From patchwork Mon Nov 12 16:06:25 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mika Westerberg X-Patchwork-Id: 10678939 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C072E13BF for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADD3E2909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9F18C29237; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 149B82909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730176AbeKMCAl (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:41 -0500 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:39016 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729891AbeKMCA1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:27 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:34 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,495,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="273385346" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:29 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 6B05B17F; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 18:06:28 +0200 (EET) From: Mika Westerberg To: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Joerg Roedel , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Ashok Raj , Bjorn Helgaas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Jacob jun Pan , Andreas Noever , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , Lukas Wunner , Christian Kellner , Mario.Limonciello@dell.com, Anthony Wong , Mika Westerberg , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 1/4] PCI / ACPI: Identify external PCI devices Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:06:25 +0300 Message-Id: <20181112160628.86620-2-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> References: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-acpi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Recent systems shipping Windows 10 version 1803 or later may support IOMMU based DMA protection. This means that the platform utilizes IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks over externally exposed PCIe root ports (typically Thunderbolt ports) The system BIOS marks these PCIe root ports as being externally facing ports by implementing following ACPI _DSD under the root port in question: Name (_DSD, Package () { ToUUID ("efcc06cc-73ac-4bc3-bff0-76143807c389"), Package () { Package () {"ExternalFacingPort", 1}, Package () {"UID", 0 } } }) This is documented [1]. To make it possible for IOMMU code to identify these external devices, we look up for this property and mark all children devices (including the root port itself) with a new flag (->is_external). [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/pci/dsd-for-pcie-root-ports#identifying-externally-exposed-pcie-root-ports Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/acpi/property.c | 3 +++ drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/pci/probe.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/pci.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/property.c b/drivers/acpi/property.c index 8c7c4583b52d..4bdad32f62c8 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/property.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/property.c @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ static const guid_t prp_guids[] = { /* Hotplug in D3 GUID: 6211e2c0-58a3-4af3-90e1-927a4e0c55a4 */ GUID_INIT(0x6211e2c0, 0x58a3, 0x4af3, 0x90, 0xe1, 0x92, 0x7a, 0x4e, 0x0c, 0x55, 0xa4), + /* External facing port GUID: efcc06cc-73ac-4bc3-bff0-76143807c389 */ + GUID_INIT(0xefcc06cc, 0x73ac, 0x4bc3, + 0xbf, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x14, 0x38, 0x07, 0xc3, 0x89), }; static const guid_t ads_guid = diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c b/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c index 2a4aa6468579..fc193279d24d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c @@ -789,6 +789,18 @@ static void pci_acpi_optimize_delay(struct pci_dev *pdev, ACPI_FREE(obj); } +static void pci_acpi_set_external(struct pci_dev *dev) +{ + u8 val; + + if (pci_pcie_type(dev) != PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT) + return; + if (device_property_read_u8(&dev->dev, "ExternalFacingPort", &val)) + return; + + dev->is_external = val == 1; +} + static void pci_acpi_setup(struct device *dev) { struct pci_dev *pci_dev = to_pci_dev(dev); @@ -803,6 +815,7 @@ static void pci_acpi_setup(struct device *dev) set_dev_node(dev, node); pci_acpi_optimize_delay(pci_dev, adev->handle); + pci_acpi_set_external(pci_dev); pci_acpi_add_pm_notifier(adev, pci_dev); if (!adev->wakeup.flags.valid) diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c index b1c05b5054a0..f1db195a4a90 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/probe.c +++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c @@ -1378,6 +1378,27 @@ static void set_pcie_thunderbolt(struct pci_dev *dev) } } +static void set_pcie_external(struct pci_dev *dev) +{ + struct pci_dev *parent; + + /* + * Walk up the device hierarchy and check for any upstream + * bridge that has is_external_facing set to true. This means + * the hierarchy is below PCIe port that is exposed externally + * (such as Thunderbolt). + */ + parent = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); + while (parent) { + if (parent->is_external) { + dev->is_external = true; + break; + } + + parent = pci_upstream_bridge(parent); + } +} + /** * pci_ext_cfg_is_aliased - Is ext config space just an alias of std config? * @dev: PCI device @@ -1638,6 +1659,8 @@ int pci_setup_device(struct pci_dev *dev) /* Need to have dev->cfg_size ready */ set_pcie_thunderbolt(dev); + set_pcie_external(dev); + /* "Unknown power state" */ dev->current_state = PCI_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index 11c71c4ecf75..e1c0e032da55 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ struct pci_dev { unsigned int is_hotplug_bridge:1; unsigned int shpc_managed:1; /* SHPC owned by shpchp */ unsigned int is_thunderbolt:1; /* Thunderbolt controller */ + unsigned int is_external:1; /* External PCIe device */ unsigned int __aer_firmware_first_valid:1; unsigned int __aer_firmware_first:1; unsigned int broken_intx_masking:1; /* INTx masking can't be used */ From patchwork Mon Nov 12 16:06:26 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mika Westerberg X-Patchwork-Id: 10678945 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6248213BF for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:07:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 520E02909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:07:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4618A29237; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:07:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B08AC2909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728103AbeKMCA0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:26 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:26426 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729371AbeKMCA0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:26 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:34 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,495,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="279166938" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:29 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 7E30F84B; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 18:06:28 +0200 (EET) From: Mika Westerberg To: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Joerg Roedel , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Ashok Raj , Bjorn Helgaas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Jacob jun Pan , Andreas Noever , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , Lukas Wunner , Christian Kellner , Mario.Limonciello@dell.com, Anthony Wong , Mika Westerberg , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Force IOMMU on for platform opt in hint Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:06:26 +0300 Message-Id: <20181112160628.86620-3-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> References: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-acpi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Lu Baolu Intel VT-d spec added a new DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG flag in DMAR ACPI table for BIOS to report compliance about platform initiated DMA restricted to RMRR ranges when transferring control to the OS. The OS treats this as a hint that the IOMMU should be enabled to prevent DMA attacks from possible malicious devices. A use of this flag is Kernel DMA protection for Thunderbolt[1] which in practice means that IOMMU should be enabled for PCIe devices connected to the Thunderbolt ports. With IOMMU enabled for these devices, all DMA operations are limited in the range reserved for it, thus the DMA attacks are prevented. All these devices are enumerated in the PCI/PCIe module and marked with an is_external flag. This forces IOMMU to be enabled if DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG is set in DMAR ACPI table and there are PCIe devices marked as is_external in the system. This can be turned off by adding "intel_iommu=off" in the kernel command line, if any problems are found. [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt Cc: Ashok Raj Cc: Jacob Pan Cc: Sohil Mehta Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj --- drivers/iommu/dmar.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/dmar.h | 8 ++++++ 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c index d9c748b6f9e4..1edf2a251336 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/dmar.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/dmar.c @@ -2042,3 +2042,28 @@ int dmar_device_remove(acpi_handle handle) { return dmar_device_hotplug(handle, false); } + +/* + * dmar_platform_optin - Is %DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG set in DMAR table + * + * Returns true if the platform has %DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG set in + * the ACPI DMAR table. This means that the platform boot firmware has made + * sure no device can issue DMA outside of RMRR regions. + */ +bool dmar_platform_optin(void) +{ + struct acpi_table_dmar *dmar; + acpi_status status; + bool ret; + + status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_DMAR, 0, + (struct acpi_table_header **)&dmar); + if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) + return false; + + ret = !!(dmar->flags & DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN); + acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)dmar); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dmar_platform_optin); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index f3ccf025108b..ada786b05a59 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static int rwbf_quirk; */ static int force_on = 0; int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; +static int no_platform_optin; #define ROOT_ENTRY_NR (VTD_PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct root_entry)) @@ -503,6 +504,7 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str) pr_info("IOMMU enabled\n"); } else if (!strncmp(str, "off", 3)) { dmar_disabled = 1; + no_platform_optin = 1; pr_info("IOMMU disabled\n"); } else if (!strncmp(str, "igfx_off", 8)) { dmar_map_gfx = 0; @@ -2895,6 +2897,14 @@ static int iommu_should_identity_map(struct device *dev, int startup) if (device_is_rmrr_locked(dev)) return 0; + /* + * Prevent any device marked as an external one from getting + * placed into the statically identity mapping domain. This + * is done because external devices are always untrusted. + */ + if (pdev->is_external) + return 0; + if ((iommu_identity_mapping & IDENTMAP_AZALIA) && IS_AZALIA(pdev)) return 1; @@ -4728,14 +4738,55 @@ const struct attribute_group *intel_iommu_groups[] = { NULL, }; +static int __init platform_optin_force_iommu(void) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL; + bool has_ext_dev = false; + + if (!dmar_platform_optin() || no_platform_optin) + return 0; + + for_each_pci_dev(pdev) { + if (pdev->is_external) { + has_ext_dev = true; + break; + } + } + + if (!has_ext_dev) + return 0; + + if (no_iommu || dmar_disabled) + pr_info("Intel-IOMMU force enabled due to platform opt in\n"); + + /* + * If Intel-IOMMU is disabled by default, we will apply + * identity map for all devices except those marked as + * unsafe external devices. + */ + if (dmar_disabled) + iommu_identity_mapping |= IDENTMAP_ALL; + + dmar_disabled = 0; +#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_SWIOTLB) + swiotlb = 0; +#endif + no_iommu = 0; + + return 1; +} + int __init intel_iommu_init(void) { int ret = -ENODEV; struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; struct intel_iommu *iommu; - /* VT-d is required for a TXT/tboot launch, so enforce that */ - force_on = tboot_force_iommu(); + /* + * Intel IOMMU is required for a TXT/tboot launch or platform + * opt in, so enforce that. + */ + force_on = tboot_force_iommu() || platform_optin_force_iommu(); if (iommu_init_mempool()) { if (force_on) diff --git a/include/linux/dmar.h b/include/linux/dmar.h index 843a41ba7e28..f8af1d770520 100644 --- a/include/linux/dmar.h +++ b/include/linux/dmar.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct acpi_dmar_header; /* DMAR Flags */ #define DMAR_INTR_REMAP 0x1 #define DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT 0x2 +#define DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN 0x4 struct intel_iommu; @@ -170,6 +171,8 @@ static inline int dmar_ir_hotplug(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru, bool insert) { return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP */ +extern bool dmar_platform_optin(void); + #else /* CONFIG_DMAR_TABLE */ static inline int dmar_device_add(void *handle) @@ -182,6 +185,11 @@ static inline int dmar_device_remove(void *handle) return 0; } +static inline bool dmar_platform_optin(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_DMAR_TABLE */ struct irte { From patchwork Mon Nov 12 16:06:27 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mika Westerberg X-Patchwork-Id: 10678937 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53BDB15A6 for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 441DE2909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 37DA32913D; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFADA29488 for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729982AbeKMCA2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:28 -0500 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:13073 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729371AbeKMCA1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:27 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:34 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,495,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="99615344" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:29 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 9034184E; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 18:06:28 +0200 (EET) From: Mika Westerberg To: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Joerg Roedel , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Ashok Raj , Bjorn Helgaas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Jacob jun Pan , Andreas Noever , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , Lukas Wunner , Christian Kellner , Mario.Limonciello@dell.com, Anthony Wong , Mika Westerberg , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 3/4] iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for external devices Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:06:27 +0300 Message-Id: <20181112160628.86620-4-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> References: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-acpi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Currently Linux automatically enables ATS (Address Translation Service) for any device that supports it (and IOMMU is turned on). ATS is used to accelerate DMA access as the device can cache translations locally so there is no need to do full translation on IOMMU side. However, as pointed out in [1] ATS can be used to bypass IOMMU based security completely by simply sending PCIe read/write transaction with AT (Address Translation) field set to "translated". To mitigate this modify the Intel IOMMU code so that it does not enable ATS for any device that is marked as being external. In case this turns out to cause performance issues we may selectively allow ATS based on user decision but currently use big hammer and disable it completely to be on the safe side. [1] https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274352 Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj --- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index ada786b05a59..b79788da6971 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -1473,7 +1473,8 @@ static void iommu_enable_dev_iotlb(struct device_domain_info *info) if (info->pri_supported && !pci_reset_pri(pdev) && !pci_enable_pri(pdev, 32)) info->pri_enabled = 1; #endif - if (info->ats_supported && !pci_enable_ats(pdev, VTD_PAGE_SHIFT)) { + if (!pdev->is_external && info->ats_supported && + !pci_enable_ats(pdev, VTD_PAGE_SHIFT)) { info->ats_enabled = 1; domain_update_iotlb(info->domain); info->ats_qdep = pci_ats_queue_depth(pdev); From patchwork Mon Nov 12 16:06:28 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mika Westerberg X-Patchwork-Id: 10678931 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08CFB13BF for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAB662913D for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id DEDDB29488; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAFD62909F for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730065AbeKMCAa (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:30 -0500 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:39016 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729995AbeKMCA3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:29 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:34 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,495,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="273385348" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:29 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 9AD90863; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 18:06:28 +0200 (EET) From: Mika Westerberg To: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Joerg Roedel , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Ashok Raj , Bjorn Helgaas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Jacob jun Pan , Andreas Noever , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , Lukas Wunner , Christian Kellner , Mario.Limonciello@dell.com, Anthony Wong , Mika Westerberg , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/4] thunderbolt: Export IOMMU based DMA protection support to userspace Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:06:28 +0300 Message-Id: <20181112160628.86620-5-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> References: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-acpi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or later may support a feature called Kernel DMA protection [1]. In practice this means that Thunderbolt connected devices are placed behind an IOMMU during the whole time it is connected (including during boot) making Thunderbolt security levels redundant. Some of these systems still have Thunderbolt security level set to "user" in order to support OS downgrade (the older version of the OS might not support IOMMU based DMA protection so connecting a device still relies on user approval then). Export this information to userspace by introducing a new sysfs attribute (iommu_dma_protection). Based on it userspace tools can make more accurate decision whether or not authorize the connected device. In addition update Thunderbolt documentation regarding IOMMU based DMA protection. [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt | 9 ++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c | 17 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt index 151584a1f950..b21fba14689b 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt @@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ Description: Holds a comma separated list of device unique_ids that If a device is authorized automatically during boot its boot attribute is set to 1. +What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/iommu_dma_protection +Date: Mar 2019 +KernelVersion: 4.21 +Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org +Description: This attribute tells whether the system uses IOMMU + for DMA protection. Value of 1 means IOMMU is used 0 means + it is not (DMA protection is solely based on Thunderbolt + security levels). + What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security Date: Sep 2017 KernelVersion: 4.13 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst index 35fccba6a9a6..ccac2596a49f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst @@ -133,6 +133,29 @@ If the user still wants to connect the device they can either approve the device without a key or write a new key and write 1 to the ``authorized`` file to get the new key stored on the device NVM. +DMA protection utilizing IOMMU +------------------------------ +Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or later may support a +feature called `Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt 3`_. This means that +Thunderbolt security is handled by an IOMMU so connected devices cannot +access memory regions outside of what is allocated for them by drivers. +When Linux is running on such system it automatically enables IOMMU if not +enabled by the user already. These systems can be identified by reading +``1`` from ``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/domainX/iommu_dma_protection`` +attribute. + +The driver does not do anything special in this case but because DMA +protection is handled by the IOMMU, security levels (if set) are +redundant. For this reason some systems ship with security level set to +``none``. Other systems have security level set to ``user`` in order to +support downgrade to older Windows, so users who want to automatically +authorize devices when IOMMU DMA protection is enabled can use the +following ``udev`` rule:: + + ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="thunderbolt", ATTRS{iommu_dma_protection}=="1", ATTR{authorized}=="0", ATTR{authorized}="1" + +.. _Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt 3: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt + Upgrading NVM on Thunderbolt device or host ------------------------------------------- Since most of the functionality is handled in firmware running on a diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c index 93e562f18d40..7416bdbd8576 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ */ #include +#include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -236,6 +238,20 @@ static ssize_t boot_acl_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(boot_acl); +static ssize_t iommu_dma_protection_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + /* + * Kernel DMA protection is a feature where Thunderbolt security is + * handled natively using IOMMU. It is enabled when IOMMU is + * enabled and ACPI DMAR table has DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN set. + */ + return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", + iommu_present(&pci_bus_type) && dmar_platform_optin()); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(iommu_dma_protection); + static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { @@ -251,6 +267,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(security); static struct attribute *domain_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_boot_acl.attr, + &dev_attr_iommu_dma_protection.attr, &dev_attr_security.attr, NULL, };