From patchwork Tue Sep 22 02:28:05 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11791349 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0DF11668 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:28:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A75E1207C3 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:28:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="pKmnePCD" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728949AbgIVC2p (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:28:45 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35694 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729617AbgIVC2p (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:28:45 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E0C38EE194; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1600741725; bh=wF8f28uaaPETaDs9ROs+b5gAJF+r6OyymaMGMt7ZKa8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=pKmnePCDT2eCutc8Av5cnmEuMGNo8uQVbxdNaLHmnFCSBmyk0rV4KOzjnpK6RvGgW LC5job7y3RV/0+NZXueTPFusEP2esk0XDXfuyWMyJrXYaTAkiaCrcLT+PypcRgChKG eZPzI7p75+gZB1VE5i/Y9lHet8koSZFu1DpcHDQA= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id g7A_OpRGZ1BI; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32DE78EE0CF; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:44 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v13 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:05 -0700 Message-Id: <20200922022809.7105-2-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org We have a need in the TPM2 trusted keys to return the ASN.1 form of the TPM key blob so it can be operated on by tools outside of the kernel. The specific tools are the openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and the Intel tpm2-tss-engine. To do that, we have to be able to read and write the same binary key format the tools use. The current ASN.1 decoder does fine for reading, but we need pieces of an ASN.1 encoder to write the key blob in binary compatible form. For backwards compatibility, the trusted key reader code will still accept the two TPM2B quantities that it uses today, but the writer will only output the ASN.1 form. The current implementation only encodes the ASN.1 bits we actually need. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: updated API to use indefinite length, and made symbol exports gpl v3: add data length error handling v4: use end_data instead of data_len pointer v5: mention tools and space out code v7: reverse christmas tree variable definitions and better spacing v9: update comments, remove indefinite length, make encoder config dependent --- include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 +++ lib/Kconfig | 3 + lib/Makefile | 1 + lib/asn1_encoder.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 490 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..08cd0c2ad34f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H +#define _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define asn1_oid_len(oid) (sizeof(oid)/sizeof(u32)) +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val); + +#endif diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index b4b98a03ff98..6ac79fe3fe52 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -684,3 +684,6 @@ config GENERIC_LIB_UCMPDI2 config PLDMFW bool default n + +config ASN1_ENCODER + tristate diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index a4a4c6864f51..3df3998a83d6 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ diff --git a/lib/asn1_encoder.c b/lib/asn1_encoder.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..41e71aae3ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/asn1_encoder.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Simple encoder primitives for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * asn1_encode_integer() - encode positive integer to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to the pointer to the data + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @integer: integer to be encoded + * + * This is a simplified encoder: it only currently does + * positive integers, but it should be simple enough to add the + * negative case if a use comes along. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = &data[2]; + bool found = false; + int i; + + if (WARN(integer < 0, + "BUG: integer encode only supports positive integers")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and integer encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* remaining length where at d (the start of the integer encoding) */ + data_len -= 2; + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, INT); + if (integer == 0) { + *d++ = 0; + goto out; + } + + for (i = sizeof(integer); i > 0 ; i--) { + int byte = integer >> (8 * (i - 1)); + + if (!found && byte == 0) + continue; + + /* + * for a positive number the first byte must have bit + * 7 clear in two's complement (otherwise it's a + * negative number) so prepend a leading zero if + * that's not the case + */ + if (!found && (byte & 0x80)) { + /* + * no check needed here, we already know we + * have len >= 1 + */ + *d++ = 0; + data_len--; + } + + found = true; + if (data_len == 0) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *d++ = byte; + data_len--; + } + + out: + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_integer); + +/* calculate the base 128 digit values setting the top bit of the first octet */ +static int asn1_encode_oid_digit(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, u32 oid) +{ + unsigned char *data = *_data; + int start = 7 + 7 + 7 + 7; + int ret = 0; + + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + /* quick case */ + if (oid == 0) { + *data++ = 0x80; + (*data_len)--; + goto out; + } + + while (oid >> start == 0) + start -= 7; + + while (start > 0 && *data_len > 0) { + u8 byte; + + byte = oid >> start; + oid = oid - (byte << start); + start -= 7; + byte |= 0x80; + *data++ = byte; + (*data_len)--; + } + + if (*data_len > 0) { + *data++ = oid; + (*data_len)--; + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; + } + + out: + *_data = data; + return ret; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_oid() - encode an oid to ASN.1 + * @data: position to begin encoding at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @oid: array of oids + * @oid_len: length of oid array + * + * this encodes an OID up to ASN.1 when presented as an array of OID values + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = data + 2; + int i, ret; + + if (WARN(oid_len < 2, "OID must have at least two elements")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (WARN(oid_len > 32, "OID is too large")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and OID encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OID); + *d++ = oid[0] * 40 + oid[1]; + + data_len -= 3; + + ret = 0; + + for (i = 2; i < oid_len; i++) { + ret = asn1_encode_oid_digit(&d, &data_len, oid[i]); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_oid); + +/** + * asn1_encode_length() - encode a length to follow an ASN.1 tag + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: pointer to remaning length (adjusted by routine) + * @len: length to encode + * + * This routine can encode lengths up to 65535 using the ASN.1 rules. + * It will accept a negative length and place a zero length tag + * instead (to keep the ASN.1 valid). This convention allows other + * encoder primitives to accept negative lengths as singalling the + * sequence will be re-encoded when the length is known. + */ +static int asn1_encode_length(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, int len) +{ + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len < 0) { + *((*data)++) = 0; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (len <= 0x7f) { + *((*data)++) = len; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x81; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 2; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 3) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xffff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x82; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 3; + return 0; + } + + if (WARN(len > 0xffffff, "ASN.1 length can't be > 0xffffff")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (*data_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + *((*data)++) = 0x83; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 16) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 4; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_tag() - add a tag for optional or explicit value + * @data: pointer to place tag at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @tag: tag to be placed + * @string: the data to be tagged + * @len: the length of the data to be tagged + * + * Note this currently only handles short form tags < 31. + * + * Standard usage is to pass in a @tag, @string and @length and the + * @string will be ASN.1 encoded with @tag and placed into @data. If + * the encoding would put data past @end_data then an error is + * returned, otherwise a pointer to a position one beyond the encoding + * is returned. + * + * To encode in place pass a NULL @string and -1 for @len and the + * maximum allowable beginning and end of the data; all this will do + * is add the current maximum length and update the data pointer to + * the place where the tag contents should be placed is returned. The + * data should be copied in by the calling routine which should then + * repeat the prior statement but now with the known length. In order + * to avoid having to keep both before and after pointers, the repeat + * expects to be called with @data pointing to where the first encode + * returned it and still NULL for @string but the real length in @len. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (WARN(tag > 30, "ASN.1 tag can't be > 30")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (!string && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode tag is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!string && len > 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * tag and install a dummy length because the real + * data_len should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tagn(CONT, CONS, tag); + data_len--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!string) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_tag); + +/** + * asn1_encode_octet_string() - encode an ASN.1 OCTET STRING + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @string: string to be encoded + * @len: length of string + * + * Note ASN.1 octet strings may contain zeros, so the length is obligatory. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need minimum of 2 bytes for tag and length of zero length string */ + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OTS); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_octet_string); + +/** + * asn1_encode_sequence() - wrap a byte stream in an ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @seq: data to be encoded as a sequence + * @len: length of the data to be encoded as a sequence + * + * Fill in a sequence. To encode in place, pass NULL for @seq and -1 + * for @len; then call again once the length is known (still with NULL + * for @seq). In order to avoid having to keep both before and after + * pointers, the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to + * where the first encode placed it. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (!seq && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode sequence is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!seq && len >= 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * sequence and install a dummy length because the + * real length should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, CONS, SEQ); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!seq) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, seq, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_sequence); + +/** + * asn1_encode_boolean() - encode a boolean value to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @val: the boolean true/false value + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* booleans are 3 bytes: tag, length == 1 and value == 0 or 1 */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, BOOL); + data_len--; + + asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, 1); + + if (val) + *(data++) = 1; + else + *(data++) = 0; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_boolean); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From patchwork Tue Sep 22 02:28:06 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11791353 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 444FC1668 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:29:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15BBB207C3 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:29:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="IcWxYZv8" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729628AbgIVC3l (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:29:41 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35772 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729617AbgIVC3l (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:29:41 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32C2D8EE194; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:29:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1600741781; bh=Fz12vh02KycNYIOJCKhsfJaZIhTY3QwTSSkaJlEmPFE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IcWxYZv8jPB2qY4eqiECqOJmJhj+X0WEmRZl4bBo+m5MjrCQkmdz8HYm+JZW7xClt bPyTDBns3cAkcGumopUPE3bJHtImZRMiR08av99V15KdzOXD5xP+NmfYCFUviA5FbH c2Blbx9rYAZ+Crl8DU33Giq2e/hK8O39c24XEX30= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yzH1KjSP0Hp5; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:29:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AAF578EE0CF; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:29:40 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v13 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:06 -0700 Message-Id: <20200922022809.7105-3-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The TCG has defined an OID prefix "2.23.133.10.1" for the various TPM key uses. We've defined three of the available numbers: 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Load() operation. 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Import() operation. Both loadable and importable keys are specific to a given TPM, the difference is that a loadable key is wrapped with the symmetric secret, so must have been created by the TPM itself. An importable key is wrapped with a DH shared secret, and may be created without access to the TPM provided you know the public part of the parent key. 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before use. The ASN.1 binary key form starts of with this OID as the first element of a sequence, giving the binary form a unique recognizable identity marker regardless of encoding. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: David Howells --- v3: correct OID_TPMImportableKey name v7: add ack v9: add review --- include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 657d6bf2c064..f6e2276e5f30 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ enum OID { OID_gostTC26Sign512B, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.2 */ OID_gostTC26Sign512C, /* 1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3 */ + /* TCG defined OIDS for TPM based keys */ + OID_TPMLoadableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.3 */ + OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ + OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ + OID__NR }; From patchwork Tue Sep 22 02:28:07 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11791357 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E00111668 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:30:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD151207C3 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:30:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="YAi/uA6v" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729617AbgIVCaS (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:30:18 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35844 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729445AbgIVCaS (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:30:18 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6A238EE194; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:30:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1600741817; bh=qSHalLJOZka2FNeS0te9w9KCf7j1qPfmlGIh/LM44us=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=YAi/uA6vjK+qdh5fncwnGj2jmbYxWPfurXoXhjLtgIQUqgNV9VtEEQse39vtdH/RY plZR6eip5+Gxpm+39F8OD/0cMvYEfwU8hejZmefXnyQegnDRDwhVBLioB49kWVE550 /LvQsKTG/krAIV+qW1vAXpmDT9JV4MEEMAiWJr4o= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Rq98FCdBpSCw; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:30:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E12868EE0CF; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:30:16 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v13 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:07 -0700 Message-Id: <20200922022809.7105-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v6: change comment, eliminate else clauses and add fixes tag v7: fixes before signoff v12: fix mismerge from v6 to make processing continue after blobauth Merge with auth fix --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 ++++--- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..eaa2e7ca136e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -781,13 +781,33 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as + * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple + * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + break; + } + + if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + break; + } + + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') pay->migratable = 0; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..b4a5058107c2 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); + if (options->blobauth_len) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); @@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + options->blobauth_len); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Tue Sep 22 02:28:08 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11791361 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51D2A1668 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:31:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 320A223A7A for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:31:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="Vt5EYHfA" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729489AbgIVCbB (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:31:01 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35924 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729445AbgIVCbB (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:31:01 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40CE48EE194; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1600741861; bh=TqtiAwiS84anodAs2AFROem97y3N4hnfIsGw2dQmAxI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Vt5EYHfA2K0x99XSAZFUN/ra8RmfVpDRP4TvQnHy5Wnrb8B7dyZ7ggSJzwat/lVHn tux5D7Zh0VXsftdmZ7w2R5kS+q5oGmzeaZk0OYBh5+Q6db3Fjc2Lmxi2GBY9P4Cd0/ SeOJLi5M9VkgrDcUSGMq20N4POb9Udbxr5ZkkM6k= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dJbr8-q3MPHg; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A92988EE0CF; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:00 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v13 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:08 -0700 Message-Id: <20200922022809.7105-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reported-by: kernel test robot Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: Updated encode API, added length checks v5: correct export format after doing interoperability checks v7: use prefix tpm2_key_ instead of tpmkey_ for functions v8: resplit commit v9: select ASN1_ENCODER v11: add ASN.1 format description v13: fix ASN.1 compiler dependency --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 58 +++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/Kconfig | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 11 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 9483a7425ad5..eb639bb24fcc 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -208,3 +208,61 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + + +TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format +------------------------ + +The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable, +even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1 +format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and +policy:: + + TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL + parent INTEGER + pubkey OCTET STRING + privkey OCTET STRING + } + +type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID +is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable +binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made +available are:: + + 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Load() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Import() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 + bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually + represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before + use. + +The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID. + +emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it +is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization +phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether +to prompt for a password. + +parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space, +like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes +also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If +this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the +TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile +object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports +the 0x81 MSO form. + +pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the +initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet +string length. + +privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the +initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed +string length. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2ed3481c6a0..b2d87ad21714 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 83bc23409164..3b75ee102c58 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER + select ASN1 help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 7b73cebbb378..f87c43f306d5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o + +$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f6a9d01d1e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- +--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys +--- + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}), + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), + pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) + } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index eaa2e7ca136e..f235637865b9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - if (!options->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index b4a5058107c2..e8dcc47b3388 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation */ +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -12,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 }; + +static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = scratch, *work1; + u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; + u8 *priv, *pub; + u16 priv_len, pub_len; + + priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + priv = src; + + src += priv_len; + + pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + pub = src; + + if (!scratch) + return -ENOMEM; + + work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, + asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); + + if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; + /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ + w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) + return PTR_ERR(w); + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); + } + + /* + * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never + * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + */ + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); + + work1 = payload->blob; + work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), + scratch, work - scratch); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) + return PTR_ERR(work1); + + return work1 - payload->blob; +} + +struct tpm2_key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 **buf) +{ + int ret; + struct tpm2_key_context ctx; + u8 *blob; + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, + payload->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + *buf = blob; + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + blob += ctx.priv_len; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -79,6 +244,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) return -EINVAL; + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -146,8 +314,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; + payload->blob_len = + tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -158,6 +328,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, else rc = -EPERM; } + if (payload->blob_len < 0) + return payload->blob_len; return rc; } @@ -184,13 +356,34 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; + u8 *blob; int rc; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) { + /* old form */ + blob = payload->blob; + payload->old_format = 1; + } + + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + + /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ + if (payload->blob_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + + private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); + + /* must be big enough for following public_len */ + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -206,7 +399,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->keyauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG; @@ -219,6 +412,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: + if (blob != payload->blob) + kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Tue Sep 22 02:28:09 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11791365 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADC936CA for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:31:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92A6E207C4 for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2020 02:31:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="CfqacVYe" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729660AbgIVCb1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:31:27 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:35984 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729445AbgIVCb1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 22:31:27 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFB668EE194; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:26 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1600741886; bh=DTofm+BJJFi59mTghseaTGq0nbL/Ik10Mlgo69EyJ4Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CfqacVYeEnRFFzFyvzPPWVSON+OIE5sG6ku6USLStFOKvj3G/sPc1/zK+jNB3G1WZ lqEnMTzBtXVldQiMZ5z1i2GWQplJt4xYrifdLLxR3UuQo6C/be2xISigM3PG4mGmtl oHa0Snnrxonn4GizTh6XrVWvQf/2v853XmX6TkPQ= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C6Szn1e0LC3H; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 556C98EE0CF; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:31:26 -0700 (PDT) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v13 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 19:28:09 -0700 Message-Id: <20200922022809.7105-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200922022809.7105-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't load. Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from the last byte of old format keys. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: added length checks to untrusted payload v8: recover patch --- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index ae2482510f8c..35224860fd0c 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ struct tpm_buf { }; enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1), + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4), TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e8dcc47b3388..905c5ca4d51c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int blob_len; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; + u32 flags; int i; int rc; @@ -259,31 +260,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); if (options->blobauth_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); /* public */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + /* key properties */ + flags = 0; + flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0; + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags); + /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + if (options->policydigest_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -356,8 +358,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob; + u8 *blob, *pub; int rc; + u32 attrs; rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); if (rc) { @@ -384,6 +387,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; + pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2; + /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */ + attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4); + + if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) == + (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) + payload->migratable = 0; + else + payload->migratable = 1; + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -464,7 +477,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!rc) { data_len = be16_to_cpup( (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -475,9 +488,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + if (payload->old_format) { + /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } else { + /* + * migratable flag already collected from key + * attributes + */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len); + payload->key_len = data_len; + } } out: