From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:12 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901777 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE9B7C388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4185722201 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="wauzPgUW" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727415AbgKLWCD (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:03 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:48784 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727043AbgKLWB7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:01:59 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5EC4922241; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:01:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218516; bh=wifdaOwX5NVLArN8MGTh/7kuNajui9NdGVy7WZ6v1Lo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=wauzPgUWtCpBx+xkQCmD5tpdClGHA3+pMMYibC8wmSrR/waGfcPZ/oUHXBhrHnJ5l vHrcFjyQ0n7C74GLxGSWqPyupYqy9/shW83mfDc3d6tr1rlfWcJAxaC7QIByNEfV2O CIpzPdnESnBbsYDcHOwuAxOrCeNbUGojakLJhhnA= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 01/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX architectural data structures Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:12 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Define the SGX architectural data structures used by various SGX functions. This is not an exhaustive representation of all SGX data structures but only those needed by the kernel. The goal is to sequester hardware structures in "sgx/arch.h" and keep them separate from kernel-internal or uapi structures. The data structures are described in Intel SDM section 37.6. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 338 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dd7602c44c72 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/** + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + * + * Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture. Data structures + * defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here. + */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H +#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H + +#include +#include + +/* The SGX specific CPUID function. */ +#define SGX_CPUID 0x12 +/* EPC enumeration. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC 2 +/* An invalid EPC section, i.e. the end marker. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID 0x0 +/* A valid EPC section. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION 0x1 +/* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) + +/** + * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV + * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not + * been completed yet. + * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's + * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. + * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received + */ +enum sgx_return_code { + SGX_NOT_TRACKED = 11, + SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16, + SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128, +}; + +/* The modulus size for 3072-bit RSA keys. */ +#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384 + +/** + * enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame + * %SGX_MISC_EXINFO: Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame. + * + * Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor + * state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional + * information stored to an SSA frame. + */ +enum sgx_miscselect { + SGX_MISC_EXINFO = BIT(0), +}; + +#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) + +#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE 184 +#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE 16 + +/** + * enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs + * %SGX_ATTR_INIT: Enclave can be entered (is initialized). + * %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG: Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR). + * %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT: Tell that this a 64-bit enclave. + * %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY: Allow to use provisioning keys for remote + * attestation. + * %SGX_ATTR_KSS: Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS). + * %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY: Allow to use token signing key that is used to + * sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to + * EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave. + */ +enum sgx_attribute { + SGX_ATTR_INIT = BIT(0), + SGX_ATTR_DEBUG = BIT(1), + SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT = BIT(2), + SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY = BIT(4), + SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY = BIT(5), + SGX_ATTR_KSS = BIT(7), +}; + +#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK (BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8)) + +/** + * struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) + * @size: size of the address space + * @base: base address of the address space + * @ssa_frame_size: size of an SSA frame + * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame + * @attributes: attributes for enclave + * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) + * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents + * @mrsigner: SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT + * @config_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isv_prod_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isv_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @config_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * + * SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not + * visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address + * range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC + * page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC + * by the means of ENCLS[ECREATE] function. + */ +struct sgx_secs { + u64 size; + u64 base; + u32 ssa_frame_size; + u32 miscselect; + u8 reserved1[24]; + u64 attributes; + u64 xfrm; + u32 mrenclave[8]; + u8 reserved2[32]; + u32 mrsigner[8]; + u8 reserved3[32]; + u32 config_id[16]; + u16 isv_prod_id; + u16 isv_svn; + u16 config_svn; + u8 reserved4[3834]; +} __packed; + +/** + * enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS + * %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN: If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints + * inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can + * be set later with EDBGWR. + */ +enum sgx_tcs_flags { + SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN = 0x01, +}; + +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE 4024 + +/** + * struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS) + * @state: used to mark an entered TCS + * @flags: execution flags (cleared by EADD) + * @ssa_offset: SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base + * @ssa_index: the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD) + * @nr_ssa_frames: the number of frame in the SSA stack + * @entry_offset: entry point offset relative to the enclave base + * @exit_addr: address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or + * interrupt + * @fs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become FS + * segment inside the enclave + * @gs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become GS + * segment inside the enclave + * @fs_limit: size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) + * @gs_limit: size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) + * + * Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address + * space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside + * an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered + * by only one thread at a time. + */ +struct sgx_tcs { + u64 state; + u64 flags; + u64 ssa_offset; + u32 ssa_index; + u32 nr_ssa_frames; + u64 entry_offset; + u64 exit_addr; + u64 fs_offset; + u64 gs_offset; + u32 fs_limit; + u32 gs_limit; + u8 reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor + * @addr: address of the enclave page + * @contents: pointer to the page contents + * @metadata: pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance + * @secs: address of the SECS page + */ +struct sgx_pageinfo { + u64 addr; + u64 contents; + u64 metadata; + u64 secs; +} __packed __aligned(32); + + +/** + * enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS: a SECS page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS: a TCS page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state + */ +enum sgx_page_type { + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM, +}; + +#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES 5 +#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) + +/** + * enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo + * %SGX_SECINFO_R: allow read + * %SGX_SECINFO_W: allow write + * %SGX_SECINFO_X: allow execution + * %SGX_SECINFO_SECS: a SECS page + * %SGX_SECINFO_TCS: a TCS page + * %SGX_SECINFO_REG: a regular page + * %SGX_SECINFO_VA: a VA page + * %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM: a page in trimmed state + */ +enum sgx_secinfo_flags { + SGX_SECINFO_R = BIT(0), + SGX_SECINFO_W = BIT(1), + SGX_SECINFO_X = BIT(2), + SGX_SECINFO_SECS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_TCS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_REG = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_VA = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_TRIM = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8), +}; + +#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0) +#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8) +#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK ~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \ + SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) + +/** + * struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page + * @flags: permissions and type + * + * Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an + * enclave to define page permissions and type. + */ +struct sgx_secinfo { + u64 flags; + u8 reserved[56]; +} __packed __aligned(64); + +#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40 + +/** + * struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD) + * @enclave_id: enclave identifier + * @mac: MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn + * + * PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads + * the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a + * VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback + * protection. + */ +struct sgx_pcmd { + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + u64 enclave_id; + u8 reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE]; + u8 mac[16]; +} __packed __aligned(128); + +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12 + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct_header - defines author of the enclave + * @header1: constant byte string + * @vendor: must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086 + * @date: YYYYMMDD in BCD + * @header2: costant byte string + * @swdefined: software defined value + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct_header { + u64 header1[2]; + u32 vendor; + u32 date; + u64 header2[2]; + u32 swdefined; + u8 reserved1[84]; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave + * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame + * @misc_mask: required miscselect in SECS + * @attributes: attributes for enclave + * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) + * @attributes_mask: required attributes in SECS + * @xfrm_mask: required XFRM in SECS + * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents + * @isvprodid: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isvsvn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct_body { + u32 miscselect; + u32 misc_mask; + u8 reserved2[20]; + u64 attributes; + u64 xfrm; + u64 attributes_mask; + u64 xfrm_mask; + u8 mrenclave[32]; + u8 reserved3[32]; + u16 isvprodid; + u16 isvsvn; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature + * @header: defines author of the enclave + * @modulus: the modulus of the public key + * @exponent: the exponent of the public key + * @signature: the signature calculated over the fields except modulus, + * @body: defines contents of the enclave + * @q1: a value used in RSA signature verification + * @q2: a value used in RSA signature verification + * + * Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields + * define the signature of the enclave. + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct { + struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; + u8 modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + u32 exponent; + u8 signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; + u8 reserved4[12]; + u8 q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + u8 q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:13 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901769 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C252CC388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5719E22241 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="h/jf5fsw" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727464AbgKLWCG (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:06 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:48900 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727438AbgKLWCE (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:04 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5B63C2224B; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:01:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218522; bh=yXcEhTOBEGu2iTxbA0uKGs9ZublDFPYF4sxjBIhNJvY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=h/jf5fswVxHYvstcBmUexp3dgBbW5ZkBKK2q2IuAU6abTN1CDJNXV8NQIbCCu+9sc elwk1LsgSRueQDNp/AiwWQjrR87qfVGwX/dXn9uoeP9Te+ZEGSopd3lA1O+p9V2cPx 9WUyAm9O80VXi7Um/py/W6hKk64ZnG60HbQxXrcs= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 02/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS functions Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:13 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org ENCLS is the userspace instruction which wraps virtually all unprivileged SGX functionality for managing enclaves. It is essentially the ioctl() of instructions with each function implementing different SGX-related functionality. Add macros to wrap the ENCLS functionality. There are two main groups, one for functions which do not return error codes and a “ret_” set for those that do. ENCLS functions are documented in Intel SDM section 36.6. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 231 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..443188fe7e70 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H +#define _X86_ENCLS_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "sgx.h" + +enum sgx_encls_function { + ECREATE = 0x00, + EADD = 0x01, + EINIT = 0x02, + EREMOVE = 0x03, + EDGBRD = 0x04, + EDGBWR = 0x05, + EEXTEND = 0x06, + ELDU = 0x08, + EBLOCK = 0x09, + EPA = 0x0A, + EWB = 0x0B, + ETRACK = 0x0C, +}; + +/** + * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr + * + * ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates + * ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults. And the ENCLS values get munged + * with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack. + * Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique + * error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the + * type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply + * convert all faults to -EFAULT. + * + * To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an + * ENCLS fault. Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate + * between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system + * error codes) values. + */ +#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000 + +/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */ +#define ENCLS_TRAPNR(r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + +/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS function. */ +#define ENCLS_WARN(r, name) { \ + do { \ + int _r = (r); \ + WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \ + } while (0); \ +} + +/** + * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed + * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS function call + * + * Check if an ENCLS function failed. This happens when the function causes a + * fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the function returns a + * non-zero value. + */ +static inline bool encls_failed(int ret) +{ + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF; + + return !!ret; +} + +/** + * __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS function that returns an error code in EAX + * @rax: function number + * @inputs: asm inputs for the function + * + * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE. + * And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, function that return an error + * code also modify flags. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * SGX error code on failure + */ +#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_1(rax, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_3(rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \ + }) + +/** + * __encls_N - encode an ENCLS function that doesn't return an error code + * @rax: function number + * @rbx_out: optional output variable + * @inputs: asm inputs for the function + * + * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that does not return an error code, e.g. + * ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault. @rbx_out is an + * optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns the requested value in + * RBX. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault + */ +#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \ + __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_1_1(rax, data, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long rbx_out; \ + int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \ + if (!ret) \ + data = rbx_out; \ + ret; \ + }) + +static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs) +{ + return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs); +} + +static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr); +} + +static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr); +} + +static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token); +} + +static inline int __eremove(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data) +{ + return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data) +{ + return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __etrack(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr); +} + +static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, + void *va) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va); +} + +static inline int __eblock(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr); +} + +static inline int __epa(void *addr) +{ + unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA; + + return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr); +} + +static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, + void *va) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va); +} + +#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901771 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAD53C388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71C0E21D7F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="2E7SBo9B" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727431AbgKLWCO (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:14 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:48990 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727477AbgKLWCJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:09 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6073821D7F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218528; bh=7TIQwLt2Y6/ppAafx74RiNO+AvvHHDEToFZCRvu32Y0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=2E7SBo9BuYoG6ZvC8nPl3+D0cU8b7IvriBGlA8E7RoBCVp+BZ8CPP46+0DHnbyYBy iOW8Q5ejDhed2FGkVtIPdc8+640Iy25YplOLlhwKjJZ6vjexXWSj/0obGP969TdWVr f+pQPToeMw2fHRkc0+PfjiSKIuo1VMKFvRpMpb5k= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 03/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:14 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Populate X86_FEATURE_SGX feature from CPUID and tie it to the Kconfig option with disabled-features.h. IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE must be examined in addition to the CPUID bits to enable full SGX support. The BIOS must both set this bit and lock IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL for SGX to be supported (Intel SDM section 36.7.1). The setting or clearing of this bit has no impact on the CPUID bits above, which is why it needs to be detected separately. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Remove X86_FEATURE_SGX{1, 2}. They were only mistakenly being used for model-specific errata detection. Further, the errata does not occur on any processors that this implementation supports. Later patches ignore the errata, so remove the CPUID bits. arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index dad350d42ecf..1181f5c7bbef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX ( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 5861d34f9771..7947cb1782da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ # define DISABLE_ENQCMD (1 << (X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX +# define DISABLE_SGX 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -74,7 +80,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK6 0 #define DISABLED_MASK7 (DISABLE_PTI) #define DISABLED_MASK8 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP) +#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 #define DISABLED_MASK11 0 #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index b2dd2648c0e2..16154953704a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ #define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18) #define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20) #define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:15 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901773 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8028BC2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21F0822244 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="2Bn2s+nd" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727214AbgKLWCT (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:19 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49134 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727477AbgKLWCQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:16 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5E68322241; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218534; bh=xMf6gQfqp1WEaDxJnUVEXOOcScjOkA1O6cDPDW317Js=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=2Bn2s+nd3EK7plLYCglYdsR2OhjazthzGlY4llPlCGQCo+Uf9UxWlYv1D/o2R9J1E V5OPh2C1d7RbsnKaAUc4ZHfEDl+U0WF6Oaw8B+yYdFdPCIYATVB7mzHQmJ9JTSRv4V FOeIs3RgCAhiRxU+y3yipDWk5YkgnXv1Dj3rkSZk= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 04/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:15 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson The SGX Launch Control hardware helps restrict which enclaves the hardware will run. Launch control is intended to restrict what software can run with enclave protections, which helps protect the overall system from bad enclaves. For the kernel's purposes, there are effectively two modes in which the launch control hardware can operate: rigid and flexible. In its rigid mode, an entity other than the kernel has ultimate authority over which enclaves can be run (firmware, Intel, etc...). In its flexible mode, the kernel has ultimate authority over which enclaves can run. Enable X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC to enumerate when the CPU supports SGX Launch Control in general. Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. The hardware allows SGX enclaves signed with this public key to initialize and run [*]. Enclaves not signed with this key can not initialize and run. Add FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, which informs whether the SGXLEPUBKEYHASH MSRs can be written by the kernel. If the MSRs do not exist or are read-only, the launch control hardware is operating in rigid mode. Linux does not and will not support creating enclaves when hardware is configured in rigid mode because it takes away the authority for launch decisions from the kernel. Note, this does not preclude KVM from virtualizing/exposing SGX to a KVM guest when launch control hardware is operating in rigid mode. [*] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 1181f5c7bbef..f5ef2d5b9231 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD (16*32+29) /* ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */ #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 16154953704a..6a5085a5f9d8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ #define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17) #define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18) #define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20) @@ -630,6 +631,12 @@ #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079 #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b +/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F + #define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b #define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:16 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901775 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57B0AC388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E82BE21D7F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ksONpEYl" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727477AbgKLWCX (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:23 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49366 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727487AbgKLWCX (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:23 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5BDBF22246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218541; bh=Sc9wonwerz/qzUKz098T7apL88ipLBMf88/MlFgNrIU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ksONpEYlyxXXlZO3N461Rn7oO5+gIJt6dtQWstmpWk5l+U+iAz15tiyrOz0FFOr1e jSLzvBhJDG5yVv36l7Bg0qpqN9Vq9lqMqCa0jKkpfOzvlYNXQyAC7A/OKh6EoIe9eX DS6hCppnLvYA0+t9G0C1hcscTgOl8Pi2A4Wdl8tc= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Serge Ayoun , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 05/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:16 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Although carved out of normal DRAM, enclave memory is marked in the system memory map as reserved and is not managed by the core mm. There may be several regions spread across the system. Each contiguous region is called an Enclave Page Cache (EPC) section. EPC sections are enumerated via CPUID Enclave pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave. Parse CPUID data, create metadata for EPC pages and populate a simple EPC page allocator. Although much smaller, ‘struct sgx_epc_page’ metadata is the SGX analog of the core mm ‘struct page’. Similar to how the core mm’s page->flags encode zone and NUMA information, embed the EPC section index to the first eight bits of sgx_epc_page->desc. This allows a quick reverse lookup from EPC page to EPC section. Existing client hardware supports only a single section, while upcoming server hardware will support at most eight sections. Thus, eight bits should be enough for long term needs. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Serge Ayoun Signed-off-by: Serge Ayoun Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Replace CONFIG_INTEL_SGX with CONFIG_X86_SGX. Changes from v40: * Renamed 'ksgxswapd' as 'ksgxd'. arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 60 ++++++++++ 5 files changed, 270 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 33c273cb3023..fd8c225eef1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1931,6 +1931,23 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter. endchoice +config X86_SGX + bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)" + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL + depends on CRYPTO=y + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y + select SRCU + select MMU_NOTIFIER + help + Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions + that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code + and data, referred to as enclaves. An enclave's private memory can + only be accessed by code running within the enclave. Accesses from + outside the enclave, including other enclaves, are disallowed by + hardware. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile index 93792b457b81..637b499450d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE) += mce/ obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR) += mtrr/ obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += resctrl/ +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += sgx/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += perfctr-watchdog.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79510ce01b3b --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +obj-y += \ + main.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..187a237eec38 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "encls.h" + +struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; +static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; +static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk; + +/* + * Reset dirty EPC pages to uninitialized state. Laundry can be left with SECS + * pages whose child pages blocked EREMOVE. + */ +static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + LIST_HEAD(dirty); + int ret; + + while (!list_empty(§ion->laundry_list)) { + if (kthread_should_stop()) + return; + + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + + page = list_first_entry(§ion->laundry_list, + struct sgx_epc_page, list); + + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); + if (!ret) + list_move(&page->list, §ion->page_list); + else + list_move_tail(&page->list, &dirty); + + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + + cond_resched(); + } + + list_splice(&dirty, §ion->laundry_list); +} + +static int ksgxd(void *p) +{ + int i; + + set_freezable(); + + /* + * Sanitize pages in order to recover from kexec(). The 2nd pass is + * required for SECS pages, whose child pages blocked EREMOVE. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) + sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]); + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]); + + /* Should never happen. */ + if (!list_empty(&sgx_epc_sections[i].laundry_list)) + WARN(1, "EPC section %d has unsanitized pages.\n", i); + } + + return 0; +} + +static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + + tsk = kthread_run(ksgxd, NULL, "ksgxd"); + if (IS_ERR(tsk)) + return false; + + ksgxd_tsk = tsk; + + return true; +} + +static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size, + unsigned long index, + struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned long i; + + section->virt_addr = memremap(phys_addr, size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!section->virt_addr) + return false; + + section->pages = vmalloc(nr_pages * sizeof(struct sgx_epc_page)); + if (!section->pages) { + memunmap(section->virt_addr); + return false; + } + + section->phys_addr = phys_addr; + spin_lock_init(§ion->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->page_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->laundry_list); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { + section->pages[i].section = index; + list_add_tail(§ion->pages[i].list, §ion->laundry_list); + } + + return true; +} + +/** + * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the + * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the + * metric. + */ +static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high) +{ + return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) + + ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32); +} + +static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void) +{ + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type; + u64 pa, size; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sgx_epc_sections); i++) { + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, i + SGX_CPUID_EPC, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK; + if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID) + break; + + if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION) { + pr_err_once("Unknown EPC section type: %u\n", type); + break; + } + + pa = sgx_calc_section_metric(eax, ebx); + size = sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx); + + pr_info("EPC section 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pa, pa + size - 1); + + if (!sgx_setup_epc_section(pa, size, i, &sgx_epc_sections[i])) { + pr_err("No free memory for an EPC section\n"); + break; + } + + sgx_nr_epc_sections++; + } + + if (!sgx_nr_epc_sections) { + pr_err("There are zero EPC sections.\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static void __init sgx_init(void) +{ + int i; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + return; + + if (!sgx_page_cache_init()) + return; + + if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init()) + goto err_page_cache; + + return; + +err_page_cache: + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + vfree(sgx_epc_sections[i].pages); + memunmap(sgx_epc_sections[i].virt_addr); + } +} + +device_initcall(sgx_init); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02afa84dd8fd --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _X86_SGX_H +#define _X86_SGX_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "arch.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt + +#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS 8 + +struct sgx_epc_page { + unsigned int section; + struct list_head list; +}; + +/* + * The firmware can define multiple chunks of EPC to the different areas of the + * physical memory e.g. for memory areas of the each node. This structure is + * used to store EPC pages for one EPC section and virtual memory area where + * the pages have been mapped. + */ +struct sgx_epc_section { + unsigned long phys_addr; + void *virt_addr; + struct list_head page_list; + struct list_head laundry_list; + struct sgx_epc_page *pages; + spinlock_t lock; +}; + +extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; + +static inline unsigned long sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + unsigned long index; + + index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page); + + return section->phys_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE; +} + +static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + unsigned long index; + + index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page); + + return section->virt_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE; +} + +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:17 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901779 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 845D8C5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D976E2222F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="fT+L4yAa" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727522AbgKLWC3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:29 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49606 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727487AbgKLWC2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:28 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8D0A022241; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218547; bh=9M4BC2Cr5Q3zI63yXfmamd5rYGuuJOkwMwhYc6Pak7Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fT+L4yAaRwqFS3SOtR6e4aMLNM5+UlpNCByFJPgvZJSGAQcWTfVYSyaamu6gL5/wk YQ9epFVxlUdmQs92fYa+hlwCkIZW8eNFi0h1KSJBwV7wPzkQHn4dmkc07vvPcXZJPj 7J3e3HNAL1a99F1vV+UOw7hwxoY1vPH2dWG3Xc7U= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 06/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:17 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-7-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson The x86 architecture has a set of page fault error codes. These indicate things like whether the fault occurred from a write, or whether it originated in userspace. The SGX hardware architecture has its own per-page memory management metadata (EPCM) [*] and hardware which is separate from the normal x86 MMU. The architecture has a new page fault error code: PF_SGX. This new error code bit is set whenever a page fault occurs as the result of the SGX MMU. These faults occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, an access attempt to enclave memory from outside the enclave causes a PF_SGX fault. PF_SGX would also be set for permission conflicts, such as if a write to an enclave page occurs and the page is marked read-write in the x86 page tables but is read-only in the EPCM. These faults do not always indicate errors, though. SGX pages are encrypted with a key that is destroyed at hardware reset, including suspend. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software to react and recover when these events occur. Include PF_SGX in the PF error codes list and throw SIGSEGV when it is encountered. [*] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 1 + arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h index 305bc1214aef..1794777b2a85 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 82bf37a5c9ec..9339fee83784 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1101,6 +1101,18 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (error_code & X86_PF_PK) return 1; + /* + * SGX hardware blocked the access. This usually happens + * when the enclave memory contents have been destroyed, like + * after a suspend/resume cycle. In any case, the kernel can't + * fix the cause of the fault. Handle the fault as an access + * error even in cases where no actual access violation + * occurred. This allows userspace to rebuild the enclave in + * response to the signal. + */ + if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX)) + return 1; + /* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:18 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901803 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6718C2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 723E022241 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="E7NkNV1K" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727566AbgKLWCf (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:35 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49868 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727553AbgKLWCe (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:34 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8AF6521D7F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218553; bh=YG6bBkYdWPGTx1ioQemKvWKBArdKCilAiewflMZmvDM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=E7NkNV1KuPDfH0vTpVWijBUemcD4qUNKYe8ZNh0z8wculPPAkeGduOr5zYm9Vuh5Y vkyv8Uc9NP8RScdEv56LLy+vscyJLckZ/CPLzshiRTog/pwkZC+0tuUX6Ou5dlY4Vp u5EACj8jH61fuXFMCSirWdZJQPECSESsTS9PADk0= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:18 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-8-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Kernel support for SGX is ultimately decided by the state of the launch control bits in the feature control MSR (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL). If the hardware supports SGX, but neglects to support flexible launch control, the kernel will not enable SGX. Enable SGX at feature control MSR initialization and update the associated X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all derivatives) if the kernel is not able to establish itself as the authority over SGX Launch Control. All checks are performed for each logical CPU (not just boot CPU) in order to verify that MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all CPUs. All SGX code in this series expects the same configuration from all CPUs. This differs from VMX where X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only for the current CPU so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM fails to load like which CPU doesn't support VMX. There’s not much the kernel or an administrator can do to fix the situation, so SGX neglects to convey additional details about these kinds of failures if they occur. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index 29a3bedabd06..d38e97325018 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c @@ -93,16 +93,32 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ +static void clear_sgx_caps(void) +{ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); +} + void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { bool tboot = tboot_enabled(); + bool enable_sgx; u64 msr; if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX); + clear_sgx_caps(); return; } + /* + * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control + * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written. + */ + enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX); + if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) goto update_caps; @@ -124,13 +140,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; } + if (enable_sgx) + msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr); update_caps: set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL); if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) - return; + goto update_sgx; if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) || (!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) { @@ -143,4 +162,12 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) init_vmx_capabilities(c); #endif } + +update_sgx: + if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) || + !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) { + if (enable_sgx) + pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n"); + clear_sgx_caps(); + } } From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:19 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901797 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6A7CC56202 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3EF2C22201 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="QzBBBZE5" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727554AbgKLWCo (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:44 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:50252 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727553AbgKLWCk (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:40 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E106B22201; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218559; bh=zJx4e7mNcNnTToB29aO9Ny/o14a9p3GCHActo+yKdJM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=QzBBBZE5WwOMsI7lDNwxIeQKUQHqDig/c1IxAbBptENai206PDp3BkkGNIMQSYzbQ K5jip7VPxFJsOz2jIujMkHc0e1gIWT90to8Pv7luEmWFtuouP/wDMN1nR3H+7cKyTK i5g/KdolDM8fhPClZSSiItXA8Ebftzuh7+scRbpQ= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 08/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:19 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-9-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Add kernel parameter to disable Intel SGX kernel support, along with supporting Documentation. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Tested-by: Sean Christopherson # Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index bd1a5b87a5e2..4684611edf09 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3385,6 +3385,8 @@ nosep [BUGS=X86-32] Disables x86 SYSENTER/SYSEXIT support. + nosgx [X86-64,SGX] Disables Intel SGX kernel support. + nosmp [SMP] Tells an SMP kernel to act as a UP kernel, and disable the IO APIC. legacy for "maxcpus=0". diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index d38e97325018..3b1b01f2b248 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c @@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ static void clear_sgx_caps(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); } +static int __init nosgx(char *str) +{ + clear_sgx_caps(); + + return 0; +} + +early_param("nosgx", nosgx); + void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { bool tboot = tboot_enabled(); From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:20 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901801 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49E69C5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E900422227 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:50 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ityVixk+" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727431AbgKLWCr (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:47 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:50610 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727633AbgKLWCq (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:46 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D813A22246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218565; bh=C3z26/BwZTBylkxi3CkpNoxIGz4D3IOIGLA5Db/CwfM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ityVixk+RnaXvYGALjt+RY+rXY6uXSV3Z0yoLltodktLCRmUovibpR7gwdvVzxwy1 qzjXxPhQH3Gnv3zJV1fU6dRt6SYPo+6pednEwsjRMYAXz3EtJohHrF/EmCWYyfsZ2T AyKeIs1nlrbXq7tlmgxynL+TbR8KqChpxOJAbAys= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 09/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX page allocator functions Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:20 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-10-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org The previous patch initialized a simple SGX page allocator. Add functions for runtime allocation and free. This allocator and its algorithms are as simple as it gets. They do a linear search across all EPC sections and find the first free page. They are not NUMA aware and only hand out individual pages. The SGX hardware does not support large pages, so something more complicated like a buddy allocator is unwarranted. The free function (sgx_free_epc_page()) implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which returns the page to the uninitialized state. This ensures that the page is ready for use at the next allocation. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 187a237eec38..2e53afc288a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -85,6 +85,71 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) return true; } +static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + + if (list_empty(§ion->page_list)) { + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + return NULL; + } + + page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list); + list_del_init(&page->list); + + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + return page; +} + +/** + * __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page + * + * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a + * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). + * + * Return: + * an EPC page, + * -errno on error + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section; + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + section = &sgx_epc_sections[i]; + + page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(section); + if (page) + return page; + } + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); +} + +/** + * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page + * @page: an EPC page + * + * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages. + */ +void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + int ret; + + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret)) + return; + + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list); + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); +} + static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size, unsigned long index, struct sgx_epc_section *section) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 02afa84dd8fd..bd9dcb1ffcfa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -57,4 +57,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) return section->virt_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE; } +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void); +void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); + #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:21 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901807 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DBD2C56202 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3442B22201 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="XwQqrGiZ" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727664AbgKLWCx (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:53 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:50906 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727633AbgKLWCw (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:52 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D1B8F22201; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218572; bh=ZmhXE36jtL3HtMS5ufKNwCYsk50uyD05pQfvQHhjPtA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XwQqrGiZ8FvcBpWtUgQK4Puj96Spdfn6UulQro7zxzl4yPt52jLe17aL7qRkiArta C2mc2wnK2xOIa3PEz6al5Tzo0BreT+1NKF5x1IAQc+78BHYN4nVW7Z1OroQB9G6tDX SMFU+lYa+wPnnvzOOyYpwCwzD6XPfMeaBF65TdsY= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton , Matthew Wilcox , Mel Gorman , Jethro Beekman , Dave Hansen , Jarkko Sakkinen , andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:21 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-11-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Background ========== 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in this series. 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources. For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before copying data to an executable enclave page. 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect(). This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap() or mprotect()). The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl(). This intent can be immediately compared to the source data’s mapping and rejected if necessary. The “intent” is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave can be compared with the earlier declared permissions. Problem ======= There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this permission comparison at mmap() time. However, there is no corresponding ->mprotect() hook. Solution ======== Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver. Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Mel Gorman Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 Acked-by: Dave Hansen # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Acked-by: Mel Gorman Tested-by: Dr. Greg Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg --- Changes from v40: * Move mprotect_fixup() outside of the callback. This keeps mm internals outside of the callback. include/linux/mm.h | 7 +++++++ mm/mprotect.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index db6ae4d3fb4e..1813fa86b981 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -559,6 +559,13 @@ struct vm_operations_struct { void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area); int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr); int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area); + /* + * Called by mprotect() to make driver-specific permission + * checks before mprotect() is finalised. The VMA must not + * be modified. Returns 0 if eprotect() can proceed. + */ + int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf); vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf, enum page_entry_size pe_size); diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 56c02beb6041..ab709023e9aa 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -616,9 +616,16 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end; if (tmp > end) tmp = end; + + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect) + error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp, newflags); + if (error) + goto out; + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); if (error) goto out; + nstart = tmp; if (nstart < prev->vm_end) From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:22 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901795 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B5B3C2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E300A22201 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="n5FnTwOY" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727477AbgKLWDA (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:00 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51152 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727633AbgKLWC7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:02:59 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 69DA922241; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:52 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218578; bh=yVgndefqtR/1td76lmvXOkKFH5pxkUAaxXl2DA3iKBE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=n5FnTwOYB88mzgBFAEDOnnCeGX+u6WKXcm8DKoa8gQcqS+3wFCXmWT8XdwT9AXTI1 Qerq4fV0dhzXNgwNflzs7/hm+7cNHeFboEvTgy/FTzGiEe2zXhFWe3M9TiodDFbNH7 fMfeD7MdL0eTCXrAeS2ilIbL/4jCuvu4aE0yDsQ0= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton , Matthew Wilcox , Jethro Beekman , andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX misc driver interface Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:22 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-12-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Intel(R) SGX is new hardware functionality that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data called enclaves. New hardware protects enclave code and data from outside access and modification. Add a driver that presents a device file and ioctl API to build and manage enclaves. Subsequent patches will expend the ioctl()’s functionality. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v40: * Do not check !page in sgx_encl_may_map() while iterating. * Do not check !vm_private_data in sgx_encl_find(), as the enclave is created at VFS open. Changes from v39: * Rename /dev/sgx/enclave as /dev/sgx_enclave. * In the page fault handler, do not check for SGX_ENCL_DEAD. This allows to do forensics to the memory of debug enclaves. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 16 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 60 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++- 6 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile index 79510ce01b3b..3fc451120735 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ obj-y += \ + driver.o \ + encl.o \ main.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..248213dea78e --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" + +static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl; + + encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl) + return -ENOMEM; + + xa_init(&encl->page_array); + mutex_init(&encl->lock); + + file->private_data = encl; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + unsigned long index; + + xa_for_each(&encl->page_array, index, entry) { + if (entry->epc_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + entry->epc_page = NULL; + } + + kfree(entry); + } + + xa_destroy(&encl->page_array); + + if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + } + + /* Detect EPC page leak's. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt); + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page); + + kfree(encl); + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; + int ret; + + ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + + vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO; + vma->vm_private_data = encl; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, + unsigned long pgoff, + unsigned long flags) +{ + if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE) + return -EINVAL; + + if (flags & MAP_FIXED) + return addr; + + return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); +} + +static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = sgx_open, + .release = sgx_release, + .mmap = sgx_mmap, + .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, +}; + +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_enclave", + .nodename = "sgx_enclave", + .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, +}; + +int __init sgx_drv_init(void) +{ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + return -ENODEV; + + return misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cda9c43b7543 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ +#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "sgx.h" + +int sgx_drv_init(void); + +#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..848b17a3a028 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "arch.h" +#include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" +#include "sgx.h" + +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); + if (!entry) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* + * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time + * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ, + * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags). + */ + if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* No page found. */ + if (!entry->epc_page) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* Entry successfully located. */ + return entry; +} + +static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address; + struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + unsigned long phys_addr; + struct sgx_encl *encl; + vm_fault_t ret; + + encl = vma->vm_private_data; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page); + + ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr)); + if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive + * @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive + * @vm_flags: VMA flags + * + * Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify + * that the permissions requested by a subset of {VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC} + * does not contain any permissions that are not contained in the build time + * permissions of any of the enclave pages within the given address range. + * + * An enclave creator must declare the strongest permissions that will be + * needed for each enclave page This ensures that mappings have the identical + * or weaker permissions that the earlier declared permissions. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -EACCES otherwise + */ +int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_encl_page *page; + unsigned long count = 0; + int ret = 0; + + XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start)); + + /* + * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might + * conflict with the enclave page permissions. + */ + if (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) + return -EACCES; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + xas_lock(&xas); + xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) { + if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) { + ret = -EACCES; + break; + } + + /* Reschedule on every XA_CHECK_SCHED iteration. */ + if (!(++count % XA_CHECK_SCHED)) { + xas_pause(&xas); + xas_unlock(&xas); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + cond_resched(); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + xas_lock(&xas); + } + } + xas_unlock(&xas); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return ret; +} + +static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) +{ + return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags); +} + +const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { + .fault = sgx_vma_fault, + .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect, +}; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b7e02eab5868 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/** + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + * + * Contains the software defined data structures for enclaves. + */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCL_H +#define _X86_ENCL_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "sgx.h" + +struct sgx_encl_page { + unsigned long desc; + unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_encl *encl; +}; + +struct sgx_encl { + unsigned long base; + unsigned long size; + unsigned int page_cnt; + unsigned int secs_child_cnt; + struct mutex lock; + struct xarray page_array; + struct sgx_encl_page secs; +}; + +extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops; + +static inline int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, + struct vm_area_struct **vma) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *result; + struct sgx_encl *encl; + + result = find_vma(mm, addr); + if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops || addr < result->vm_start) + return -EINVAL; + + encl = result->vm_private_data; + *vma = result; + + return 0; +} + +int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags); + +#endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 2e53afc288a4..38f2e80cc31a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; @@ -232,9 +234,10 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void) static void __init sgx_init(void) { + int ret; int i; - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) return; if (!sgx_page_cache_init()) @@ -243,8 +246,15 @@ static void __init sgx_init(void) if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init()) goto err_page_cache; + ret = sgx_drv_init(); + if (ret) + goto err_kthread; + return; +err_kthread: + kthread_stop(ksgxd_tsk); + err_page_cache: for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { vfree(sgx_epc_sections[i].pages); From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:23 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901811 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C86E3C388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65A3A22227 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="RBQIH26M" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727522AbgKLWDG (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:06 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51408 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727412AbgKLWDF (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:05 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F0FC722246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:02:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218584; bh=qsZSpefObeo4LE9BEgwkXfFlbw/Kwz2RSqZIClDHejA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RBQIH26MMLJ5OqVxJqiJtJbjXqXHymlbyvRwciw0ZuqtAl6prfg+UlcD+z4vk+vwV 4qe1pZ5YWQYE0svgZ0hWoIIqfcBjuYx1g1pgzWW52AwJfmpZanWyua/APUE+uE0zWh F7KkTyWF7yTKptGOYbRzlltTrvikWQ99T36XYxrw= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:23 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-13-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Add an ioctl() that performs ECREATE function of ENCLS instruction, which creates SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS). Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software. Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Remove sgx_validate_secs() and ECREATE do the validation. If it fails, return -EIO. .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 25 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 12 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 180 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst index 55a2d9b2ce33..a4c75a28c839 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f31bb17e27c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + */ +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H + +#include +#include + +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 + +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl + * @src: address for the SECS page data + */ +struct sgx_enclave_create { + __u64 src; +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile index 3fc451120735..91d3dc784a29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ obj-y += \ driver.o \ encl.o \ + ioctl.o \ main.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index 248213dea78e..9878b542c616 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -88,10 +88,22 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return sgx_ioctl(filep, cmd, arg); +} +#endif + static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .open = sgx_open, .release = sgx_release, + .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl, +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl, +#endif .mmap = sgx_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h index cda9c43b7543..a728e8e848bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h @@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "sgx.h" +long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); + int sgx_drv_init(void); #endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 848b17a3a028..e60c504f869f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) struct sgx_encl_page *entry; unsigned long phys_addr; struct sgx_encl *encl; + unsigned long pfn; vm_fault_t ret; encl = vma->vm_private_data; @@ -61,6 +62,13 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page); + /* Check if another thread got here first to insert the PTE. */ + if (!follow_pfn(vma, addr, &pfn)) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + } + ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr)); if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index b7e02eab5868..6ecb03c08edf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -26,9 +26,16 @@ struct sgx_encl_page { struct sgx_encl *encl; }; +enum sgx_encl_flags { + SGX_ENCL_IOCTL = BIT(0), + SGX_ENCL_DEBUG = BIT(1), + SGX_ENCL_CREATED = BIT(2), +}; + struct sgx_encl { unsigned long base; unsigned long size; + unsigned long flags; unsigned int page_cnt; unsigned int secs_child_cnt; struct mutex lock; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1355490843d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" + +static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc; + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long encl_size; + long ret; + + /* The extra page goes to SECS. */ + encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE; + + secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) + return PTR_ERR(secs_epc); + + encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc; + + pginfo.addr = 0; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs; + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + pginfo.secs = 0; + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_epc)); + if (ret) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err_out; + } + + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG) + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags); + + encl->secs.encl = encl; + encl->base = secs->base; + encl->size = secs->size; + + /* Set only after completion, as encl->lock has not been taken. */ + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags); + + return 0; + +err_out: + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_create() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE + * @encl: An enclave pointer. + * @arg: The ioctl argument. + * + * Allocate kernel data structures for the enclave and invoke ECREATE. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EIO: ECREATE failed. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; + void *secs; + int ret; + + if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&create_arg, arg, sizeof(create_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + secs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!secs) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) + ret = -EFAULT; + else + ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs); + + kfree(secs); + return ret; +} + +long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; + int ret; + + if (test_and_set_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags)) + return -EBUSY; + + switch (cmd) { + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; + default: + ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; + break; + } + + clear_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags); + return ret; +} From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:24 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901805 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2DF5C5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 993EC2223F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Qp7PqC9A" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727412AbgKLWDN (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:13 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51592 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727388AbgKLWDL (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:11 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EE6F52224D; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218590; bh=ZLTZPSBQAxvEdpfHl469lUwSAKK8Jz0t3oiUHq9tp74=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Qp7PqC9ATb0ZIkPFIIjFqbRr+qIfMYQzU3p/QKu4IX9y2gbcUN+z7J2TfTBwfweKZ 2fDe1IFtFLMUL6czGbemVVajZVnga1mgI3RDgjSGrEqh2qpd/rjd83M1zb30xEoyoL jNw3tSoV+tzNaE7c1u5BrjD6MbOl0R2PP9pmJLVU= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-14-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction. Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity. The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_ measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize. Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running. Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Remove unneeded access_ok(). It is taken care of by get_user_pages(). * Define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE to capture the block size used with EEXTEND. * When EADD or EEXTEND fail, just return -EIO. Leave the enclave cleanup as the duty of VFS and the page reclaimer. * Remove SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH, as the ioctl can be interrupted anyway. arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 30 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 284 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 315 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index f31bb17e27c3..835f7e588f0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -8,10 +8,21 @@ #include #include +/** + * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags + * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of + * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. + */ +enum sgx_page_flags { + SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01, +}; + #define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -22,4 +33,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create { __u64 src; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl + * @src: start address for the page data + * @offset: starting page offset + * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data + * @flags: page control flags + * @count: number of bytes added (multiple of the page size) + */ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { + __u64 src; + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 secinfo; + __u64 flags; + __u64 count; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 1355490843d1..82acff7bda60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -101,6 +101,287 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + return encl_page; +} + +static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) +{ + u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; + u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; + + if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means + * that we need to validate it ourselves. + */ + if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) + return -EINVAL; + + if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct page *src_page; + int ret; + + /* Deny noexec. */ + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); + if (!vma) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) + return -EACCES; + + ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL); + if (ret < 1) + return -EFAULT; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page); + + ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + + kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents); + put_page(src_page); + + return ret ? -EIO : 0; +} + +/* + * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, + * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this + * operation until the entire page is measured." + */ +static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + unsigned long offset; + int ret; + + for (offset = 0; offset < PAGE_SIZE; offset += SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), + sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page) + offset); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND"); + + return -EIO; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, + unsigned long offset, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags); + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) + return PTR_ERR(encl_page); + + epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { + kfree(encl_page); + return PTR_ERR(epc_page); + } + + mmap_read_lock(current->mm); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). + */ + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + goto err_out_unlock; + + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + src); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + + /* + * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" + * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario + * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. + */ + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + + if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) { + ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + } + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + return ret; + +err_out: + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + kfree(encl_page); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance + * + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask + * are applied to all pages. + * + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in + * the measurement. + * + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following + * heuristics: + * + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions. + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W. + * + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits + * within the given address range. + * + * The function deinitializes kernel data structures for enclave and returns + * -EIO in any of the following conditions: + * + * - Enclave Page Cache (EPC), the physical memory holding enclaves, has + * been invalidated. This will cause EADD and EEXTEND to fail. + * - If the source address is corrupted somehow when executing EADD. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EACCES: The source page is located in a noexec partition. + * - -ENOMEM: Out of EPC pages. + * - -EINTR: The call was interrupted before data was processed. + * - -EIO: Either EADD or EEXTEND failed because invalid source address + * or power cycle. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long c; + int ret; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.offset, PAGE_SIZE) || + !IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (add_arg.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (add_arg.offset + add_arg.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo, + sizeof(secinfo))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (c = 0 ; c < add_arg.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (!c) + ret = -EINTR; + + break; + } + + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c, + &secinfo, add_arg.flags); + if (ret) + break; + } + + add_arg.count = c; + + if (copy_to_user(arg, &add_arg, sizeof(add_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -113,6 +394,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index bd9dcb1ffcfa..91234f425b89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt #define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS 8 +#define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE 256 struct sgx_epc_page { unsigned int section; From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:25 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901799 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96AD8C5519F for ; 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s=default; t=1605218596; bh=Vqp4o3mMef6/0mJsmtNbNzy2NYxwOAFZioTao2+0a+k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CN6HEsLTnkIIcjvtx2DBNVe8Of08MolHHQrN5ngI3gFNyL/og6jjxLhedFuOYIAga UPGRENMYNaeDxmM0sBT8xL4Ww2VxXppJ7Kt0cxVCagJO00+BgxBer5TC2jphAZMQYu 5flxWJCItjiHthU1brDM7G9IkF1WxKixqYk8Y2RQ= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-15-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or, they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the transition from being malleable to locked-down. Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the enclave can be measured to verify its integrity. Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Declare 'k' for the MSR updating loop. It was incorrectly using 'i'. * Return -EIO instead of -EFAULT on EINIT failure, just like happens when EADD or EEXTEND fails. * When EINIT fails, just return -EIO. Leave the enclave cleanup as the duty of VFS and the page reclaimer. arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 27 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index 835f7e588f0d..66f2d32cb4d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -52,4 +54,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { __u64 count; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl + * @sigstruct: address for the SIGSTRUCT data + */ +struct sgx_enclave_init { + __u64 sigstruct; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index 9878b542c616..ef14abbb67e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ #include "driver.h" #include "encl.h" +u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~0x3; +u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; + static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct sgx_encl *encl; @@ -117,8 +121,31 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { int __init sgx_drv_init(void) { + unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + u64 attr_mask; + u64 xfrm_mask; + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) return -ENODEV; + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + if (!(eax & 1)) { + pr_err("SGX disabled: SGX1 instruction support not available.\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + + sgx_misc_reserved_mask = ~ebx | SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK; + + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + attr_mask = (((u64)ebx) << 32) + (u64)eax; + sgx_attributes_reserved_mask = ~attr_mask | SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) { + xfrm_mask = (((u64)edx) << 32) + (u64)ecx; + sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~xfrm_mask; + } + return misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h index a728e8e848bd..6b0063221659 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h @@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ #include #include "sgx.h" +#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20 + +extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask; +extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int sgx_drv_init(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 6ecb03c08edf..34088659cee6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum sgx_encl_flags { SGX_ENCL_IOCTL = BIT(0), SGX_ENCL_DEBUG = BIT(1), SGX_ENCL_CREATED = BIT(2), + SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED = BIT(3), }; struct sgx_encl { @@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ struct sgx_encl { struct mutex lock; struct xarray page_array; struct sgx_encl_page secs; + unsigned long attributes; + unsigned long attributes_mask; }; extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 82acff7bda60..e036819ea5c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) encl->secs.encl = encl; encl->base = secs->base; encl->size = secs->size; + encl->attributes = secs->attributes; + encl->attributes_mask = SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | SGX_ATTR_KSS; /* Set only after completion, as encl->lock has not been taken. */ set_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags); @@ -334,7 +336,8 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) unsigned long c; int ret; - if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags)) + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || + test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg))) @@ -382,6 +385,191 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } +static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus, + void *hash) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm); + + shash->tfm = tfm; + + return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash); +} + +static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash); + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, + void *token) +{ + u64 mrsigner[4]; + int i, j, k; + void *addr; + int ret; + + /* + * Deny initializing enclaves with attributes (namely provisioning) + * that have not been explicitly allowed. + */ + if (encl->attributes & ~encl->attributes_mask) + return -EACCES; + + /* + * Attributes should not be enforced *only* against what's available on + * platform (done in sgx_encl_create) but checked and enforced against + * the mask for enforcement in sigstruct. For example an enclave could + * opt to sign with AVX bit in xfrm, but still be loadable on a platform + * without it if the sigstruct->body.attributes_mask does not turn that + * bit on. + */ + if (sigstruct->body.attributes & sigstruct->body.attributes_mask & + sgx_attributes_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sigstruct->body.miscselect & sigstruct->body.misc_mask & + sgx_misc_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sigstruct->body.xfrm & sigstruct->body.xfrm_mask & + sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner); + if (ret) + return ret; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, + * e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, + * EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be + * serviced. + */ + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) { + addr = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + + preempt_disable(); + + for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + k, mrsigner[k]); + + ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr); + + preempt_enable(); + + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT) + continue; + else + break; + } + + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT) + break; + + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME); + + if (signal_pending(current)) { + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto err_out; + } + } + + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT"); + + ret = -EIO; + } else if (ret) { + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret); + ret = -EPERM; + } else { + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags); + } + +err_out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance + * + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EPERM: Invalid SIGSTRUCT. + * - -EIO: EINIT failed because of a power cycle. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct; + struct sgx_enclave_init init_arg; + struct page *initp_page; + void *token; + int ret; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || + test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&init_arg, arg, sizeof(init_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + initp_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initp_page) + return -ENOMEM; + + sigstruct = kmap(initp_page); + token = (void *)((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2); + memset(token, 0, SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE); + + if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)init_arg.sigstruct, + sizeof(*sigstruct))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + /* + * A legacy field used with Intel signed enclaves. These used to mean + * regular and architectural enclaves. The CPU only accepts these values + * but they do not have any other meaning. + * + * Thus, reject any other values. + */ + if (sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x0000 && + sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x8086) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, token); + +out: + kunmap(initp_page); + __free_page(initp_page); + return ret; +} + + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -397,6 +585,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:26 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901809 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1479C2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6AD3C2222F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="rKxd7ejf" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727746AbgKLWDZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:25 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51722 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727736AbgKLWDX (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:23 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E08D322246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218602; bh=Bi4QfkXjBDOdgaWCQU/fAvGSk3toJ8Fb2yNcpnwhkmI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=rKxd7ejfP3R/yz6966PdQivUQMWkwGW/pHpRD4eik1FXaHtKeO7VRtD5h8P5siJvM eoN0TV8IJYY5WOk3/uiugqsrzO78C5aFiJDhnk98BI/JtgjsBeQqoKbFS7rqURmp0X xHDOJ6XDQLF5OIaGrr5UIwqn23J80lK6JrjUDAno= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:26 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-16-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do “stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand the keys to the castle over, an enclave must often prove that it is running on an SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in providing proof. There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this happen: 1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on a single system, or even in a single application. 2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they do not exist. 3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special hardware key. They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key. Any user which can create a provisioning enclave can access the processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges. Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which permits creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more strict permissions than the plain enclave device. The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty. This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl(). Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Rename /dev/sgx/provision as /dev/sgx_provision. arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index 66f2d32cb4d7..c32210235bf5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -63,4 +65,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init { __u64 sigstruct; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_provision - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION ioctl + * @fd: file handle of /dev/sgx_provision + */ +struct sgx_enclave_provision { + __u64 fd; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index ef14abbb67e1..f618a04c4224 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, }; +const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, +}; + static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, .name = "sgx_enclave", @@ -119,11 +123,19 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, }; +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_provision", + .nodename = "sgx_provision", + .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, +}; + int __init sgx_drv_init(void) { unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; u64 attr_mask; u64 xfrm_mask; + int ret; if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) return -ENODEV; @@ -147,5 +159,15 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void) sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~xfrm_mask; } - return misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave); + ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision); + if (ret) { + misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave); + return ret; + } + + return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h index 6b0063221659..4eddb4d571ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask; extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; +extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops; + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int sgx_drv_init(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index e036819ea5c1..0ba0e670e2f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -569,6 +569,40 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION + * @enclave: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_provision instance + * + * Allow ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY for an enclave by providing a file handle to + * /dev/sgx_provision. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -errno: Otherwise. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_provision params; + struct file *file; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + file = fget(params.fd); + if (!file) + return -EINVAL; + + if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) { + fput(file); + return -EINVAL; + } + + encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY; + + fput(file); + return 0; +} long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -588,6 +622,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:27 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901813 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD9D6C2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71E732223F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="NoP3VzyT" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727781AbgKLWDb (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:31 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51820 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727778AbgKLWDa (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:30 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E2B9B22201; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218608; bh=PlgrMu8KNE1LK/nbN6CBCeWwn5etw88Ddbrkdd9IBhU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NoP3VzyTxxiLR7xt51UccSPerCXBGrBlFVI9W13zgmVXytLEqd0qmyAUT8Lpy145Y GyctJheitmqwMKFi5H0vMiy00e/fJxJaIXl2/+7W7C2LWJQw5vvCcXNKxUMdzRnC8s /zvN8lTeiM2USoOENKfO/Pbn63pLoLQtIfkemPWY= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 16/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:27 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-17-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Signals are a horrid little mechanism. They are especially nasty in multi-threaded environments because signal state like handlers is global across the entire process. But, signals are basically the only way that userspace can “gracefully” handle and recover from exceptions. The kernel generally does not like exceptions to occur during execution. But, exceptions are a fact of life and must be handled in some circumstances. The kernel handles them by keeping a list of individual instructions which may cause exceptions. Instead of truly handling the exception and returning to the instruction that caused it, the kernel instead restarts execution at a *different* instruction. This makes it obvious to that thread of execution that the exception occurred and lets *that* code handle the exception instead of the handler. This is not dissimilar to the try/catch exceptions mechanisms that some programming languages have, but applied *very* surgically to single instructions. It effectively changes the visible architecture of the instruction. Problem ======= SGX generates a lot of signals, and the code to enter and exit enclaves and muck with signal handling is truly horrid. At the same time, an approach like kernel exception fixup can not be easily applied to userspace instructions because it changes the visible instruction architecture. Solution ======== The vDSO is a special page of kernel-provided instructions that run in userspace. Any userspace calling into the vDSO knows that it is special. This allows the kernel a place to legitimately rewrite the user/kernel contract and change instruction behavior. Add support for fixing up exceptions that occur while executing in the vDSO. This replaces what could traditionally only be done with signal handling. This new mechanism will be used to replace previously direct use of SGX instructions by userspace. Just introduce the vDSO infrastructure. Later patches will actually replace signal generation with vDSO exception fixup. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 6 ++-- arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S | 9 ++++- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 5 +++ 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index 21243747965d..2ad757fb3c23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o # files to link into kernel -obj-y += vma.o +obj-y += vma.o extable.o KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y @@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y) -$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S -$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE +$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table +$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg $(call if_changed,objcopy) $(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..afcf5b65beef --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct vdso_exception_table_entry { + int insn, fixup; +}; + +bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, + unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr) +{ + const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image; + const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable; + unsigned int nr_entries, i; + unsigned long base; + + /* + * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP. It's impossible to identify + * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and + * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup. + */ + if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_DB || trapnr == X86_TRAP_BP) + return false; + + if (!current->mm->context.vdso) + return false; + + base = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso + image->extable_base; + nr_entries = image->extable_len / (sizeof(*extable)); + extable = image->extable; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) { + if (regs->ip == base + extable[i].insn) { + regs->ip = base + extable[i].fixup; + regs->di = trapnr; + regs->si = error_code; + regs->dx = fault_addr; + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b56f6b012941 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H +#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H + +/* + * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup, + * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall + * exception table, not each individual entry. + */ +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \ + ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to + +.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req + .pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long (\from) - __ex_table + .long (\to) - __ex_table + .popsection +.endm +#else +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \ + ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \ + ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".popsection\n" +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S index 4d152933547d..dc8da7695859 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S @@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS * stuff that isn't used at runtime in between. */ - .text : { *(.text*) } :text =0x90909090, + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.fixup) + } :text =0x90909090, + + .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } :text .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } :text + __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } :text + /DISCARD/ : { *(.discard) *(.discard.*) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h index 6f46e11ce539..1c7cfac7e64a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h @@ -5,6 +5,41 @@ * are built for 32-bit userspace. */ +static void BITSFUNC(copy)(FILE *outfile, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i % 10 == 0) + fprintf(outfile, "\n\t"); + fprintf(outfile, "0x%02X, ", (int)(data)[i]); + } +} + + +/* + * Extract a section from the input data into a standalone blob. Used to + * capture kernel-only data that needs to persist indefinitely, e.g. the + * exception fixup tables, but only in the kernel, i.e. the section can + * be stripped from the final vDSO image. + */ +static void BITSFUNC(extract)(const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + FILE *outfile, ELF(Shdr) *sec, const char *name) +{ + unsigned long offset; + size_t len; + + offset = (unsigned long)GET_LE(&sec->sh_offset); + len = (size_t)GET_LE(&sec->sh_size); + + if (offset + len > data_len) + fail("section to extract overruns input data"); + + fprintf(outfile, "static const unsigned char %s[%lu] = {", name, len); + BITSFUNC(copy)(outfile, data + offset, len); + fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n"); +} + static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, void *stripped_addr, size_t stripped_len, FILE *outfile, const char *image_name) @@ -15,7 +50,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, ELF(Ehdr) *hdr = (ELF(Ehdr) *)raw_addr; unsigned long i, syms_nr; ELF(Shdr) *symtab_hdr = NULL, *strtab_hdr, *secstrings_hdr, - *alt_sec = NULL; + *alt_sec = NULL, *extable_sec = NULL; ELF(Dyn) *dyn = 0, *dyn_end = 0; const char *secstrings; INT_BITS syms[NSYMS] = {}; @@ -77,6 +112,8 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name), ".altinstructions")) alt_sec = sh; + if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name), "__ex_table")) + extable_sec = sh; } if (!symtab_hdr) @@ -155,6 +192,9 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, (int)((unsigned char *)stripped_addr)[i]); } fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n"); + if (extable_sec) + BITSFUNC(extract)(raw_addr, raw_len, outfile, + extable_sec, "extable"); fprintf(outfile, "const struct vdso_image %s = {\n", image_name); fprintf(outfile, "\t.data = raw_data,\n"); @@ -165,6 +205,14 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, fprintf(outfile, "\t.alt_len = %lu,\n", (unsigned long)GET_LE(&alt_sec->sh_size)); } + if (extable_sec) { + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_base = %lu,\n", + (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_offset)); + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_len = %lu,\n", + (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_size)); + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable = extable,\n"); + } + for (i = 0; i < NSYMS; i++) { if (required_syms[i].export && syms[i]) fprintf(outfile, "\t.sym_%s = %" PRIi64 ",\n", diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h index bbcdc7b8f963..b5d23470f56b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image { unsigned long size; /* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */ unsigned long alt, alt_len; + unsigned long extable_base, extable_len; + const void *extable; long sym_vvar_start; /* Negative offset to the vvar area */ @@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image); extern int map_vdso_once(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr); +extern bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long fault_addr); #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:28 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901827 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AB83C388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3045F22246 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="XBMixRKE" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727804AbgKLWDg (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:36 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51968 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727801AbgKLWDg (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:36 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1A9EF21D7F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218615; bh=uqpHLcPZino2yEMltWpyaGARZTu7pMUqeIRcIUZbI4g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XBMixRKEVvcAe38v2xjKbIKwiYwdg0GtIBO5EnjWnvneSiqzwnobg0cCYlG/NdkzU sig5MFWbokoL4ro2mGeqz/l8QZG3wgyTq4O5kCg4NYI4K1k806LX33bB4FBo0DlGmK QAvke+LEVTgaTwQ8PPTOQnPHQlBQeazwoCkKpUXM= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 17/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:28 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-18-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson vDSO exception fixup is a replacement for signals in limited situations. Signals and vDSO exception fixup need to provide similar information to userspace, including the hardware error code. That hardware error code needs to be sanitized. For instance, if userspace accesses a kernel address, the error code could indicate to userspace whether the address had a Present=1 PTE. That can leak information about the kernel layout to userspace, which is bad. The existing signal code does this sanitization, but fairly late in the signal process. The vDSO exception code runs before the sanitization happens. Move error code sanitization out of the signal code and into a helper. Call the helper in the signal code. Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Add the missing change to the set_signal_archinfo() that removes the snippet contained in sanitize_error_code(). arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 9339fee83784..0161d4acf3ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -602,11 +602,9 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, oops_end(flags, regs, sig); } -static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, - unsigned long error_code) +static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address, + unsigned long *error_code) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - /* * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to @@ -617,7 +615,13 @@ static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, * information and does not appear to cause any problems. */ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; +} + +static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, + unsigned long error_code) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = current; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF; tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | X86_PF_USER; @@ -658,6 +662,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ @@ -806,13 +812,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (is_errata100(regs, address)) return; - /* - * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table - * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses - * are always protection faults. - */ - if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); if (likely(show_unhandled_signals)) show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk); @@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address)) return; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901825 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3F0EC388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C48522227 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="xsFIWfXb" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727816AbgKLWDn (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:43 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52052 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727554AbgKLWDm (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:42 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7418822201; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218621; bh=lLJtR/mdQCowNqyjs2YNNv1DQVf9RP/EXQXZ1D9VcIk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=xsFIWfXbERY7UtUK5bJJT0cPArkrboG02Jj+9VztyFzI9XBLXjuLCTzuk1TY4kuXz 2dzae4rxXi/ImWvmzTV1qXB9dwRU8VrK/Sfe1jeqY53K+F9w52FkQ58+uu9XkNIZkW 2lkfMIau/4B4jdj/QbCn7nYw5YpKvOZwK9U08qEM= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 18/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:29 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-19-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions, in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers. Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel should not be directly visible to userspace. Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any, will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 10 ++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index e1b78829d909..fb55981f2a0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include @@ -117,6 +118,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str, tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr; die(str, regs, error_code); + } else { + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, error_code, 0)) + return 0; } /* @@ -550,6 +554,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP; + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0)) + return; + show_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV, "", desc, regs, error_code); force_sig(SIGSEGV); goto exit; @@ -1049,6 +1056,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) if (!si_code) goto exit; + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, 0, 0)) + return; + force_sig_fault(SIGFPE, si_code, (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs)); exit: diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 0161d4acf3ad..f1f1b5a0956a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include /* exception stack */ #include /* VMALLOC_START, ... */ #include /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ +#include /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include @@ -814,6 +815,9 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) + return; + if (likely(show_unhandled_signals)) show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk); @@ -933,6 +937,9 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) + return; + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:30 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901833 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B4F1C388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E357E22227 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="F0r4WBX9" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727828AbgKLWDt (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:49 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52122 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727554AbgKLWDt (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:49 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9FEE022246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218627; bh=gC6g9+xqelSAfv4MR4556VT7IU8Bmu5wsRm9z6FXalM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=F0r4WBX9rAh4Je4cQAxYPFaFkFfWZjFBXr3Ho3ZLy51zrBn46IVIpE655HU8oXg1/ VxuGBIgiuNmx21wfouVxcpZZFE3jsb2kbp9rg7rIatmGWfaGTfVxj85/p7n7Bn2TqC ImQF7HB8yRxu6qlpkwol5yxOqM9ShLVmdJOwz4gA= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , Cedric Xing , Jarkko Sakkinen , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 19/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:30 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be “proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave. In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is virtually always implemented inside a shared library. The runtime helps build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle. The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers, registered by the library. But, being process-wide, shared state, signal handling and shared libraries do not mix well. Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions (EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime. Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a user-provided callback at the time of the exception. The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX, R8 and R9 registers. This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and the runtime. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Relaid out the user handler documentation: return values are described in sgx_enclave_user_handler_t keneldoc and broad description is given in struct sgx_enclave_run kerneldoc. * Renamed @leaf as @function, given that we want to speak consistently about ENCLS and ENCLU functions. * Reorder user_handler and user_data as the last fields in sgx_enclave_run, as they are an extension to the basic functionality. arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 91 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 254 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index 2ad757fb3c23..9915fbd34264 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o +vobjs-$(VDSO64-y) += vsgx.o # files to link into kernel obj-y += vma.o extable.o @@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data. diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S index 36b644e16272..4bf48462fca7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION { __vdso_time; clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; + __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; local: *; }; } diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..86a0e94f68df --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "extable.h" + +/* Relative to %rbp. */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN 16 + +/* The offsets relative to struct sgx_enclave_run. */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_TCS 0 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF 8 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_VECTOR 12 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE 14 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ADDR 16 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER 24 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_DATA 32 /* not used */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_START 40 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_END 256 + +.code64 +.section .text, "ax" + +SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave) + /* Prolog */ + .cfi_startproc + push %rbp + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %rbp, 0 + mov %rsp, %rbp + .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp + push %rbx + .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, -8 + + mov %ecx, %eax +.Lenter_enclave: + /* EENTER <= function <= ERESUME */ + cmp $EENTER, %eax + jb .Linvalid_input + cmp $ERESUME, %eax + ja .Linvalid_input + + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rcx + + /* Validate that the reserved area contains only zeros. */ + mov $SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_START, %rbx +1: + cmpq $0, (%rcx, %rbx) + jne .Linvalid_input + add $8, %rbx + cmpq $SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_END, %rbx + jne 1b + + /* Load TCS and AEP */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_TCS(%rcx), %rbx + lea .Lasync_exit_pointer(%rip), %rcx + + /* Single ENCLU serving as both EENTER and AEP (ERESUME) */ +.Lasync_exit_pointer: +.Lenclu_eenter_eresume: + enclu + + /* EEXIT jumps here unless the enclave is doing something fancy. */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx + + /* Set exit_reason. */ + movl $EEXIT, SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF(%rbx) + + /* Invoke userspace's exit handler if one was provided. */ +.Lhandle_exit: + cmpq $0, SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER(%rbx) + jne .Linvoke_userspace_handler + + /* Success, in the sense that ENCLU was attempted. */ + xor %eax, %eax + +.Lout: + pop %rbx + leave + .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8 + ret + + /* The out-of-line code runs with the pre-leave stack frame. */ + .cfi_def_cfa %rbp, 16 + +.Linvalid_input: + mov $(-EINVAL), %eax + jmp .Lout + +.Lhandle_exception: + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx + + /* Set the exception info. */ + mov %eax, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF)(%rbx) + mov %di, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_VECTOR)(%rbx) + mov %si, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE)(%rbx) + mov %rdx, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ADDR)(%rbx) + jmp .Lhandle_exit + +.Linvoke_userspace_handler: + /* Pass the untrusted RSP (at exit) to the callback via %rcx. */ + mov %rsp, %rcx + + /* Save struct sgx_enclave_exception %rbx is about to be clobbered. */ + mov %rbx, %rax + + /* Save the untrusted RSP offset in %rbx (non-volatile register). */ + mov %rsp, %rbx + and $0xf, %rbx + + /* + * Align stack per x86_64 ABI. Note, %rsp needs to be 16-byte aligned + * _after_ pushing the parameters on the stack, hence the bonus push. + */ + and $-0x10, %rsp + push %rax + + /* Push struct sgx_enclave_exception as a param to the callback. */ + push %rax + + /* Clear RFLAGS.DF per x86_64 ABI */ + cld + + /* + * Load the callback pointer to %rax and lfence for LVI (load value + * injection) protection before making the call. + */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER(%rax), %rax + lfence + call *%rax + + /* Undo the post-exit %rsp adjustment. */ + lea 0x10(%rsp, %rbx), %rsp + + /* + * If the return from callback is zero or negative, return immediately, + * else re-execute ENCLU with the postive return value interpreted as + * the requested ENCLU function. + */ + cmp $0, %eax + jle .Lout + jmp .Lenter_enclave + + .cfi_endproc + +_ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(.Lenclu_eenter_eresume, .Lhandle_exception) + +SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1314e41a744 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H +#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H + +#define EENTER 0x02 +#define ERESUME 0x03 +#define EEXIT 0x04 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index c32210235bf5..791e45334a4a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -74,4 +74,95 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision { __u64 fd; }; +struct sgx_enclave_run; + +/** + * typedef sgx_enclave_user_handler_t - Exit handler function accepted by + * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() + * @run: The run instance given by the caller + * + * The register parameters contain the snapshot of their values at enclave + * exit. An invalid ENCLU function number will cause -EINVAL to be returned + * to the caller. + * + * Return: + * - <= 0: The given value is returned back to the caller. + * - > 0: ENCLU function to invoke, either EENTER or ERESUME. + */ +typedef int (*sgx_enclave_user_handler_t)(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, + long rsp, long r8, long r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_run - the execution context of __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() + * @tcs: TCS used to enter the enclave + * @function: The last seen ENCLU function (EENTER, ERESUME or EEXIT) + * @exception_vector: The interrupt vector of the exception + * @exception_error_code: The exception error code pulled out of the stack + * @exception_addr: The address that triggered the exception + * @user_handler: User provided callback run on exception + * @user_data: Data passed to the user handler + * @reserved Reserved for future extensions + * + * If @user_handler is provided, the handler will be invoked on all return paths + * of the normal flow. The user handler may transfer control, e.g. via a + * longjmp() call or a C++ exception, without returning to + * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(). + */ +struct sgx_enclave_run { + __u64 tcs; + __u32 function; + __u16 exception_vector; + __u16 exception_error_code; + __u64 exception_addr; + __u64 user_handler; + __u64 user_data; + __u8 reserved[216]; +}; + +/** + * typedef vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t - Prototype for __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(), + * a vDSO function to enter an SGX enclave. + * @rdi: Pass-through value for RDI + * @rsi: Pass-through value for RSI + * @rdx: Pass-through value for RDX + * @function: ENCLU function, must be EENTER or ERESUME + * @r8: Pass-through value for R8 + * @r9: Pass-through value for R9 + * @run: struct sgx_enclave_run, must be non-NULL + * + * NOTE: __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() does not ensure full compliance with the + * x86-64 ABI, e.g. doesn't handle XSAVE state. Except for non-volatile + * general purpose registers, EFLAGS.DF, and RSP alignment, preserving/setting + * state in accordance with the x86-64 ABI is the responsibility of the enclave + * and its runtime, i.e. __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() cannot be called from C + * code without careful consideration by both the enclave and its runtime. + * + * All general purpose registers except RAX, RBX and RCX are passed as-is to the + * enclave. RAX, RBX and RCX are consumed by EENTER and ERESUME and are loaded + * with @function, asynchronous exit pointer, and @run.tcs respectively. + * + * RBP and the stack are used to anchor __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to the + * pre-enclave state, e.g. to retrieve @run.exception and @run.user_handler + * after an enclave exit. All other registers are available for use by the + * enclave and its runtime, e.g. an enclave can push additional data onto the + * stack (and modify RSP) to pass information to the optional user handler (see + * below). + * + * Most exceptions reported on ENCLU, including those that occur within the + * enclave, are fixed up and reported synchronously instead of being delivered + * via a standard signal. Debug Exceptions (#DB) and Breakpoints (#BP) are + * never fixed up and are always delivered via standard signals. On synchrously + * reported exceptions, -EFAULT is returned and details about the exception are + * recorded in @run.exception, the optional sgx_enclave_exception struct. + * + * Return: + * - 0: ENCLU function was successfully executed. + * - -EINVAL: Invalid ENCL number (neither EENTER nor ERESUME). + */ +typedef int (*vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t)(unsigned long rdi, unsigned long rsi, + unsigned long rdx, unsigned int function, + unsigned long r8, unsigned long r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:31 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901829 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24552C2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFEA42224A for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="bwBcEzgO" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727736AbgKLWD5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:57 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52210 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727257AbgKLWD4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:03:56 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3661821D7F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218634; bh=iVcKPINN3ODOn+JmuN8v9vTYV42/EIKxkl9ClcRBEH4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=bwBcEzgOi1H9M4NdxaVL6zuPJlN1UcFsv7Gsd6RXggvZP20QC/iLIA3tnlHG2vebd QRVIzqYPE6aofugp5fjNlbj3tZVaM1mkhGWZhWrt81XF8O6e1gCkba/JPetTLewiEI jDdfooEuGuJ08ljMJIJD9LJWesmwE0/VFuckOjMg= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 20/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-21-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations, but ensures that all SGX hardware and software infrastructure is functioning. Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v40: * Remove $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf from TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS, as otherwise run_tests tries to execute it. Add it as a build dependency. * Use the correct device path, /dev/sgx_enclave, instead of /dev/sgx/enclave. * Return kselftest framework expected return codes. tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 +++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 44 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 277 +++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 246 +++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 391 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 ++ .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++++ 12 files changed, 1222 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index d9c283503159..aa06e3ea0250 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ TARGETS += user TARGETS += vm TARGETS += x86 TARGETS += zram +TARGETS += sgx #Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted # Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or # "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fbaf0bda9a92 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +test_sgx +test_encl.elf diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d51c90663943 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +top_srcdir = ../../../.. + +include ../lib.mk + +.PHONY: all clean + +CAN_BUILD_X86_64 := $(shell ../x86/check_cc.sh $(CC) \ + ../x86/trivial_64bit_program.c) + +ifndef OBJCOPY +OBJCOPY := $(CROSS_COMPILE)objcopy +endif + +INCLUDES := -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include +HOST_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -g $(INCLUDES) -fPIC -z noexecstack +ENCL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -static -nostdlib -nostartfiles -fPIC \ + -fno-stack-protector -mrdrnd $(INCLUDES) + +TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx + +ifeq ($(CAN_BUILD_X86_64), 1) +all: $(TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS) $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf +endif + +$(OUTPUT)/test_sgx: $(OUTPUT)/main.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/load.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/call.o + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lcrypto + +$(OUTPUT)/main.o: main.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/load.o: load.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o: sigstruct.c + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/call.o: call.S + $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf: test_encl.lds test_encl.c test_encl_bootstrap.S + $(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@ + +EXTRA_CLEAN := \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf \ + $(OUTPUT)/load.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/call.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/main.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx \ + $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx.o \ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4ecadc7490f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/** +* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. +*/ + + .text + + .global sgx_call_vdso +sgx_call_vdso: + .cfi_startproc + push %r15 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r15, 0 + push %r14 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r14, 0 + push %r13 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r13, 0 + push %r12 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %r12, 0 + push %rbx + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, 0 + push $0 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + push 0x38(%rsp) + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + call *eenter(%rip) + add $0x10, %rsp + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -0x10 + pop %rbx + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r12 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r13 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r14 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + pop %r15 + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8 + ret + .cfi_endproc diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..592c1ccf4576 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + */ + +#ifndef DEFINES_H +#define DEFINES_H + +#include + +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096 +#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + +#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) + +#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h" + +#endif /* DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07988de6b767 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" + +void encl_delete(struct encl *encl) +{ + if (encl->encl_base) + munmap((void *)encl->encl_base, encl->encl_size); + + if (encl->bin) + munmap(encl->bin, encl->bin_size); + + if (encl->fd) + close(encl->fd); + + if (encl->segment_tbl) + free(encl->segment_tbl); + + memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl)); +} + +static bool encl_map_bin(const char *path, struct encl *encl) +{ + struct stat sb; + void *bin; + int ret; + int fd; + + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) { + perror("open()"); + return false; + } + + ret = stat(path, &sb); + if (ret) { + perror("stat()"); + goto err; + } + + bin = mmap(NULL, sb.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); + if (bin == MAP_FAILED) { + perror("mmap()"); + goto err; + } + + encl->bin = bin; + encl->bin_size = sb.st_size; + + close(fd); + return true; + +err: + close(fd); + return false; +} + +static bool encl_ioc_create(struct encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_secs *secs = &encl->secs; + struct sgx_enclave_create ioc; + int rc; + + assert(encl->encl_base != 0); + + memset(secs, 0, sizeof(*secs)); + secs->ssa_frame_size = 1; + secs->attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT; + secs->xfrm = 3; + secs->base = encl->encl_base; + secs->size = encl->encl_size; + + ioc.src = (unsigned long)secs; + rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioc); + if (rc) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE failed: errno=%d\n", + errno); + munmap((void *)secs->base, encl->encl_size); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages ioc; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + int rc; + + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + secinfo.flags = seg->flags; + + ioc.src = (uint64_t)encl->src + seg->offset; + ioc.offset = seg->offset; + ioc.length = seg->size; + ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE; + + rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, &ioc); + if (rc < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES failed: errno=%d.\n", + errno); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl) +{ + Elf64_Phdr *phdr_tbl; + off_t src_offset; + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr; + int i, j; + int ret; + + memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl)); + + ret = open("/dev/sgx_enclave", O_RDWR); + if (ret < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open /dev/sgx_enclave\n"); + goto err; + } + + encl->fd = ret; + + if (!encl_map_bin(path, encl)) + goto err; + + ehdr = encl->bin; + phdr_tbl = encl->bin + ehdr->e_phoff; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { + Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i]; + + if (phdr->p_type == PT_LOAD) + encl->nr_segments++; + } + + encl->segment_tbl = calloc(encl->nr_segments, + sizeof(struct encl_segment)); + if (!encl->segment_tbl) + goto err; + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) { + Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i]; + unsigned int flags = phdr->p_flags; + struct encl_segment *seg; + + if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD) + continue; + + seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j]; + + if (!!(flags & ~(PF_R | PF_W | PF_X))) { + fprintf(stderr, + "%d has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", i, + phdr->p_flags); + goto err; + } + + if (j == 0 && flags != (PF_R | PF_W)) { + fprintf(stderr, + "TCS has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", + phdr->p_flags); + goto err; + } + + if (j == 0) { + src_offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset; + + seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + seg->flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8; + } else { + seg->prot = (phdr->p_flags & PF_R) ? PROT_READ : 0; + seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_W) ? PROT_WRITE : 0; + seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) ? PROT_EXEC : 0; + seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot; + } + + seg->offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset; + seg->size = (phdr->p_filesz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK; + + printf("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x\n", seg->offset, seg->size, + seg->prot); + + j++; + } + + assert(j == encl->nr_segments); + + encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset; + encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset + + encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size; + + for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; ) + encl->encl_size <<= 1; + + return true; + +err: + encl_delete(encl); + return false; +} + +static bool encl_map_area(struct encl *encl) +{ + size_t encl_size = encl->encl_size; + void *area; + + area = mmap(NULL, encl_size * 2, PROT_NONE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + if (area == MAP_FAILED) { + perror("mmap"); + return false; + } + + encl->encl_base = ((uint64_t)area + encl_size - 1) & ~(encl_size - 1); + + munmap(area, encl->encl_base - (uint64_t)area); + munmap((void *)(encl->encl_base + encl_size), + (uint64_t)area + encl_size - encl->encl_base); + + return true; +} + +bool encl_build(struct encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_init ioc; + int ret; + int i; + + if (!encl_map_area(encl)) + return false; + + if (!encl_ioc_create(encl)) + return false; + + /* + * Pages must be added before mapping VMAs because their permissions + * cap the VMA permissions. + */ + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (!encl_ioc_add_pages(encl, seg)) + return false; + } + + ioc.sigstruct = (uint64_t)&encl->sigstruct; + ret = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioc); + if (ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT failed: errno=%d\n", + errno); + return false; + } + + return true; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1839fcab4701 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "../kselftest.h" + +static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL; +vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t eenter; + +struct vdso_symtab { + Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab; + const char *elf_symstrtab; + Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab; +}; + +static void *vdso_get_base_addr(char *envp[]) +{ + Elf64_auxv_t *auxv; + int i; + + for (i = 0; envp[i]; i++) + ; + + auxv = (Elf64_auxv_t *)&envp[i + 1]; + + for (i = 0; auxv[i].a_type != AT_NULL; i++) { + if (auxv[i].a_type == AT_SYSINFO_EHDR) + return (void *)auxv[i].a_un.a_val; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr) +{ + Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr; + Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) + if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) + return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset; + + return NULL; +} + +static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++) + if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag) + return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr; + + return NULL; +} + +static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab) +{ + Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr); + + symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB); + if (!symtab->elf_symtab) + return false; + + symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB); + if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab) + return false; + + symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH); + if (!symtab->elf_hashtab) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name) +{ + unsigned long h = 0, high; + + while (*name) { + h = (h << 4) + *name++; + high = h & 0xf0000000; + + if (high) + h ^= high >> 24; + + h &= ~high; + } + + return h; +} + +static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name) +{ + Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0]; + Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2]; + Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum]; + Elf64_Sym *sym; + Elf64_Word i; + + for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF; + i = chaintab[i]) { + sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i]; + if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name])) + return sym; + } + + return NULL; +} + +bool report_results(struct sgx_enclave_run *run, int ret, uint64_t result, + const char *test) +{ + bool valid = true; + + if (ret) { + printf("FAIL: %s() returned: %d\n", test, ret); + valid = false; + } + + if (run->function != EEXIT) { + printf("FAIL: %s() function, expected: %u, got: %u\n", test, EEXIT, + run->function); + valid = false; + } + + if (result != MAGIC) { + printf("FAIL: %s(), expected: 0x%lx, got: 0x%lx\n", test, MAGIC, + result); + valid = false; + } + + if (run->user_data) { + printf("FAIL: %s() user data, expected: 0x0, got: 0x%llx\n", + test, run->user_data); + valid = false; + } + + return valid; +} + +static int user_handler(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, long ursp, long r8, long r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run) +{ + run->user_data = 0; + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_run run; + struct vdso_symtab symtab; + Elf64_Sym *eenter_sym; + uint64_t result = 0; + struct encl encl; + unsigned int i; + void *addr; + int ret; + + memset(&run, 0, sizeof(run)); + + if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", &encl)) { + encl_delete(&encl); + ksft_exit_skip("cannot load enclaves\n"); + } + + if (!encl_measure(&encl)) + goto err; + + if (!encl_build(&encl)) + goto err; + + /* + * An enclave consumer only must do this. + */ + for (i = 0; i < encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + addr = mmap((void *)encl.encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size, + seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl.fd, 0); + if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { + fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed, errno=%d.\n", errno); + exit(1); + } + } + + memset(&run, 0, sizeof(run)); + run.tcs = encl.encl_base; + + addr = vdso_get_base_addr(envp); + if (!addr) + goto err; + + if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab)) + goto err; + + eenter_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave"); + if (!eenter_sym) + goto err; + + eenter = addr + eenter_sym->st_value; + + ret = sgx_call_vdso((void *)&MAGIC, &result, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL, &run); + if (!report_results(&run, ret, result, "sgx_call_vdso")) + goto err; + + + /* Invoke the vDSO directly. */ + result = 0; + ret = eenter((unsigned long)&MAGIC, (unsigned long)&result, 0, EENTER, + 0, 0, &run); + if (!report_results(&run, ret, result, "eenter")) + goto err; + + /* And with an exit handler. */ + run.user_handler = (__u64)user_handler; + run.user_data = 0xdeadbeef; + ret = eenter((unsigned long)&MAGIC, (unsigned long)&result, 0, EENTER, + 0, 0, &run); + if (!report_results(&run, ret, result, "user_handler")) + goto err; + + printf("SUCCESS\n"); + encl_delete(&encl); + exit(KSFT_PASS); + +err: + encl_delete(&encl); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45e6ab65442a --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + */ + +#ifndef MAIN_H +#define MAIN_H + +struct encl_segment { + off_t offset; + size_t size; + unsigned int prot; + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct encl { + int fd; + void *bin; + off_t bin_size; + void *src; + size_t src_size; + size_t encl_size; + off_t encl_base; + unsigned int nr_segments; + struct encl_segment *segment_tbl; + struct sgx_secs secs; + struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct; +}; + +void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx); +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl); +bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl); +bool encl_build(struct encl *encl); + +int sgx_call_vdso(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 function, void *r8, void *r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +#endif /* MAIN_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc06f108bae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c @@ -0,0 +1,391 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "defines.h" +#include "main.h" + +struct q1q2_ctx { + BN_CTX *bn_ctx; + BIGNUM *m; + BIGNUM *s; + BIGNUM *q1; + BIGNUM *qr; + BIGNUM *q2; +}; + +static void free_q1q2_ctx(struct q1q2_ctx *ctx) +{ + BN_CTX_free(ctx->bn_ctx); + BN_free(ctx->m); + BN_free(ctx->s); + BN_free(ctx->q1); + BN_free(ctx->qr); + BN_free(ctx->q2); +} + +static bool alloc_q1q2_ctx(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, + struct q1q2_ctx *ctx) +{ + ctx->bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + ctx->s = BN_bin2bn(s, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL); + ctx->m = BN_bin2bn(m, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL); + ctx->q1 = BN_new(); + ctx->qr = BN_new(); + ctx->q2 = BN_new(); + + if (!ctx->bn_ctx || !ctx->s || !ctx->m || !ctx->q1 || !ctx->qr || + !ctx->q2) { + free_q1q2_ctx(ctx); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool calc_q1q2(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, uint8_t *q1, + uint8_t *q2) +{ + struct q1q2_ctx ctx; + + if (!alloc_q1q2_ctx(s, m, &ctx)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Not enough memory for Q1Q2 calculation\n"); + return false; + } + + if (!BN_mul(ctx.q1, ctx.s, ctx.s, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (!BN_div(ctx.q1, ctx.qr, ctx.q1, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q1 %d bytes\n", + BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1)); + goto out; + } + + if (!BN_mul(ctx.q2, ctx.s, ctx.qr, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (!BN_div(ctx.q2, NULL, ctx.q2, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx)) + goto out; + + if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q2 %d bytes\n", + BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2)); + goto out; + } + + BN_bn2bin(ctx.q1, q1); + BN_bn2bin(ctx.q2, q2); + + free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx); + return true; +out: + free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx); + return false; +} + +struct sgx_sigstruct_payload { + struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; + struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; +}; + +static bool check_crypto_errors(void) +{ + int err; + bool had_errors = false; + const char *filename; + int line; + char str[256]; + + for ( ; ; ) { + if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) + break; + + had_errors = true; + err = ERR_get_error_line(&filename, &line); + ERR_error_string_n(err, str, sizeof(str)); + fprintf(stderr, "crypto: %s: %s:%d\n", str, filename, line); + } + + return had_errors; +} + +static inline const BIGNUM *get_modulus(RSA *key) +{ + const BIGNUM *n; + + RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL); + return n; +} + +static RSA *gen_sign_key(void) +{ + BIGNUM *e; + RSA *key; + int ret; + + e = BN_new(); + key = RSA_new(); + + if (!e || !key) + goto err; + + ret = BN_set_word(e, RSA_3); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + + ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(key, 3072, e, NULL); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + + BN_free(e); + + return key; + +err: + RSA_free(key); + BN_free(e); + + return NULL; +} + +static void reverse_bytes(void *data, int length) +{ + int i = 0; + int j = length - 1; + uint8_t temp; + uint8_t *ptr = data; + + while (i < j) { + temp = ptr[i]; + ptr[i] = ptr[j]; + ptr[j] = temp; + i++; + j--; + } +} + +enum mrtags { + MRECREATE = 0x0045544145524345, + MREADD = 0x0000000044444145, + MREEXTEND = 0x00444E4554584545, +}; + +static bool mrenclave_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data) +{ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, 64)) { + fprintf(stderr, "digest update failed\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool mrenclave_commit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *mrenclave) +{ + unsigned int size; + + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)mrenclave, &size)) { + fprintf(stderr, "digest commit failed\n"); + return false; + } + + if (size != 32) { + fprintf(stderr, "invalid digest size = %u\n", size); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +struct mrecreate { + uint64_t tag; + uint32_t ssaframesize; + uint64_t size; + uint8_t reserved[44]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + + +static bool mrenclave_ecreate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t blob_size) +{ + struct mrecreate mrecreate; + uint64_t encl_size; + + for (encl_size = 0x1000; encl_size < blob_size; ) + encl_size <<= 1; + + memset(&mrecreate, 0, sizeof(mrecreate)); + mrecreate.tag = MRECREATE; + mrecreate.ssaframesize = 1; + mrecreate.size = encl_size; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) + return false; + + return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mrecreate); +} + +struct mreadd { + uint64_t tag; + uint64_t offset; + uint64_t flags; /* SECINFO flags */ + uint8_t reserved[40]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + +static bool mrenclave_eadd(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, uint64_t flags) +{ + struct mreadd mreadd; + + memset(&mreadd, 0, sizeof(mreadd)); + mreadd.tag = MREADD; + mreadd.offset = offset; + mreadd.flags = flags; + + return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreadd); +} + +struct mreextend { + uint64_t tag; + uint64_t offset; + uint8_t reserved[48]; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + +static bool mrenclave_eextend(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, + const uint8_t *data) +{ + struct mreextend mreextend; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 0x1000; i += 0x100) { + memset(&mreextend, 0, sizeof(mreextend)); + mreextend.tag = MREEXTEND; + mreextend.offset = offset + i; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreextend)) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x00])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x40])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x80])) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0xC0])) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool mrenclave_segment(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, struct encl *encl, + struct encl_segment *seg) +{ + uint64_t end = seg->offset + seg->size; + uint64_t offset; + + for (offset = seg->offset; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, offset, seg->flags)) + return false; + + if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, offset, encl->src + offset)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl) +{ + uint64_t header1[2] = {0x000000E100000006, 0x0000000000010000}; + uint64_t header2[2] = {0x0000006000000101, 0x0000000100000060}; + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct = &encl->sigstruct; + struct sgx_sigstruct_payload payload; + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned int siglen; + RSA *key = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; + int i; + + memset(sigstruct, 0, sizeof(*sigstruct)); + + sigstruct->header.header1[0] = header1[0]; + sigstruct->header.header1[1] = header1[1]; + sigstruct->header.header2[0] = header2[0]; + sigstruct->header.header2[1] = header2[1]; + sigstruct->exponent = 3; + sigstruct->body.attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT; + sigstruct->body.xfrm = 3; + + /* sanity check */ + if (check_crypto_errors()) + goto err; + + key = gen_sign_key(); + if (!key) + goto err; + + BN_bn2bin(get_modulus(key), sigstruct->modulus); + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (!ctx) + goto err; + + if (!mrenclave_ecreate(ctx, encl->src_size)) + goto err; + + for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i]; + + if (!mrenclave_segment(ctx, encl, seg)) + goto err; + } + + if (!mrenclave_commit(ctx, sigstruct->body.mrenclave)) + goto err; + + memcpy(&payload.header, &sigstruct->header, sizeof(sigstruct->header)); + memcpy(&payload.body, &sigstruct->body, sizeof(sigstruct->body)); + + SHA256((unsigned char *)&payload, sizeof(payload), digest); + + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sigstruct->signature, &siglen, key)) + goto err; + + if (!calc_q1q2(sigstruct->signature, sigstruct->modulus, sigstruct->q1, + sigstruct->q2)) + goto err; + + /* BE -> LE */ + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->signature, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q1, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + reverse_bytes(sigstruct->q2, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE); + + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + RSA_free(key); + return true; + +err: + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + RSA_free(key); + return false; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cf25b5dc1e03 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include "defines.h" + +static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i]; + + return dest; +} + +void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi) +{ + memcpy(rsi, rdi, 8); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0fbbda7e665e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64) + +PHDRS +{ + tcs PT_LOAD; + text PT_LOAD; + data PT_LOAD; +} + +SECTIONS +{ + . = 0; + .tcs : { + *(.tcs*) + } : tcs + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.rodata*) + } : text + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .data : { + *(.data*) + } : data + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.comment*) + *(.note*) + *(.debug*) + *(.eh_frame*) + } +} + +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves") diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5d5680d4ea39 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + */ + + .macro ENCLU + .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7 + .endm + + .section ".tcs", "aw" + .balign 4096 + + .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS + .quad encl_ssa # OSSA + .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA + .quad encl_entry # OENTRY + .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT + .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved + + # Identical to the previous TCS. + .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS + .quad encl_ssa # OSSA + .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU) + .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA + .quad encl_entry # OENTRY + .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME) + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE + .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT + .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT + .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved + + .text + +encl_entry: + # RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is also the first address + # inside the enclave. By adding the value of le_stack_end to it, we get + # the absolute address for the stack. + lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax + xchg %rsp, %rax + push %rax + + push %rcx # push the address after EENTER + push %rbx # push the enclave base address + + call encl_body + + pop %rbx # pop the enclave base address + + /* Clear volatile GPRs, except RAX (EEXIT function). */ + xor %rcx, %rcx + xor %rdx, %rdx + xor %rdi, %rdi + xor %rsi, %rsi + xor %r8, %r8 + xor %r9, %r9 + xor %r10, %r10 + xor %r11, %r11 + + # Reset status flags. + add %rdx, %rdx # OF = SF = AF = CF = 0; ZF = PF = 1 + + # Prepare EEXIT target by popping the address of the instruction after + # EENTER to RBX. + pop %rbx + + # Restore the caller stack. + pop %rax + mov %rax, %rsp + + # EEXIT + mov $4, %rax + enclu + + .section ".data", "aw" + +encl_ssa: + .space 4096 + + .balign 4096 + .space 8192 +encl_stack: From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:32 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901831 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D50DCC5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6745B22201 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="nLJH2WnB" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727412AbgKLWEF (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:05 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52304 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727431AbgKLWED (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:03 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C204B2223F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:03:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218640; bh=gjuqWOnqGEYIQJXeukv3AKqNfRgYOpupf7+LoNRUjmU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=nLJH2WnBuNzNQjOFyThmGJBYNIisQzWQCbEImpQncYmbTXuzOobB5H/Z9lYhvnowg AuxNX7D0zN4ZD1bnAmeh/yQ+jaX+FQmt//c0YYg4Z+tLUem1CMnlCHRY+geYOEAYgF yCy9VvlCTqNMbFQmX1dyoW/mTiL0+UNNEfGDwz8I= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Hillf Danton , linux-mm@kvack.org, Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 21/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:32 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits on this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Cc: Hillf Danton Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Remove SGX_ENCL_DEAD checks from the page reclaimer. They are no longer needed as enclave contents are deleted only when it is released. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 59 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 483 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 51 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 89 +++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 466 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 13 + 6 files changed, 1134 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index f618a04c4224..f2eac41bb4ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -17,13 +17,24 @@ u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct sgx_encl *encl; + int ret; encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL); if (!encl) return -ENOMEM; + kref_init(&encl->refcount); xa_init(&encl->page_array); mutex_init(&encl->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->va_pages); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list); + spin_lock_init(&encl->mm_lock); + + ret = init_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu); + if (ret) { + kfree(encl); + return ret; + } file->private_data = encl; @@ -33,31 +44,37 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; - struct sgx_encl_page *entry; - unsigned long index; - - xa_for_each(&encl->page_array, index, entry) { - if (entry->epc_page) { - sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); - encl->secs_child_cnt--; - entry->epc_page = NULL; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + + /* + * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains + * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have + * not exited yet. The processes, which have exited, are gone from the + * list by sgx_mmu_notifier_release(). + */ + for ( ; ; ) { + spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock); + + if (list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) { + encl_mm = NULL; + } else { + encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list, + struct sgx_encl_mm, list); + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list); } - kfree(entry); - } + spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock); - xa_destroy(&encl->page_array); + /* The enclave is no longer mapped by any mm. */ + if (!encl_mm) + break; - if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) { - sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); - encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu); + mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, encl_mm->mm); + kfree(encl_mm); } - /* Detect EPC page leak's. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt); - WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page); - - kfree(encl); + kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); return 0; } @@ -70,6 +87,10 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (ret) return ret; + ret = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm); + if (ret) + return ret; + vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops; vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO; vma->vm_private_data = encl; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index e60c504f869f..141424657718 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -12,11 +12,90 @@ #include "encls.h" #include "sgx.h" +/* + * ELDU: Load an EPC page as unblocked. For more info, see "OS Management of EPC + * Pages" in the SDM. + */ +static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page) +{ + unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct sgx_backing b; + pgoff_t page_index; + int ret; + + if (secs_page) + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base); + else + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size); + + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, &b); + if (ret) + return ret; + + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.contents); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.pcmd) + + b.pcmd_offset; + + if (secs_page) + pginfo.secs = (u64)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_page); + else + pginfo.secs = 0; + + ret = __eldu(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), + sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl_page->va_page->epc_page) + va_offset); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ELDU"); + + ret = -EFAULT; + } + + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata - b.pcmd_offset)); + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents); + + sgx_encl_put_backing(&b, false); + + return ret; +} + +static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page) +{ + + unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return epc_page; + + ret = __sgx_encl_eldu(encl_page, epc_page, secs_page); + if (ret) { + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + sgx_free_va_slot(encl_page->va_page, va_offset); + list_move(&encl_page->va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + + return epc_page; +} + static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, unsigned long vm_flags) { unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; struct sgx_encl_page *entry; entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); @@ -31,11 +110,27 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits) return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); - /* No page found. */ - if (!entry->epc_page) - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); - /* Entry successfully located. */ + if (entry->epc_page) { + if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED) + return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + + return entry; + } + + if (!(encl->secs.epc_page)) { + epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(&encl->secs, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + } + + epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(entry, encl->secs.epc_page); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page); + return entry; } @@ -51,12 +146,23 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) encl = vma->vm_private_data; + /* + * It's very unlikely but possible that allocating memory for the + * mm_list entry of a forked process failed in sgx_vma_open(). When + * this happens, vm_private_data is set to NULL. + */ + if (unlikely(!encl)) + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); if (IS_ERR(entry)) { mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + if (PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY) + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; } @@ -76,11 +182,29 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; } + sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(vma->vm_mm, entry); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; } +static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data; + + /* + * It's possible but unlikely that vm_private_data is NULL. This can + * happen in a grandchild of a process, when sgx_encl_mm_add() had + * failed to allocate memory in this callback. + */ + if (unlikely(!encl)) + return; + + if (sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm)) + vma->vm_private_data = NULL; +} + + /** * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed * @encl: an enclave pointer @@ -151,4 +275,355 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { .fault = sgx_vma_fault, .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect, + .open = sgx_vma_open, +}; + +/** + * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance + * @kref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl + * + * Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the + * enclave and the instance itself. + */ +void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount); + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + unsigned long index; + + xa_for_each(&encl->page_array, index, entry) { + if (entry->epc_page) { + /* + * The page and its radix tree entry cannot be freed + * if the page is being held by the reclaimer. + */ + if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) + continue; + + sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + entry->epc_page = NULL; + } + + kfree(entry); + } + + xa_destroy(&encl->page_array); + + if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + } + + while (!list_empty(&encl->va_pages)) { + va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page, + list); + list_del(&va_page->list); + sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); + kfree(va_page); + } + + if (encl->backing) + fput(encl->backing); + + cleanup_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu); + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list)); + + /* Detect EPC page leak's. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt); + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page); + + kfree(encl); +} + +/* + * 'mm' is exiting and no longer needs mmu notifications. + */ +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, + struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier); + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL; + + /* + * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved + * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok. + */ + spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock); + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) { + if (tmp == encl_mm) { + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock); + + if (tmp == encl_mm) { + synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu); + mmu_notifier_put(mn); + } +} + +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier); + + kfree(encl_mm); +} + +static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = { + .release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release, + .free_notifier = sgx_mmu_notifier_free, }; + +static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL; + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp; + int idx; + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (tmp->mm == mm) { + encl_mm = tmp; + break; + } + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + return encl_mm; +} + +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + int ret; + + /* + * Even though a single enclave may be mapped into an mm more than once, + * each 'mm' only appears once on encl->mm_list. This is guaranteed by + * holding the mm's mmap lock for write before an mm can be added or + * remove to an encl->mm_list. + */ + mmap_assert_write_locked(mm); + + /* + * It's possible that an entry already exists in the mm_list, because it + * is removed only on VFS release or process exit. + */ + if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm)) + return 0; + + encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_mm) + return -ENOMEM; + + encl_mm->encl = encl; + encl_mm->mm = mm; + encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops; + + ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm); + if (ret) { + kfree(encl_mm); + return ret; + } + + spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock); + list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list); + /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_reclaimer_block(). */ + smp_wmb(); + encl->mm_list_version++; + spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + pgoff_t index) +{ + struct inode *inode = encl->backing->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping); + + return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask); +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_get_backing() - Pin the backing storage + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @page_index: enclave page index + * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page + * + * Pin the backing storage pages for storing the encrypted contents and Paging + * Crypto MetaData (PCMD) of an enclave page. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * -errno otherwise. + */ +int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + pgoff_t pcmd_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size) + 1 + (page_index >> 5); + struct page *contents; + struct page *pcmd; + + contents = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, page_index); + if (IS_ERR(contents)) + return PTR_ERR(contents); + + pcmd = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, pcmd_index); + if (IS_ERR(pcmd)) { + put_page(contents); + return PTR_ERR(pcmd); + } + + backing->page_index = page_index; + backing->contents = contents; + backing->pcmd = pcmd; + backing->pcmd_offset = + (page_index & (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) - 1)) * + sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage + * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page + * @do_write: mark pages dirty + */ +void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write) +{ + if (do_write) { + set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd); + set_page_dirty(backing->contents); + } + + put_page(backing->pcmd); + put_page(backing->contents); +} + +static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, + void *data) +{ + pte_t pte; + int ret; + + ret = pte_young(*ptep); + if (ret) { + pte = pte_mkold(*ptep); + set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit + * @mm: mm_struct that is checked + * @page: enclave page to be tested for recent access + * + * Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the enclave page and + * clears it. + * + * Return: 1 if the page has been recently accessed and 0 if not. + */ +int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, + struct sgx_encl_page *page) +{ + unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int ret; + + ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma); + if (ret) + return 0; + + if (encl != vma->vm_private_data) + return 0; + + ret = apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE, + sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page + * + * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page. + * + * Return: + * a VA page, + * -errno otherwise + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, true); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + + ret = __epa(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (ret) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "EPA returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret); + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + return epc_page; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_va_slot - allocate a VA slot + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * + * Allocates a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance. + * + * Return: offset of the slot inside the VA page + */ +unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + + if (slot < SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT) + set_bit(slot, va_page->slots); + + return slot << 3; +} + +/** + * sgx_free_va_slot - free a VA slot + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * @offset: offset of the slot inside the VA page + * + * Frees a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance. + */ +void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset) +{ + clear_bit(offset >> 3, va_page->slots); +} + +/** + * sgx_va_page_full - is the VA page full? + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * + * Return: true if all slots have been taken + */ +bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + + return slot == SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 34088659cee6..c1982a9ab8df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -19,11 +19,18 @@ #include #include "sgx.h" +/* 'desc' bits holding the offset in the VA (version array) page. */ +#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK GENMASK_ULL(11, 3) + +/* 'desc' bit marking that the page is being reclaimed. */ +#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED BIT(3) + struct sgx_encl_page { unsigned long desc; unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits; struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; struct sgx_encl *encl; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; }; enum sgx_encl_flags { @@ -33,6 +40,13 @@ enum sgx_encl_flags { SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED = BIT(3), }; +struct sgx_encl_mm { + struct sgx_encl *encl; + struct mm_struct *mm; + struct list_head list; + struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier; +}; + struct sgx_encl { unsigned long base; unsigned long size; @@ -44,6 +58,30 @@ struct sgx_encl { struct sgx_encl_page secs; unsigned long attributes; unsigned long attributes_mask; + + cpumask_t cpumask; + struct file *backing; + struct kref refcount; + struct list_head va_pages; + unsigned long mm_list_version; + struct list_head mm_list; + spinlock_t mm_lock; + struct srcu_struct srcu; +}; + +#define SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT 512 + +struct sgx_va_page { + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + DECLARE_BITMAP(slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + struct list_head list; +}; + +struct sgx_backing { + pgoff_t page_index; + struct page *contents; + struct page *pcmd; + unsigned long pcmd_offset; }; extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops; @@ -67,4 +105,17 @@ static inline int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags); +void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref); +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm); +int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, + struct sgx_backing *backing); +void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); +int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, + struct sgx_encl_page *page); + +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); +unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); +void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset); +bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); + #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 0ba0e670e2f0..6d37117ac8a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -16,20 +16,77 @@ #include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" +static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL; + void *err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT != + (SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK >> 3) + 1); + + if (!(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)) { + va_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*va_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!va_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(); + if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) { + err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page); + kfree(va_page); + return err; + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + } + encl->page_cnt++; + return va_page; +} + +static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + encl->page_cnt--; + + if (va_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); + list_del(&va_page->list); + kfree(va_page); + } +} + static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) { struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; unsigned long encl_size; + struct file *backing; long ret; + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) + return PTR_ERR(va_page); + else if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + /* else the tail page of the VA page list had free slots. */ + /* The extra page goes to SECS. */ encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE; - secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); - if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) - return PTR_ERR(secs_epc); + backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5), + VM_NORESERVE); + if (IS_ERR(backing)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(backing); + goto err_out_shrink; + } + + encl->backing = backing; + + secs_epc = sgx_alloc_epc_page(&encl->secs, true); + if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc); + goto err_out_backing; + } encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc; @@ -63,6 +120,13 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; +err_out_backing: + fput(encl->backing); + encl->backing = NULL; + +err_out_shrink: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); + return ret; } @@ -228,21 +292,35 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, { struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; int ret; encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags); if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) return PTR_ERR(encl_page); - epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true); if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { kfree(encl_page); return PTR_ERR(epc_page); } + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(va_page); + goto err_out_free; + } + mmap_read_lock(current->mm); mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + /* + * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock. Ditto for + * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path. + */ + if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + /* * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited @@ -273,6 +351,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, goto err_out; } + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); return ret; @@ -281,9 +360,11 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); err_out_unlock: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); +err_out_free: sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); kfree(encl_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 38f2e80cc31a..3426785df457 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk; +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq); + +/* + * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed + * with sgx_reclaimer_lock acquired. + */ +static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list); + +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock); /* * Reset dirty EPC pages to uninitialized state. Laundry can be left with SECS @@ -50,6 +59,348 @@ static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section) list_splice(&dirty, §ion->laundry_list); } +static bool sgx_reclaimer_age(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + bool ret = true; + int idx; + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); + ret = !sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(encl_mm->mm, page); + mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + + if (!ret) + break; + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + if (!ret) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner; + unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + unsigned long mm_list_version; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int idx, ret; + + do { + mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version; + + /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */ + smp_rmb(); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); + + ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma); + if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data) + zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE); + + mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version)); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + ret = __eblock(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EBLOCK"); + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +} + +static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + int ret; + + pginfo.addr = 0; + pginfo.secs = 0; + + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->contents); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->pcmd) + + backing->pcmd_offset; + + ret = __ewb(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), va_slot); + + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata - + backing->pcmd_offset)); + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents); + + return ret; +} + +static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info) +{ +} + +static const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + int idx; + + /* + * Can race with sgx_encl_mm_add(), but ETRACK has already been + * executed, which means that the CPUs running in the new mm will enter + * into the enclave with a fresh epoch. + */ + cpumask_clear(cpumask); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm)); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + return cpumask; +} + +/* + * Swap page to the regular memory transformed to the blocked state by using + * EBLOCK, which means that it can no loger be referenced (no new TLB entries). + * + * The first trial just tries to write the page assuming that some other thread + * has reset the count for threads inside the enlave by using ETRACK, and + * previous thread count has been zeroed out. The second trial calls ETRACK + * before EWB. If that fails we kick all the HW threads out, and then do EWB, + * which should be guaranteed the succeed. + */ +static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + unsigned int va_offset; + void *va_slot; + int ret; + + encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; + + va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page, + list); + va_offset = sgx_alloc_va_slot(va_page); + va_slot = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(va_page->epc_page) + va_offset; + if (sgx_va_page_full(va_page)) + list_move_tail(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) { + ret = __etrack(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page)); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ETRACK"); + } + + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) { + /* + * Slow path, send IPIs to kick cpus out of the + * enclave. Note, it's imperative that the cpu + * mask is generated *after* ETRACK, else we'll + * miss cpus that entered the enclave between + * generating the mask and incrementing epoch. + */ + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(encl), + sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1); + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + } + } + + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EWB"); + + sgx_free_va_slot(va_page, va_offset); + } else { + encl_page->desc |= va_offset; + encl_page->va_page = va_page; + } +} + +static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_backing secs_backing; + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, backing); + encl_page->epc_page = NULL; + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + + if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) { + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, PFN_DOWN(encl->size), + &secs_backing); + if (ret) + goto out; + + sgx_encl_ewb(encl->secs.epc_page, &secs_backing); + + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + + sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing, true); + } + +out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +} + +/* + * Take a fixed number of pages from the head of the active page pool and + * reclaim them to the enclave's private shmem files. Skip the pages, which have + * been accessed since the last scan. Move those pages to the tail of active + * page pool so that the pages get scanned in LRU like fashion. + * + * Batch process a chunk of pages (at the moment 16) in order to degrade amount + * of IPI's and ETRACK's potentially required. sgx_encl_ewb() does degrade a bit + * among the HW threads with three stage EWB pipeline (EWB, ETRACK + EWB and IPI + * + EWB) but not sufficiently. Reclaiming one page at a time would also be + * problematic as it would increase the lock contention too much, which would + * halt forward progress. + */ +static void sgx_reclaim_pages(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *chunk[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN]; + struct sgx_backing backing[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN]; + struct sgx_epc_section *section; + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + pgoff_t page_index; + int cnt = 0; + int ret; + int i; + + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + for (i = 0; i < SGX_NR_TO_SCAN; i++) { + if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list)) + break; + + epc_page = list_first_entry(&sgx_active_page_list, + struct sgx_epc_page, list); + list_del_init(&epc_page->list); + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + + if (kref_get_unless_zero(&encl_page->encl->refcount) != 0) + chunk[cnt++] = epc_page; + else + /* The owner is freeing the page. No need to add the + * page back to the list of reclaimable pages. + */ + epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + } + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + + if (!sgx_reclaimer_age(epc_page)) + goto skip; + + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base); + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl_page->encl, page_index, &backing[i]); + if (ret) + goto skip; + + mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock); + encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; + mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock); + continue; + +skip: + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &sgx_active_page_list); + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); + + chunk[i] = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + if (epc_page) + sgx_reclaimer_block(epc_page); + } + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + if (!epc_page) + continue; + + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + sgx_reclaimer_write(epc_page, &backing[i]); + sgx_encl_put_backing(&backing[i], true); + + kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); + epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + + section = &sgx_epc_sections[epc_page->section]; + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, §ion->page_list); + section->free_cnt++; + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + } +} + +static unsigned long sgx_nr_free_pages(void) +{ + unsigned long cnt = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) + cnt += sgx_epc_sections[i].free_cnt; + + return cnt; +} + +static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark) +{ + return sgx_nr_free_pages() < watermark && + !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list); +} + static int ksgxd(void *p) { int i; @@ -71,6 +422,20 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p) WARN(1, "EPC section %d has unsanitized pages.\n", i); } + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + if (try_to_freeze()) + continue; + + wait_event_freezable(ksgxd_waitq, + kthread_should_stop() || + sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)); + + if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)) + sgx_reclaim_pages(); + + cond_resched(); + } + return 0; } @@ -100,6 +465,7 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_sec page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list); list_del_init(&page->list); + section->free_cnt--; spin_unlock(§ion->lock); return page; @@ -132,6 +498,100 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } +/** + * sgx_mark_page_reclaimable() - Mark a page as reclaimable + * @page: EPC page + * + * Mark a page as reclaimable and add it to the active page list. Pages + * are automatically removed from the active list when freed. + */ +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + page->flags |= SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + list_add_tail(&page->list, &sgx_active_page_list); + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); +} + +/** + * sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() - Remove a page from the reclaim list + * @page: EPC page + * + * Clear the reclaimable flag and remove the page from the active page list. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * -EBUSY if the page is in the process of being reclaimed + */ +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED) { + /* The page is being reclaimed. */ + if (list_empty(&page->list)) { + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } + + list_del(&page->list); + page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + } + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page + * @owner: the owner of the EPC page + * @reclaim: reclaim pages if necessary + * + * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a + * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). If + * @reclaim is set to true, directly reclaim pages when we are out of pages. No + * mm's can be locked when @reclaim is set to true. + * + * Finally, wake up ksgxd when the number of pages goes below the watermark + * before returning back to the caller. + * + * Return: + * an EPC page, + * -errno on error + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + + for ( ; ; ) { + page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + if (!IS_ERR(page)) { + page->owner = owner; + break; + } + + if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (!reclaim) { + page = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + break; + } + + if (signal_pending(current)) { + page = ERR_PTR(-ERESTARTSYS); + break; + } + + sgx_reclaim_pages(); + cond_resched(); + } + + if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES)) + wake_up(&ksgxd_waitq); + + return page; +} + /** * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page * @page: an EPC page @@ -143,12 +603,15 @@ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page) struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; int ret; + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED); + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret)) return; spin_lock(§ion->lock); list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list); + section->free_cnt++; spin_unlock(§ion->lock); } @@ -176,9 +639,12 @@ static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size, for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { section->pages[i].section = index; + section->pages[i].flags = 0; + section->pages[i].owner = NULL; list_add_tail(§ion->pages[i].list, §ion->laundry_list); } + section->free_cnt = nr_pages; return true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 91234f425b89..a188a683ffb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -15,9 +15,17 @@ #define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS 8 #define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE 256 +#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16 +#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32 +#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64 + +/* Pages, which are being tracked by the page reclaimer. */ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED BIT(0) struct sgx_epc_page { unsigned int section; + unsigned int flags; + struct sgx_encl_page *owner; struct list_head list; }; @@ -33,6 +41,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section { struct list_head page_list; struct list_head laundry_list; struct sgx_epc_page *pages; + unsigned long free_cnt; spinlock_t lock; }; @@ -61,4 +70,8 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void); void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim); + #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:33 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901837 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D781CC2D0E4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8929921D7F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="CCDUh9uZ" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727855AbgKLWEJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:09 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52382 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727431AbgKLWEH (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:07 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 24C072224A; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218647; bh=3uE1EWWgmHyhxsMrlxMO0pitcKAQZZowQalmf1U/uhQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CCDUh9uZxRU9CDY8IukXlxMH6jlh1+xh8Kr03XmvLubN0b6kXGpf1mUr0CQaERU8b 1jBZHUUbRU1OPaJmdkvAj/0niyprFTxvWNHarA7ujNDemOJdTwgmpaMOvfz+gbq1NS iX8RvRPS1YtFFpBVEmiURT6aA7DTEhQnfdD1J92I= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton , Matthew Wilcox , Jethro Beekman , andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 22/24] x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driver Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:33 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-23-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Enclave memory is normally inaccessible from outside the enclave. This makes enclaves hard to debug. However, enclaves can be put in a debug mode when they are being built. In debug enclaves data *can* be read and/or written by using the ENCLS[EDBGRD] and ENCLS[EDBGWR] functions. This is obviously only for debugging and destroys all the protections afforded to normal enclaves. But, enclaves know their own debug status and can adjust their behavior appropriately. Add a vm_ops->access() implementation which can be used to read and write memory inside debug enclaves. This is typically used via ptrace() APIs. Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Tested-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Changes from v39: * Check only for SGX_ENCL_DEBUG in sgx_vma_access(), so that a debug enclave's memory can read and written at any phase of its life-cycle. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 111 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 141424657718..94e7e41e6adf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -272,10 +272,121 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags); } +static int sgx_encl_debug_read(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page, + unsigned long addr, void *data) +{ + unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK; + int ret; + + + ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data); + if (ret) + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page, + unsigned long addr, void *data) +{ + unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK; + int ret; + + ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data); + if (ret) + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock. + */ +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + for ( ; ; ) { + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags); + if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY) + break; + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return entry; +} + +static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, + void *buf, int len, int write) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL; + char data[sizeof(unsigned long)]; + unsigned long align; + int offset; + int cnt; + int ret = 0; + int i; + + /* + * If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set + * to NULL. + */ + if (!encl) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags)) + return -EFAULT; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) { + entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK, + vma->vm_flags); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(entry); + break; + } + + align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long)); + offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1); + cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset; + cnt = min(cnt, len - i); + + ret = sgx_encl_debug_read(encl, entry, align, data); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (write) { + memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt); + ret = sgx_encl_debug_write(encl, entry, align, data); + if (ret) + goto out; + } else { + memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt); + } + +out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + if (ret) + break; + } + + return ret < 0 ? ret : i; +} + const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { .fault = sgx_vma_fault, .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect, .open = sgx_vma_open, + .access = sgx_vma_access, }; /** From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:34 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901835 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04E5EC388F7 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94DD822227 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Cl8GfkOT" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727431AbgKLWEP (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:15 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52524 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727268AbgKLWEO (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:14 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7D3F82224F; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218653; bh=MlJclM1DXBZCSDFFGh8Kn2eTG3SOsamSFwv/jM+ETZg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Cl8GfkOTfhSe2CJKD7tXBqWGAO3w/btinb8/zacFRZ4lPID2MgIuyGe+OmN/qln07 ID9+VHA2/LkYWTvF7sqs91KhfShSuonxq2PbL86VC7Wl8OHgIGM1qGy8T43Va3sNBC ubeXwK+9ocsYqwBRurNLavLiWMfFIBunfEo2NuLc= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX kernel architecture Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-24-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Document the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D. Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 # Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson # Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 211 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 212 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst index 9c6ebf355f81..e7eb84484ddc 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst @@ -33,3 +33,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation i386/index x86_64/index sva + sgx diff --git a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..eaee1368b4fd --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=============================== +Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) +=============================== + +Overview +======== + +Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) hardware enables for user space applications +to set aside private memory regions of code and data: + +* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the. + regions. +* Unprivileged (ring-3) ENCLU functions allow an application to enter and + execute inside the regions. + +These memory regions are called enclaves. An enclave can be only entered at a +fixed set of entry points. Each entry point can hold a single hardware thread +at a time. While the enclave is loaded from a regular binary file by using +ENCLS functions, only the threads inside the enclave can access its memory. The +region is denied from outside access by the CPU, and encrypted before it leaves +from LLC. + +The support can be determined by + + ``grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo`` + +SGX must both be supported in the processor and enabled by the BIOS. If SGX +appears to be unsupported on a system which has hardware support, ensure +support is enabled in the BIOS. If a BIOS presents a choice between "Enabled" +and "Software Enabled" modes for SGX, choose "Enabled". + +Enclave Page Cache +================== + +SGX utilizes an *Enclave Page Cache (EPC)* to store pages that are associated +with an enclave. It is contained in a BIOS-reserved region of physical memory. +Unlike pages used for regular memory, pages can only be accessed from outside of +the enclave during enclave construction with special, limited SGX instructions. + +Only a CPU executing inside an enclave can directly access enclave memory. +However, a CPU executing inside an enclave may access normal memory outside the +enclave. + +The kernel manages enclave memory similar to how it treats device memory. + +Enclave Page Types +------------------ + +**SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)** + Enclave's address range, attributes and other global data are defined + by this structure. + +**Regular (REG)** + Regular EPC pages contain the code and data of an enclave. + +**Thread Control Structure (TCS)** + Thread Control Structure pages define the entry points to an enclave and + track the execution state of an enclave thread. + +**Version Array (VA)** + Version Array pages contain 512 slots, each of which can contain a version + number for a page evicted from the EPC. + +Enclave Page Cache Map +---------------------- + +The processor tracks EPC pages in a hardware metadata structure called the +*Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)*. The EPCM contains an entry for each EPC page +which describes the owning enclave, access rights and page type among the other +things. + +EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. This prevents the +kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes to +remain read-only. EPCM permissions may only impose additional restrictions on +top of normal x86 page permissions. + +For all intents and purposes, the SGX architecture allows the processor to +invalidate all EPCM entries at will. This requires that software be prepared to +handle an EPCM fault at any time. In practice, this can happen on events like +power transitions when the ephemeral key that encrypts enclave memory is lost. + +Application interface +===================== + +Enclave build functions +----------------------- + +In addition to the traditional compiler and linker build process, SGX has a +separate enclave “build” process. Enclaves must be built before they can be +executed (entered). The first step in building an enclave is opening the +**/dev/sgx_enclave** device. Since enclave memory is protected from direct +access, special privileged instructions are Then used to copy data into enclave +pages and establish enclave page permissions. + +.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c + :functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_create + sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages + sgx_ioc_enclave_init + sgx_ioc_enclave_provision + +Enclave vDSO +------------ + +Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific EENTER and ERESUME +functions, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the complexity of +transitioning to and from an enclave, enclaves typically utilize a library to +handle the actual transitions. This is roughly analogous to how glibc +implementations are used by most applications to wrap system calls. + +Another crucial characteristic of enclaves is that they can generate exceptions +as part of their normal operation that need to be handled in the enclave or are +unique to SGX. + +Instead of the traditional signal mechanism to handle these exceptions, SGX +can leverage special exception fixup provided by the vDSO. The kernel-provided +vDSO function wraps low-level transitions to/from the enclave like EENTER and +ERESUME. The vDSO function intercepts exceptions that would otherwise generate +a signal and return the fault information directly to its caller. This avoids +the need to juggle signal handlers. + +.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h + :functions: vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t + +ksgxd +===== + +SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxwapd*. + +EPC sanitization +---------------- + +ksgxd is started when SGX initializes. Enclave memory is typically ready +For use when the processor powers on or resets. However, if SGX has been in +use since the reset, enclave pages may be in an inconsistent state. This might +occur after a crash and kexec() cycle, for instance. At boot, ksgxd +reinitializes all enclave pages so that they can be allocated and re-used. + +The sanitization is done by going through EPC address space and applying the +EREMOVE function to each physical page. Some enclave pages like SECS pages have +hardware dependencies on other pages which prevents EREMOVE from functioning. +Executing two EREMOVE passes removes the dependencies. + +Page reclaimer +-------------- + +Similar to the core kswapd, ksgxd, is responsible for managing the +overcommitment of enclave memory. If the system runs out of enclave memory, +*ksgxwapd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory. + +Launch Control +============== + +SGX provides a launch control mechanism. After all enclave pages have been +copied, kernel executes EINIT function, which initializes the enclave. Only after +this the CPU can execute inside the enclave. + +ENIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement. The function +checks that the measurement is correct and signature is signed with the key +hashed to the four **IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}** MSRs representing the +SHA256 of a public key. + +Those MSRs can be configured by the BIOS to be either readable or writable. +Linux supports only writable configuration in order to give full control to the +kernel on launch control policy. Before calling EINIT function, the driver sets +the MSRs to match the enclave's signing key. + +Encryption engines +================== + +In order to conceal the enclave data while it is out of the CPU package, the +memory controller has an encryption engine to transparently encrypt and decrypt +enclave memory. + +In CPUs prior to Ice Lake, the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is used to +encrypt pages leaving the CPU caches. MEE uses a n-ary Merkle tree with root in +SRAM to maintain integrity of the encrypted data. This provides integrity and +anti-replay protection but does not scale to large memory sizes because the time +required to update the Merkle tree grows logarithmically in relation to the +memory size. + +CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of +MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, which +means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated. B, it includes +additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory +aliases from being Created. + +DMA to enclave memory is blocked by range registers on both MEE and TME systems +(SDM section 41.10). + +Usage Models +============ + +Shared Library +-------------- + +Sensitive data and the code that acts on it is partitioned from the application +into a separate library. The library is then linked as a DSO which can be loaded +into an enclave. The application can then make individual function calls into +the enclave through special SGX instructions. A run-time within the enclave is +configured to marshal function parameters into and out of the enclave and to +call the correct library function. + +Application Container +--------------------- + +An application may be loaded into a container enclave which is specially +configured with a library OS and run-time which permits the application to run. +The enclave run-time and library OS work together to execute the application +when a thread enters the enclave. From patchwork Thu Nov 12 22:01:35 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11901839 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B44FC5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10E3F2223F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MnaLy22J" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727268AbgKLWEU (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:20 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52626 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727857AbgKLWEU (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 17:04:20 -0500 Received: from suppilovahvero.lan (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AC60322246; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:04:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605218659; bh=GbI4CGnBFEA+npROLTvsvNQizyIPaccrpO+b2Gc9aEY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=MnaLy22JZT5NQu5LsqaqgXRj8CwsWTw65YxZhWxA70ZBvKXUv5jn+N65k/gXHjSuk 7dxpdy1EpAASHTXHaKaOULgJfEzy30yp7DcqOiV38g9XqsBHoQ6K8DhNJs8+yDKHgZ 7aJgB/Vv72Gm9J0z9QeG2QI5L6xf4+q+gMGbEVDo= From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Thomas Gleixner , Borislav Petkov , Jethro Beekman , akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, asapek@google.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com, cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v41 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 00:01:35 +0200 Message-Id: <20201112220135.165028-25-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20201112220135.165028-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Add the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Jethro Beekman # v40 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- MAINTAINERS | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 0b75ed0f06d8..20602ac130f0 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9126,6 +9126,19 @@ F: Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst F: arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c F: include/linux/tboot.h +INTEL SGX +M: Jarkko Sakkinen +L: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/ +T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-sgx.git +F: Documentation/x86/sgx.rst +F: arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S +F: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/* +F: tools/testing/selftests/sgx/* +K: \bSGX_ + INTERCONNECT API M: Georgi Djakov L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org