From patchwork Mon Jun 29 15:30:37 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Tyler Hicks X-Patchwork-Id: 11631559 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40DD7138C for ; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:09:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28CE8206E9 for ; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 19:09:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="iE6FwL5p" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730935AbgF2TJ4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Jun 2020 15:09:56 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:50382 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730932AbgF2TJy (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Jun 2020 15:09:54 -0400 Received: from sequoia.work.tihix.com (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 328C820B4904; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 08:31:12 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 328C820B4904 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1593444672; bh=6ZAZLRdiVmhJSotXumflMugZiteYC6hE4wK0N2IMWYQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=iE6FwL5pkqNJ+D5EKPLuBSJ6t2EamXVQtIgimYH3NTz+/m6iAqvPMKibVX9huKOhS bwF9HbBeqw6gTxc45Xiy6vfBhPGmjSnqofkv6Un+Q5APCtuUITSWlzpD5dFSbCvb5s 51vbIlpPIX5UoiCkEcK7RGLA88jityVKynrVKvbg= From: Tyler Hicks To: Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler Subject: [PATCH] ima: Rename internal audit rule functions Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 10:30:37 -0500 Message-Id: <20200629153037.337349-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Rename IMA's internal audit rule functions from security_filter_rule_*() to ima_audit_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace, which is typically reserved for general security subsystem infrastructure, and better aligns the IMA function names with the names of the LSM hooks. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler --- Developed on top of next-integrity-testing, commit cd1d8603df60 ("IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions"), plus this patch series: [PATCH v2 00/11] ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com/T/#t This patch has dependencies on the above patch series. Tested with and without CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES enabled by attempting to load IMA policy with rules containing the subj_role=foo conditional. Build logs are clean in both configurations. The IMA policy was first loaded without and then with a valid AppArmor profile named "foo". The behavior is the same before and after this patch is applied: | CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=n | CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Without Profile | IMA policy load fails | IMA policy load fails With Profile | IMA policy load fails | IMA policy load succeeds security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 16 +++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index ff2bf57ff0c7..5d62ee8319f4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -419,24 +419,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES -#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init -#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free -#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match +#define ima_audit_rule_init security_audit_rule_init +#define ima_audit_rule_free security_audit_rule_free +#define ima_audit_rule_match security_audit_rule_match #else -static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int ima_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } -static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +static inline void ima_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 294323b36d06..60894656a4b7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { - security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); + ima_audit_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); } } @@ -308,10 +308,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) */ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL; - security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + ima_audit_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, + nentry->lsm[i].args_p, + &nentry->lsm[i].rule); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -495,18 +494,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc = ima_audit_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc = ima_audit_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule); default: break; } @@ -901,10 +898,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, return -ENOMEM; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; - result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, - Audit_equal, - entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + result = ima_audit_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);