From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:40 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947915 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0493AC83014 for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:31:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8D0B8217A0 for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:31:45 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8D0B8217A0 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=NhL0HHRbc47uDpURBGru2L6UYwUgYpx99+AXtu8l18I=; b=snYbygZGHfvQMizeqw0F484P1 TyKVEU9XpcGeskqptpUCj9/13PQUc8q4Fbu2P3RohBbC/xtnY695cj3KpwXDTNlDL4UWKHrVLfyPv K3zBPCkuNNjpvxLkvj0/Hdf7F+PdjGDzArdoh8ecnbg1jUw5haJjwVBNAD4FC0Gka+wW+i9rSohr5 TKt534r6kjSLr0dpl5kr5b5J85ZqllFfjsLXT3nEz7UGAqlS+sPdoEDaK4S55Or5T5bSBbm99xiIV dUVYSPhony9yVQlH6/UPQwlqgEcFz3KImxDY8WVKvAO9ONpQRwhcwtHeJtyxNS89ly8ghlTjlzJki UYTp2zD7A==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8F-0004L0-0f; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:23 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8A-0004Iw-PL; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:20 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:40 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-2-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013019_049488_04A802CB X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.94 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well. Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand --- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c index 26d5dcd2d69e..0f109eb16196 100644 --- a/fs/dax.c +++ b/fs/dax.c @@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size) #define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1) #define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) - static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES]; static int __init init_dax_wait_table(void) @@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry) static unsigned int dax_entry_order(void *entry) { if (xa_to_value(entry) & DAX_PMD) - return PMD_ORDER; + return PMD_PAGE_ORDER; return 0; } @@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, { struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; - XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_ORDER); + XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK; bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; bool sync; @@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, * entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_ORDER); + entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); if (xa_is_internal(entry)) { result = xa_to_internal(entry); goto fallback; @@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order) if (order == 0) ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE); #endif else diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h index 71125a4676c4..7f718b8dc789 100644 --- a/include/linux/pgtable.h +++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ #define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL #endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + /* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] * From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:41 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947919 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AEB35C63777 for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:32:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35FD7206E3 for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:32:19 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 35FD7206E3 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; 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Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8Q-0004PJ-OD; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:34 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8L-0004NT-Iv; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:30 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:41 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-3-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013030_027083_6A1643FC X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 12.82 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index c43ccdddb0f6..ae146a260b14 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma) extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page); extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len); + /* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g., diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 61f72b09d990..c481f088bd50 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1348,9 +1348,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, - unsigned long flags, - unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len) { unsigned long locked, lock_limit; From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:42 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947921 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6264BC64E7B for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:32:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2EA42067D for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:32:26 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org E2EA42067D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=ezl5JxQU3vL0H1nXv4h+Ssd1R6ChcLUHZQf412eXFEg=; b=zPHtjB5Bm6GTZSFTLrvGWd/ZP VDwkkh8VmnlH9Vda6UdzJZAomBprKRI3crOJwtUXXcIyJ5d/0JulsevCRLhuQXVhAXdnlRFzsnArD 0iR5OhatEe4vdfQyv5y+vg2KImywHO/1VTZWHxo1V91bjGEU8e7JZGT5bGc4dqsPgpohuOA5aC1Ah 5rl2g99CHFmo2+Y90jC1E30ljNx+tZ/NLkqkFqtCFprTrTPG9TCr8XLZ0GySdUpeqdz1vD7qYyPTW xh2Yg++3byNl6FC8UwgSNZDDsus4zCQYC92a5yPJzQX/bI9SU//WFbQ18qKm7e1r0onnpuMXQs3QD J8ROa7hmw==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8g-0004Xm-T3; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:50 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8X-0004T0-68; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:45 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 03/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:42 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-4-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013041_454457_0997C169 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.30 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once. Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Catalin Marinas # arm64 --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h index 45217f21f1fe..d3598419a284 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); #include diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 92eccaf595c8..b53ef37bf95a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable) __pgprot(PTE_VALID)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask = __pgprot(0), .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID), }; + unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, (unsigned long)page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE), .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY), }; + unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, (unsigned long)page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h index d690b08dff2a..92b9bb26bf5e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } #endif -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c index 87ba5a68bbb8..0454f2d052c4 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c @@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) return __set_memory(addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), __pgprot(_PAGE_EXEC)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { int ret; unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages; struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask = __pgprot(0), .clear_mask = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT) @@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) return ret; } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { int ret; unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages; struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask = PAGE_KERNEL, .clear_mask = __pgprot(0) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index 4352f08bfbb5..6224cb291f6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages); int set_pages_ro(struct page *page, int numpages); int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); extern int kernel_set_to_readonly; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 16f878c26667..d157fd617c99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages) return __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { - return __set_pages_np(page, 1); + return __set_pages_np(page, numpages); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { - return __set_pages_p(page, 1); + return __set_pages_p(page, numpages); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h index fe1aa4e54680..c650f82db813 100644 --- a/include/linux/set_memory.h +++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h @@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP -static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { return 0; } -static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 069576704c57..d40bb6666735 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page, int enable) * changes and this will no longer be the case. */ if (enable) - ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); else - ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page); + ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); if (ret) { pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n"); diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index d7075ad340aa..7e903524e002 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -2179,13 +2179,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) } static inline void set_area_direct_map(const struct vm_struct *area, - int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page)) + int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page, + int numpages)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) if (page_address(area->pages[i])) - set_direct_map(area->pages[i]); + set_direct_map(area->pages[i], 1); } /* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */ From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:43 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947923 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E67FC63777 for ; 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bh=8cRvKRZegV9af61Rey0MJkBjSkGHksKA1Czpj4Ol38w=; b=iKD1ZcMzKJhQuhnlNfNJvkjxV y+Bx9zF66ogrmg1mutySC8Qtv+X3KSpG8+ym6p1MB4ggVO/FerNWeq5BQAMlev7PylQpmkJYUEPMn MV07tRNm0KS6CH+5RwWoPWl+boCXCDFtCKiQnrn8pl22bxcIAzc/J8y7xmiT/5Y1Mzo8+BnFAz6my fSLp1F5Y42K9PRvD0B3RMtvZnozsFzAhremfXz2RZcVReDpnwlwVGO6RRD3DuWO5+s+IGEbZjL8KV kfRPot1bDOQh3HZkagukS4eJTrA/x+5Wz48/RR9U8GXES093bgyjl2h8EQ39QcBASYhoJN0PY2Ed9 X6cbLb1oA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8y-0004g1-5m; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:08 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8h-0004Yo-Vq; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:30:55 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 04/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:43 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-5-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013052_318021_8915EE35 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 26.23 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect. Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand --- arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 13 +++++++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild index ff9cbb631212..4306136ef329 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -4,5 +4,4 @@ generic-y += local64.h generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h generic-y += qrwlock.h generic-y += qspinlock.h -generic-y += set_memory.h generic-y += user.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h index d3598419a284..b1bdf83a73db 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -136,12 +136,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) dsb(ish); } -int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); - -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); -bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); - #include #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ecb6b0f449ab --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H +#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H + +#include + +bool can_set_direct_map(void); +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map + +int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); + +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages); +bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); + +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c index a0b144cfaea7..0cbc50c4fa5a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 86be6d1a78ab..aa5ec08cb902 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -477,7 +478,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp) int flags = 0; u64 i; - if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled()) + if (can_set_direct_map()) flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; /* @@ -1453,8 +1454,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool. */ - if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() || - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE)) + if (can_set_direct_map() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE)) flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; __create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start), diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index b53ef37bf95a..d505172265b0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data { bool rodata_full __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED); +bool can_set_direct_map(void) +{ + return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled(); +} + static int change_page_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data) { struct page_change_data *cdata = data; @@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) }; unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, @@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) }; unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages; - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, @@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) { - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return; set_memory_valid((unsigned long)page_address(page), numpages, enable); @@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) pte_t *ptep; unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return true; pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr); diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h index c650f82db813..7b4b6626032d 100644 --- a/include/linux/set_memory.h +++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h @@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) { return true; } +#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ +/* + * Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at + * boot time. Let them overrive this query. + */ +#ifndef can_set_direct_map +static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void) +{ + return true; +} +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ #ifndef set_mce_nospec static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:44 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947925 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9AE3C64E7B for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:33:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2BDE82067D for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:33:23 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2BDE82067D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=MMb7TkyIBh+8bVtpwJgKqOzgvmIcPaaWkPzKbtWf6J4=; b=X1juZz0J7UuRJfX4hPoPYqSxQ adffB/3CAUnPoGgwm6BCiRde6lHFG5J6EbV/T08UPA8YAjIhmUW6agtxOZyYX71mdJFvdtqUMmJR2 kYlbedBNfyAFk23Zl1LZAwx2lhYxjIMQUT2B2+5EwGIE6C4QCIIC6EbHRHIZ8VD5+wqS/yBs6T6Oz gqkB0MwVOSOnBAYlUUJvzOARuQU8a35YOxRkgvVshp1n08O+F0575AWYdC5MqaA3e6re3GYIy3nwB P48NR3vrbnUj5qchsWtx9ti8FUOer6BhrpzTa1kFJK/m78/smEA1eivxr7EKKzwh+WPKC6aTwD0Ri B3z8XOzPA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki9U-0004vG-WC; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:41 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki8t-0004fF-04; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:06 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 05/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:44 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-6-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013103_261016_068D926A X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 34.42 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the owning mm. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses. Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- include/linux/secretmem.h | 24 ++++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 ++ mm/secretmem.c | 273 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 34d5fb82f674..7d781fea79c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ config FORCE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE in order to test the non static function tracing in the generic code, as other architectures still use it. But we only need to keep it around for x86_64. No need to keep it - for x86_32. For x86_32, force DYNAMIC_FTRACE. + for x86_32. For x86_32, force DYNAMIC_FTRACE. # # Arch settings # diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..70e7db9f94fe --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h @@ -97,5 +97,6 @@ #define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d /* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d /* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 2dd6cbb8cabc..805fd7a668be 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret); /* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index c89c5444924b..d8d170fa5210 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -884,4 +884,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + endmenu diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index 6eeb4b29efb8..dfda14c48a75 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 5ec98de1e5de..71164fa83114 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -793,6 +794,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL }; struct page *page; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return NULL; + page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx); if (ctx.pgmap) put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap); @@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma)) return -EFAULT; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return -EFAULT; + if (write) { if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE)) @@ -2196,6 +2203,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte))); page = pte_page(pte); + if (page_is_secretmem(page)) + goto pte_unmap; + head = try_grab_compound_head(page, 1, flags); if (!head) goto pte_unmap; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..781aaaca8c70 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2020 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt + +/* + * Define mode and flag masks to allow validation of the system call + * parameters. + */ +#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0) +#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK + +struct secretmem_ctx { + unsigned int mode; +}; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp) +{ + /* + * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map + * fragmentation + */ + return alloc_page(gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; + vm_fault_t ret = 0; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); + + page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); + if (!page) { + + page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask); + if (!page) + return vmf_error(-ENOMEM); + + err = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); + if (unlikely(err)) + goto err_put_page; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); + if (err) + goto err_del_page_cache; + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); + + __SetPageUptodate(page); + + ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; + } + + vmf->page = page; + return ret; + +err_del_page_cache: + delete_from_page_cache(page); +err_put_page: + put_page(page); + return vmf_error(err); +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len)) + return -EAGAIN; + + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED; + + return 0; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops; +} + +static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .mmap = secretmem_mmap, +}; + +static bool secretmem_isolate_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode) +{ + return false; +} + +static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, + struct page *newpage, struct page *page, + enum migrate_mode mode) +{ + return -EBUSY; +} + +static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) +{ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); + clear_highpage(page); +} + +static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { + .freepage = secretmem_freepage, + .migratepage = secretmem_migratepage, + .isolate_page = secretmem_isolate_page, +}; + +bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page); + + if (!mapping) + return false; + + return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops; +} + +static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt; + +static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) +{ + struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx; + struct inode *inode; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return ERR_CAST(inode); + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto err_free_inode; + + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", + O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + goto err_free_ctx; + + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + + inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; + + /* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */ + inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; + inode->i_size = 0; + + file->private_data = ctx; + + ctx->mode = flags & SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK; + + return file; + +err_free_ctx: + kfree(ctx); +err_free_inode: + iput(inode); + return file; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) +{ + struct file *file; + int fd, err; + + /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC); + + if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) + return -EINVAL; + + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + file = secretmem_file_create(flags); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(file); + goto err_put_fd; + } + + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; + + fd_install(fd, file); + return fd; + +err_put_fd: + put_unused_fd(fd); + return err; +} + +static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private; + + truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); + clear_inode(inode); + kfree(ctx); +} + +static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = { + .evict_inode = secretmem_evict_inode, +}; + +static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC); + + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops; + + return 0; +} + +static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { + .name = "secretmem", + .init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context, + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, +}; + +static int secretmem_init(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs); + if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt)) + ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt); + + return ret; +} +fs_initcall(secretmem_init); From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:45 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947927 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95AE3C64E7B for ; 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bh=+cG0//avYkBo3nxqmS11Qwkb/hLrOQDfYOmdhr8iPIc=; b=na+RlPJVCphi6k48/ru5Q4PvK PBL3UAhljNtED/OJxZrqXQ89SXUjlmWXjFO4R6y7Kexu/t2wCiJpHGntOy7pIOSocmgbBfgMSLTew xv/c49J4GqjGaNN+Xv7kud1H4LKb/A4v7GSM1lLKHppy8SbjbPy7uzDDj3arL+4+cvF+nNn2w6hf4 JDCMpHsCDncyX5yrWidvcuOugLMI6EAsg5HTw6KEvyCJ40s9gincwj3ezD6+JqXr1G6+GX4QOCeTl Dx8RP6eO+Dfef4ILQzknnvl6fvgeTJ83+cHj1K50HJq4K3DQABOLNLR06/chwBzaPCKj0IR+15Qzf nMWBI2JvA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkiA3-0005NZ-Cy; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:32:15 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki95-0004m0-3K; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:23 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 06/10] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:45 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-7-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013115_633008_A77FCB5C X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 25.17 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings. Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages. As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages. The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- mm/Kconfig | 2 + mm/secretmem.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index d8d170fa5210..e0e789398421 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -886,5 +886,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS config SECRETMEM def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + select CMA endmenu diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 781aaaca8c70..52a900a135a5 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -35,25 +38,80 @@ #define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK struct secretmem_ctx { + struct gen_pool *pool; unsigned int mode; }; -static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp) +static struct cma *secretmem_cma; + +static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) { + unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER); + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + page = cma_alloc(secretmem_cma, nr_pages, PMD_SIZE, gfp & __GFP_NOWARN); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + if (err) + goto err_cma_release; + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (err) + goto err_set_direct_map; + + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PMD_SIZE); + + return 0; + +err_set_direct_map: /* - * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map - * fragmentation + * If a split of PUD-size page was required, it already happened + * when we marked the pages invalid which guarantees that this call + * won't fail */ - return alloc_page(gfp); + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); +err_cma_release: + cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); + return err; +} + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (gen_pool_avail(pool) < PAGE_SIZE) { + err = secretmem_pool_increase(ctx, gfp); + if (err) + return NULL; + } + + addr = gen_pool_alloc(pool, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!addr) + return NULL; + + page = virt_to_page(addr); + get_page(page); + + return page; } static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data; struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; vm_fault_t ret = 0; - unsigned long addr; struct page *page; int err; @@ -62,8 +120,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); if (!page) { - - page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask); + page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask); if (!page) return vmf_error(-ENOMEM); @@ -71,14 +128,8 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (unlikely(err)) goto err_put_page; - err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1); - if (err) - goto err_del_page_cache; - - addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); - __SetPageUptodate(page); + set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ctx); ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED; } @@ -86,8 +137,6 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vmf->page = page; return ret; -err_del_page_cache: - delete_from_page_cache(page); err_put_page: put_page(page); return vmf_error(err); @@ -136,8 +185,11 @@ static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) { - set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1); - clear_highpage(page); + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = (struct secretmem_ctx *)page_private(page); + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + + gen_pool_free(pool, addr, PAGE_SIZE); } static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { @@ -172,13 +224,18 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) if (!ctx) goto err_free_inode; + ctx->pool = gen_pool_create(PAGE_SHIFT, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (!ctx->pool) + goto err_free_ctx; + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); if (IS_ERR(file)) - goto err_free_ctx; + goto err_free_pool; mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + inode->i_private = ctx; inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; @@ -192,6 +249,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) return file; +err_free_pool: + gen_pool_destroy(ctx->pool); err_free_ctx: kfree(ctx); err_free_inode: @@ -210,6 +269,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) return -EINVAL; + if (!secretmem_cma) + return -ENOMEM; + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return fd; @@ -230,11 +292,37 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) return err; } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, void *data) +{ + unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; + unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + struct page *page = virt_to_page(start); + unsigned long nr_pages = (end - start + 1) / PAGE_SIZE; + int i; + + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) + clear_highpage(page + i); + + cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); +} + +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + + gen_pool_for_each_chunk(pool, secretmem_cleanup_chunk, ctx); + gen_pool_destroy(pool); +} + static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) { struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private; truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); + secretmem_cleanup_pool(ctx); clear_inode(inode); kfree(ctx); } @@ -271,3 +359,29 @@ static int secretmem_init(void) return ret; } fs_initcall(secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str) +{ + phys_addr_t align = PMD_SIZE; + unsigned long reserved_size; + int err; + + reserved_size = memparse(str, NULL); + if (!reserved_size) + return 0; + + if (reserved_size * 2 > PUD_SIZE) + align = PUD_SIZE; + + err = cma_declare_contiguous(0, reserved_size, 0, align, 0, false, + "secretmem", &secretmem_cma); + if (err) { + pr_err("failed to create CMA: %d\n", err); + return err; + } + + pr_info("reserved %luM\n", reserved_size >> 20); + + return 0; +} +__setup("secretmem=", secretmem_setup); From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:46 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947929 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNWANTED_LANGUAGE_BODY,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C68CC71156 for ; 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bh=m0yYt5RIZWn7D3UEnhBdlkGGs4wUCy0KX8745EwOedw=; b=IMImj/jA1+K848mhHP9zhAn5J rkJAh5hNStCuHij4WfLHxV+u2/umRcnynOo+mfi9kp86DnNbPyont/lDz+oN5tUMS7dggCvM7w4be Pscjtlz8ulCqLXZvO06KV2uDwXcpT9mU3swl0R/lo9NVx1gqCvHkShSE6quzRzFEwkxDQBMBo5rpE CJGCZfH/7MTiuHFU/vT8+fNIKZyP2JFyPe7uUpMh++1b2fzBLwM64MvcHXsZNqnL3KBCU9KoBAw3E wq/9O8cY8lmzsTHemdolr2h/nDUPd7bmAPQyd7ueoD/TxK3tvOHU5wo18iLRMA4SpbVIWcmLXkalP seMau+bxw==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkiAB-0005SE-UC; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:32:23 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki9E-0004rn-Q1; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:27 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 07/10] secretmem: add memcg accounting Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:46 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-8-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013125_128067_11B3A86F X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.91 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Roman Gushchin Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt --- mm/filemap.c | 3 ++- mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 249cf489f5df..cf7f1dc9f4b8 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page, page->mapping = mapping; page->index = offset; - if (!huge) { + if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) { error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp); if (error) goto error; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 52a900a135a5..2390901d3ff7 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx { static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order) +{ + int err; + + err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order); + if (err) + return err; + + /* + * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat + * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes + */ + mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, + PAGE_SIZE << order); + + return 0; +} + +static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order) +{ + + mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, + -PAGE_SIZE << order); + memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order); +} + static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) { unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER); @@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); if (err) goto err_cma_release; + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages); + if (err) + goto err_memcg_uncharge; + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE); if (err) @@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp) * won't fail */ set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); +err_memcg_uncharge: + secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); err_cma_release: cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages); return err; @@ -302,6 +335,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, int i; set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages); + secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER); for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) clear_highpage(page + i); From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:47 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947931 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DD05C63777 for ; 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Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h index 70e7db9f94fe..907a6734059c 100644 --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page); +bool secretmem_active(void); #else @@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "power.h" @@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void) bool hibernation_available(void) { - return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); + return nohibernate == 0 && + !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) && + !secretmem_active(); } /** diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 2390901d3ff7..7236f4d9458a 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx { static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users); +} + static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order) { int err; @@ -179,6 +186,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + atomic_dec(&secretmem_users); + return 0; +} + static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; @@ -201,6 +214,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, }; @@ -318,6 +332,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; fd_install(fd, file); + atomic_inc(&secretmem_users); return fd; err_put_fd: From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:48 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947933 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4CE4C64E7B for ; Thu, 3 Dec 2020 06:34:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E5CD2067D for ; 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Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkiAV-0005gj-Hv; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:32:43 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki9b-00057u-Rg; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:31:50 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:48 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-10-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013148_123014_107AD4E3 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.49 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann --- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- mm/secretmem.c | 3 +++ scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 8 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h @@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ #define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT #define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index c52ab1c4a755..109e6681b8fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -446,3 +446,4 @@ 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 i386 watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index f3270a9ef467..742cf17d7725 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 common watch_mount sys_watch_mount +442 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 6d55324363ab..f9d93fbf9b69 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags); asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned int at_flags, int watch_fd, int watch_id); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned long flags); /* * Architecture-specific system calls diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h index 5df46517260e..51151888f330 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h @@ -861,9 +861,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise) #define __NR_watch_mount 441 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 442 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 442 +#define __NR_syscalls 443 /* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 7236f4d9458a..b8a32954ac68 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str) unsigned long reserved_size; int err; + if (!can_set_direct_map()) + return 0; + reserved_size = memparse(str, NULL); if (!reserved_size) return 0; diff --git a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755 --- a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh +++ b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */ From patchwork Thu Dec 3 06:29:49 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11947935 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B3A9C63777 for ; 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bh=MxGen5kEpDWrVo0bS9vWb7sp55yr3hSGGTftb21vlT8=; b=YxPJrEh8Tdt67KrOnkzlb+EZw gA86QxaMcxDXUhr3YjJa78rcjCUAI+nROwVYvX4H7Ci+RvX00pkmtYGTpsOKVCZub7zcIZZ8xLsuB qrzZqK7hXZsyQHf8cpMPodBbhBrd7LZR0XDCXLrCTc067+s+uQF6mQCPIt8EF5E++DafiOoiSKOTH AV3EQUZ9CEl2tBWKXP5O5IxDwaGy5cDncRwPIJTqNWxIa4OkDKPQVKppMauujtvKcgusuH7B/a/QK tOg+ZuqwVkq+XDygkuOkGQ0C+gYRoURkRc72Zjj7UGKDapA2BUDjOvRExpaUk1s2m9GhJL1s++XsP jIX/wnvOg==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkiAj-0005rA-1X; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:32:57 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kki9l-0005E2-Tx; Thu, 03 Dec 2020 06:32:01 +0000 From: Mike Rapoport Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=permerror (bad message/signature format) To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v14 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:29:49 +0200 Message-Id: <20201203062949.5484-11-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201203_013158_345462_C17DD20A X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 24.35 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Mark Rutland , David Hildenbrand , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Dave Hansen , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Christopher Lameter , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox , Mike Rapoport , Ingo Molnar , Michael Kerrisk , Arnd Bergmann , James Bottomley , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Walmsley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dan Williams , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Palmer Dabbelt , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Mike Rapoport Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore index 9a35c3f6a557..c8deddc81e7a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore @@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.* diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile index 62fb15f286ee..9ab98946fbf2 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79578dfd13e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2020 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "../kselftest.h" + +#define fail(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_fail(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define pass(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_pass(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define skip(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_skip(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +#ifdef __NR_memfd_secret + +#include + +#define PATTERN 0x55 + +static const int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; +static const int mode = MAP_SHARED; + +static unsigned long page_size; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_cur; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_max; + +static int memfd_secret(unsigned long flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, flags); +} + +static void test_file_apis(int fd) +{ + char buf[64]; + + if ((read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (pread(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0) || + (pwrite(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0)) + fail("unexpected file IO\n"); + else + pass("file IO is blocked as expected\n"); +} + +static void test_mlock_limit(int fd) +{ + size_t len; + char *mem; + + len = mlock_limit_cur; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + munmap(mem, len); + + len = mlock_limit_max * 2; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem != MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unexpected mlock limit violation\n"); + munmap(mem, len); + return; + } + + pass("mlock limit is respected\n"); +} + +static void try_process_vm_read(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + struct iovec liov, riov; + char buf[64]; + char *mem; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + liov.iov_len = riov.iov_len = sizeof(buf); + liov.iov_base = buf; + riov.iov_base = mem; + + if (process_vm_readv(getppid(), &liov, 1, &riov, 1, 0) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + exit(KSFT_SKIP); + exit(KSFT_PASS); + } + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void try_ptrace(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + pid_t ppid = getppid(); + int status; + char *mem; + long ret; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + perror("pipe write"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ppid, 0, 0); + if (ret) { + perror("ptrace_attach"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = waitpid(ppid, &status, WUNTRACED); + if ((ret != ppid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) { + fprintf(stderr, "weird waitppid result %ld stat %x\n", + ret, status); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + if (ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, ppid, mem, 0)) + exit(KSFT_PASS); + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void check_child_status(pid_t pid, const char *name) +{ + int status; + + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + + if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_SKIP) { + skip("%s is not supported\n", name); + return; + } + + if ((WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_PASS) || + WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + pass("%s is blocked as expected\n", name); + return; + } + + fail("%s: unexpected memory access\n", name); +} + +static void test_remote_access(int fd, const char *name, + void (*func)(int fd, int pipefd[2])) +{ + int pipefd[2]; + pid_t pid; + char *mem; + + if (pipe(pipefd)) { + fail("pipe failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + fail("fork failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + if (pid == 0) { + func(fd, pipefd); + return; + } + + mem = mmap(NULL, page_size, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("Unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + + ftruncate(fd, page_size); + memset(mem, PATTERN, page_size); + + if (write(pipefd[1], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + check_child_status(pid, name); +} + +static void test_process_vm_read(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "process_vm_read", try_process_vm_read); +} + +static void test_ptrace(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "ptrace", try_ptrace); +} + +static int set_cap_limits(rlim_t max) +{ + struct rlimit new; + cap_t cap = cap_init(); + + new.rlim_cur = max; + new.rlim_max = max; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &new)) { + perror("setrlimit() returns error"); + return -1; + } + + /* drop capabilities including CAP_IPC_LOCK */ + if (cap_set_proc(cap)) { + perror("cap_set_proc() returns error"); + return -2; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void prepare(void) +{ + struct rlimit rlim; + + page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); + if (!page_size) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Failed to get page size %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to detect mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + mlock_limit_cur = rlim.rlim_cur; + mlock_limit_max = rlim.rlim_max; + + printf("page_size: %ld, mlock.soft: %ld, mlock.hard: %ld\n", + page_size, mlock_limit_cur, mlock_limit_max); + + if (page_size > mlock_limit_cur) + mlock_limit_cur = page_size; + if (page_size > mlock_limit_max) + mlock_limit_max = page_size; + + if (set_cap_limits(mlock_limit_max)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to set mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); +} + +#define NUM_TESTS 4 + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int fd; + + prepare(); + + ksft_print_header(); + ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS); + + fd = memfd_secret(0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + ksft_exit_skip("memfd_secret is not supported\n"); + else + ksft_exit_fail_msg("memfd_secret failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + } + + test_mlock_limit(fd); + test_file_apis(fd); + test_process_vm_read(fd); + test_ptrace(fd); + + close(fd); + + ksft_exit(!ksft_get_fail_cnt()); +} + +#else /* __NR_memfd_secret */ + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("skip: skipping memfd_secret test (missing __NR_memfd_secret)\n"); + return KSFT_SKIP; +} + +#endif /* __NR_memfd_secret */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests index e953f3cd9664..95a67382f132 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests @@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode