From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:05 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074985 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DCD2C43381 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C89A364E88 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232532AbhBHK7L (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:11 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:12406 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229482AbhBHKzR (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:55:17 -0500 IronPort-SDR: J0bpbQlWSWxl/VDO8hhQt1qHbz/258o6W5t3ue5fUvBRg7HSxKAmEFrrmACdpgs6jEBsEqdlmI rC8gdEM/h6Jw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="160848436" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="160848436" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:26 -0800 IronPort-SDR: orGDpGs+hGtjow9s1rUhvWUjBnI+3rAOYL5ZrOH1AIEcI7FSywQoKSB3RU8xEr2sAaNqS2921+ DLR9WESVnuYA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374450953" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:23 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:05 +1300 Message-Id: <8e6a1963b3666215223c247193e5a3e09a8c3698.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Move SGX_LC feature bit to CPUID dependency table to make clearing all SGX feature bits easier. Also remove clear_sgx_caps() since it is just a wrapper of setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX) now. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- Hi Jarkko, Dave, I had your Acked-by in v3. Jarkko said this patch should be before the patch which introduced SGX1/SGX2 bit, since it is improvement of existing code, so I switched the order. I assumed I can still have your Acked-by because code change was just due to patch re-ordering. v3->v4: - Changed patch order with the patch that introduced new SGX1/SGX2 bits, since it is improvement of existing code, per Jarkko. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 12 +++--------- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c index 42af31b64c2c..d40f8e0a54ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW }, { X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA }, + { X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, X86_FEATURE_SGX }, {} }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index 3b1b01f2b248..27533a6e04fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c @@ -93,15 +93,9 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ -static void clear_sgx_caps(void) -{ - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX); - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); -} - static int __init nosgx(char *str) { - clear_sgx_caps(); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX); return 0; } @@ -116,7 +110,7 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX); - clear_sgx_caps(); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX); return; } @@ -177,6 +171,6 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) { if (enable_sgx) pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n"); - clear_sgx_caps(); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX); } } From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:06 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074981 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88958C43381 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DAB2064E7A for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232734AbhBHK5p (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:57:45 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:12408 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232768AbhBHKzR (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:55:17 -0500 IronPort-SDR: EVi5Epjrh7LKnzQK2UIVMGdSZSaWcnRKU7z3xlvFInyEje8CtoS1gzKUnMD/Kd8uXFIaF8gzK5 RqFi/kYYYqtw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="160848439" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="160848439" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:30 -0800 IronPort-SDR: +wJPqe9YHzqc4+stkICHgYNTAX0B5MZUJPnz5waZi4L97shtKzGIonXs2sFSVXLKaccLkVcdz1 w20I20sH7OBg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374450958" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:26 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:06 +1300 Message-Id: <3e7f24c8d5341f71df6f96fabe6c6ca564c90bcb.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add SGX1 and SGX2 feature flags, via CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX, as scattered features, since adding a new leaf for only two bits would be wasteful. As part of virtualizing SGX, KVM will expose the SGX CPUID leafs to its guest, and to do so correctly needs to query hardware and kernel support for SGX1 and SGX2. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Acked-by: Dave Hansen --- v3->v4: - Refined the comments of SGX1/SGX2 bits, per comments from Dave, Paolo, Sean and Jarkko. - Moved this patch after the patch which moves SGX_LC to cpuid_deps[] table too. v2->v3: - Split moving SGX_LC to cpuid-deps table logic into separate patch. --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 84b887825f12..0432e7303996 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT (11*32+ 6) /* #AC for split lock */ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c index d40f8e0a54ce..defda61f372d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA }, { X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, X86_FEATURE_SGX }, + { X86_FEATURE_SGX1, X86_FEATURE_SGX }, + { X86_FEATURE_SGX2, X86_FEATURE_SGX1 }, {} }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index 236924930bf0..fea0df867d18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x00000010, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000010, 3 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SGX1, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x00000012, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SGX2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x00000012, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CPUID_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:07 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074983 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52BB8C433DB for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02C3464E7A for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230033AbhBHK6x (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:58:53 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:62994 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232775AbhBHKzR (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:55:17 -0500 IronPort-SDR: Iv24ftczEL7NUwYHqnEcAwWe/dX7oCkPk78ad/pIhfs0qyC/En7tX+cG1Mm7vzPsQdpqLkEqNI QgaGJnMEMkTA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="160848445" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="160848445" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:33 -0800 IronPort-SDR: mzgSUtQLWnHJQdC9ufAdPrvGCYLTesftui++2oicehInSSFZUjDnkJuZRSqCzFDns5ON/DxWAT 00PWTHg6MuZg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374450966" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:30 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:07 +1300 Message-Id: <237b82e13e52191409577acddf9b4b28b16bf1bc.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Jarkko Sakkinen Encapsulate the snippet in sgx_free_epc_page() concerning EREMOVE to sgx_reset_epc_page(), which is a static helper function for sgx_encl_release(). It's the only function existing, which deals with initialized pages. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Moved WARN() on SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag to sgx_reset_epc_page(), since the patch to remove the WARN() in v3 was removed. Dave and Sean were not convinced, and Sean "tripped more than once in the past during one of the many rebases of the virtual EPC and EPC cgroup branches". - Added a comment in sgx_reset_epc_page() to explain sgx_free_epc_page() now won't do EREMOVE and is expecting EPC page already in clean slate, per Dave. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 20a2dd5ba2b4..a758c7870f06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -381,6 +381,23 @@ const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { .access = sgx_vma_access, }; + +/* + * Place the page in uninitialized state. Called by in sgx_encl_release() + * before sgx_free_epc_page(), which requires EPC page is already in clean + * slate. + */ +static void sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED); + + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret)) + return; +} + /** * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance * @kref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl @@ -404,6 +421,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) continue; + sgx_reset_epc_page(entry->epc_page); sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); encl->secs_child_cnt--; entry->epc_page = NULL; @@ -415,6 +433,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) xa_destroy(&encl->page_array); if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) { + sgx_reset_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; } @@ -423,6 +442,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page, list); list_del(&va_page->list); + sgx_reset_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); kfree(va_page); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 8df81a3ed945..21c2ffa13870 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -598,18 +598,14 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim) * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page * @page: an EPC page * - * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages. + * Put the EPC page back to the list of free pages. It's the callers + * responsibility to make sure that the page is in uninitialized state In other + * words, do EREMOVE, EWB or whatever operation is necessary before calling + * this function. */ void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page) { struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; - int ret; - - WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED); - - ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); - if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret)) - return; spin_lock(§ion->lock); list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:08 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075017 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B98BC433DB for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:03:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A80564E7B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:03:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232951AbhBHLCL (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:02:11 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:12408 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232724AbhBHK5e (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:57:34 -0500 IronPort-SDR: CNbOY0pMCjEp4sWdBD8A0m8jS09QKDZeJDve9K4MGawH+tCdxefNa0FK5KUhZ3bJi4VvnfbO5x NdQXhDWUeahQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="160848447" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="160848447" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:37 -0800 IronPort-SDR: 6P61UZizKkR5CojD8/MKiSjDZ6UECYyFwBCXXug/ZAWDcsmBdQf0SgH9ljgR+lTVV7e5JgEGCT Yku6NfzTaJrA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374450973" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:33 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:08 +1300 Message-Id: <3c1edb38e95843eb9bf3fcbbec6cf9bdd9b3e7b1.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson SGX driver can accurately track how enclave pages are used. This enables SECS to be specifically targeted and EREMOVE'd only after all child pages have been EREMOVE'd. This ensures that SGX driver will never encounter SGX_CHILD_PRESENT in normal operation. Virtual EPC is different. The host does not track how EPC pages are used by the guest, so it cannot guarantee EREMOVE success. It might, for instance, encounter a SECS with a non-zero child count. Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT for use by SGX virtualization to assert EREMOVE failures are expected, but only due to SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Refined the commit msg, per Dave. v2->v3: - Changed from 'Enclave has child' to 'SECS has child', per Jarkko. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h index dd7602c44c72..abf99bb71fdc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h @@ -26,12 +26,14 @@ * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not * been completed yet. + * %SGX_CHILD_PRESENT SECS has child pages present in the EPC. * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received */ enum sgx_return_code { SGX_NOT_TRACKED = 11, + SGX_CHILD_PRESENT = 13, SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16, SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128, }; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:09 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075019 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75691C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:04:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 202E664E27 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:04:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231466AbhBHLDO (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:03:14 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:62994 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232726AbhBHK5e (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:57:34 -0500 IronPort-SDR: Nn9261rbXOzrVEKUjoqfDf9N5Gpbt+bxDhOduUOLzcfhUEhWFATDeDsObELwso6hckZLIJ8F/b /mp2RH909JZA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="160848448" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="160848448" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:41 -0800 IronPort-SDR: Upd9U00CUkcO6fL5K9DoYZde3BEBFhZohE0hOYCtyzO8fJG/LZUGmC1tbGWZdNt4ADt6Rw/Fkb XIKPd4xLP61w== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374450980" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:37 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:09 +1300 Message-Id: <11a923a314accf36a82aac4b676310a4802f5c75.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw" EPC without an associated enclave. The intended and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM Kconfig. More specifically, to allocate a virtual EPC instance with particular size, the userspace hypervisor opens the device node, and uses mmap() with the intended size to get an address range of virtual EPC. Then it may use the address range to create one KVM memory slot as virtual EPC for guest. Implement the "raw" EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via /dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages: - Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as just another memory backend for guests. - EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth. The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Removed #define pr_fmt(fmt), per Dave and Jarkko. - Added one line summary next to copyright, and also updated copyright, per Dave. - Added comment to explain zombie_secs_pages and the lock, per Dave. - Removed !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) in sgx_vepc_init(), per Dave. - Removed virt.h, per Dave, and put the declaration of sgx_vepc_init() to arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h. v2->v3: - Changed from /dev/sgx_virt_epc to /dev/sgx_vepc, per Jarkko. Accordingly, renamed 'sgx_virt_epc_xx' to 'sgx_vepc_xx' for various functions and structrues. - Changed CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION to CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, per Dave. v1->v2: - Added one paragraph to explain fops of virtual EPC, per Jarkko's suggestion. - Moved change to sgx_init() out of this patch to a separate patch, as stated in cover letter. - In sgx_virt_epc_init(), return error if VMX is not supported, or CONFIG_KVM_INTEL is not enabled, because there's no point to create /dev/sgx_virt_epc if KVM is not supported. - Removed 'struct mm_struct *mm' in 'struct sgx_virt_epc', and related logic in sgx_virt_epc_open/release/mmap(), per Dave's comment. - Renamed 'virtual_epc_zombie_pages' and 'virt_epc_lock' to 'zombie_secs_pages' 'zombie_secs_pages_lock', per Dave's suggestion. - Changed __sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_free_epc_page() due to Jarkko's patch removes EREMOVE in sgx_free_epc_page(). - Changed all struct sgx_virt_epc *epc to struct sgx_virt_epc *vepc. - In __sgx_virt_epc_fault(), changed comment to use WARN_ON() to make sure vepc->lock has already been hold, per Dave's suggestion. - In sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), added comments to explain SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT is not expected; and changed to use WARN_ONCE() to dump actual error code, per Dave's comment. - Removed NULL page check in sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), per Dave's comment. --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 259 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 281 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 21f851179ff0..ccb35d14c297 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1951,6 +1951,18 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config X86_SGX_KVM + bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) Virtualization" + depends on X86_SGX && KVM_INTEL + help + + Enables KVM guests to create SGX enclaves. + + This includes support to expose "raw" unreclaimable enclave memory to + guests via a device node, e.g. /dev/sgx_vepc. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile index 91d3dc784a29..9c1656779b2a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile @@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ obj-y += \ encl.o \ ioctl.o \ main.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += virt.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 5fa42d143feb..1bff93be7bf4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM +int __init sgx_vepc_init(void); +#else +static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +#endif + #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..47542140f8c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Device driver to expose SGX enclave memory to KVM guests. + * + * Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "encls.h" +#include "sgx.h" + +struct sgx_vepc { + struct xarray page_array; + struct mutex lock; +}; + +/* + * Temporary SECS pages that cannot be EREMOVE'd due to having child in other + * virtual EPC instances, and the lock to protect it. + */ +static struct mutex zombie_secs_pages_lock; +static struct list_head zombie_secs_pages; + +static int __sgx_vepc_fault(struct sgx_vepc *vepc, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + unsigned long index, pfn; + int ret; + + WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&vepc->lock)); + + /* Calculate index of EPC page in virtual EPC's page_array */ + index = vma->vm_pgoff + PFN_DOWN(addr - vma->vm_start); + + epc_page = xa_load(&vepc->page_array, index); + if (epc_page) + return 0; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(vepc, false); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return PTR_ERR(epc_page); + + ret = xa_err(xa_store(&vepc->page_array, index, epc_page, GFP_KERNEL)); + if (ret) + goto err_free; + + pfn = PFN_DOWN(sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page)); + + ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, pfn); + if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto err_delete; + } + + return 0; + +err_delete: + xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index); +err_free: + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return ret; +} + +static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; + struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data; + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&vepc->lock); + ret = __sgx_vepc_fault(vepc, vma, vmf->address); + mutex_unlock(&vepc->lock); + + if (!ret) + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + + if (ret == -EBUSY && (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY)) { + mmap_read_unlock(vma->vm_mm); + return VM_FAULT_RETRY; + } + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; +} + +const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vepc_vm_ops = { + .fault = sgx_vepc_fault, +}; + +static int sgx_vepc_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct sgx_vepc *vepc = file->private_data; + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) + return -EINVAL; + + vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vepc_vm_ops; + /* Don't copy VMA in fork() */ + vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_IO | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_DONTCOPY; + vma->vm_private_data = vepc; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_vepc_free_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + int ret; + + /* + * Take a previously guest-owned EPC page and return it to the + * general EPC page pool. + * + * Guests can not be trusted to have left this page in a good + * state, so run EREMOVE on the page unconditionally. In the + * case that a guest properly EREMOVE'd this page, a superfluous + * EREMOVE is harmless. + */ + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (ret) { + /* + * Only SGX_CHILD_PRESENT is expected, which is because of + * EREMOVE'ing an SECS still with child, in which case it can + * be handled by EREMOVE'ing the SECS again after all pages in + * virtual EPC have been EREMOVE'd. See comments in below in + * sgx_vepc_release(). + * + * The user of virtual EPC (KVM) needs to guarantee there's no + * logical processor is still running in the enclave in guest, + * otherwise EREMOVE will get SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT which cannot be + * handled here. + */ + WARN_ONCE(ret != SGX_CHILD_PRESENT, + "EREMOVE (EPC page 0x%lx): unexpected error: %d\n", + sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page), ret); + return ret; + } + + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_vepc_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_vepc *vepc = file->private_data; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, *tmp, *entry; + unsigned long index; + + LIST_HEAD(secs_pages); + + xa_for_each(&vepc->page_array, index, entry) { + /* + * Remove all normal, child pages. sgx_vepc_free_page() + * will fail if EREMOVE fails, but this is OK and expected on + * SECS pages. Those can only be EREMOVE'd *after* all their + * child pages. Retries below will clean them up. + */ + if (sgx_vepc_free_page(entry)) + continue; + + xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index); + } + + /* + * Retry EREMOVE'ing pages. This will clean up any SECS pages that + * only had children in this 'epc' area. + */ + xa_for_each(&vepc->page_array, index, entry) { + epc_page = entry; + /* + * An EREMOVE failure here means that the SECS page still + * has children. But, since all children in this 'sgx_vepc' + * have been removed, the SECS page must have a child on + * another instance. + */ + if (sgx_vepc_free_page(epc_page)) + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &secs_pages); + + xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index); + } + + /* + * SECS pages are "pinned" by child pages, an unpinned once all + * children have been EREMOVE'd. A child page in this instance + * may have pinned an SECS page encountered in an earlier release(), + * creating a zombie. Since some children were EREMOVE'd above, + * try to EREMOVE all zombies in the hopes that one was unpinned. + */ + mutex_lock(&zombie_secs_pages_lock); + list_for_each_entry_safe(epc_page, tmp, &zombie_secs_pages, list) { + /* + * Speculatively remove the page from the list of zombies, + * if the page is successfully EREMOVE it will be added to + * the list of free pages. If EREMOVE fails, throw the page + * on the local list, which will be spliced on at the end. + */ + list_del(&epc_page->list); + + if (sgx_vepc_free_page(epc_page)) + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &secs_pages); + } + + if (!list_empty(&secs_pages)) + list_splice_tail(&secs_pages, &zombie_secs_pages); + mutex_unlock(&zombie_secs_pages_lock); + + kfree(vepc); + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_vepc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_vepc *vepc; + + vepc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sgx_vepc), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vepc) + return -ENOMEM; + mutex_init(&vepc->lock); + xa_init(&vepc->page_array); + + file->private_data = vepc; + + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations sgx_vepc_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = sgx_vepc_open, + .release = sgx_vepc_release, + .mmap = sgx_vepc_mmap, +}; + +static struct miscdevice sgx_vepc_dev = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_vepc", + .nodename = "sgx_vepc", + .fops = &sgx_vepc_fops, +}; + +int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) +{ + /* SGX virtualization requires KVM to work */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + return -ENODEV; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&zombie_secs_pages); + mutex_init(&zombie_secs_pages_lock); + + return misc_register(&sgx_vepc_dev); +} From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:41 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074987 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1BE5C433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A59BA64E7B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232686AbhBHK7Y (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:24 -0500 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:15510 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232783AbhBHKzw (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:55:52 -0500 IronPort-SDR: PWMJ0SIfY2oYkhVB59/YyqkYYJ70oqzlzcRTgs8daPWpAs5rYQEa/DZ2HDmfc0pOARX3NviVIu MV0vJC9A3Zww== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="266525349" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="266525349" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:57 -0800 IronPort-SDR: UhA65xgOe8ZgwV/uSCd2FIKweCN700qJ5M3CtITL6fbJC3qW9BNAAsEkztAMtp9GME+5gdp9F4 pEW6V2iUSeag== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451052" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:54:53 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jethro@fortanix.com, b.thiel@posteo.de, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 06/26] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:41 +1300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson The kernel will currently disable all SGX support if the hardware does not support launch control. Make it more permissive to allow SGX virtualization on systems without Launch Control support. This will allow KVM to expose SGX to guests that have less-strict requirements on the availability of flexible launch control. Improve error message to distinguish between three cases. There are two cases where SGX support is completely disabled: 1) SGX has been disabled completely by the BIOS 2) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is unavailable (because of Kconfig). One where it is partially available: 3) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is supported. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Removed cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX1) check in enable_sgx_any, since it logically is not related to KVM SGX series, per Sean. - Changed declaration of variables to be in reverse-christmas tree style, per Jarkko. v2->v3: - Added to use 'enable_sgx_any', per Dave. - Changed to call clear_cpu_cap() directly, rather than using clear_sgx_caps() and clear_sgx_lc(). - Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, instead of CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION. v1->v2: - Refined commit message per Dave's comments. - Added check to only enable SGX virtualization when VMX is supported, per Dave's comment. - Refined error msg print to explicitly call out SGX virtualization will be supported when LC is locked by BIOS, per Dave's comment. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index 27533a6e04fa..96c370284913 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c @@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ early_param("nosgx", nosgx); void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { bool tboot = tboot_enabled(); - bool enable_sgx; + bool enable_sgx_any, enable_sgx_kvm, enable_sgx_driver; + bool enable_vmx; u64 msr; if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { @@ -114,13 +115,21 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } + enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL); + /* - * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control - * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written. + * Separate out SGX driver enabling from KVM. This allows KVM + * guests to use SGX even if the kernel SGX driver refuses to + * use it. This happens if flexible Faunch Control is not + * available. */ - enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && - cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX); + enable_sgx_any = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX); + enable_sgx_driver = enable_sgx_any && + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); + enable_sgx_kvm = enable_sgx_any && enable_vmx && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM); if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) goto update_caps; @@ -136,15 +145,18 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code. */ - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) { + if (enable_vmx) { msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; if (tboot) msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; } - if (enable_sgx) - msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) { + msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED; + if (enable_sgx_driver) + msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + } wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr); @@ -167,10 +179,29 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } update_sgx: - if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) || - !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) { - if (enable_sgx) - pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n"); + if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED)) { + if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) + pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS.\n"); clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX); + return; + } + + /* + * VMX feature bit may be cleared due to being disabled in BIOS, + * in which case SGX virtualization cannot be supported either. + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && enable_sgx_kvm) { + pr_err_once("SGX virtualization disabled due to lack of VMX.\n"); + enable_sgx_kvm = 0; + } + + if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) && enable_sgx_driver) { + if (!enable_sgx_kvm) { + pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Disable SGX.\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX); + } else { + pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Support SGX virtualization only.\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); + } } } From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:50 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074989 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5171C4332E for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CFAF64EBF for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:59:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232778AbhBHK7j (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:39 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:43443 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232355AbhBHK4L (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:56:11 -0500 IronPort-SDR: XlUfOj9wsNXwwT1lCsO6Bb5gThI1jNujf7BeIm1AVAoLhLTFoLnPdaunUz2F4hD5/idQfhC8Ol itu2xf5CbChg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443914" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443914" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:11 -0800 IronPort-SDR: Em9CndnNVGahP3+qIfN9s3RLblnIwF636GsEgyS56HLCEhsdHYAKpZKUQca3Ds/rHLtxsD88a9 0zKKZ7B9e2eA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451086" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:07 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:50 +1300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Modify sgx_init() to always try to initialize the virtual EPC driver, even if the SGX driver is disabled. The SGX driver might be disabled if SGX Launch Control is in locked mode, or not supported in the hardware at all. This allows (non-Linux) guests that support non-LC configurations to use SGX. Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Added comment to explain virtual EPC driver can be supported in both cases that SGX driver is not supported, or failed to initialize, per Dave and Jarkko. - Removed "virt.h" inclusion since it was removed in previous patch, per Dave. v2->v3: - Changed from sgx_virt_epc_init() to sgx_vepc_init(). --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 21c2ffa13870..60a7a630212e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -712,7 +712,15 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) goto err_page_cache; } - ret = sgx_drv_init(); + /* + * Always try to initialize the native *and* KVM drivers. + * The KVM driver is less picky than the native one and + * can function if the native one is not supported on the + * current system or fails to initialize. + * + * Error out only if both fail to initialize. + */ + ret = !!sgx_drv_init() & !!sgx_vepc_init(); if (ret) goto err_kthread; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:51 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074991 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C472C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:00:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1082F64E7D for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:00:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232798AbhBHK7r (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:47 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:51142 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232386AbhBHK4L (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:56:11 -0500 IronPort-SDR: QDaezTRX+Rsn0Tx9zgw1ed2O/usJjRHKxf5yPkf2jpr7qElKrqKxxJP+tXA5FakQqU+s6S/zJi FdyJIJbWXtaQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443920" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443920" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:14 -0800 IronPort-SDR: mvfypsleTcmGasnch8v01Nb4SGTNCllclAyDUG0KvZ59ROJkYEu2mYEWwuqPwW9x6gatGFvmBu flGtoYB4DA6Q== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451091" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:11 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 08/26] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:51 +1300 Message-Id: <66eaee0542b76b7088fe5e7bf294e4de66c70256.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Expose SGX architectural structures, as KVM will use many of the architectural constants and structs to virtualize SGX. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - No code change. - Added Jarkko's Acked-by. Restored Dave's Acked-by. v2->v3: - Added "Expose SGX architectural structures, as..." to commit message, per Jarkko. --- arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} | 0 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} (100%) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h similarity index 100% rename from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h rename to arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index a758c7870f06..855a68aadda1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include "arch.h" +#include #include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" #include "sgx.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 1bff93be7bf4..161d2d8ac3b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include "arch.h" +#include #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h index 592c1ccf4576..4dd39a003f40 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) #define __packed __attribute__((packed)) -#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h" #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h" #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h" From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:52 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074999 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1284DC433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:01:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7C5A64E0B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:01:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232760AbhBHLBN (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:01:13 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:51021 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232685AbhBHK5C (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:57:02 -0500 IronPort-SDR: hHkqj1WaMoMr86P/JR3VvjkSiQMWH5LzG/FgGG/Zn1hxS1VWGNUsvegZSCMEZWXIYpdUUctbCN 3HWqLllD698w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443924" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443924" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:17 -0800 IronPort-SDR: z+C5tCHMwk1T+89RwAqHw3g9XKj19+6yn2jz3sFLZcM1AlGLcO7xLzd26PEn2GTEOn9+GErTon P7QM4Ur42Xiw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451097" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:14 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 09/26] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:52 +1300 Message-Id: <15e75afe5424d01727400cd87fa832342bd2a662.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Move the ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h so that they can be used by KVM. And because they're architectural. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 --------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h index abf99bb71fdc..3dbe7aacf552 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h @@ -22,6 +22,21 @@ /* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */ #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) +enum sgx_encls_function { + ECREATE = 0x00, + EADD = 0x01, + EINIT = 0x02, + EREMOVE = 0x03, + EDGBRD = 0x04, + EDGBWR = 0x05, + EEXTEND = 0x06, + ELDU = 0x08, + EBLOCK = 0x09, + EPA = 0x0A, + EWB = 0x0B, + ETRACK = 0x0C, +}; + /** * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index 443188fe7e70..be5c49689980 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -11,21 +11,6 @@ #include #include "sgx.h" -enum sgx_encls_function { - ECREATE = 0x00, - EADD = 0x01, - EINIT = 0x02, - EREMOVE = 0x03, - EDGBRD = 0x04, - EDGBWR = 0x05, - EEXTEND = 0x06, - ELDU = 0x08, - EBLOCK = 0x09, - EPA = 0x0A, - EWB = 0x0B, - ETRACK = 0x0C, -}; - /** * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr * From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:53 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075021 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7399C433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:05:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5938464E54 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:05:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232382AbhBHLFM (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:05:12 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:43443 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232837AbhBHK6W (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:58:22 -0500 IronPort-SDR: NAtJpM4vWl2bbLGlbZgfbx8Qa5AMHVylLkCbhgdwkO1eKHSuXzz5wuRPcF735KP7VlmH8CoiLS GvdS9Elv3byw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443931" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443931" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:21 -0800 IronPort-SDR: yyJ+SO9MgqzZ9M3pfQ6PiRrT5gY4+ZK6m/pZulHhSjQhZy9gpd5KGbaPDS8rJL/gkg7JkOTKEJ ViXRf7G/AmWg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451109" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:17 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 10/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:53 +1300 Message-Id: <99ee8ed32c15885ec6e9be52f15d479ac0a7eb4e.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Define the ENCLS leafs that are available with SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). The leafs will be used by KVM to conditionally expose SGX2 capabilities to guests. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h index 3dbe7aacf552..756c8dacc52a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx_arch.h @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ enum sgx_encls_function { EPA = 0x0A, EWB = 0x0B, ETRACK = 0x0C, + EAUG = 0x0D, + EMODPR = 0x0E, + EMODT = 0x0F, }; /** From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:54 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075023 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E29C0C433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:05:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EF0E64E27 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:05:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232692AbhBHLFa (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:05:30 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:51142 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232838AbhBHK6W (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:58:22 -0500 IronPort-SDR: KuwfAocQ7LtLg2HV+sBXauSUP0J34gqxlIOWwCYs28U6pqlQzEyJfBpTx7YPAB8O3Y/z89BLQP yIVodEftRlcw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443937" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443937" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:24 -0800 IronPort-SDR: O+73kYbz8QVzP6qEFIdlQOkTohnMiuVC2Ra+ACyYqHnk895Iox1LO/JDy5/0Vfzd9eXZQa/MwE kr2+xOVNHpwA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451114" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:21 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 11/26] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:54 +1300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a helper to extract the fault indicator from an encoded ENCLS return value. SGX virtualization will also need to detect ENCLS faults. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - No code change. Added Jarkko's Acked-by. v2->v3: - Changed commenting style for return value, per Jarkko. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 ++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h index be5c49689980..3219d011ee28 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -40,6 +40,19 @@ } while (0); \ } +/* + * encls_faulted() - Check if an ENCLS leaf faulted given an error code + * @ret the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call + * + * Return: + * - true: ENCLS leaf faulted. + * - false: Otherwise. + */ +static inline bool encls_faulted(int ret) +{ + return ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG; +} + /** * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS function call @@ -50,7 +63,7 @@ */ static inline bool encls_failed(int ret) { - if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + if (encls_faulted(ret)) return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF; return !!ret; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 90a5caf76939..e5977752c7be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, } } - if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) { + if (encls_faulted(ret)) { if (encls_failed(ret)) ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT"); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:55 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075075 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1027C43381 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:11:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1DCB64E0B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:11:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232913AbhBHLKo (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:10:44 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:51021 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232623AbhBHK7R (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:17 -0500 IronPort-SDR: g34+VM4h2p+vGcwD6AyURrBvdsXx7P06Dz8yPNZSvUqEmp4s9iuljSKVfx8Ic/vp5RNOLLD85+ jWhdZQVStPmA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443943" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443943" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:27 -0800 IronPort-SDR: JY08++9qG1TIAIVr6f8WAHDx9K7KnRL9KGlZH70sxCNZcj6ePcm+E8rNwzo+ClQKFvnHh9IG4Y mzXluJsakigg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451131" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:24 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 12/26] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:55 +1300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Add a helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs. SGX virtualization also needs to update those MSRs based on guest's "virtual" SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn before EINIT from guest. Acked-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Patch rebase due to sgx/virt.h was removed per Dave, and sgx_vepc_init() declaration was moved to sgx/sgx.h. - Added Jarkko's Ack-by. Restored Dave's Acked-by. v2->v3: - Added comment for sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(), per Jarkko and Dave. --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 5 ++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index e5977752c7be..1bae754268d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, void *token) { u64 mrsigner[4]; - int i, j, k; + int i, j; void *addr; int ret; @@ -544,8 +544,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, preempt_disable(); - for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + k, mrsigner[k]); + sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(mrsigner); ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 60a7a630212e..dadd7acac4ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -696,6 +696,21 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void) return true; } + +/* + * Update the SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSRs to the values specified by caller. + * Bare-metal driver requires to update them to hash of enclave's signer + * before EINIT. KVM needs to update them to guest's virtual MSR values + * before doing EINIT from guest. + */ +void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]); +} + static int __init sgx_init(void) { int ret; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h index 161d2d8ac3b6..371fdf3b16a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -92,4 +92,6 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) } #endif +void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash); + #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:56 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075069 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFBD7C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 779AB64E4F for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232698AbhBHLJW (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:09:22 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:43443 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231945AbhBHLAJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:00:09 -0500 IronPort-SDR: dEAEj1D3joI8yLDttEaeQY0/Iw4uNGui6Aq9C2wRBya1IkA62V6wLLkGO3dMmaxFlzNg/LQpFy wYnuiZRaywwA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443951" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443951" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:31 -0800 IronPort-SDR: VXJCg/JieLrHZNWjIRBpA6dA+Pi+jlPxViDJ5CiKEqWW+y7gnIwd7KyT81UNm3XJv2pUoAKjbc xx4NXM4m3ycA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451162" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:28 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 13/26] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:56 +1300 Message-Id: <9d79e09b0f0d24c002a91bd95edace2d09045c10.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson The host kernel must intercept ECREATE to be able to impose policies on guests. When it does this, the host kernel runs ECREATE against the userspace mapping of the virtualized EPC. Provide wrappers around __ecreate() and __einit() to hide the ugliness of overloading the ENCLS return value to encode multiple error formats in a single int. KVM will trap-and-execute ECREATE and EINIT as part of SGX virtualization, and on an exception, KVM needs the trapnr so that it can inject the correct fault into the guest. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Added one new line before last return in sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko. v2->v3: - Added kdoc for sgx_virt_ecreate() and sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko. - Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM. --- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 16 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8a3ea3e1efbe --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_H +#define _ASM_X86_SGX_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM +struct sgx_pageinfo; + +int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs, + int *trapnr); +int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token, + void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr); +#endif + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c index 47542140f8c1..016bad7cff8d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c @@ -257,3 +257,97 @@ int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) return misc_register(&sgx_vepc_dev); } + +/** + * sgx_virt_ecreate() - Run ECREATE on behalf of guest + * @pageinfo: Pointer to PAGEINFO structure + * @secs: Userspace pointer to SECS page + * @trapnr: trap number injected to guest in case of ECREATE error + * + * Run ECREATE on behalf of guest after KVM traps ECREATE for the purpose + * of enforcing policies of guest's enclaves, and return the trap number + * which should be injected to guest in case of any ECREATE error. + * + * Return: + * - 0: ECREATE was successful. + * - -EFAULT: ECREATE returned error. + */ +int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs, + int *trapnr) +{ + int ret; + + /* + * @secs is userspace address, and it's not guaranteed @secs points at + * an actual EPC page. It's also possible to generate a kernel mapping + * to physical EPC page by resolving PFN but using __uaccess_xx() is + * simpler. + */ + __uaccess_begin(); + ret = __ecreate(pageinfo, (void *)secs); + __uaccess_end(); + + if (encls_faulted(ret)) { + *trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_virt_ecreate); + +static int __sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token, + void __user *secs) +{ + int ret; + + __uaccess_begin(); + ret = __einit((void *)sigstruct, (void *)token, (void *)secs); + __uaccess_end(); + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_virt_einit() - Run EINIT on behalf of guest + * @sigstruct: Userspace pointer to SIGSTRUCT structure + * @token: Userspace pointer to EINITTOKEN structure + * @secs: Userspace pointer to SECS page + * @lepubkeyhash: Pointer to guest's *virtual* SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSR + * values + * @trapnr: trap number injected to guest in case of EINIT error + * + * Run EINIT on behalf of guest after KVM traps EINIT. If SGX_LC is available + * in host, SGX driver may rewrite the hardware values at wish, therefore KVM + * needs to update hardware values to guest's virtual MSR values in order to + * ensure EINIT is executed with expected hardware values. + * + * Return: + * - 0: EINIT was successful. + * - -EFAULT: EINIT returned error. + */ +int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token, + void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr) +{ + int ret; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) { + ret = __sgx_virt_einit(sigstruct, token, secs); + } else { + preempt_disable(); + + sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(lepubkeyhash); + + ret = __sgx_virt_einit(sigstruct, token, secs); + preempt_enable(); + } + + if (encls_faulted(ret)) { + *trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_virt_einit); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:54:57 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075061 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D577C433DB for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3699F64E3F for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232944AbhBHLH0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:07:26 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:51142 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232761AbhBHLAL (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:00:11 -0500 IronPort-SDR: X1GZ0FmUt5ZfVJljGTUOBYEqGBm3jr8t8XgjLAA0A1CgypK8VGB2K7NNKruNZ5qWUQnVp5OFCW /0ZzoatTiXfw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="161443955" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="161443955" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:35 -0800 IronPort-SDR: uSOfhIYwTppqMv/TelnmejtAxmjHXS6Qki/AApoQhgfa3uxLXojdWzai1ZvYPjPNeZU0tmOEft JI4ffTUzICaw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451172" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:31 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 14/26] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:54:57 +1300 Message-Id: <35385e6246415d788be0ad282e5c95ede12bbe70.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson And extract sgx_set_attribute() out of sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() and export it as symbol for KVM to use. Provisioning key is sensitive. SGX driver only allows to create enclave which can access provisioning key when enclave creator has permission to open /dev/sgx_provision. It should apply to VM as well, as provisioning key is platform specific, thus unrestricted VM can also potentially compromise provisioning key. Move provisioning device creation out of sgx_drv_init() to sgx_init() as preparation for adding SGX virtualization support, so that even SGX driver is not enabled due to flexible launch control is not available, SGX virtualization can still be enabled, and use it to restrict VM's capability of being able to access provisioning key. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - No code change. Added Jarkko's Reviewed-by. v2->v3: - Added kdoc for sgx_set_attribute(), per Jarkko. --- arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 17 ---------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 16 ++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h index 8a3ea3e1efbe..d67afb051db3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ #include +int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes, + unsigned int attribute_fd); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM struct sgx_pageinfo; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index f2eac41bb4ff..4f3241109bda 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, }; -const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, -}; - static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, .name = "sgx_enclave", @@ -144,13 +140,6 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, }; -static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { - .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, - .name = "sgx_provision", - .nodename = "sgx_provision", - .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, -}; - int __init sgx_drv_init(void) { unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; @@ -184,11 +173,5 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void) if (ret) return ret; - ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision); - if (ret) { - misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave); - return ret; - } - return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 1bae754268d1..4714de12422d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ /* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -664,24 +665,11 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) { struct sgx_enclave_provision params; - struct file *file; if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; - file = fget(params.fd); - if (!file) - return -EINVAL; - - if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) { - fput(file); - return -EINVAL; - } - - encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY; - - fput(file); - return 0; + return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd); } long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index dadd7acac4ad..d3c97c0fee3d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -1,14 +1,18 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "driver.h" #include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" @@ -711,6 +715,51 @@ void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]); } +const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, +}; + +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_provision", + .nodename = "sgx_provision", + .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, +}; + +/** + * sgx_set_attribute() - Update allowed attributes given file descriptor + * @allowed_attributes: Pointer to allowed enclave attributes + * @attribute_fd: File descriptor for specific attribute + * + * Append enclave attribute indicated by file descriptor to allowed + * attributes. Currently only SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY indicated by + * /dev/sgx_provision is supported. + * + * Return: + * -0: SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY is appended to allowed_attributes + * -EINVAL: Invalid, or not supported file descriptor + */ +int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes, + unsigned int attribute_fd) +{ + struct file *file; + + file = fget(attribute_fd); + if (!file) + return -EINVAL; + + if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) { + fput(file); + return -EINVAL; + } + + *allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY; + + fput(file); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_set_attribute); + static int __init sgx_init(void) { int ret; @@ -727,6 +776,10 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) goto err_page_cache; } + ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision); + if (ret) + goto err_kthread; + /* * Always try to initialize the native *and* KVM drivers. * The KVM driver is less picky than the native one and @@ -737,10 +790,13 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void) */ ret = !!sgx_drv_init() & !!sgx_vepc_init(); if (ret) - goto err_kthread; + goto err_provision; return 0; +err_provision: + misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_provision); + err_kthread: kthread_stop(ksgxd_tsk); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:25 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074997 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57478C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:01:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 057AF64E7A for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:01:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232877AbhBHLAa (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:00:30 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50171 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232681AbhBHK4p (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:56:45 -0500 IronPort-SDR: NH0V+0w+1zwRsVjuDhW+koWixl4yOgXi7JBU0T3CTDI3398gIMM9spjtbGSnyDCtoOqhm7kpdZ 2bpbCu3pYa/w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758495" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758495" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:51 -0800 IronPort-SDR: FpMu8iQI4A9/s3WYcEEACrIp1wGM1HY/CByD+KOsMuq3KtxQpDluRqYnPrULIa68k1Kn3AlP3A 41goxQ4QI63w== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451192" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:47 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:25 +1300 Message-Id: <0daea2891388cd30097cc62a7a5644b321ae80a5.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32). The full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16. Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and required dedicated handling. I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY bit was a somewhat viable approach. But even with only a single bit to worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx. Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off flows isn't scalable. Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 42 +++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 25 +++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 0fbb46990dfc..f112c2482887 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -3311,7 +3311,11 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); enum vm_entry_failure_code entry_failure_code; bool evaluate_pending_interrupts; - u32 exit_reason, failed_index; + u32 failed_index; + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = { + .basic = -1, + .failed_vmentry = 1, + }; if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu)) kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(vcpu); @@ -3363,7 +3367,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12, &entry_failure_code)) { - exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; + exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code; goto vmentry_fail_vmexit; } @@ -3374,7 +3378,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset += vmcs12->tsc_offset; if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, &entry_failure_code)) { - exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; + exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code; goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode; } @@ -3384,7 +3388,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count); if (failed_index) { - exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL; + exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL; vmcs12->exit_qualification = failed_index; goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode; } @@ -3452,7 +3456,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT; load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12); - vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason | VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY; + vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full; if (enable_shadow_vmcs || vmx->nested.hv_evmcs) vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true; return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT; @@ -5540,7 +5544,12 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); fail: - nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason, + /* + * This is effectively a reflected VM-Exit, as opposed to a synthesized + * nested VM-Exit. Pass the original exit reason, i.e. don't hardcode + * EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC as the exit reason. + */ + nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason.full, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu), vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu)); return 1; @@ -5608,7 +5617,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * MSR bitmap. This may be the case even when L0 doesn't use MSR bitmaps. */ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 exit_reason) + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason) { u32 msr_index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu); gpa_t bitmap; @@ -5622,7 +5632,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * First we need to figure out which of the four to use: */ bitmap = vmcs12->msr_bitmap; - if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE) + if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE) bitmap += 2048; if (msr_index >= 0xc0000000) { msr_index -= 0xc0000000; @@ -5759,11 +5769,12 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_mtf(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) * Return true if L0 wants to handle an exit from L2 regardless of whether or not * L1 wants the exit. Only call this when in is_guest_mode (L2). */ -static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) +static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason) { u32 intr_info; - switch ((u16)exit_reason) { + switch (exit_reason.basic) { case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI: intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu); if (is_nmi(intr_info)) @@ -5819,12 +5830,13 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) * Return 1 if L1 wants to intercept an exit from L2. Only call this when in * is_guest_mode (L2). */ -static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) +static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason) { struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); u32 intr_info; - switch ((u16)exit_reason) { + switch (exit_reason.basic) { case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI: intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu); if (is_nmi(intr_info)) @@ -5943,7 +5955,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason) bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); - u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason; + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason; unsigned long exit_qual; u32 exit_intr_info; @@ -5962,7 +5974,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto reflect_vmexit; } - trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX); + trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(exit_reason.full, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX); /* If L0 (KVM) wants the exit, it trumps L1's desires. */ if (nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(vcpu, exit_reason)) @@ -5988,7 +6000,7 @@ bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu); reflect_vmexit: - nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, exit_intr_info, exit_qual); + nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason.full, exit_intr_info, exit_qual); return true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 2af05d3b0590..746b87375aff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value. */ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) || - to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 @@ -5667,7 +5667,7 @@ static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); *info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu); - if (!(vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) { + if (!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry) { *info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info; *intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu); if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info)) @@ -5911,8 +5911,9 @@ void dump_vmcs(void) static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); - u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason; + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason; u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info; + u16 exit_handler_index; /* * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more @@ -5954,11 +5955,11 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) return 1; } - if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) { + if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) { dump_vmcs(); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY; vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason - = exit_reason; + = exit_reason.full; vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu; return 0; } @@ -5980,18 +5981,18 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) * will cause infinite loop. */ if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) && - (exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI && - exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION && - exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL && - exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS && - exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) { + (exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI && + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION && + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL && + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS && + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) { vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV; vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3; vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info; - vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason; + vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason.full; vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification; - if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { vcpu->run->internal.ndata++; vcpu->run->internal.data[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS); @@ -6023,38 +6024,39 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE) return 1; - if (exit_reason >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers) + if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers) goto unexpected_vmexit; #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE) + if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE) return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu); - else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER) + else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER) return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu); - else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW) + else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW) return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu); - else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT) + else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT) return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu); - else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_HLT) + else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_HLT) return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu); - else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) + else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu); #endif - exit_reason = array_index_nospec(exit_reason, - kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers); - if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason]) + exit_handler_index = array_index_nospec((u16)exit_reason.basic, + kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers); + if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index]) goto unexpected_vmexit; - return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu); + return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index](vcpu); unexpected_vmexit: - vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n", exit_reason); + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n", + exit_reason.full); dump_vmcs(); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON; vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2; - vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason; + vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full; vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu; return 0; } @@ -6373,9 +6375,9 @@ static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); - if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT) + if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT) handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu); - else if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI) + else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI) handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx); } @@ -6567,7 +6569,7 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp) static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason) { + switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) { case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE: return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu); case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER: @@ -6766,17 +6768,17 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0; if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) { - vmx->exit_reason = 0xdead; + vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead; return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; } - vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON); - if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY)) + vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON); + if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY)) kvm_machine_check(); - trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX); + trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason.full, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX); - if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) + if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 9d3a557949ac..903f246b5abd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -70,6 +70,29 @@ struct pt_desc { struct pt_ctx guest; }; +union vmx_exit_reason { + struct { + u32 basic : 16; + u32 reserved16 : 1; + u32 reserved17 : 1; + u32 reserved18 : 1; + u32 reserved19 : 1; + u32 reserved20 : 1; + u32 reserved21 : 1; + u32 reserved22 : 1; + u32 reserved23 : 1; + u32 reserved24 : 1; + u32 reserved25 : 1; + u32 reserved26 : 1; + u32 sgx_enclave_mode : 1; + u32 smi_pending_mtf : 1; + u32 smi_from_vmx_root : 1; + u32 reserved30 : 1; + u32 failed_vmentry : 1; + }; + u32 full; +}; + /* * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu. @@ -244,7 +267,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { int vpid; bool emulation_required; - u32 exit_reason; + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason; /* Posted interrupt descriptor */ struct pi_desc pi_desc; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:26 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074993 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 112B3C43381 for ; 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d="scan'208";a="374451213" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:51 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 16/26] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:26 +1300 Message-Id: <59f541560bba9d65a0b113beaf034125082fb61f.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Export the gva_to_gpa() helpers for use by SGX virtualization when executing ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest. To execute ECREATE and EINIT, KVM must obtain the GPA of the target Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA. Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel. SGX virtualization will also use gva_to_gpa() to obtain HVAs for non-EPC pages in order to pass user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT, which avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 9a8969a6dd06..5ca7b181a3ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5891,6 +5891,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops.get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0; return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read); gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, struct x86_exception *exception) @@ -5907,6 +5908,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK; return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write); /* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:27 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12074995 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF5C8C43331 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:00:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5AAF64E9A for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:00:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232728AbhBHLAK (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:00:10 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50182 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232714AbhBHK4v (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:56:51 -0500 IronPort-SDR: zPRX7gej9GCZG3hAOpN709OhkLTGnZV0C9Tole0/ZDDyPnXXyoInPS6AqePtKYTm4JGFyo0IVS tJBdGWDLUPuQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758522" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758522" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:59 -0800 IronPort-SDR: IDZ72MfHjzrBJhfJApMrow1HHLg3+9g5OJOvr9aUS821nOQFjBwbJXjd4k8d1EIUbh+hAEbVP7 9m0o60QL3ZxA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451220" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:55:55 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 17/26] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:27 +1300 Message-Id: <53fc18528336ea8b1b40b3caa7d6d6c490a80f40.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Page faults that are signaled by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), as opposed to the traditional IA32/EPT page tables, set an SGX bit in the error code to indicate that the #PF was induced by SGX. KVM will need to emulate this behavior as part of its trap-and-execute scheme for virtualizing SGX Launch Control, e.g. to inject SGX-induced #PFs if EINIT faults in the host, and to support live migration. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3d6616f6f6ef..9581f81e62a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage; #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4 #define PFERR_PK_BIT 5 +#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33 @@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage; #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT) #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT) #define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT) +#define PFERR_SGX_MASK (1U << PFERR_SGX_BIT) #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT) #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT) From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075027 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99804C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49E4F64E37 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232873AbhBHLGf (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:06:35 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50165 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232301AbhBHK67 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:58:59 -0500 IronPort-SDR: 7lFxqxaRTp0ITIYzA6OqlEJrGEzA5PB4IlKM/M8qospYZ1UtqwjepWX4vrBbj6OggHvFds7k9N my85nXmTUAgg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758535" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758535" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:04 -0800 IronPort-SDR: kbephgv7OGD6DGxTJOyjSwsJTCeRyC3bYZqpYuq/G8B9mSTLq+cFix/Sfg1opbV+ciqvS2Qnll zb0JQMwNWOWg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451237" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:00 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:28 +1300 Message-Id: <3189b8090d5d1d4547dade6d1a7feb034af3c2c6.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true. Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature. Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features. More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/jxCOLG+HUO4QlZ@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 13036cf0b912..f8037fab8950 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops. */ -u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; +u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps); static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted) @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted) } #define F feature_bit +#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0) static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find( struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index) @@ -331,13 +332,13 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return r; } -static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */ +static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf) { const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32); struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry; reverse_cpuid_check(leaf); - kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask; cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index, &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx); @@ -345,6 +346,26 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg); } +static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +{ + /* Use the "init" variant for scattered leafs. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS); + + kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask; + + __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf); +} + +static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_init(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +{ + /* Use the "mask" variant for hardwared-defined leafs. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS); + + kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask; + + __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf); +} + void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) { unsigned int f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0; @@ -355,12 +376,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) unsigned int f_gbpages = 0; unsigned int f_lm = 0; #endif + memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps)); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) > sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability)); memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, - sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps)); + sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps))); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX, /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index dc921d76e42e..2041e2f07347 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -7,7 +7,20 @@ #include #include -extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; +/* + * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are scattered in the kernel, but need to + * be directly used by KVM. Note, these word values conflict with the kernel's + * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those. + */ +enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { + NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS, + + NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, +}; + +#define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f) ((w)*32 + (f)) + +extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); @@ -83,6 +96,20 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0); } +/* + * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word + * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions. + */ +static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) +{ + return x86_feature; +} + +static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature) +{ + return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32; +} + /* * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition. Features contain * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined @@ -91,6 +118,8 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) */ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature) { + x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature); + reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32); return 1 << (x86_feature & 31); } @@ -99,7 +128,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature) static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf]; @@ -291,7 +320,7 @@ static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature); @@ -299,7 +328,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature) static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature); @@ -307,7 +336,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature) static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07080C433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:06:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B57FA64E27 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:06:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232274AbhBHLGF (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:06:05 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50171 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232313AbhBHK7B (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:01 -0500 IronPort-SDR: uUHAg1/swLms2t64q0WWYTFrPeHrVUK50BmC4eKeepFyXzlnSCIdjSoPpYBbHPKlXceSRZ/EdN OghUuZOB9Zig== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758547" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758547" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:08 -0800 IronPort-SDR: IrTH/Dm7ltdauHXyg7O4gqEFESTvmglOGoceLM5/UtpkUDGRM5FoWRalXTnShZEZAOOmgrMwtX pR0d6f85S0ww== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451258" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:04 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:29 +1300 Message-Id: <7bbd2c06c8fc21f5b7e44254e693285be1c2cdaa.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Define a new KVM-only feature word for advertising and querying SGX sub-features in CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX. Because SGX1 and SGX2 are scattered in the kernel's feature word, they need to be translated so that the bit numbers match those of hardware. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 2041e2f07347..f55701ef58fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -13,13 +13,18 @@ * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those. */ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { - NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS, + CPUID_12_EAX = NCAPINTS, + NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS, NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, }; #define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f) ((w)*32 + (f)) +/* Intel-defined SGX sub-features, CPUID level 0x12 (EAX). */ +#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX1 X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 0) +#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX2 X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1) + extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); @@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX}, }; /* @@ -102,6 +108,11 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) */ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) { + if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1) + return __X86_FEATURE_SGX1; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2) + return __X86_FEATURE_SGX2; + return x86_feature; } From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075059 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F826C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6BAB64E37 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:07:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232917AbhBHLHL (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:07:11 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50182 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230020AbhBHK7G (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:59:06 -0500 IronPort-SDR: +Fg7dU+n/kxy2kXJSmm8j9wNmXYOQtdcUNv1+hUg1PK3MxbvCCZtAU5Ho/s9st8mR0bTI8boXp o0nMgKBrnt0g== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758552" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758552" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:12 -0800 IronPort-SDR: QaM+Qtxo7QPJk4TS2glWCkkBOAiYxXxxGK3zX5cBOh5qts/bltWWBOLro1ON1XeZ9CNF+h4kAf YtPE/qy6NDhA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451275" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:08 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 20/26] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:30 +1300 Message-Id: <398cb629888edfa50266ad1629a1dacff9b37b49.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX enclave. In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment, wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave. When exiting an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and then reloaded when re-entering the enclave. E.g. after an instruction based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave). To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR. Define the new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE. Clear the bit in exit_reason so that checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g. "if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work. KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits from enclaves. The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit. The inability to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit check. For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD, e.g. RDRAND_EXITING. But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation, e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit from an enclave. This is architecturally accurate for instruction VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable to killing the VM. In practice, only broken or particularly stupid guests should ever encounter this behavior. Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before getting to skip_emulated_instruction. [1] Impossible for all practical purposes. Not truly impossible since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme. [2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h index 38ca445a8429..e99021a00eb9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h @@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ enum vmcs_field { #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS 0x00000002 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_SMI 0x00000004 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI 0x00000008 +#define GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR 0x00000010 /* GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE flags */ #define GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h index ada955c5ebb6..c7a18eb2a074 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY 0x80000000 +#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE 0x08000000 #define EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI 0 #define EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index f112c2482887..562eab7b0a51 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4126,6 +4126,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, { /* update exit information fields: */ vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason; + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode) + vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE; vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification; vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 746b87375aff..4cb8a3f1374c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1561,12 +1561,18 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data) static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len) { + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode) { + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + return false; + } return true; } static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason; unsigned long rip, orig_rip; + u32 instr_len; /* * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on @@ -1577,9 +1583,33 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value. */ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) || - to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + + /* + * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM + * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the + * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not + * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit. But, because + * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave, + * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur. + * + * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions + * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves + * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept. + * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr + * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot. + * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on + * a VM-Exit from an enclave. + */ + if (!instr_len) + goto rip_updated; + + WARN(exit_reason.sgx_enclave_mode, + "KVM: skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit"); + orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); - rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + rip = orig_rip + instr_len; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit @@ -1595,6 +1625,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 0; } +rip_updated: /* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */ vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0); @@ -5341,6 +5372,9 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { gpa_t gpa; + if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, NULL, 0)) + return 1; + /* * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an * nGPA here instead of the required GPA. From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075067 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C7B09C4332E for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92BB864E50 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233097AbhBHLIP (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:08:15 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50165 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232834AbhBHLBP (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:01:15 -0500 IronPort-SDR: oi4lO7j0H22N3E7rs+txT7wYpzwtADxoHNNQKuoVjylBFFP4UwUjssajK0TKhPW0N8SqjwvsZt SvlgoFPeYz3Q== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758565" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758565" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:16 -0800 IronPort-SDR: D83SIHey2zlMt8edMMKZZsU1WF/Z7p5BLAImow0KFPBT5bLhsK42Jo1r+eDJuvff5J/etOffTi BBCnOL06p5XA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451286" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:12 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 21/26] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:31 +1300 Message-Id: <00d058a5b59e10b48ea71baf2fa0beaef4d19c57.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 15 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 +++++--- 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile index 4bd14ab01323..5c86edc73b72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ kvm-y += x86.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \ kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o + kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b3d614d288c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include +#include + +#include "cpuid.h" +#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "sgx.h" +#include "vmx.h" +#include "x86.h" + +bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; + +static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) +{ + if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + return false; + + if (leaf >= ECREATE && leaf <= ETRACK) + return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1); + + if (leaf >= EAUG && leaf <= EMODT) + return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2); + + return false; +} + +static inline bool sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + const u64 bits = FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_LOCKED; + + return (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control & bits) == bits; +} + +int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u32 leaf = (u32)vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]; + + if (!encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(vcpu, leaf)) { + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + } else if (!sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + } else { + WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; + vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6e17ecd4aca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_SGX_H +#define __KVM_X86_SGX_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM +extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; + +int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +#else +#define enable_sgx 0 +#endif + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 4cb8a3f1374c..dbe585329842 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include "mmu.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "sgx.h" #include "trace.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmcs12.h" @@ -5623,16 +5624,18 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 1; } +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { /* - * SGX virtualization is not yet supported. There is no software - * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD - * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS. + * SGX virtualization is disabled. There is no software enable bit for + * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent + * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware). */ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */ /* * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075063 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 405EAC433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D672264E54 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232984AbhBHLHr (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:07:47 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50171 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232897AbhBHLBR (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:01:17 -0500 IronPort-SDR: b5zo43EuzYZuNcTXaJqL2A0KcKtMHM6pAa1NfpKkFkpAc95jmfLJ8Zy81NCTnIe7mbDgEe8mKI hop8Z6X+uESQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758576" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758576" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:20 -0800 IronPort-SDR: jYYcCEpC/WmWfzPHoNK4/HNmBpBLHQbPfr4usOTSuUV3HMc4EcTt0PGEwX7gUutOm7WQhX/qAu RRKl1vkq1bUg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451307" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:16 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 22/26] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:32 +1300 Message-Id: <2ba27310c6ebccd87b268b0d9f616d79f07d3c8c.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID. Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- v3->v4: - Added canonical check for guest's PAGEINFO.metadata and PAGEINFO.contents, per Rick and Sean. - Added deep copy of guest's PAGEINFO.contents to kernel memory to avoid TOCTOU attack, per Rick and Sean. --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 250 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 9581f81e62a4..cd71f30fbdd1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1000,6 +1000,9 @@ struct kvm_arch { struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16]; } msr_filter; + /* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */ + bool sgx_provisioning_allowed; + struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter; struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index 6b3d614d288c..7bdb125325ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -12,6 +12,251 @@ bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +/* + * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed + * address size based on the mode. Related prefixes are ignored. + */ +static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, + int size, int alignment, gva_t *gva) +{ + struct kvm_segment s; + bool fault; + + /* Skip vmcs.GUEST_DS retrieval for 64-bit mode to avoid VMREADs. */ + *gva = offset; + if (!is_long_mode(vcpu)) { + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, VCPU_SREG_DS); + *gva += s.base; + } + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*gva, alignment)) { + fault = true; + } else if (likely(is_long_mode(vcpu))) { + fault = is_noncanonical_address(*gva, vcpu); + } else { + *gva &= 0xffffffff; + fault = (s.unusable) || + (s.type != 2 && s.type != 3) || + (*gva > s.limit) || + ((s.base != 0 || s.limit != 0xffffffff) && + (((u64)*gva + size - 1) > s.limit + 1)); + } + if (fault) + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return fault ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +static void sgx_handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, + unsigned int size) +{ + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; + vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; + vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2; + vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = addr; + vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = size; +} + +static int sgx_read_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hva, void *data, + unsigned int size) +{ + if (__copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)hva, size)) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, hva, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, bool write, + gpa_t *gpa) +{ + struct x86_exception ex; + + if (write) + *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, gva, &ex); + else + *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, gva, &ex); + + if (*gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA) { + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_gpa_to_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long *hva) +{ + *hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, PFN_DOWN(gpa)); + if (kvm_is_error_hva(*hva)) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, gpa, 1); + return -EFAULT; + } + + *hva |= gpa & ~PAGE_MASK; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_inject_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, int trapnr) +{ + struct x86_exception ex; + + /* + * A non-EPCM #PF indicates a bad userspace HVA. This *should* check + * for PFEC.SGX and not assume any #PF on SGX2 originated in the EPC, + * but the error code isn't (yet) plumbed through the ENCLS helpers. + */ + if (trapnr == PF_VECTOR && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) { + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; + vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; + vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* + * If the guest thinks it's running on SGX2 hardware, inject an SGX + * #PF if the fault matches an EPCM fault signature (#GP on SGX1, + * #PF on SGX2). The assumption is that EPCM faults are much more + * likely than a bad userspace address. + */ + if ((trapnr == PF_VECTOR || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) && + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) { + memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex)); + ex.vector = PF_VECTOR; + ex.error_code = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK | + PFERR_SGX_MASK; + ex.address = gva; + ex.error_code_valid = true; + ex.nested_page_fault = false; + kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + } else { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + } + return 1; +} + +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1; + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva; + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva; + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa; + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva; + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo; + struct sgx_secs *contents; + u64 attributes, xfrm, size; + u32 miscselect; + struct x86_exception ex; + u8 max_size_log2; + int trapnr, r; + + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0); + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1); + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, &pageinfo_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be + * translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate. + */ + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, &pageinfo, + sizeof(pageinfo), &ex); + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) { + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + return 1; + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size); + return 0; + } + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, &metadata_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096, + &contents_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA. + * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF. + */ + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, &metadata_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, &contents_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa)) + return 1; + + /* + * ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e. + * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to + * userspace if a GPA is invalid. + */ + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, &metadata_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, &contents_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva)) + return 0; + + /* + * Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the + * guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and + * simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to + * enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. + */ + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!contents) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */ + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE)) + return 0; + + miscselect = contents->miscselect; + attributes = contents->attributes; + xfrm = contents->xfrm; + size = contents->size; + + /* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */ + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed && + (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) { + if (sgx_12_1->eax & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) + pr_warn_once("KVM: SGX PROVISIONKEY advertised but not allowed\n"); + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + + /* Enforce CPUID restrictions on MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM. */ + if ((u32)miscselect & ~sgx_12_0->ebx || + (u32)attributes & ~sgx_12_1->eax || + (u32)(attributes >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->ebx || + (u32)xfrm & ~sgx_12_1->ecx || + (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + + /* Enforce CPUID restriction on max enclave size. */ + max_size_log2 = (attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ? sgx_12_0->edx >> 8 : + sgx_12_0->edx; + if (size >= BIT_ULL(max_size_log2)) + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + + pageinfo.metadata = metadata_hva; + pageinfo.contents = (u64)contents; + + r = sgx_virt_ecreate(&pageinfo, (void __user *)secs_hva, &trapnr); + + free_page((unsigned long)contents); + + if (r) + return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr); + + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); +} + static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) { if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) @@ -42,6 +287,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } else if (!sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); } else { + if (leaf == ECREATE) + return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu); WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075065 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF345C4332B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E5C764E54 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233081AbhBHLIC (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:08:02 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50182 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232902AbhBHLBW (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:01:22 -0500 IronPort-SDR: ZhfuUlO4p+oxX01sVsQnmWIHcl4tiLRX5yitZ1Kut/lt9pTUgMVddUJQOQ3DrucVWMfL5zOt15 paRTwvSiLRZA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758581" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758581" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:25 -0800 IronPort-SDR: mJYUi+0Y0Ade2bkV0l0zGhoRX/XJWQz1t/oNebc4iFV+W4EpHdXz3y+ww3X17CKdGoLzKv47UM N2k2jEhu/0FA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451329" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:21 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 23/26] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:33 +1300 Message-Id: <76b580c72541b17a7ee1f8cd3038329d9ad6023d.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host. Note, KVM allows writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is unlocked. This is technically not architectural behavior, but it's roughly equivalent to the arch behavior of the MSRs being writable prior to activating SGX[1]. Emulating SGX activation is feasible, but adds no tangible benefits and would just create extra work for KVM and guest firmware. [1] SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL cannot be set until SGX is activated, e.g. by firmware. SGX activation is triggered by setting bit 0 in MSR 0x7a. Until SGX is activated, the LE hash MSRs are writable, e.g. to allow firmware to lock down the LE root key with a non-Intel value. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index 7bdb125325ef..177ee1c826a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +/* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */ +static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init; + /* * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed * address size based on the mode. Related prefixes are ignored. @@ -296,3 +299,35 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } return 1; } + +void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) +{ + /* + * Use Intel's default value for Skylake hardware if Launch Control is + * not supported, i.e. Intel's hash is hardcoded into silicon, or if + * Launch Control is supported and enabled, i.e. mimic the reset value + * and let the guest write the MSRs at will. If Launch Control is + * supported but disabled, then use the current MSR values as the hash + * MSRs exist but are read-only (locked and not writable). + */ + if (!enable_sgx || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) || + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0, &sgx_pubkey_hash[0])) { + sgx_pubkey_hash[0] = 0xa6053e051270b7acULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[1] = 0x6cfbe8ba8b3b413dULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[2] = 0xc4916d99f2b3735dULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[3] = 0xd4f8c05909f9bb3bULL; + } else { + /* MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 is read above */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1, sgx_pubkey_hash[1]); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2, sgx_pubkey_hash[2]); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, sgx_pubkey_hash[3]); + } +} + +void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + + memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash, + sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash)); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h index 6e17ecd4aca3..6502fa52c7e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -8,8 +8,14 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void); +void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #else #define enable_sgx 0 + +static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { } +static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } #endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index dbe585329842..349585f63c4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1888,6 +1888,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL: msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control; break; + case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash + [msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0]; + break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) return 1; @@ -2154,6 +2161,15 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0) vmx_leave_nested(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) || + ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) && + !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED)))) + return 1; + vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash + [msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: if (!msr_info->host_initiated) return 1; /* they are read-only */ @@ -6957,6 +6973,8 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) else memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs)); + vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu); + vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1; vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull; @@ -7907,6 +7925,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt()) pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM; + setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(); + if (nested) { nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested, vmx_capability.ept); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 903f246b5abd..af4bced6c84b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { */ u64 msr_ia32_feature_control; u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; + /* SGX Launch Control public key hash */ + u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4]; u64 ept_pointer; struct pt_desc pt_desc; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:34 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075073 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DCB2CC433E6 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:10:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E0E664E54 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:10:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232858AbhBHLKH (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:10:07 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50165 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232995AbhBHLDa (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:03:30 -0500 IronPort-SDR: jrBOo6kdh0HbZHb2DIwiRhbdN21HIwcEriRz6jUJncEwY3jTWvPiA5351hBYQJ5oMO39Y+3Y8j 1ycQedk2wfyw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758589" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758589" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:29 -0800 IronPort-SDR: bZp0P7nWh4RpAyGJ2Ule6/d7NNLQlR/ztnDa1VlyCrANFK1QXfdVIZjsT1shjP35PCh3wyUDXE UJRd4m2YD/Zw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451340" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:25 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 24/26] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:34 +1300 Message-Id: <7093c6d1b4c85b83c0f16cbfd07edfa64eeee814.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash). Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index 177ee1c826a8..36e65b7c1129 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -260,6 +260,59 @@ static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } +static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags; + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva; + gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa; + int ret, trapnr; + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA. + * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF. + */ + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa)) + return 1; + + /* + * ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e. + * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to + * userspace if a GPA is invalid. Note, all structures are aligned and + * cannot split pages. + */ + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva)) + return 0; + + ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva, + (void __user *)secs_hva, + vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr); + + if (ret == -EFAULT) + return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr); + + rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | + X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | + X86_EFLAGS_OF); + if (ret) + rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF; + else + rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF; + vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags); + + kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret); + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); +} + static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) { if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) @@ -292,6 +345,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } else { if (leaf == ECREATE) return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu); + if (leaf == EINIT) + return handle_encls_einit(vcpu); WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:55:35 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075071 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4308C433E0 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F78264E27 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:09:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232683AbhBHLJs (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:09:48 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:50171 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233000AbhBHLDc (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:03:32 -0500 IronPort-SDR: +8J8D89e5igbg4pUnjY2oNlgwtI2RDOprqBE6TJQqJhh2XP8xrGtMU04KafvKDQ/5EYe9waXlB OxUKsOd3LLFw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="181758596" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="181758596" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:33 -0800 IronPort-SDR: cGEqSAXwkSdSOj6MS+f5VCYNDcJi/ILbtoS5eBb8XbWbkZmEbpURqt1u3r+2ZBaUavZ/lYlElH nmd1egYqdBlw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451347" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:29 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 25/26] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:55:35 +1300 Message-Id: <9fb3cb4cb123718e417fc228eddda79ee358cc8e.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel. When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch. Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 26 +++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 13 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index f8037fab8950..04b2f5de2d7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpuid.h" #include "lapic.h" #include "mmu.h" @@ -171,6 +172,21 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0; + /* + * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate + * the supported XSAVE Feature Request Mask (XFRM), i.e. the enclave's + * requested XCR0 value. The enclave's XFRM must be a subset of XCRO + * at the time of EENTER, thus adjust the allowed XFRM by the guest's + * supported XCR0. Similar to XCR0 handling, FP and SSE are forced to + * '1' even on CPUs that don't support XSAVE. + */ + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0x1); + if (best) { + best->ecx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 & 0xffffffff; + best->edx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 >> 32; + best->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE; + } + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu); @@ -413,7 +429,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) ); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX, - F(FSGSBASE) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) | + F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) | F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | 0 /*INVPCID*/ | F(RTM) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(RDSEED) | F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) | F(AVX512F) | F(AVX512PF) | F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | F(AVX512DQ) | @@ -424,7 +440,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) | F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) | F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) | - F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ + F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ | + F(SGX_LC) ); /* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */ if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57)) @@ -463,6 +480,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES) ); + kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_12_EAX, + SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2) + ); + kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX, F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ | F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) | @@ -784,6 +805,38 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) entry->edx = 0; } break; + case 0x12: + /* Intel SGX */ + if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) { + entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0; + break; + } + + /* + * Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features) + * and max enclave sizes. The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT + * are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most + * feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted. + */ + cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX); + entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO; + + entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1); + if (!entry) + goto out; + + /* + * Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES. ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la + * feature flags. Advertise all supported flags, including + * privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from + * userspace. ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is + * expected to derive it from supported XCR0. + */ + entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | + /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | + SGX_ATTR_KSS; + entry->ebx &= 0; + break; /* Intel PT */ case 0x14: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 562eab7b0a51..fca1f4c8cc5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "mmu.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "sgx.h" #include "trace.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -2318,6 +2319,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)) exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST; + if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING) + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, vmcs12); + secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control); } @@ -5726,6 +5730,20 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return false; } +static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + u32 encls_leaf; + + if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)) + return false; + + encls_leaf = kvm_rax_read(vcpu); + if (encls_leaf > 62) + encls_leaf = 63; + return vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap & BIT_ULL(encls_leaf); +} + static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, gpa_t bitmap) { @@ -5819,9 +5837,6 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC: /* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */ return true; - case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS: - /* SGX is never exposed to L1 */ - return true; default: break; } @@ -5945,6 +5960,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE: return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE); + case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS: + return nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(vcpu, vmcs12); default: return true; } @@ -6517,6 +6534,9 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps) msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + if (enable_sgx) + msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + /* miscellaneous data */ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, msrs->misc_low, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h index 197148d76b8f..184418baeb3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h @@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK; } +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING); +} + /* * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1 * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index 36e65b7c1129..a0d7a02257b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ #include "cpuid.h" #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "nested.h" #include "sgx.h" #include "vmx.h" #include "x86.h" -bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +bool __read_mostly enable_sgx = 1; +module_param_named(sgx, enable_sgx, bool, 0444); /* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */ static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init; @@ -386,3 +388,79 @@ void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash, sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash)); } + +/* + * ECREATE must be intercepted to enforce MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM + * restrictions if the guest's allowed-1 settings diverge from hardware. + */ +static bool sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *guest_cpuid; + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed) + return true; + + guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0); + if (!guest_cpuid) + return true; + + cpuid_count(0x12, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx) + return true; + + guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1); + if (!guest_cpuid) + return true; + + cpuid_count(0x12, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (guest_cpuid->eax != eax || guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx || + guest_cpuid->ecx != ecx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx) + return true; + + return false; +} + +void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + /* + * There is no software enable bit for SGX that is virtualized by + * hardware, e.g. there's no CR4.SGXE, so when SGX is disabled in the + * guest (either by the host or by the guest's BIOS) but enabled in the + * host, trap all ENCLS leafs and inject #UD/#GP as needed to emulate + * the expected system behavior for ENCLS. + */ + u64 bitmap = -1ull; + + /* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */ + if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) + return; + + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && + sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1)) { + bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(ETRACK, ECREATE); + if (sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(vcpu)) + bitmap |= (1 << ECREATE); + } + + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) + bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(EMODT, EAUG); + + /* + * Trap and execute EINIT if launch control is enabled in the + * host using the guest's values for launch control MSRs, even + * if the guest's values are fixed to hardware default values. + * The MSRs are not loaded/saved on VM-Enter/VM-Exit as writing + * the MSRs is extraordinarily expensive. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + bitmap |= (1 << EINIT); + + if (!vmcs12 && is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + if (vmcs12 && nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(vmcs12)) + bitmap |= vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap; + } + vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, bitmap); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h index 6502fa52c7e9..a400888b376d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ #include +#include "capabilities.h" +#include "vmx_ops.h" + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; @@ -11,11 +14,21 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void); void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12); #else #define enable_sgx 0 static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { } static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } + +static inline void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + /* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */ + if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) + vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull); +} #endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c index c8e51c004f78..034adb6404dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { FIELD64(VMREAD_BITMAP, vmread_bitmap), FIELD64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, vmwrite_bitmap), FIELD64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap), + FIELD64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap), FIELD64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address), FIELD64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer), FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl), diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h index 80232daf00ff..13494956d0e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h @@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { u64 vm_function_control; u64 eptp_list_address; u64 pml_address; - u64 padding64[3]; /* room for future expansion */ + u64 encls_exiting_bitmap; + u64 padding64[2]; /* room for future expansion */ /* * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have @@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void) CHECK_OFFSET(vm_function_control, 296); CHECK_OFFSET(eptp_list_address, 304); CHECK_OFFSET(pml_address, 312); + CHECK_OFFSET(encls_exiting_bitmap, 320); CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_guest_host_mask, 344); CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_guest_host_mask, 352); CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_read_shadow, 360); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 349585f63c4d..9a2293a39e37 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2160,6 +2160,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data; if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0) vmx_leave_nested(vcpu); + + /* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */ + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL); break; case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && @@ -4317,6 +4320,15 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG, ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false); + if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit() && nested) { + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + else + vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + } + vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control; } @@ -4416,8 +4428,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1); } - if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) - vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull); + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL); if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) { memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc)); @@ -7301,6 +7312,22 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx); + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL); + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED; + else + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED; + /* + * Only allow guest to write its virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs when + * host is writable, otherwise it is meaningless. + */ + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= + FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + else + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= + ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + /* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */ update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); } @@ -7321,6 +7348,13 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void) if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT); + if (!enable_sgx) { + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2); + } + if (vmx_umip_emulated()) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP); From patchwork Mon Feb 8 10:56:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12075001 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCED5C433DB for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:02:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FB1064E0B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:02:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232295AbhBHLBp (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 06:01:45 -0500 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:15612 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232718AbhBHK50 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:57:26 -0500 IronPort-SDR: GRaoRPOvMWcc4ilEZOwy6RO28CeU1kCVjd4FNFEyBcqXsTl4aRNPcwCl/eOnyeymSG1cnsO0w8 2H33scnJFfZA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9888"; a="266525520" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="266525520" Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:45 -0800 IronPort-SDR: tOp+LK2t3eucjEPmhG6dNYeE8N9Jv+49hRIQ1vHwTTn0DEQbEwvPDvr61WpP3l40BIDTJKm+Fd 68JVq0CNQdKg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,161,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="374451368" Received: from jaeminha-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.251.11.62]) by orsmga002-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Feb 2021 02:56:40 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, corbet@lwn.net, Andy Lutomirski , Kai Huang Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 26/26] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:56:33 +1300 Message-Id: <897b4a9088dc04a674b8bf244d465ebac042a8a2.1612777752.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file. The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default. Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index c136e254b496..47c7c7c33025 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -6037,6 +6037,29 @@ KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space can then handle to implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications to inform a user that an MSR was not handled. +7.22 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE +---------------------- + +:Architectures: x86 +:Target: VM +:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs +:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested + attribute is not supported by KVM. + +KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or +more priveleged enclave attributes. args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid +SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted +by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY). + +The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide +additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY +is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable +system fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions +by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by +default. + +See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details. + 8. Other capabilities. ====================== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 04b2f5de2d7b..ad00a1af1545 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) * expected to derive it from supported XCR0. */ entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | - /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | + SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | SGX_ATTR_KSS; entry->ebx &= 0; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 5ca7b181a3ae..3d1b4113a57b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -3767,6 +3769,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR: case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER: case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: +#endif r = 1; break; case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS: @@ -5295,6 +5300,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0]; r = 0; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: { + unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0; + + r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]); + if (r) + break; + + /* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */ + if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) && + !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) + kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true; + else + r = -EINVAL; + break; + } +#endif default: r = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 374c67875cdb..e17bda18a9b4 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID 190 #define KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID 191 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192 +#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 200 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING