S" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732166AbgFPQJg (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:09:36 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42916 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732662AbgFPQJ1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:09:27 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 117DE8EE2A2; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:09:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1592323767; bh=3llJlnxLs5DVHn0G5ki4HHdzA1ryCBQlECPHy1QLDlY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=p2ihQV6SVunDj1zEg8vPa4CD1lndbH8YQC1Ptn/ueuPp6j8/5a71jwy69L0ajBi32 eSNw+O81M9EsUsTTKG8iku1enykiv8gotkZvelK4X8y48wTReuLKCr3nQBT9nIF5/S KumC5utLzqXZNd5P6uU3BYtYcGf2VdUwhH8Eox0A= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J4TDYPuUlho3; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:09:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E45A8EE188; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:09:26 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v10 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:02:29 -0700 Message-Id: <20200616160229.8018-9-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200616160229.8018-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like the reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart count. The most useful comparison is against the millisecond count for expiring keys. However, you have to remember that currently Linux doesn't try to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the expiration is actually measured in how long the TPM itself has been powered on ... the TPM timer doesn't count while the system is powered down. The millisecond counter is a u64 quantity found at offset 8 in the timer structure, and the <= comparision operand is 9, so a policy set to expire after the TPM has been up for 100 seconds would look like 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 in hex. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 29 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index b68d3eb73f00..53a6196c7df9 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -241,3 +241,32 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + +Appendix +-------- + +TPM 2.0 Policies +---------------- + +The current TPM supports PCR lock policies as documented above and +CounterTimer policies which can be used to create expiring keys. One +caveat with expiring keys is that the TPM millisecond counter does not +update while a system is powered off and Linux does not sync the TPM +millisecond count with its internal clock, so the best you can expire +in is in terms of how long any given TPM has been powered on. (FIXME: +Linux should simply update the millisecond clock to the current number +of seconds past the epoch on boot). + +A CounterTimer policy is expressed in terms of length and offset +against the TPM clock structure (TPMS_TIME_INFO), which looks like the +packed structure:: + + struct tpms_time_info { + u64 uptime; /* time in ms since last start or reset */ + u64 clock; /* cumulative uptime in ms */ + u32 resetcount; /* numer of times the TPM has been reset */ + u32 restartcount; /* number of times the TPM has been restarted */ + u8 safe /* time was safely loaded from NVRam */ + }; + +The usual comparison for expiring keys is against clock, at offset 8. diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index e32e9728adce..5026a06977e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD = 0x018c, TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 87a13e607eca..bd8eb02e1094 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, len = *plen; } - crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); + if (len) + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */ crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest); @@ -332,6 +333,16 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; struct tpm_buf buf; + if (cmd == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) + /* + * both PolicyAuthValue and PolicyPassword + * hash to the same thing, but one triggers + * HMAC authentication and the other simple + * authentication. Since we have no HMAC + * code, we're choosing the simple + */ + cmd = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd); if (rc) return rc; @@ -352,8 +363,35 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size); break; + + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER: { + /* + * the format of this is the last two u16 + * quantities are the offset and operation + * respectively. The rest is operandB which + * must be zero padded in a hash digest + */ + u16 opb_len = pols->len[i] - 4; + + if (opb_len > pols->hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, opb_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], opb_len); + + /* offset and operand*/ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + opb_len, 4); + failure = "Counter Timer"; + + break; + } + default: failure = "unknown policy"; + if (pols->len[i]) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i]); + break; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 98c65431ca75..3ec01ed874d9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 flags; int i; int rc; + static const int POLICY_SIZE = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { @@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* 4 array len, 2 hash alg */ const int len = 4 + 2 + options->pcrinfo_len; - pols = kmalloc(sizeof(*pols) + len, GFP_KERNEL); + pols = kmalloc(POLICY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!pols) return -ENOMEM; @@ -289,6 +290,39 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, return -EINVAL; } + /* + * if we already have a policy, we have to add authorization + * to it. If we don't, we can simply follow the usual + * non-policy route. + */ + if (options->blobauth_len != 0 && payload->policies) { + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + static u8 *scratch; + int i; + bool found = false; + + pols = payload->policies; + + /* make sure it's not already in policy */ + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + if (pols->code[i] == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) { + found = true; + + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + i = pols->count++; + scratch = pols->policies[i - 1] + pols->len[i - 1]; + + /* the TPM2_PolicyPassword command has no payload */ + pols->policies[i] = scratch; + pols->len[i] = 0; + pols->code[i] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE; + } + } + if (payload->policies) { rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies, options->hash,