From patchwork Mon Oct 5 03:49:46 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11816055 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D6B76CB for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEE7520776 for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725846AbgJEDuM (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:12 -0400 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:20502 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725845AbgJEDuM (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:12 -0400 IronPort-SDR: azGN/Bzf9WpVzcP1yza+V1575A/Zb42rDqfFCdj0bZhI5gOz9J14tCbvTwY65EhVNTEYDtbEuu C7q/XvDPbNpQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9764"; a="142714801" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,338,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="142714801" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:49:59 -0700 IronPort-SDR: YRifT+q2NWn8g5Wf0vrL1CfRUpvzlbHSniVgFGp6jjB4ddsyHxzfXiem1OmmWxlyLNZycr5gGm dKrSlGx0/IaA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,337,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="295962406" Received: from sidorovd-mobl1.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.48.68]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:49:55 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , "James E.J. Bottomley" , David Howells , Kent Yoder , James Bottomley , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "H. Peter Anvin" , David Safford , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 06:49:46 +0300 Message-Id: <20201005034948.174228-2-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: David Howells Cc: Kent Yoder Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..c7b1701cdac5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, int ret; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); @@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; + return -EIO; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); @@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; + return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), @@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; goto out; } if (tpm2) From patchwork Mon Oct 5 03:49:47 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11816061 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D75CC1752 for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5EAC20776 for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725870AbgJEDuQ (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:16 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:23175 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725845AbgJEDuP (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:15 -0400 IronPort-SDR: MkkxK6Y7rVdhmaGtv/OrtN8m7kjaaI7664Sw8AsvWZRROhaIg/WeLzy2OWSrSLirVgABkP6UO4 YYGscEkj9Wjg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9764"; a="151108730" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,337,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="151108730" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:50:09 -0700 IronPort-SDR: bxdgkr37ObvhdiWoF/F2UWV5gFSZbR5Qh8FAB2hm1/Qv39DEfzH2H6t2Ltpnj0/0Gtr2enNYIb mnXzPdWauRyg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,337,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="295962453" Received: from sidorovd-mobl1.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.48.68]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:50:04 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , "James E.J. Bottomley" , stable@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Mimi Zohar , Sumit Garg , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Bottomley , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Jerry Snitselaar , Alexey Klimov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 06:49:47 +0300 Message-Id: <20201005034948.174228-3-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom. Fix this issue by introducting trusted_tpm_load() and trusted_tpm_new(), which wrap these operations, and take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything. Use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Sumit Garg Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reported-by: kernel test robot --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 -- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 ++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 78 +++++++++++++++-------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +- 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 947d1db0a5cc..283f78211c3a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops; extern struct idr dev_nums_idr; ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz); -ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec) int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, const struct tpm_class_ops *ops); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 8f4ff39f51e7..fc0ece0d8d46 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -397,6 +397,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, @@ -410,7 +414,17 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { return -ENODEV; } - +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ +} +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc) +{ +} static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c7b1701cdac5..c1dfc32c780b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -950,6 +950,51 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) return p; } +static int trusted_tpm_load(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_tpm_new(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ret != payload->key_len) + return -EIO; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + /* * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key * @@ -968,12 +1013,6 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -1011,32 +1050,21 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + ret = trusted_tpm_load(chip, payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: load failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + ret = trusted_tpm_new(chip, payload, options); - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - ret = -EIO; - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: new failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; default: ret = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..effdb67fac6d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); if (rc) goto out; @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); if (!rc) *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); if (rc > 0) rc = -EPERM; From patchwork Mon Oct 5 03:49:48 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11816069 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B60531752 for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AA9720809 for ; Mon, 5 Oct 2020 03:50:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725893AbgJEDuW (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:22 -0400 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:58110 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725845AbgJEDuU (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2020 23:50:20 -0400 IronPort-SDR: uptD8U17immlurGd9ENjXZK0RLD0Vob5upo6+ncnSA74Py9+rbuTzUrhLtX75zKUE20hulglvf oAhAMxh7nYbg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9764"; a="227459661" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,337,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="227459661" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:50:15 -0700 IronPort-SDR: +78de7BTlqIULS/Zxm5ve24hn9db3Xmtj/8xNCINYlnMzS6tR/HizVcMsHNpUKmwAymjxlVgtR BiOgwX62BQsg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,337,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="295962488" Received: from sidorovd-mobl1.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.48.68]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Oct 2020 20:50:11 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , David Safford , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 06:49:48 +0300 Message-Id: <20201005034948.174228-4-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20201005034948.174228-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Howells Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c1dfc32c780b..20ca18e17437 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') pay->migratable = 0; - else + else if (*args[0].from != '1') return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_pcrlock: