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Tue, 03 Nov 2020 08:02:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([122.173.169.225]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j140sm8471006pfd.216.2020.11.03.08.02.37 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 03 Nov 2020 08:02:47 -0800 (PST) From: Sumit Garg To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com Subject: [PATCH v8 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 21:31:44 +0530 Message-Id: <1604419306-26105-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201103_110252_522316_6B40065D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 25.34 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Sumit Garg , op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, corbet@lwn.net, janne.karhunen@gmail.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jens.wiklander@linaro.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, serge@hallyn.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg --- include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 338 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e2bb15 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +#include + +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" + +/* + * Get random data for symmetric key + * + * [out] memref[0] Random data + */ +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 + +/* + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Plain key + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob + */ +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 + +/* + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob + * [out] memref[1] Plain key + */ +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 + +/** + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. + * @ctx: TEE context handler. + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. + */ +struct trusted_key_private { + struct device *dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; + u32 session_id; + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; +}; + +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 49e3bcf..012dd78 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-y += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index aa4f2a0..15b1b0f3 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -29,6 +30,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) { "tpm", &tpm_trusted_key_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) + { "tee", &tee_trusted_key_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da8785a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; + +/* + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; + } + + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); + + return ret; +} + +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) +{ + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); + + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) + return -ENODEV; + + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; + sess_arg.num_params = 0; + + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", + sess_arg.ret); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_ctx; + } + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_sess; + + pvt_data.dev = dev; + + return 0; + +out_sess: + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); +out_ctx: + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, + {} +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); + +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + .bus = &tee_bus_type, + .probe = trusted_key_probe, + .remove = trusted_key_remove, + }, +}; + +static int trusted_tee_init(void) +{ + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +static void trusted_tee_exit(void) +{ + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = trusted_tee_init, + .seal = trusted_tee_seal, + .unseal = trusted_tee_unseal, + .get_random = trusted_tee_get_random, + .exit = trusted_tee_exit, +};