From patchwork Thu Sep 24 13:35:13 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11797355 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1DF01731 for ; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:35:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8887323977 for ; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:35:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1600954532; bh=gmPXyAX6NRORABRS1X+O+hlaJaxz4SMaYcsWwU32+YQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=SkngAJo8XM7z53SGroaRp2smUQlgZkxfuT5d/EFvlX5/TcC6nhLbGNOz2XMTiCDgy dxlrZ2tzTipCNw/fecyzxqFOvRvxL9fcevnaXLB0pPzNVvOnkW+Zxo7rbOS7OgJKhT iuoX+c6uHAQ7ai7DQ5BbKLv3lXDgWg2K/Hr7BQC4= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728015AbgIXNf2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:35:28 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:53762 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727742AbgIXNf2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:35:28 -0400 Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90FE6238E4; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:35:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1600954527; bh=gmPXyAX6NRORABRS1X+O+hlaJaxz4SMaYcsWwU32+YQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=p32nBzNWVSlkrVPnxwe/lSmc0i585xyETJ13vozHH4MSaiQYdYQhbLRYp8OcGNviF A3s8z1nuUKq2G3l1nKn8slJz++kKmb/ls5QtnT5kqETxZYNCs9p2nQ4ZN/ur/PWnmp cAZVHTBRLlUKnA2dGaS9fYLKh/bUtZqXJRPNtM3c= From: Mike Rapoport To: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Idan Yaniv , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Shuah Khan , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 16:35:13 +0300 Message-Id: <20200924133513.1589-1-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- man2/memfd_secret.2 | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 176 insertions(+) create mode 100644 man2/memfd_secret.2 diff --git a/man2/memfd_secret.2 b/man2/memfd_secret.2 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e4ecd3662 --- /dev/null +++ b/man2/memfd_secret.2 @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2020, IBM Corporation. +.\" Written by Mike Rapoport +.\" +.\" Based on memfd_create(2) man page +.\" Copyright (C) 2014 Michael Kerrisk +.\" and Copyright (C) 2014 David Herrmann +.\" +.\" %%%LICENSE_START(GPLv2+) +.\" +.\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +.\" it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +.\" the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +.\" (at your option) any later version. +.\" +.\" This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +.\" but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +.\" MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +.\" GNU General Public License for more details. +.\" +.\" You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public +.\" License along with this manual; if not, see +.\" . +.\" %%%LICENSE_END +.\" +.TH MEMFD_SECRET 2 2020-08-02 Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +memfd_secret \- create an anonymous file to map secret memory regions +.SH SYNOPSIS +.nf +.B #include +.PP +.BI "int memfd_secret(unsigned long " flags ");" +.fi +.PP +.IR Note : +There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES. +.SH DESCRIPTION +.BR memfd_secret () +creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it. +The file can only be memory-mapped; +the memory in such mapping +will have stronger protection than usual memory mapped files, +and so it can be used to store application secrets. +Unlike a regular file, a file created with +.BR memfd_secret () +lives in RAM and has a volatile backing storage. +Once all references to the file are dropped, it is automatically released. +The initial size of the file is set to 0. +Following the call, the file size should be set using +.BR ftruncate (2). +.PP +The memory areas obtained with +.BR mmap (2) +from the file descriptor are exclusive to the owning context. +These areas are removed from the kernel page tables +and only the page table of the process holding the file descriptor +maps the corresponding physical memory. +.PP +The following values may be bitwise ORed in +.IR flags +to control the behavior of +.BR memfd_secret (2): +.TP +.BR FD_CLOEXEC +Set the close-on-exec flag on the new file descriptor. +See the description of the +.B O_CLOEXEC +flag in +.BR open (2) +for reasons why this may be useful. +.PP +.TP +.BR SECRETMEM_UNCACHED +In addition to excluding memory areas from the kernel page tables, +mark the memory mappings uncached in the page table of the owning process. +Such mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads +and cache-based side channels. +This mode of +.BR memfd_secret () +is not supported on all architectures. +.PP +See also NOTES below. +.PP +As its return value, +.BR memfd_secret () +returns a new file descriptor that can be used to refer to an anonymous file. +This file descriptor is opened for both reading and writing +.RB ( O_RDWR ) +and +.B O_LARGEFILE +is set for the file descriptor. +.PP +With respect to +.BR fork (2) +and +.BR execve (2), +the usual semantics apply for the file descriptor created by +.BR memfd_secret (). +A copy of the file descriptor is inherited by the child produced by +.BR fork (2) +and refers to the same file. +The file descriptor is preserved across +.BR execve (2), +unless the close-on-exec flag has been set. +.PP +The memory regions backed with +.BR memfd_secret () +are locked in the same way as +.BR mlock (2), +however the implementation will not try to +populate the whole range during the +.BR mmap () +call. +The amount of memory allowed for memory mappings +of the file descriptor obeys the same rules as +.BR mlock (2) +and cannot exceed +.B RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. +.SH RETURN VALUE +On success, +.BR memfd_secret () +returns a new file descriptor. +On error, \-1 is returned and +.I errno +is set to indicate the error. +.SH ERRORS +.TP +.B ENOSYS +.BR memfd_secret () +is not implemented on this architecture. +.TP +.B EINVAL +.I flags +included unknown bits. +.TP +.B EMFILE +The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has been reached. +.TP +.B EMFILE +The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached. +.TP +.B ENOMEM +There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file. +.SH VERSIONS +The +.BR memfd_secret (2) +system call first appeared in Linux 5.X; +.SH CONFORMING TO +The +.BR memfd_secret (2) +system call is Linux-specific. +.SH NOTES +The +.BR memfd_secret (2) +system call provides an ability to hide information +from the operating system. +Normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, +but they are visible to the privileged code. +The mappings created using +.BR memfd_secret () +are hidden from the kernel as well. +.PP +If an architecture supports +.B SECRETMEM_UNCACHED, +the mappings also have protection from speculative execution vulnerabilties, +at the expense of increased memory access latency. +Care should be taken when using +.B +SECRETMEM_UNCACHED +to avoid degrading application performance. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR fcntl (2), +.BR ftruncate (2), +.BR mlock (2), +.BR mmap (2), +.BR setrlimit (2),