From patchwork Wed Jul 22 18:47:39 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lachlan Sneff X-Patchwork-Id: 11679121 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49B8313B4 for ; Wed, 22 Jul 2020 18:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2CBE120787 for ; Wed, 22 Jul 2020 18:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="KAq5fY0P" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728906AbgGVSrt (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jul 2020 14:47:49 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:39812 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728124AbgGVSrt (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Jul 2020 14:47:49 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-187-218-229.hsd1.pa.comcast.net [73.187.218.229]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9DB1E20B4908; Wed, 22 Jul 2020 11:47:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 9DB1E20B4908 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1595443668; bh=KgDhk3pb5g9v+6urunGPeZ2gYMKw/7DWtt31eUbTvJc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=KAq5fY0P34zD34/KdGSmEs49b3TPZa1K7nMOC521pSteTkDi75hQg06iEsJ8gkqGr RG2mqPRHOnJU9cPUPzgziKZd+vDmqOFmdF/hniatgMiyyIz7A/Q8p954rYym1j0pxc R5gi/o32wVQe+dhPcH9N+7Y0HjKS14cqSFJy8YXM= From: Lachlan Sneff To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, pvorel@suse.cz, ltp@lists.linux.it Cc: nramas@linux.microsoft.com, balajib@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3] IMA: Add test for kexec cmdline measurement Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 14:47:39 -0400 Message-Id: <20200722184739.19460-1-t-josne@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org IMA policy can be set to measure the command line passed in the kexec system call. There needs to be a test to validate this kexec command line measurement. Add a testcase that verifies that the IMA subsystem has correctly measured the cmdline specified during a kexec. Note that this test does not actually reboot. Signed-off-by: Lachlan Sneff --- runtest/ima | 1 + .../kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md | 11 ++ .../security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_kexec.sh | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+) create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_kexec.sh diff --git a/runtest/ima b/runtest/ima index 309d47420..5f4b4a7a1 100644 --- a/runtest/ima +++ b/runtest/ima @@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ ima_policy ima_policy.sh ima_tpm ima_tpm.sh ima_violations ima_violations.sh ima_keys ima_keys.sh +ima_kexec ima_kexec.sh evm_overlay evm_overlay.sh diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md index db8819a99..926eb8478 100644 --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md @@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=key_import_test template=ima-buf The test also requires loaded policy with `func=KEY_CHECK`, see example in `keycheck.policy`. +### IMA kexec test + +This test requires that the ima policy contains: +``` +measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE +``` + +Even though the test does not actually reboot, it does require a valid, +signed kernel image. By default, the test will look in `/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname r)`, +but if no image is accessible there, a valid image be must be placed at `/tmp/Image`. + ## EVM tests `evm_overlay.sh` requires a builtin IMA appraise tcb policy (e.g. `ima_policy=appraise_tcb` diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_kexec.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_kexec.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e3ecaec8 --- /dev/null +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_kexec.sh @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# Copyright (c) 2020 Microsoft Corporation +# Author: Lachlan Sneff +# +# Verify that kexec cmdline is measured correctly. + +TST_NEEDS_CMDS="kexec sed xargs printf grep tr" +TST_CNT=1 +TST_NEEDS_DEVICE=1 + +. ima_setup.sh + +# Since the test is executed inside some sort of +# separate shell, *most* environment variables are +# not accessible, so there's no way to set it from +# the outside. +# +# `/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname-r)` is where the image is +# located on many systems, but not all. Therefore, +# if the image is not located there, require the +# user to copy it to `/tmp/Image`. +# +# Ideally, this test shouldn't even require an image, +# since it doesn't actually reboot, but the IMA cmdline +# measurement occurs after the image is parsed and +# verified, so we must pass a valid kernel image. There +# is a possiblity of putting together a "faux" kernel +# image that has the right headers and appears to be +# signed correctly, but doesn't actually contain any +# code, but, after investigating that possiblity, it +# appears to be quite difficult (and would require a +# new faux kernel for each arch). +IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" +if [ ! -f $IMAGE ]; then + IMAGE="/tmp/Image" +fi + +measure() { + local found temp_file="file.txt" temp_file2="file2.txt" algorithm \ + digest expected_digest + + echo -n "$1" > $temp_file + grep "kexec-cmdline" $ASCII_MEASUREMENTS > $temp_file2 + + while read found + do + algorithm=$(echo "$found" | cut -d' ' -f4 | cut -d':' -f1) + digest=$(echo "$found" | cut -d' ' -f4 | cut -d':' -f2) + + expected_digest=$(compute_digest $algorithm $temp_file) + + if [ "$digest" = "$expected_digest" ]; then + return 0 + fi + done < $temp_file2 + + return 1 +} + +# Test that the kexec cmdline is measured correctly. +# NOTE: This does *not* actually reboot. +test1() { + # Strip the `BOOT_IMAGE=...` part from the cmdline. + local cmdline="$(sed 's/BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]* //' /proc/cmdline)" + + if ! kexec -sl $IMAGE --reuse-cmdline; then + tst_res TCONF "kexec failed: $?" + + local sb_status="$(bootctl status 2>/dev/null | grep 'Secure Boot' \ + | tr -d ' ' | sed 's/SecureBoot:*//')" + + if [ "$sb_status" = "enabled" ]; then + tst_res TINFO "secure boot is enabled, the specified kernel image may not be signed" + fi + + return + fi + + kexec -su + + if ! measure "$cmdline"; then + tst_res TFAIL "unable to find a correct entry in the IMA log" + + if [ ! -r $IMA_POLICY ]; then + tst_brk TCONF "cannot read IMA policy (CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y required) to give contextual information" + fi + + if ! grep "measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE" $IMA_POLICY >/dev/null; then + tst_brk TCONF "The IMA policy does not specify 'measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE', see IMA test README" + fi + + return + fi + + cmdline="foo" + if ! kexec -sl $IMAGE --append=$cmdline; then + tst_brk TCONF "kexec failed: $?" + fi + + kexec -su + + if ! measure "$cmdline"; then + tst_brk TFAIL "unable to find a correct entry in the IMA log" + fi + + cmdline="bar" + if ! kexec -sl $IMAGE --command-line=$cmdline; then + tst_brk TCONF "kexec failed: $?" + fi + + kexec -su + + if ! measure "$cmdline"; then + tst_brk TFAIL "unable to find a correct entry in the IMA log" + fi + + tst_res TPASS "kexec cmdline was measured correctly" +} + +tst_run