From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:10 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772239 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2970459D for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07B232098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986300; bh=GtuuizJcLTW3bGJL00gWeJR50PJRhFYvFxYZjc4ncd8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=P+YPvlkz8saPS40pAyG1RhKwwK0q2rrfxBAyaK9B2qA9S6S5JPAAEai1AcZ0o8BWs DYFejv47kAGTYCSARZF7k66FaJDhTlBLYgcmQqzqBLGIC7Q9WsEBrNRL3F0q/pFvUU CCWHHcbkqKseNEorjFnEv6nIx+z64oVicHnlYni8= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725983AbgIMIiS (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:18 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60734 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725959AbgIMIiA (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:00 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E83F12158C; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986278; bh=GtuuizJcLTW3bGJL00gWeJR50PJRhFYvFxYZjc4ncd8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ZaFapO37bkQppa6Mfy7/oCRTuVCkGxIItwG0O6+zThp0LVIBFMBSRlYNmPNE0hm/3 gpgrbhjQ36hK2NIGs7AQxe4umMm/89OcvQsbIwyCjRtz2+JfILGzoZtJHr8nJtZiII TL35ICsyN32gYSXf069tqnTiexq92a0uA3QpB+vU= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 01/11] fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:10 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is intended to be GFP_NOFS-safe. But actually it isn't, since it uses functions like crypto_alloc_skcipher() which aren't GFP_NOFS-safe, even when called under memalloc_nofs_save(). Therefore it can deadlock when called from a context that needs GFP_NOFS, e.g. during an ext4 transaction or between f2fs_lock_op() and f2fs_unlock_op(). This happens when creating a new encrypted file. We can't fix this by just not setting up the key for new inodes right away, since new symlinks need their key to encrypt the symlink target. So we need to set up the new inode's key before starting the transaction. But just calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info() earlier doesn't work, since it assumes the encryption context is already set, and the encryption context can't be set until the transaction. The recently proposed fscrypt support for the ceph filesystem (https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fscrypt/20200821182813.52570-1-jlayton@kernel.org/T/#u) will have this same ordering problem too, since ceph will need to encrypt new symlinks before setting their encryption context. Finally, f2fs can deadlock when the filesystem is mounted with '-o test_dummy_encryption' and a new file is created in an existing unencrypted directory. Similarly, this is caused by holding too many locks when calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info(). To solve all these problems, add new helper functions: - fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() sets up a new inode's encryption key (fscrypt_info), using the parent directory's encryption policy and a new random nonce. It neither reads nor writes the encryption context. - fscrypt_set_context() persists the encryption context of a new inode, using the information from the fscrypt_info already in memory. This replaces fscrypt_inherit_context(). Temporarily keep fscrypt_inherit_context() around until all filesystems have been converted to use fscrypt_set_context(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 + fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/crypto/policy.c | 62 +++++++++++-- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 17 ++++ 4 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 8117a61b6f558..355f6d9377517 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -572,6 +572,9 @@ int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key); int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk); +void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci, + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk); + /* keysetup_v1.c */ void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index fea6226afc2b0..5371eee8f4b30 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include "fscrypt_private.h" @@ -222,6 +223,16 @@ int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, return 0; } +void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci, + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +{ + WARN_ON(ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0); + WARN_ON(!mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized); + + ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino, + &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); +} + static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { @@ -254,8 +265,14 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, return err; } - ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino, - &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); + /* + * New inodes may not have an inode number assigned yet. + * Hashing their inode number is delayed until later. + */ + if (ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0) + WARN_ON(!(ci->ci_inode->i_state & I_CREATING)); + else + fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, mk); return 0; } @@ -454,57 +471,27 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); } -int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) +static int +fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, + const union fscrypt_policy *policy, + const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]) { struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info; - union fscrypt_context ctx; struct fscrypt_mode *mode; struct key *master_key = NULL; int res; - if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) - return 0; - res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags); if (res) return res; - res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); - if (res < 0) { - const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = - fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); - - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { - fscrypt_warn(inode, - "Error %d getting encryption context", - res); - return res; - } - /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ - res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); - memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); - } - crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); if (!crypt_info) return -ENOMEM; crypt_info->ci_inode = inode; - - res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&crypt_info->ci_policy, &ctx, res); - if (res) { - fscrypt_warn(inode, - "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); - goto out; - } - - memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx), - FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); - - if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode)) { - res = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } + crypt_info->ci_policy = *policy; + memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); mode = select_encryption_mode(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode); if (IS_ERR(mode)) { @@ -519,8 +506,8 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) goto out; /* - * Multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info, so use - * cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in + * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info. + * So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in * fscrypt_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_crypt_info with a * RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it. */ @@ -555,8 +542,117 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) put_crypt_info(crypt_info); return res; } + +/** + * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() - set up an inode's encryption key + * @inode: the inode to set up the key for + * + * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done. + * + * Note: unless ->i_crypt_info is already set, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So + * generally this shouldn't be called from within a filesystem transaction. + * + * Return: 0 if ->i_crypt_info was set or was already set, *or* if the + * encryption key is unavailable. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to + * distinguish these cases.) Also can return another -errno code. + */ +int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) +{ + int res; + union fscrypt_context ctx; + union fscrypt_policy policy; + + if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) + return 0; + + res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); + if (res < 0) { + const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = + fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Error %d getting encryption context", + res); + return res; + } + /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ + res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); + memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); + } + + res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res); + if (res) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); + return res; + } + + if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&policy, inode)) + return -EINVAL; + + return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, &policy, + fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx)); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info); +/** + * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() - prepare to create a new inode in a directory + * @dir: a possibly-encrypted directory + * @inode: the new inode. ->i_mode must be set already. + * ->i_ino doesn't need to be set yet. + * @encrypt_ret: (output) set to %true if the new inode will be encrypted + * + * If the directory is encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info in preparation for + * encrypting the name of the new file. Also, if the new inode will be + * encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info and set *encrypt_ret=true. + * + * This isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe, and therefore it should be called before starting + * any filesystem transaction to create the inode. For this reason, ->i_ino + * isn't required to be set yet, as the filesystem may not have set it yet. + * + * This doesn't persist the new inode's encryption context. That still needs to + * be done later by calling fscrypt_set_context(). + * + * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the directory's encryption key is missing, + * or another -errno code + */ +int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + bool *encrypt_ret) +{ + int err; + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; + + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb) == NULL) + return 0; + + err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); + if (err) + return err; + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) + return -ENOKEY; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mode == 0)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Only regular files, directories, and symlinks are encrypted. + * Special files like device nodes and named pipes aren't. + */ + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && + !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && + !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + + *encrypt_ret = true; + + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); + return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, + &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, + nonce); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode); + /** * fscrypt_put_encryption_info() - free most of an inode's fscrypt data * @inode: an inode being evicted diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index b92f345231780..7e96953d385ec 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -236,18 +236,19 @@ bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, } /** - * fscrypt_new_context_from_policy() - create a new fscrypt_context from - * an fscrypt_policy + * fscrypt_new_context() - create a new fscrypt_context * @ctx_u: output context * @policy_u: input policy + * @nonce: nonce to use * * Create an fscrypt_context for an inode that is being assigned the given - * encryption policy. A new nonce is randomly generated. + * encryption policy. @nonce must be a new random nonce. * * Return: the size of the new context in bytes. */ -static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, - const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u) +static int fscrypt_new_context(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, + const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, + const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]) { memset(ctx_u, 0, sizeof(*ctx_u)); @@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, memcpy(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor, sizeof(ctx->master_key_descriptor)); - get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); + memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); return sizeof(*ctx); } case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: { @@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, memcpy(ctx->master_key_identifier, policy->master_key_identifier, sizeof(ctx->master_key_identifier)); - get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); + memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); return sizeof(*ctx); } } @@ -377,6 +378,7 @@ static int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, union fscrypt_policy *policy) static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, const union fscrypt_policy *policy) { + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; union fscrypt_context ctx; int ctxsize; int err; @@ -414,7 +416,8 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, return -EINVAL; } - ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy); + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context(&ctx, policy, nonce); return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, NULL); } @@ -637,6 +640,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context); int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, void *fs_data, bool preload) { + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; union fscrypt_context ctx; int ctxsize; struct fscrypt_info *ci; @@ -650,7 +654,8 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, if (ci == NULL) return -ENOKEY; - ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy); + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, nonce); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data); @@ -660,6 +665,45 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context); +/** + * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode + * @inode: a new inode + * @fs_data: private data given by FS and passed to ->set_context() + * + * This should be called after fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), generally during a + * filesystem transaction. Everything here must be %GFP_NOFS-safe. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure + */ +int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) +{ + struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; + union fscrypt_context ctx; + int ctxsize; + + /* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have set up the key already. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ci)) + return -ENOKEY; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, ci->ci_nonce); + + /* + * This may be the first time the inode number is available, so do any + * delayed key setup that requires the inode number. + */ + if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 && + (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) { + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = + ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0]; + + fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, mk); + } + + return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_context); + /** * fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() - handle '-o test_dummy_encryption' * @sb: the filesystem on which test_dummy_encryption is being specified diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index eaf16eb557887..9cf7ca90f3abb 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child); int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, void *fs_data, bool preload); +int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data); struct fscrypt_dummy_context { const union fscrypt_context *ctx; @@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); /* keysetup.c */ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); +int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + bool *encrypt_ret); void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode); int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode); @@ -347,6 +350,11 @@ static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +static inline int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + struct fscrypt_dummy_context { }; @@ -394,6 +402,15 @@ static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +static inline int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, + struct inode *inode, + bool *encrypt_ret) +{ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; +} + static inline void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { return; From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:11 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772277 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68CAE112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 519EF2098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986387; bh=nVSMprpeSosbO3HIVvYvcbOcUNBMzSOQM0td1dFGCwI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=IIzcyFCY2BTect+PlD8jVm45mXtHWMdvxoA7LIf/hzMxkfzsC6BGbYwrVMOdexAdK diPGg99mbQN86+znVAja8yFm1xA/QYTof7BSe0AzAzV444FeBAuGAFz5JuvyrAW57V nmi1DM3fTKFMax8LIKpLyD629EBp03bGpIl0vat0= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725918AbgIMIjm (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:39:42 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60746 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725957AbgIMIiA (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:00 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3FAA52168B; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986278; bh=nVSMprpeSosbO3HIVvYvcbOcUNBMzSOQM0td1dFGCwI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=V00kf5XLm9lY1xt1ty/xgqrsenfsXZ6pzt+SXbnRKQ3e9fVR6We4G0EY8hjqo9Ald 7n09iIpMN42vGdntBunQgRVEPLY2cfh/w6QreksAz+rvIEV8FQLnt7JmweobGQXsxw p7XoXPrRGWn4KIukK34qwLiwqe0gAihlc1Aj3XQs= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 02/11] ext4: factor out ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:11 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers To compute a new inode's xattr credits, we need to know whether the inode will be encrypted or not. When we switch to use the new helper function fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), we won't find out whether the inode will be encrypted until slightly later than is currently the case. That will require moving the code block that computes the xattr credits. To make this easier and reduce the length of __ext4_new_inode(), move this code block into a new function ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index df25d38d65393..0cc576005a923 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -742,6 +742,53 @@ static int find_inode_bit(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group, return 1; } +static int ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode(struct inode *dir, mode_t mode, + bool encrypt) +{ + struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb; + int nblocks = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL + struct posix_acl *p = get_acl(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); + + if (IS_ERR(p)) + return PTR_ERR(p); + if (p) { + int acl_size = p->a_count * sizeof(ext4_acl_entry); + + nblocks += (S_ISDIR(mode) ? 2 : 1) * + __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, NULL /* inode */, + NULL /* block_bh */, acl_size, + true /* is_create */); + posix_acl_release(p); + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + { + int num_security_xattrs = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY + num_security_xattrs++; +#endif + /* + * We assume that security xattrs are never more than 1k. + * In practice they are under 128 bytes. + */ + nblocks += num_security_xattrs * + __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, NULL /* inode */, + NULL /* block_bh */, 1024, + true /* is_create */); + } +#endif + if (encrypt) + nblocks += __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, + NULL /* inode */, + NULL /* block_bh */, + FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE, + true /* is_create */); + return nblocks; +} + /* * There are two policies for allocating an inode. If the new inode is * a directory, then a forward search is made for a block group with both @@ -796,45 +843,10 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, } if (!handle && sbi->s_journal && !(i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) { -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL - struct posix_acl *p = get_acl(dir, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); - - if (IS_ERR(p)) - return ERR_CAST(p); - if (p) { - int acl_size = p->a_count * sizeof(ext4_acl_entry); - - nblocks += (S_ISDIR(mode) ? 2 : 1) * - __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, NULL /* inode */, - NULL /* block_bh */, acl_size, - true /* is_create */); - posix_acl_release(p); - } -#endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - { - int num_security_xattrs = 1; - -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY - num_security_xattrs++; -#endif - /* - * We assume that security xattrs are never - * more than 1k. In practice they are under - * 128 bytes. - */ - nblocks += num_security_xattrs * - __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, NULL /* inode */, - NULL /* block_bh */, 1024, - true /* is_create */); - } -#endif - if (encrypt) - nblocks += __ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, - NULL /* inode */, NULL /* block_bh */, - FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE, - true /* is_create */); + ret2 = ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode(dir, mode, encrypt); + if (ret2 < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret2); + nblocks += ret2; } ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb); From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:12 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772273 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1FC3C112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 083E12098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986375; bh=b+br3C3cbfnBLBIC6l48f9MznNCXZDVFxP9oBuV6fkI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=u72gJk13Gzd6cBMcOmj0OFrZHzMNGZCn67yYkCSNRuE+GN9U2Fbi8EEX2idxrCSEW HXklfsCkTRDOVHLNglc+ww56yY+Ow4S0KyLUw//xws5panKwRgm/aL9QqCNQkrt3MU b+PqIpgDJevxkJIdwljf3SKNDtjYt4rx1pp/jSRI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726045AbgIMIjW (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:39:22 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60762 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725899AbgIMIiA (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:00 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 863D6217BA; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986278; bh=b+br3C3cbfnBLBIC6l48f9MznNCXZDVFxP9oBuV6fkI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VGul2KB3CInYTSSC4L2PRp6JTaRYcFNP0nidlDNYYfkMYlIOTEaZob7V4VtNrIGWm AL/Oi/ir5g2CXybFFSNqBguAQ9/tmP5RJyHzacP8pFF/S1Y/Chg87Lm7X6Oje3vh0B +OcZ8AHS3KZSm/Zul/lrrcPWKAWpE1oq0ZaXR1zw= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 03/11] ext4: use fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:12 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Convert ext4 to use the new functions fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context(). This avoids calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from within a transaction, which can deadlock because fscrypt_get_encryption_info() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe. For more details about this problem, see the earlier patch "fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()". Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index 0cc576005a923..698ca4a4db5f7 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, ext4_group_t i; ext4_group_t flex_group; struct ext4_group_info *grp; - int encrypt = 0; + bool encrypt = false; /* Cannot create files in a deleted directory */ if (!dir || !dir->i_nlink) @@ -831,24 +831,6 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(sbi))) return ERR_PTR(-EIO); - if ((IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) && - (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)) && - !(i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) { - err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); - if (err) - return ERR_PTR(err); - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - encrypt = 1; - } - - if (!handle && sbi->s_journal && !(i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) { - ret2 = ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode(dir, mode, encrypt); - if (ret2 < 0) - return ERR_PTR(ret2); - nblocks += ret2; - } - ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb); trace_ext4_request_inode(dir, mode); inode = new_inode(sb); @@ -878,10 +860,25 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, else ei->i_projid = make_kprojid(&init_user_ns, EXT4_DEF_PROJID); + if (!(i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) { + err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypt); + if (err) + goto out; + } + err = dquot_initialize(inode); if (err) goto out; + if (!handle && sbi->s_journal && !(i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)) { + ret2 = ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode(dir, mode, encrypt); + if (ret2 < 0) { + err = ret2; + goto out; + } + nblocks += ret2; + } + if (!goal) goal = sbi->s_inode_goal; @@ -1174,7 +1171,7 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, * prevent its deduplication. */ if (encrypt) { - err = fscrypt_inherit_context(dir, inode, handle, true); + err = fscrypt_set_context(inode, handle); if (err) goto fail_free_drop; } From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:13 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772235 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D152F59D for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B38AB2098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986288; bh=zejOgicpkvvmMFhZrMwnmiCb7goGZK7Q97xiTR6JSH8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=XtgA5tjcIg3qBzVPAj0lXiW/+f4RglDLigXNoUZ1H1ZQx/uPYanOixn/LwU7TDHdA GzbZdlY7BiXXvYyavNuDyYI740IvEHJlrhLWyNl6CJSdRJVRb5ppZfwLu+d9naJFXQ AmaCarpIDg162f0uoxgDabqIlV4QyXoBV9qqd4QE= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725974AbgIMIiF (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:05 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60770 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725952AbgIMIiA (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:00 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CCDDB21655; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986279; bh=zejOgicpkvvmMFhZrMwnmiCb7goGZK7Q97xiTR6JSH8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=n11IT1hhQb77UCP2bEEcG/beILGMlhRe+fSjff5reIPEWW9kdcATSTO9XHz1V4Chi h4xzhbz1a5sYUiKr6b243U/wP/4X+I4AMc3n+bQXWx/m3bS8jTnUO031AbOxjTg2L7 vNC21WM7uk+GO93acsK5nw+857QFhbNttSg0o4uk= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 04/11] f2fs: use fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:13 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Convert f2fs to use the new functions fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context(). This avoids calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from under f2fs_lock_op(), which can deadlock because fscrypt_get_encryption_info() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe. For more details about this problem, see the earlier patch "fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()". This also fixes a f2fs-specific deadlock when the filesystem is mounted with '-o test_dummy_encryption' and a file is created in an unencrypted directory other than the root directory: INFO: task touch:207 blocked for more than 30 seconds. Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-00099-g729e3d0919844 #2 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:touch state:D stack: 0 pid: 207 ppid: 167 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: [...] lock_page include/linux/pagemap.h:548 [inline] pagecache_get_page+0x25e/0x310 mm/filemap.c:1682 find_or_create_page include/linux/pagemap.h:348 [inline] grab_cache_page include/linux/pagemap.h:424 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2395 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2373 [inline] __get_node_page.part.0+0x39/0x2d0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1350 __get_node_page fs/f2fs/node.c:35 [inline] f2fs_get_node_page+0x2e/0x60 fs/f2fs/node.c:1399 read_inline_xattr+0x88/0x140 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:288 lookup_all_xattrs+0x1f9/0x2c0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:344 f2fs_getxattr+0x9b/0x160 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:532 f2fs_get_context+0x1e/0x20 fs/f2fs/super.c:2460 fscrypt_get_encryption_info+0x9b/0x450 fs/crypto/keysetup.c:472 fscrypt_inherit_context+0x2f/0xb0 fs/crypto/policy.c:640 f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xab/0x340 fs/f2fs/dir.c:540 f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x145/0x390 fs/f2fs/inline.c:621 f2fs_add_dentry+0x31/0x80 fs/f2fs/dir.c:757 f2fs_do_add_link+0xcd/0x130 fs/f2fs/dir.c:798 f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3234 [inline] f2fs_create+0x104/0x290 fs/f2fs/namei.c:344 lookup_open.isra.0+0x2de/0x500 fs/namei.c:3103 open_last_lookups+0xa9/0x340 fs/namei.c:3177 path_openat+0x8f/0x1b0 fs/namei.c:3365 do_filp_open+0x87/0x130 fs/namei.c:3395 do_sys_openat2+0x96/0x150 fs/open.c:1168 [...] That happened because f2fs_add_inline_entry() locks the directory inode's page in order to add the dentry, then f2fs_get_context() tries to lock it recursively in order to read the encryption xattr. This problem is specific to "test_dummy_encryption" because normally the directory's fscrypt_info would be set up prior to f2fs_add_inline_entry() in order to encrypt the new filename. Regardless, the new design fixes this test_dummy_encryption deadlock as well as potential deadlocks with fs reclaim, by setting up any needed fscrypt_info structs prior to taking so many locks. The test_dummy_encryption deadlock was reported by Daniel Rosenberg. Reported-by: Daniel Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim --- fs/f2fs/dir.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 23 ----------------------- fs/f2fs/namei.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c index b2530b9507bd9..414bc94fbd546 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ struct page *f2fs_init_inode_metadata(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, goto put_error; if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { - err = fscrypt_inherit_context(dir, inode, page, false); + err = fscrypt_set_context(inode, page); if (err) goto put_error; } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index d9e52a7f3702f..0503371f88ed4 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -1315,13 +1315,6 @@ enum fsync_mode { #define IS_IO_TRACED_PAGE(page) (0) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) \ - (unlikely(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx != NULL)) -#else -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0) -#endif - /* For compression */ enum compress_algorithm_type { COMPRESS_LZO, @@ -4022,22 +4015,6 @@ static inline bool f2fs_lfs_mode(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) return F2FS_OPTION(sbi).fs_mode == FS_MODE_LFS; } -static inline bool f2fs_may_encrypt(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(dir); - umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; - - /* - * If the directory encrypted or dummy encryption enabled, - * then we should encrypt the inode. - */ - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) - return (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)); -#endif - return false; -} - static inline bool f2fs_may_compress(struct inode *inode) { if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode) || f2fs_is_pinned_file(inode) || diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index 84e4bbc1a64de..45f324511a19e 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static struct inode *f2fs_new_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode) nid_t ino; struct inode *inode; bool nid_free = false; + bool encrypt = false; int xattr_size = 0; int err; @@ -69,13 +70,17 @@ static struct inode *f2fs_new_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode) F2FS_I(inode)->i_projid = make_kprojid(&init_user_ns, F2FS_DEF_PROJID); + err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypt); + if (err) + goto fail_drop; + err = dquot_initialize(inode); if (err) goto fail_drop; set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NEW_INODE); - if (f2fs_may_encrypt(dir, inode)) + if (encrypt) f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(inode); if (f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi)) { From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772267 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D7B6859D for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C00612158C for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986340; bh=kONvZL9ec2SBbE4EAel9mci0YCQN1pZc7hmFt/F6qwY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=KO4/nTOvzkxx3FVSdJg5NyzQz8If81BH2rydaAV+Laz1ajBeK6hVklS42HOwSSOlR gSX9n6HTcLKbF3FefyhjJeYu/Kj2A4qlX/6YHJ6KAZi4wEp3F6gQrTP4ZzywnFJV2r FuwUrB+GYp61T63/AGCTVG9XgytnCOlJARgT8lYs= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726033AbgIMIi4 (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:56 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60862 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725961AbgIMIiC (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:02 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1F82221974; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986279; bh=kONvZL9ec2SBbE4EAel9mci0YCQN1pZc7hmFt/F6qwY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Dt37vv3oahYtgL3ZyctM6QKg97LdSKU34ArCqE9y/U84AQImmjJjp3IWpIeQl2boS KR5a1PsbxdPL8JYbUIX8BxdraDjfMGMuehFFlmoxAmRLN8Iu8UVTjj0WRil4BKsjzY V8lffoJKumHVSbQOwdTzejpV6lXUi6DoBaK6UQQ4= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 05/11] ubifs: use fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:14 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Convert ubifs to use the new functions fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context(). Unlike ext4 and f2fs, this doesn't appear to fix any deadlock bug. But it does shorten the code slightly and get all filesystems using the same helper functions, so that fscrypt_inherit_context() can be removed. It also fixes an incorrect error code where ubifs returned EPERM instead of the expected ENOKEY. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/ubifs/dir.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c index a9c1f5a9c9bdd..155521e51ac57 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c @@ -81,19 +81,6 @@ struct inode *ubifs_new_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, struct inode *dir, struct ubifs_inode *ui; bool encrypted = false; - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { - err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); - if (err) { - ubifs_err(c, "fscrypt_get_encryption_info failed: %i", err); - return ERR_PTR(err); - } - - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) - return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - - encrypted = true; - } - inode = new_inode(c->vfs_sb); ui = ubifs_inode(inode); if (!inode) @@ -112,6 +99,12 @@ struct inode *ubifs_new_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, struct inode *dir, current_time(inode); inode->i_mapping->nrpages = 0; + err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypted); + if (err) { + ubifs_err(c, "fscrypt_prepare_new_inode failed: %i", err); + goto out_iput; + } + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ubifs_file_address_operations; @@ -131,7 +124,6 @@ struct inode *ubifs_new_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, struct inode *dir, case S_IFBLK: case S_IFCHR: inode->i_op = &ubifs_file_inode_operations; - encrypted = false; break; default: BUG(); @@ -151,9 +143,8 @@ struct inode *ubifs_new_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, struct inode *dir, if (c->highest_inum >= INUM_WATERMARK) { spin_unlock(&c->cnt_lock); ubifs_err(c, "out of inode numbers"); - make_bad_inode(inode); - iput(inode); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_iput; } ubifs_warn(c, "running out of inode numbers (current %lu, max %u)", (unsigned long)c->highest_inum, INUM_WATERMARK); @@ -171,16 +162,19 @@ struct inode *ubifs_new_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, struct inode *dir, spin_unlock(&c->cnt_lock); if (encrypted) { - err = fscrypt_inherit_context(dir, inode, &encrypted, true); + err = fscrypt_set_context(inode, NULL); if (err) { - ubifs_err(c, "fscrypt_inherit_context failed: %i", err); - make_bad_inode(inode); - iput(inode); - return ERR_PTR(err); + ubifs_err(c, "fscrypt_set_context failed: %i", err); + goto out_iput; } } return inode; + +out_iput: + make_bad_inode(inode); + iput(inode); + return ERR_PTR(err); } static int dbg_check_name(const struct ubifs_info *c, From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:15 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772269 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 41944112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29FA32098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:39:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986353; bh=QcAYVOOtDATZpIRqzv/LkDypHnDI6SB1ZfPpGvjEMKo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=N/IMBGpRCYs42MIZ/9oYIrW2oFQ5AwOYQkurrSL88rHpjcvBCgZJa6z/AYzOK7jS8 +VCmC9HdmEVRAteUFYQ/AxjV1YSbNHVJBh7umbek/mlu9vpMzQ/M7sLdDQ1FEuNFO4 x4Mq3V355leNS9u6khjcKw0V7xTAtdTXPUPci67w= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726020AbgIMIiz (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:55 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60864 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725963AbgIMIiC (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:02 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 668D421D1A; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986279; bh=QcAYVOOtDATZpIRqzv/LkDypHnDI6SB1ZfPpGvjEMKo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=oUtAxnwOQeM7Dr2kgVlV4dfly4HkPpXojureiWqD3KugJJtonikaBJ/0WmS3mzwuK qMm4vt2DVIHEOZTV+hdqzAxhm6zjVO48B+OZgoviTP4C8OaMEwnUsQFSxeKIaiKp0X OfnRS1CorFgwModQHk4r5wqxh3MkMjhLTDRNgh6Y= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 06/11] fscrypt: remove fscrypt_inherit_context() Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:15 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-7-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that all filesystems have been converted to use fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context(), fscrypt_inherit_context() is no longer used. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/policy.c | 37 ------------------------------------- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 7e96953d385ec..4ff893f7b030a 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -628,43 +628,6 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context); -/** - * fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent - * @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited. - * @child: Child inode that inherits the context from @parent. - * @fs_data: private data given by FS. - * @preload: preload child i_crypt_info if true - * - * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure - */ -int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, - void *fs_data, bool preload) -{ - u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; - union fscrypt_context ctx; - int ctxsize; - struct fscrypt_info *ci; - int res; - - res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent); - if (res < 0) - return res; - - ci = fscrypt_get_info(parent); - if (ci == NULL) - return -ENOKEY; - - get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); - ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, nonce); - - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); - res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data); - if (res) - return res; - return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context); - /** * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode * @inode: a new inode diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index 9cf7ca90f3abb..81d6ded243288 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -156,8 +156,6 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child); -int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, - void *fs_data, bool preload); int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data); struct fscrypt_dummy_context { @@ -343,13 +341,6 @@ static inline int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, return 0; } -static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, - struct inode *child, - void *fs_data, bool preload) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - static inline int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:16 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772259 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3B48112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B040C2098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986326; bh=ZzMv1pUhY0NvnbJHjrS2ra7ESt6vtXPBJHTWIdsGFCY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=Nc62X27ASHIvLtMrzfhPrET0OLCOT8yTG7eX1aOU50p9UTnfKnvwoLNjLFCdckxqi 65LlAzTR9x9R9WRMnCs/y0gASrzCV2LgQ8tIBCEHXUImvBSWP7NuvrhF30x9YNjVR9 fOA/9lR0TzXTvTmWLkparGFIQZiFB7pj1uGhOyCs= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726015AbgIMIio (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:44 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60892 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725968AbgIMIiD (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:03 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id ADEDA21897; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986279; bh=ZzMv1pUhY0NvnbJHjrS2ra7ESt6vtXPBJHTWIdsGFCY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=htn5yvO7LimZHQRe0sNzsC6HWpNV2ozCcjLCoxA2U9dMCvVUhX+F3sLgJGNsNeThm Qpm56LCeKLX/y+YPmuNFV3XiL6WWzw4EGH/L7x1ZgQem4c6oYP9lj9QNygbClngGw9 gIDlHOloDtyrRG1uzwwilmGP9u8I6vN0pvLAbntk= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 07/11] fscrypt: require that fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() already has key Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:16 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-8-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that all filesystems have been converted to use fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), the encryption key for new symlink inodes is now already set up whenever we try to encrypt the symlink target. Enforce this rather than try to set up the key again when it may be too late to do so safely. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index 491b252843eb9..7748db5092409 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -217,9 +217,13 @@ int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd; unsigned int ciphertext_len; - err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); - if (err) - return err; + /* + * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have already set up the new + * symlink inode's encryption key. We don't wait until now to do it, + * since we may be in a filesystem transaction now. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))) + return -ENOKEY; if (disk_link->name) { /* filesystem-provided buffer */ From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:17 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772261 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A0A6112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6F7F2098B for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986330; bh=MK+A5d7zq9Y3Zsp3oOCC55fP5PFX6LAy1zZJkGWXiO0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=Xecpaf4utjN5bPIi8oWbgkl/8p6kDMR3bO0BDhcZt59OVC0EzOVc3zTYbp+plIqGy 8DiuMnj7hnmJ5L/pv+uRNINO134DreaX2CZENRDInT1Vioix7znnT571a9eYV3vq4P zNY59ZHoqgi6S2FSBK8OlQjAEjaAbZ++s1BhxynI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726008AbgIMIim (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:42 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60894 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725967AbgIMIiD (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:03 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0090E221E7; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:37:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986280; bh=MK+A5d7zq9Y3Zsp3oOCC55fP5PFX6LAy1zZJkGWXiO0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BNXvgR5be/gzPpLGuUrvSdScKa/sWQTRwvtGRXdyLDV9JksHQuCd363gzeItv1NTO fe8DHiB/3NngDwFC1HJAMcMhn7T+d0fNkZRqLoTsAqiPgTyy1iW2iC1bdIXYivfggq BghRF3rUV5A5hGY+UX1g51VGbPjjlUjgDIdH+ssE= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 08/11] fscrypt: stop pretending that key setup is nofs-safe Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:17 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers fscrypt_get_encryption_info() has never actually been safe to call in a context that needs GFP_NOFS, since it calls crypto_alloc_skcipher(). crypto_alloc_skcipher() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe, even if called under memalloc_nofs_save(). This is because it may load kernel modules, and also because it internally takes crypto_alg_sem. Other tasks can do GFP_KERNEL allocations while holding crypto_alg_sem for write. The use of fscrypt_init_mutex isn't GFP_NOFS-safe either. So, stop pretending that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is nofs-safe. I.e., when it allocates memory, just use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_NOFS. Note, another reason to do this is that GFP_NOFS is deprecated in favor of using memalloc_nofs_save() in the proper places. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 7 ++----- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 2 +- fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c index faa25541ccb68..89bffa82ed74a 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci) crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = sb->s_blocksize; crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci); num_devs = fscrypt_get_num_devices(sb); - devs = kmalloc_array(num_devs, sizeof(*devs), GFP_NOFS); + devs = kmalloc_array(num_devs, sizeof(*devs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!devs) return -ENOMEM; fscrypt_get_devices(sb, num_devs, devs); @@ -135,9 +135,8 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, struct fscrypt_blk_crypto_key *blk_key; int err; int i; - unsigned int flags; - blk_key = kzalloc(struct_size(blk_key, devs, num_devs), GFP_NOFS); + blk_key = kzalloc(struct_size(blk_key, devs, num_devs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!blk_key) return -ENOMEM; @@ -166,10 +165,8 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, } queue_refs++; - flags = memalloc_nofs_save(); err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(&blk_key->base, blk_key->devs[i]); - memalloc_nofs_restore(flags); if (err) { fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 5371eee8f4b30..7f5fbc2654d57 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, if (res) return res; - crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); + crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!crypt_info) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c index a3cb52572b05c..2762c53504323 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int derive_key_aes(const u8 *master_key, goto out; } crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); - req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) { res = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ find_and_lock_process_key(const char *prefix, const struct user_key_payload *ukp; const struct fscrypt_key *payload; - description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix, + description = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%*phN", prefix, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE, descriptor); if (!description) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key) return dk; /* Nope, allocate one. */ - dk = kzalloc(sizeof(*dk), GFP_NOFS); + dk = kzalloc(sizeof(*dk), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dk) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); refcount_set(&dk->dk_refcount, 1); @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci, * This cannot be a stack buffer because it will be passed to the * scatterlist crypto API during derive_key_aes(). */ - derived_key = kmalloc(ci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_NOFS); + derived_key = kmalloc(ci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_KERNEL); if (!derived_key) return -ENOMEM; From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:18 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772247 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1773112E for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6D8A2158C for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986315; bh=7wQf9Y1Ge/SR2fWtRDGBHBDQ9VcJIvgAiZJHiDlXVEw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=DUpVc7uFoNFwiEi0f4Dv7mU/rzOoVJOc/l4p+eExK8NSUKS1uRXzAFhyRPRaT5S4l tRWtlfJRkImFysjduw8sDufVXjmFx6mJYs4XpGv2+hoZiNbh26XpCX4v7JfSsLL3Sf u5e+d12R8O4wfY94EIu/F4br0vgxj9dwsC6Etfss= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725997AbgIMIic (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:32 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60910 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725972AbgIMIiF (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:05 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 47AB12177B; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986280; bh=7wQf9Y1Ge/SR2fWtRDGBHBDQ9VcJIvgAiZJHiDlXVEw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=zwrK+k53ctQTtemSNOcktR68ukUN1sYgfusdrpKvROi2SHYNuhB0Z3cuqHWUGFP+g D2zzBdN5bj+hkP9FDiiRMu1yN1xOPI6llElIUCFMZUmWhRfYKVknYCFWCbL+MExBGt IiJc+P2KyMx7HAYgKeD5Zic2/IUSD9CeQNNYj2I0= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 09/11] fscrypt: make "#define fscrypt_policy" user-only Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:18 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-10-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers The fscrypt UAPI header defines fscrypt_policy to fscrypt_policy_v1, for source compatibility with old userspace programs. Internally, the kernel doesn't want that compatibility definition. Instead, fscrypt_private.h #undefs it and re-defines it to a union. That works for now. However, in order to add fscrypt_operations::get_dummy_policy(), we'll need to forward declare 'union fscrypt_policy' in include/linux/fscrypt.h. That would cause build errors because "fscrypt_policy" is used in ioctl numbers. To avoid this, modify the UAPI header to make the fscrypt_policy compatibility definition conditional on !__KERNEL__, and make the ioctls use fscrypt_policy_v1 instead of fscrypt_policy. Note that this doesn't change the actual ioctl numbers. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 1 - include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 355f6d9377517..ac3352086ee44 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static inline const u8 *fscrypt_context_nonce(const union fscrypt_context *ctx) return NULL; } -#undef fscrypt_policy union fscrypt_policy { u8 version; struct fscrypt_policy_v1 v1; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h index 7875709ccfebf..e5de603369381 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct fscrypt_policy_v1 { __u8 flags; __u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; }; -#define fscrypt_policy fscrypt_policy_v1 /* * Process-subscribed "logon" key description prefix and payload format. @@ -156,9 +155,9 @@ struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg { __u32 __out_reserved[13]; }; -#define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy) +#define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy_v1) #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT _IOW('f', 20, __u8[16]) -#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy) +#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy_v1) #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX _IOWR('f', 22, __u8[9]) /* size + version */ #define FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY _IOWR('f', 23, struct fscrypt_add_key_arg) #define FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY _IOWR('f', 24, struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg) @@ -170,6 +169,7 @@ struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg { /* old names; don't add anything new here! */ #ifndef __KERNEL__ +#define fscrypt_policy fscrypt_policy_v1 #define FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_4 FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_4 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_8 FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_8 From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:19 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772249 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F103C14F6 for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9FED2158C for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986315; bh=SHrYUdtm1g7ntgYtdzixMrvNEz6L5/D07nXI8RMvuM4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=SpSRzA6zgLZFjvPHWh6WiSnXENUOqrToKdB0/Q8PJj/zTylAv/M8+MEFMjfcH6W8b i/IaaXY9vwHYno6oGKk70W4rj8MvvEK6s3yz3KYYorKmnuuYbnELAW9hsy/2MykHkB LjjLZcQjeOW/lH2xqlK9jdn6UCiMePY8q6lQDyIw= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725994AbgIMIib (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:31 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60912 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725973AbgIMIiF (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:05 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8F613221E8; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986280; bh=SHrYUdtm1g7ntgYtdzixMrvNEz6L5/D07nXI8RMvuM4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=veKboLnYaZiOTtz2C8eTq+4ZzLtMFia4/2LmiMxvTMRGrBr7KkSQff6AbozrpZCjI r7KZJPqL7OLkVIJp0K7kUKARQmFdsbBKV25xdjuZcfTY+pIznei/mrRSnKdbJUGBoU ODgwD4kGxAx2Jksu0dMPri89adQ4x8OCkHTNGDEE= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 10/11] fscrypt: move fscrypt_prepare_symlink() out-of-line Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:19 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-11-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers In preparation for moving the logic for "get the encryption policy inherited by new files in this directory" to a single place, make fscrypt_prepare_symlink() a regular function rather than an inline function that wraps __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(). This way, the new function fscrypt_policy_to_inherit() won't need to be exported to filesystems. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 63 ++++++++++------------------------------- 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index 7748db5092409..a399c54947f28 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -166,12 +166,43 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, return 0; } -int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len, - unsigned int max_len, - struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) +/** + * fscrypt_prepare_symlink() - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink + * @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created + * @target: plaintext symlink target + * @len: length of @target excluding null terminator + * @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target + * @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared + * + * This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk, + * stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len. An + * encrypted symlink may be longer than the original. + * + * Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be + * unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted. For encrypted + * symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the + * on-disk target later. (The reason for the two-step process is that some + * filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the + * inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.) + * + * Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long, + * -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem + * occurred while setting up the encryption key. + */ +int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target, + unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len, + struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) { int err; + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && !fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb)) { + disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; + disk_link->len = len + 1; + if (disk_link->len > max_len) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + return 0; + } + /* * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in @@ -207,7 +238,7 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len, disk_link->name = NULL; return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_symlink); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_symlink); int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index 81d6ded243288..39e7397a3f103 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -225,9 +225,9 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct fscrypt_name *fname); int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags); -int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len, - unsigned int max_len, - struct fscrypt_str *disk_link); +int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target, + unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len, + struct fscrypt_str *disk_link); int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link); const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr, @@ -520,15 +520,21 @@ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, return 0; } -static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, - unsigned int len, - unsigned int max_len, - struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) +static inline int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, + const char *target, + unsigned int len, + unsigned int max_len, + struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; + disk_link->len = len + 1; + if (disk_link->len > max_len) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + return 0; } - static inline int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, unsigned int len, @@ -793,45 +799,6 @@ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -/** - * fscrypt_prepare_symlink() - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink - * @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created - * @target: plaintext symlink target - * @len: length of @target excluding null terminator - * @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target - * @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared - * - * This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk, - * stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len. An - * encrypted symlink may be longer than the original. - * - * Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be - * unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted. For encrypted - * symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the - * on-disk target later. (The reason for the two-step process is that some - * filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the - * inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.) - * - * Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long, - * -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem - * occurred while setting up the encryption key. - */ -static inline int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, - const char *target, - unsigned int len, - unsigned int max_len, - struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) -{ - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb) != NULL) - return __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(dir, len, max_len, disk_link); - - disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; - disk_link->len = len + 1; - if (disk_link->len > max_len) - return -ENAMETOOLONG; - return 0; -} - /** * fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() - encrypt the symlink target if needed * @inode: symlink inode From patchwork Sun Sep 13 08:36:20 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11772253 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C4D959D for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D78E221655 for ; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986319; bh=uXAKQEyo1ZibZ5pKuVwr5khIlDHKT/16U27Bj6ZSiSg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=BAwtIo5ll6mI8kDXva+X5vjrkHjSuuLrFfE70U3UJOsFnS9Nj1ZYCUSQMwgCiv3qP h986FCvTjdZXaGl+6InoZ5OMXblUzfCIM1WqdHBb5U1LusgN3VBRtOfVtKwhkclNHv r6sI6xLKAV38tblxEWPBzhXuR4J1cwZV6m1Y65TQ= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725987AbgIMIiV (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:21 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60936 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725977AbgIMIiI (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Sep 2020 04:38:08 -0400 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D722E221EB; Sun, 13 Sep 2020 08:38:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599986281; bh=uXAKQEyo1ZibZ5pKuVwr5khIlDHKT/16U27Bj6ZSiSg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=H4FhAQ9OassN3Ahd6a1Jk1M8V7lIvacumPHEdPr+RhjizjRaA4LYqyyhFaUoeync7 OHCltlxvvbn902LgbjZBcnEK/9m2gM/7pNZ0kWJ/BLB7SohmPX7uqVzIrluoUQx9Su SVArXciITuHXr6I1fKyXl9uaDvkngq/+hey9augM= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Layton , Daniel Rosenberg Subject: [PATCH v2 11/11] fscrypt: handle test_dummy_encryption in more logical way Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 01:36:20 -0700 Message-Id: <20200913083620.170627-12-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200913083620.170627-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: ceph-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers The behavior of the test_dummy_encryption mount option is that when a new file (or directory or symlink) is created in an unencrypted directory, it's automatically encrypted using a dummy encryption policy. That's it; in particular, the encryption (or lack thereof) of existing files (or directories or symlinks) doesn't change. Unfortunately the implementation of test_dummy_encryption is a bit weird and confusing. When test_dummy_encryption is enabled and a file is being created in an unencrypted directory, we set up an encryption key (->i_crypt_info) for the directory. This isn't actually used to do any encryption, however, since the directory is still unencrypted! Instead, ->i_crypt_info is only used for inheriting the encryption policy. One consequence of this is that the filesystem ends up providing a "dummy context" (policy + nonce) instead of a "dummy policy". In commit ed318a6cc0b6 ("fscrypt: support test_dummy_encryption=v2"), I mistakenly thought this was required. However, actually the nonce only ends up being used to derive a key that is never used. Another consequence of this implementation is that it allows for 'inode->i_crypt_info != NULL && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)', which is an edge case that can be forgotten about. For example, currently FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY on an unencrypted directory may return the dummy encryption policy when the filesystem is mounted with test_dummy_encryption. That seems like the wrong thing to do, since again, the directory itself is not actually encrypted. Therefore, switch to a more logical and maintainable implementation where the dummy encryption policy inheritance is done without setting up keys for unencrypted directories. This involves: - Adding a function fscrypt_policy_to_inherit() which returns the encryption policy to inherit from a directory. This can be a real policy, a dummy policy, or no policy. - Replacing struct fscrypt_dummy_context, ->get_dummy_context(), etc. with struct fscrypt_dummy_policy, ->get_dummy_policy(), etc. - Making fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() take an fscrypt_policy instead of an inode. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim --- fs/crypto/fname.c | 11 ++-- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 6 +- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 30 ++++------ fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 33 +++-------- fs/crypto/policy.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 6 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 17 +++--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +- fs/f2fs/super.c | 16 ++--- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 40 +++++-------- 10 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c index 47bcfddb278ba..eb13408b50a70 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c @@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ static int base64_decode(const char *src, int len, u8 *dst) return cp - dst; } -bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len, - u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret) +bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy, + u32 orig_len, u32 max_len, + u32 *encrypted_len_ret) { - const struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; - int padding = 4 << (fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) & + int padding = 4 << (fscrypt_policy_flags(policy) & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK); u32 encrypted_len; @@ -418,7 +418,8 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, return ret; if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname->len, + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(&dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, + iname->len, dir->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen, &fname->crypto_buf.len)) return -ENAMETOOLONG; diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index ac3352086ee44..4f5806a3b73d7 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -291,8 +291,9 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, /* fname.c */ int fscrypt_fname_encrypt(const struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname, u8 *out, unsigned int olen); -bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len, - u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret); +bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy, + u32 orig_len, u32 max_len, + u32 *encrypted_len_ret); extern const struct dentry_operations fscrypt_d_ops; /* hkdf.c */ @@ -592,5 +593,6 @@ bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, int fscrypt_policy_from_context(union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, const union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, int ctx_size); +const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir); #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index a399c54947f28..42f5ee9f592d1 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -193,30 +193,24 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target, unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) { - int err; + const union fscrypt_policy *policy; - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && !fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb)) { + /* + * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know + * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in + * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory. + */ + policy = fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(dir); + if (policy == NULL) { + /* Not encrypted */ disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; disk_link->len = len + 1; if (disk_link->len > max_len) return -ENAMETOOLONG; return 0; } - - /* - * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know - * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in - * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory. - * The easiest way to get access to this is to just load the directory's - * fscrypt_info, since we'll need it to create the dir_entry anyway. - * - * Note: in test_dummy_encryption mode, @dir may be unencrypted. - */ - err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); - if (err) - return err; - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) - return -ENOKEY; + if (IS_ERR(policy)) + return PTR_ERR(policy); /* * Calculate the size of the encrypted symlink and verify it won't @@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target, * counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it. */ - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, len, + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(policy, len, max_len - sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data), &disk_link->len)) return -ENAMETOOLONG; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 7f5fbc2654d57..f38fb71501ae9 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, /** * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() - set up an inode's encryption key - * @inode: the inode to set up the key for + * @inode: the inode to set up the key for. Must be encrypted. * * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done. * @@ -567,18 +567,8 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); if (res < 0) { - const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = - fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); - - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { - fscrypt_warn(inode, - "Error %d getting encryption context", - res); - return res; - } - /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ - res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); - memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); + fscrypt_warn(inode, "Error %d getting encryption context", res); + return res; } res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res); @@ -620,17 +610,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info); int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, bool *encrypt_ret) { - int err; + const union fscrypt_policy *policy; u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb) == NULL) + policy = fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(dir); + if (policy == NULL) return 0; - - err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); - if (err) - return err; - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) - return -ENOKEY; + if (IS_ERR(policy)) + return PTR_ERR(policy); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mode == 0)) return -EINVAL; @@ -647,9 +634,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, *encrypt_ret = true; get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); - return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, - &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, - nonce); + return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, policy, nonce); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode); diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 4ff893f7b030a..97cf07543651f 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ bool fscrypt_policies_equal(const union fscrypt_policy *policy1, return !memcmp(policy1, policy2, fscrypt_policy_size(policy1)); } +static const union fscrypt_policy * +fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb) +{ + if (!sb->s_cop->get_dummy_policy) + return NULL; + return sb->s_cop->get_dummy_policy(sb); +} + static bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode, u32 filenames_mode) { if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS && @@ -628,6 +636,25 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context); +/* + * Return the encryption policy that new files in the directory will inherit, or + * NULL if none, or an ERR_PTR() on error. If the directory is encrypted, also + * ensure that its key is set up, so that the new filename can be encrypted. + */ +const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir) +{ + int err; + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { + err = fscrypt_require_key(dir); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + return &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy; + } + + return fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(dir->i_sb); +} + /** * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode * @inode: a new inode @@ -672,31 +699,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_context); * @sb: the filesystem on which test_dummy_encryption is being specified * @arg: the argument to the test_dummy_encryption option. * If no argument was specified, then @arg->from == NULL. - * @dummy_ctx: the filesystem's current dummy context (input/output, see below) + * @dummy_policy: the filesystem's current dummy policy (input/output, see + * below) * * Handle the test_dummy_encryption mount option by creating a dummy encryption - * context, saving it in @dummy_ctx, and adding the corresponding dummy - * encryption key to the filesystem. If the @dummy_ctx is already set, then + * policy, saving it in @dummy_policy, and adding the corresponding dummy + * encryption key to the filesystem. If the @dummy_policy is already set, then * instead validate that it matches @arg. Don't support changing it via * remount, as that is difficult to do safely. * - * The reason we use an fscrypt_context rather than an fscrypt_policy is because - * we mustn't generate a new nonce each time we access a dummy-encrypted - * directory, as that would change the way filenames are encrypted. - * - * Return: 0 on success (dummy context set, or the same context is already set); - * -EEXIST if a different dummy context is already set; + * Return: 0 on success (dummy policy set, or the same policy is already set); + * -EEXIST if a different dummy policy is already set; * or another -errno value. */ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, const substring_t *arg, - struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *dummy_policy) { const char *argstr = "v2"; const char *argstr_to_free = NULL; struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec = { 0 }; int version; - union fscrypt_context *ctx = NULL; + union fscrypt_policy *policy = NULL; int err; if (arg->from) { @@ -706,12 +730,12 @@ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, } if (!strcmp(argstr, "v1")) { - version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1; + version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1; key_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR; memset(key_spec.u.descriptor, 0x42, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); } else if (!strcmp(argstr, "v2")) { - version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2; + version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2; key_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER; /* key_spec.u.identifier gets filled in when adding the key */ } else { @@ -719,21 +743,8 @@ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } - if (dummy_ctx->ctx) { - /* - * Note: if we ever make test_dummy_encryption support - * specifying other encryption settings, such as the encryption - * modes, we'll need to compare those settings here. - */ - if (dummy_ctx->ctx->version == version) - err = 0; - else - err = -EEXIST; - goto out; - } - - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ctx) { + policy = kzalloc(sizeof(*policy), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!policy) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -742,18 +753,18 @@ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, if (err) goto out; - ctx->version = version; - switch (ctx->version) { - case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1: - ctx->v1.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; - ctx->v1.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; - memcpy(ctx->v1.master_key_descriptor, key_spec.u.descriptor, + policy->version = version; + switch (policy->version) { + case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1: + policy->v1.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; + policy->v1.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; + memcpy(policy->v1.master_key_descriptor, key_spec.u.descriptor, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); break; - case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2: - ctx->v2.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; - ctx->v2.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; - memcpy(ctx->v2.master_key_identifier, key_spec.u.identifier, + case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: + policy->v2.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS; + policy->v2.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS; + memcpy(policy->v2.master_key_identifier, key_spec.u.identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE); break; default: @@ -761,11 +772,19 @@ int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, err = -EINVAL; goto out; } - dummy_ctx->ctx = ctx; - ctx = NULL; + + if (dummy_policy->policy) { + if (fscrypt_policies_equal(policy, dummy_policy->policy)) + err = 0; + else + err = -EEXIST; + goto out; + } + dummy_policy->policy = policy; + policy = NULL; err = 0; out: - kfree(ctx); + kfree(policy); kfree(argstr_to_free); return err; } @@ -783,10 +802,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption); void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, char sep, struct super_block *sb) { - const union fscrypt_context *ctx = fscrypt_get_dummy_context(sb); + const union fscrypt_policy *policy = fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(sb); + int vers; - if (!ctx) + if (!policy) return; - seq_printf(seq, "%ctest_dummy_encryption=v%d", sep, ctx->version); + + vers = policy->version; + if (vers == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1) /* Handle numbering quirk */ + vers = 1; + + seq_printf(seq, "%ctest_dummy_encryption=v%d", sep, vers); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption); diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 523e00d7b3924..f9a692c0a66c3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ struct ext4_super_block { #define EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED 0x0002 /* Fatal error detected */ #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) ((sbi)->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx != NULL) +#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) ((sbi)->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy != NULL) #else #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0) #endif @@ -1596,8 +1596,8 @@ struct ext4_sb_info { atomic_t s_warning_count; atomic_t s_msg_count; - /* Encryption context for '-o test_dummy_encryption' */ - struct fscrypt_dummy_context s_dummy_enc_ctx; + /* Encryption policy for '-o test_dummy_encryption' */ + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy s_dummy_enc_policy; /* * Barrier between writepages ops and changing any inode's JOURNAL_DATA diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index ea425b49b3456..7e77722406e2f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb) crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver); kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock); fs_put_dax(sbi->s_daxdev); - fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE utf8_unload(sbi->s_encoding); #endif @@ -1392,10 +1392,10 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len, return res; } -static const union fscrypt_context * -ext4_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) +static const union fscrypt_policy * +ext4_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb) { - return EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx; + return EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy; } static bool ext4_has_stable_inodes(struct super_block *sb) @@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations ext4_cryptops = { .key_prefix = "ext4:", .get_context = ext4_get_context, .set_context = ext4_set_context, - .get_dummy_context = ext4_get_dummy_context, + .get_dummy_policy = ext4_get_dummy_policy, .empty_dir = ext4_empty_dir, .max_namelen = EXT4_NAME_LEN, .has_stable_inodes = ext4_has_stable_inodes, @@ -1888,12 +1888,13 @@ static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, * needed to allow it to be set or changed during remount. We do allow * it to be specified during remount, but only if there is no change. */ - if (is_remount && !sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx.ctx) { + if (is_remount && !sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); return -1; } - err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, arg, &sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); + err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, arg, + &sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy); if (err) { if (err == -EEXIST) ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, @@ -4935,7 +4936,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(get_qf_name(sb, sbi, i)); #endif - fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_ctx); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy); ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi); brelse(bh); out_fail: diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 0503371f88ed4..7c089ff7ff943 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ struct f2fs_mount_info { int fsync_mode; /* fsync policy */ int fs_mode; /* fs mode: LFS or ADAPTIVE */ int bggc_mode; /* bggc mode: off, on or sync */ - struct fscrypt_dummy_context dummy_enc_ctx; /* test dummy encryption */ + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy dummy_enc_policy; /* test dummy encryption */ block_t unusable_cap_perc; /* percentage for cap */ block_t unusable_cap; /* Amount of space allowed to be * unusable when disabling checkpoint diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index dfa072fa80815..f2b3d1a279fb7 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -433,12 +433,12 @@ static int f2fs_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, * needed to allow it to be set or changed during remount. We do allow * it to be specified during remount, but only if there is no change. */ - if (is_remount && !F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx) { + if (is_remount && !F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_policy.policy) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); return -EINVAL; } err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption( - sb, arg, &F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); + sb, arg, &F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_policy); if (err) { if (err == -EEXIST) f2fs_warn(sbi, @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb) for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_qf_names[i]); #endif - fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_policy); destroy_percpu_info(sbi); for (i = 0; i < NR_PAGE_TYPE; i++) kvfree(sbi->write_io[i]); @@ -2482,10 +2482,10 @@ static int f2fs_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len, ctx, len, fs_data, XATTR_CREATE); } -static const union fscrypt_context * -f2fs_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) +static const union fscrypt_policy * +f2fs_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb) { - return F2FS_OPTION(F2FS_SB(sb)).dummy_enc_ctx.ctx; + return F2FS_OPTION(F2FS_SB(sb)).dummy_enc_policy.policy; } static bool f2fs_has_stable_inodes(struct super_block *sb) @@ -2523,7 +2523,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations f2fs_cryptops = { .key_prefix = "f2fs:", .get_context = f2fs_get_context, .set_context = f2fs_set_context, - .get_dummy_context = f2fs_get_dummy_context, + .get_dummy_policy = f2fs_get_dummy_policy, .empty_dir = f2fs_empty_dir, .max_namelen = F2FS_NAME_LEN, .has_stable_inodes = f2fs_has_stable_inodes, @@ -3864,7 +3864,7 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(F2FS_OPTION(sbi).s_qf_names[i]); #endif - fscrypt_free_dummy_context(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_ctx); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&F2FS_OPTION(sbi).dummy_enc_policy); kvfree(options); free_sb_buf: kfree(raw_super); diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index 39e7397a3f103..b3b0c5675c6b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ #define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE 16 -union fscrypt_context; +union fscrypt_policy; struct fscrypt_info; struct seq_file; @@ -62,8 +62,7 @@ struct fscrypt_operations { int (*get_context)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len); int (*set_context)(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len, void *fs_data); - const union fscrypt_context *(*get_dummy_context)( - struct super_block *sb); + const union fscrypt_policy *(*get_dummy_policy)(struct super_block *sb); bool (*empty_dir)(struct inode *inode); unsigned int max_namelen; bool (*has_stable_inodes)(struct super_block *sb); @@ -101,14 +100,6 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(const struct inode *inode) return IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode); } -static inline const union fscrypt_context * -fscrypt_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) -{ - if (!sb->s_cop->get_dummy_context) - return NULL; - return sb->s_cop->get_dummy_context(sb); -} - /* * When d_splice_alias() moves a directory's encrypted alias to its decrypted * alias as a result of the encryption key being added, DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME @@ -158,20 +149,21 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child); int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data); -struct fscrypt_dummy_context { - const union fscrypt_context *ctx; +struct fscrypt_dummy_policy { + const union fscrypt_policy *policy; }; -int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, - const substring_t *arg, - struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx); +int fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption( + struct super_block *sb, + const substring_t *arg, + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *dummy_policy); void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, char sep, struct super_block *sb); static inline void -fscrypt_free_dummy_context(struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) +fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *dummy_policy) { - kfree(dummy_ctx->ctx); - dummy_ctx->ctx = NULL; + kfree(dummy_policy->policy); + dummy_policy->policy = NULL; } /* keyring.c */ @@ -250,12 +242,6 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(const struct inode *inode) return false; } -static inline const union fscrypt_context * -fscrypt_get_dummy_context(struct super_block *sb) -{ - return NULL; -} - static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move(struct dentry *dentry) { } @@ -346,7 +332,7 @@ static inline int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } -struct fscrypt_dummy_context { +struct fscrypt_dummy_policy { }; static inline void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, @@ -356,7 +342,7 @@ static inline void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, } static inline void -fscrypt_free_dummy_context(struct fscrypt_dummy_context *dummy_ctx) +fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *dummy_policy) { }