From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263959 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 814EFC433ED for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:23:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CCE161059 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:23:44 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0CCE161059 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding :Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=55FED6HJ3JvcIGObKyjRzAJbLz83tSHAZ2kEPjNuVD4=; b=obPNyvMzpYXgLqWO9SLiXMzNE I1p6NqcYuxBWgOyYbgEJktXU5alHh5ieK97WYZF+rt9ZZWhWUbWebpQQoRWPT0djMY3Hf8G6VYQNZ ZB61B5yhOk2IMDFixsotlLKxcJZxeFgv83oD64LNUCpHOjYFWKBvYnhMnyw/AGxAeVfUZ8f/kMIDM nR9tjSNygQjb4QEEuyVtfGoLDokckyPDFA7dF7JkWSE4yHP2hWUnp5Ptv0UjRYFK3m1L1p0Y+5cWO hErYwzLdOp/zsqOczZwsj/TbQS3AjFQUouMAasMQZgbXqwyAf9ORxX5hhOvjon0EkFGgVuuDZuHIl FWHgLlinA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=desiato.infradead.org) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2f-00HIcN-6I; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:25 +0000 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([2607:7c80:54:e::133]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2Q-00HIZT-U6; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:11 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender :Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=xlPv8bK+kYUHQ5KeZlE+cVBt7o0l6PJl4UCe9txHG6M=; b=5HB/xxhtZlaCqLz2JoX2WfSSg0 ABH2r5kTWCpXYatzJwJu9n1cSohX6i2S8/0jUWgl+Pc6flxb65GSKtYkPIahyrAViYA4u3FK0rFhK sNHVWkrcuoMgzWhGLiy3s0bKZOnIxl4A2CBJ6whZbRi3PfTk7rcToLDHiR+wrg+Tm0yIFWoYuX40O amPHdY+q4H0CqhFwiwhB2NBfTMVWMCbNKEE+7cZux8tZecJ2tHe81FYmjt5AkjZTlGpKQ0JOe+k1r /v8NKBD/I0ajFAb1Dofl87VPI9ZUliVUOuUNWHUu/eHt25B6GgiXRoKTxtJ0fw1XFSm2zhpfRwww1 ojuDtYFw==; Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2I-00EP0c-O9; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:09 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D22F961354; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:20:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322462; bh=md5mw3JUxzbtFFaaDyyGq19iUCguUIMuIFvGTOhePfw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=P3a06ZJvRz46kFMWg9pf/IOA57egQ4wI4Y69wTSENf0rhnnoM1Z1TFAYh++bdWLkO l37aYiW/A19EiugDX/o+LTgeqNGZkGfpYZ8dsPIo4w7OfAN3GOzpk39b+YUTbQOFFD bHM8C5jkExlpXHUfQyAYCDnuTkKf+0hH5Ia/huO48ztdE2CTC8xeFt/hOJ44BoBK2r suvk4iWxgOEuQIkvkNfZCJi1YFWTfWWhU4hhk+jrQRe0cbmxPzaasQqBdo0eE5MJs8 eDY5z1K7TwGmk5h3yoUPMEXy36XzNRB7ph+/3fCIokWZmcS+j+jB/l83bRiAFAb52m Fzfz3N3IoPG2Q== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 1/7] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:28 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-2-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002102_868254_890A41F5 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.53 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index 54bd0dc2c23c..46eb82eaa195 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma) extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page); extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len); + /* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g., diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 0584e540246e..81f5595a8490 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1352,9 +1352,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, - unsigned long flags, - unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long len) { unsigned long locked, lock_limit; From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263961 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72B15C433B4 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:24:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 056E561059 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:24:19 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 056E561059 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding :Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=sE9wo4bEppnGCqtdkvjotbHv231wskAqVAP0WSrrL2k=; b=mZTpqWBAqVqzYqFbptEMAk18W RH6IgaTW+ZHRTNimMEQZqu4EPkvQoe7X605yb0thBrhUOEKWrXNDvtmP86BI8sNORaHCVgZjotJom P+84PWiOyGVS/rO61Ka4McUZxkvteuUcc4EKWCRl4dkEbcReISNk2juPmBvJAxwQyRUhL6wwZQKE0 IDqkbe3NScDsq1CrbIwJyZmTYV5gy+F6nQdlizTbiSq0eorywg5L/C3QlKY9zUt5DsjvO+sfpIiC1 xy5byYO4km1DgJjp6qklBR45JO52jiBCswvMJ12g68A0GNXrkecbRxUyN1FLr6UF2T8HAACoX1TIr OAMZJyZdg==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=desiato.infradead.org) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu3H-00HIuV-DY; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:22:03 +0000 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([2607:7c80:54:e::133]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2c-00HIcZ-V0; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:24 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender :Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=s1tihprrndNEowLm5YgrQRX3PW5FVP8G7FOcYxdHinY=; b=1qwuK+74M5aQlFCGynHat2DdlL +QDNhEyBEau79zOAsd1NJLJdWIVZrlO7HHiVOTYEqGcLKB9vw2A+wmHIJ7lfjfs8o+Rdu0t7hKhF2 KtbmxBkKAFfH7bvMw9LkaDNx7QDI9V2NlGvAxXpPhlfFrspeBIiFQIOAFGtGSr35JUbwPAgJCtbx3 biymOEuMJPiT7WnlMQDNvMO9x4G1GECN90aQOyuSxVnb2Uhx6S/fvVh5rK9lMfWLZJe+nYCg9QLBW Q4Cy93p7TcX+A7U+QwtDMBwykx5Ni0oqWLRNKHWSGpKpOpywRAjkM/LiC0Fw17RR9cqnM1NgmfeEO iH6A6YAQ==; Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2V-00EP2L-0Y; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:21 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DF8D661360; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322474; bh=VPlgDYwLzrYfExLKq4qVF51gZCyV282lUs8rNsT8l0w=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=K5PwhRMD8bU2CDOmwnKDlaJHdTSqbGy94jnbyid+awVbgoi49NA2qX0lHna9rjEri HGWd24NXUy8nAnevipFFL71wTfg1bN5FDkc3mRxx1IA3VUAbMx9rezhrfVwGID5AvI i7VzPEd1EEPMRB4/1TBMgP1crvAe2gmJ7u0SLRoizKm8tj72NVPYRq9zQuIsrNCCHl tTd86MGJWlGdWWgZZavxtFO02uQ1kMiG5HRg471f+i+y5N+/hXW1MITKC1ZpemNaI3 5HAuWd5vaYG/xOTSCuiw7I7DLoffN9emLRTI69Z/2qhVahAtWZW8ncGDSX4g4viYtu IYdJMq9UlwMnQ== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, kernel test robot Subject: [PATCH v20 2/7] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:29 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-3-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002115_117396_FF2F8D3D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 13.75 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case. Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reported-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley --- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index a8ad8eb76120..c426e7d20907 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263963 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82C7FC433B4 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:24:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 15E1361166 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:24:26 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 15E1361166 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding :Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=IYY3pyEz/qln9U/1hDbF104K11W3/99TXk5Qefa8Xx0=; b=J3ExwCKg8QbCfNYpBvPoSAV+g zK1DZRp986qgCswhXAVAbZ6CP1QP/d+g5HeSSitUNtZJItb+FxbRZ1tcbN18sTr4QYUSReqgJlYAV T8B6plAihzWYi0qOWMAvRLyfJ5lpBZk+Ugtl/d+0qVMrJGEf57YqwOo0K3MYCvcWMpNmm31Rftgrt nWZwQp1I0+1absmZBtMl+GZ0UXP/d1kpKvJbA/Efz3uAR0XAwBAyy8Z+mwklZ+q2qwzZtfunqHeHG NYi/d41u+CkT9RDRMi4vQSuoNQsrDtn3qQAeXTdwTSjQ0k16KT3nBxUkEzsaGM4e2BEMSYzxqv2WD 4QHzdYtlA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=desiato.infradead.org) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu40-00HJAg-F7; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:22:48 +0000 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([2607:7c80:54:e::133]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2m-00HIfZ-18; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:33 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender :Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=3CeYDB0cBLViGb+yedTe0M/ufHXKkvq2OjRG6pbxMlM=; b=4+72usKMDTzWH5nodIlR9aeMJJ fuvUGJYLr895jat+qMwdSOUGyFvM0sI4cw5r+/UkvJfaSW0CdfJs8pkkooxXE5sQj+WmV73w0wPe9 ftmuH7sbBzOELNE4RKCtNTwvE/99aexiPDT+W4UiyMiJjqck+2GeGY8JO1r/XNNRQlwjTbhcObWOf X7UzLETbGLrN18zgupdW115d57jdli46+nMjYoiY5FNNH/Tt1CIPKhj3FcMPsALaE+zkJ+0BxH21N 3zvdJ9+LlO5V5uqt0CTMLeDQt7FS12LngW8V0AWfokMIf7Sb49K840egyspZrs/Wgy/7XNUlsR7vb EUx4Djig==; Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2h-00EP5O-8P; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:30 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2F4946135F; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322486; bh=/KigOkMNE1Z6fcyoZ/lh7stlbqW7rjfo2ZgyqVvK+Eg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=P1EWOJzo2ovv4NqPytAn9qIoIbJf0JIW9Fj+P+3fFOxr3unuXhqa9ymnxWgvRxZUL 25xnSdUQBAuy/TYEKFRcJgbPftI0PKmvLzEu+L7TdPShtELgXUAcnnEpj2W4qBGoVM ha9Y2VoVCJj76CE1BHJg3klSKqO7EtAUstI+zuJWqfTjovL8SFlGE9Wp6UAnt/NSln PCGVy9xiHo3l6JqxlRGSOQXRPu1tLjNQWsCBzKTwVSH9PczxTR/0twOkkpunIjEqUR SoojVZjSPTQLbkG7U98q157sX9LkwONSj9kLjJnnITERXxAe4NoWzHOfdJk8awwwjz v6VQ3CZ4RQRvQ== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 3/7] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:30 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-4-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002127_388301_18D77004 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 24.61 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect. Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs. [arnd@arndb.de: arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion ] Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 13 +++++++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild index 07ac208edc89..73aa25843f65 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild @@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ generic-y += early_ioremap.h generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h generic-y += qrwlock.h generic-y += qspinlock.h -generic-y += set_memory.h generic-y += user.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h index 52e5c1623224..4e3c13799735 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -131,12 +131,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) dsb(ish); } -int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); - -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); -bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); - #include #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h index d061176d57ea..aa855c6a0ae6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #ifndef __ASM_KFENCE_H #define __ASM_KFENCE_H -#include +#include static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void) { return true; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0f740b781187 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H +#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H + +#include + +bool can_set_direct_map(void); +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map + +int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable); + +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page); +bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); + +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c index 90a335c74442..0ec94e718724 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 6dd9369e3ea0..e42aeff6c344 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -515,7 +516,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp) */ BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_index(direct_map_end - 1) == pgd_index(direct_map_end)); - if (rodata_full || crash_mem_map || debug_pagealloc_enabled()) + if (can_set_direct_map() || crash_mem_map) flags |= NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; /* @@ -1483,8 +1484,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool. */ - if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() || - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE)) + if (can_set_direct_map() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE)) flags |= NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; __create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start), diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 92eccaf595c8..a3bacd79507a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data { bool rodata_full __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED); +bool can_set_direct_map(void) +{ + return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled(); +} + static int change_page_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data) { struct page_change_data *cdata = data; @@ -155,7 +160,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page) .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID), }; - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, @@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) .clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY), }; - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return 0; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, @@ -181,7 +186,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) { - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return; set_memory_valid((unsigned long)page_address(page), numpages, enable); @@ -206,7 +211,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) pte_t *ptep; unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); - if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full) + if (!can_set_direct_map()) return true; pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr); diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h index fe1aa4e54680..f36be5166c19 100644 --- a/include/linux/set_memory.h +++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h @@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) { return true; } +#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ +/* + * Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at + * boot time. Let them overrive this query. + */ +#ifndef can_set_direct_map +static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void) +{ + return true; +} +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ #ifndef set_mce_nospec static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap) From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263965 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA299C433ED for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:25:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3CD9D61059 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:25:16 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3CD9D61059 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding :Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=H2TtgMHvt+hNsEwcGgM+ri4au6EzU+ixG/d4k3/5Xjw=; b=XRocqntHnWNhm22OJ4arVb6rJ xxF/oaxLgp4Obt9NGERiZ3d7oXgIbDfjRhMlGiTVT9jj17OQrGYGcgINGYxVkyr3xO7SoJMgr/EYL 2sVj/HGNQfkkYrIMF2sTt51wktl5fy/RYT3nC7azVckrO/GvYjdIaZo9zRkhLGniKdHnVXXwJ+s/V fLGZe2qoIlGug29KK+bAD41NLBLCK/2bwQQgj4RmLnWZhhnN1lPd9cKy390OlOkcPFzgIcSYY0dSi 9+ZS0K/n6QzcF/XQxTu/Ii4nqjwSqJEYzWkDBilYth4UIw5nc93rjDtObzLshsGfT4+JI2dH5PNFO nSgQwWlzQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=desiato.infradead.org) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu4f-00HJRO-8k; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:23:30 +0000 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([2607:7c80:54:e::133]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu30-00HIju-3V; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:46 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender :Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=dBmKdO+hKB2joCr0RyVlX6rszFi2auYSPjkTRdRfUPo=; b=sV9HFXY5SEs8uy3MrdJjxP8iP+ dsH9ijn8gby/pJRtlPQrVVXE/SULbSxS4PnflJibyjHDwW022RZEtiq3qwbdZpnsYJhQyZjnhswvK N8l3SxO6wCmyVWKJDJgT5bZ89+DBVsenmgu3q4DU1tD/8UqEXcNAfcBWZ4kgkGg2VNduaEg9HO2J2 0XmI54apBh4yEbFgZUNZupC92WNOODNRU4HqYVQXJrSXdwRAgYbCCzzq7AmOUYKVgTwdzJ1a+hVk7 toQKouo3DEnBDoCtARDbQicrPdUJiOFENotx1yQjMD8PjviM5Bi0BHFR3WuRNiPZ0rnNmAoKlp94l z75tjMZg==; Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu2t-00EP7A-9m; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:44 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 751D161360; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322498; bh=4z1NOptCcNImOA4y+p4M8GjPPJf9b9wzlwosak+jq8Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=evzHCPxw5BwtRbUqo4xU1QwSGYJK6zBC+wJKKE+NEUAexkHNz6UhKIdbf6ENcjyra vc85ACXLyhV/GM6gkBzRZWVL+kNSHKNHqIqnXjXPkCC8eOLmQ5QbfAPvaTDUmk46O3 rbU2e5J/dCEWRid36bQbwLGx6O7B8bETSpqdtOHWnzqbkCHVpsoj3tKUSbgy+5MfVg oygWs0R+D+3MONwEN1LyuBR+/A6aIVOtpb18sIuYYD1hn0638BapM5z14JXPPqhTmC XD9DjCMYj0mOXddiZJgB82ewJzV0KR/UNuOegJPMrKfR68LuAx9TD4QUk5WTQ8+Ayy 4v1eCEUQVT3/A== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 4/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:31 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002139_435781_12369B22 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 42.82 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 48 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 5 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 12 ++ mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/secretmem.c | 239 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e617b4afcc62 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops; + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + struct address_space *mapping; + + /* + * Using page_mapping() is quite slow because of the actual call + * instruction and repeated compound_head(page) inside the + * page_mapping() function. + * We know that secretmem pages are not compound and LRU so we can + * save a couple of cycles here. + */ + if (PageCompound(page) || !PageLRU(page)) + return false; + + mapping = (struct address_space *) + ((unsigned long)page->mapping & ~PAGE_MAPPING_FLAGS); + + if (mapping != page->mapping) + return false; + + return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h @@ -97,5 +97,6 @@ #define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d /* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d /* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 0ea8128468c3..4d7e377a74f3 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -358,6 +358,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret); /* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index 02d44e3420f5..6d0972db7278 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -901,4 +901,9 @@ config KMAP_LOCAL # struct io_mapping based helper. Selected by drivers that need them config IO_MAPPING bool + +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select STRICT_DEVMEM + endmenu diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index bf71e295e9f6..7bb6ed5e42e8 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -125,3 +125,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o obj-$(CONFIG_IO_MAPPING) += io-mapping.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 0697134b6a12..6515f82b0f32 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -816,6 +817,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL }; struct page *page; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return NULL; + page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx); if (ctx.pgmap) put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap); @@ -949,6 +953,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return -EFAULT; + if (write) { if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE)) @@ -2077,6 +2084,11 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, if (!head) goto pte_unmap; + if (unlikely(page_is_secretmem(page))) { + put_compound_head(head, 1, flags); + goto pte_unmap; + } + if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) { put_compound_head(head, 1, flags); goto pte_unmap; diff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c index df590fda5688..5e9f4dea4e96 100644 --- a/mm/mlock.c +++ b/mm/mlock.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" @@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev, if (newflags == vma->vm_flags || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL) || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || vma == get_gate_vma(current->mm) || - vma_is_dax(vma)) + vma_is_dax(vma) || vma_is_secretmem(vma)) /* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ goto out; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..972cd1bbc3cc --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2021 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt + +/* + * Define mode and flag masks to allow validation of the system call + * parameters. + */ +#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0) +#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK + +static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init; +module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable, + "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call"); + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; + gfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); + +retry: + page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset); + if (!page) { + page = alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!page) + return VM_FAULT_OOM; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page); + if (err) { + put_page(page); + return vmf_error(err); + } + + __SetPageUptodate(page); + err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp); + if (unlikely(err)) { + put_page(page); + /* + * If a split of large page was required, it + * already happened when we marked the page invalid + * which guarantees that this call won't fail + */ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + if (err == -EEXIST) + goto retry; + + return vmf_error(err); + } + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); + } + + vmf->page = page; + return VM_FAULT_LOCKED; +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len)) + return -EAGAIN; + + vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED | VM_DONTDUMP; + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; + + return 0; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops; +} + +static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .mmap = secretmem_mmap, +}; + +static bool secretmem_isolate_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode) +{ + return false; +} + +static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, + struct page *newpage, struct page *page, + enum migrate_mode mode) +{ + return -EBUSY; +} + +static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) +{ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + clear_highpage(page); +} + +const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { + .freepage = secretmem_freepage, + .migratepage = secretmem_migratepage, + .isolate_page = secretmem_isolate_page, +}; + +static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt; + +static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) +{ + struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + struct inode *inode; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return ERR_CAST(inode); + + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", + O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + goto err_free_inode; + + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER); + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; + + /* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */ + inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; + inode->i_size = 0; + + return file; + +err_free_inode: + iput(inode); + return file; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) +{ + struct file *file; + int fd, err; + + /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC); + + if (!secretmem_enable) + return -ENOSYS; + + if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) + return -EINVAL; + + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + file = secretmem_file_create(flags); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(file); + goto err_put_fd; + } + + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; + + fd_install(fd, file); + return fd; + +err_put_fd: + put_unused_fd(fd); + return err; +} + +static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + return init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; +} + +static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { + .name = "secretmem", + .init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context, + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, +}; + +static int secretmem_init(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (!secretmem_enable) + return ret; + + secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs); + if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt)) + ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt); + + /* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */ + secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC; + + return ret; +} +fs_initcall(secretmem_init); From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263967 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39306C433ED for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:26:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE35B61059 for ; 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Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu35-00EP8o-BT; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:57 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7E86060FF2; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322511; bh=VvJS0+ZJEoquXgUk8xJF5PKmUdUMF1JI5SU1kjFhtvo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=rXKV5xSSk4VG2jEf9nzGlBJR53Wh4leDl8+/8xyUEs819qQ2tIZz2xiwz7ZgCUpns G2CW8lT02BiO7ZnW5TqyEI6NRe5ha7QbYoSf5xM5Ys5rGf/+7BGSSDaqcOwagE6ol2 neY5Rr8IiaxFWUk3A0sNmsEcYIEXcOkqRMVO1ZdWoTIjXuBKxmF5gYIK3ZyOpAHK0r l2LEP8aiowY9Yj10NpAdCO5qVjAdjZvI2j9de8afBgqPO26su0L6fm5MCQCpSIkMKn z9PP7ICM/triYEsfzV3I/fIndVc/GswBjdGwsQ0bgOqWuAIon0LnVtSA8tMdYb6XM7 483GRYphYfiIQ== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 5/7] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:32 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002151_465474_B6634430 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 18.16 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h index e617b4afcc62..21c3771e6a56 100644 --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) } bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool secretmem_active(void); #else @@ -43,6 +44,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "power.h" @@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void) bool hibernation_available(void) { - return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); + return nohibernate == 0 && + !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) && + !secretmem_active(); } /** diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 972cd1bbc3cc..f77d25467a14 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400); MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable, "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call"); +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users); +} + static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; @@ -94,6 +101,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + atomic_dec(&secretmem_users); + return 0; +} + static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; @@ -116,6 +129,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, }; @@ -202,6 +216,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; fd_install(fd, file); + atomic_inc(&secretmem_users); return fd; err_put_fd: From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263997 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37E55C433B4 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:27:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B29D561028 for ; 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Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu3H-00EPB8-Ey; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:22:12 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8C9E061059; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322523; bh=w+xDNuIbQ75zIlV6X2vYSDb8rOR9eABNVP3j0dfEFa0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=EcnN0UPkpt0PUXc4QhfASaAw9lgLQKWLTtAkxY407pB2li0zIlJsJJWuQtKWhpjz9 MNvRoOw87ZsKKEjY2ePFQmmoiXR9pc2bjDMyzPztLqQIiXP8u1UlcHHrEYSwChuDZW B0zn4bC/JkLRTSG5GsZir/OgvlymYbXy4ctnotUUZv159LD6s1MoJ1ENQahot0F0x+ bli7ZHdn8oaTZztrqvzHz1g7SeNZlyWQHa/LFzs92i34QWi61TmQT5wULNdbCKL16P U6O3zIffTdNqNskZHUAeUNMY4ofmzWW0/24e3WaOwpnYJaRnklQmyx+eELdehv2mM0 2RRTo51Uil6Eg== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 6/7] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:33 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002203_592762_A18553CF X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.18 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++++++- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h @@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ #define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT #define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET #include diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index 28a1423ce32e..e44519020a43 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -451,3 +451,4 @@ 444 i386 landlock_create_ruleset sys_landlock_create_ruleset 445 i386 landlock_add_rule sys_landlock_add_rule 446 i386 landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self +447 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index ecd551b08d05..a06f16106f24 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ 444 common landlock_create_ruleset sys_landlock_create_ruleset 445 common landlock_add_rule sys_landlock_add_rule 446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self +447 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 050511e8f1f8..1a1b5d724497 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -1050,6 +1050,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr _ asmlinkage long sys_landlock_add_rule(int ruleset_fd, enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, const void __user *rule_attr, __u32 flags); asmlinkage long sys_landlock_restrict_self(int ruleset_fd, __u32 flags); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags); /* * Architecture-specific system calls diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h index 6de5a7fc066b..28b388368cf6 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h @@ -873,8 +873,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_landlock_add_rule, sys_landlock_add_rule) #define __NR_landlock_restrict_self 446 __SYSCALL(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, sys_landlock_restrict_self) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 447 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif + #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 447 +#define __NR_syscalls 448 /* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different diff --git a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755 --- a/scripts/checksyscalls.sh +++ b/scripts/checksyscalls.sh @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */ From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:34 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1liu3T-00EPE4-Fi; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:22:17 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 98C0861261; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:22:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322535; bh=/sX/jGQ3JN6/XKQ1NDaJYJw4pzJL70dwO5FMw+G72PY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=f+YjTzqP+9dSYI70RU4DThrizsxctxLZRMu/q8ty2IWe8Nc17NbquHWFyKjmU2vc9 m8RagSp2RC0Zc5xEwMWxUj3Gzi/5pxqgdYGEikeskllS6D9DJgYG8e5JGb2DYRqHG7 d0EmNU6cGWLKjDHS9oy9W3PeK0P3g1z7w9zmCg4QimU6dtqvhHSzUd26wH9ViqHEEM dvPmXVQmKGBO/XhNVqX/8wpcPK9Ksnv3x7AsX4CJ76j849EeYlbh5BNyS+xI9GW6xP Wv2kjJL30YV1Ld6SakA9TbIOpihvIoB09ylE42UkxBumMXtRF7U2iQB8q4R9BvCJdS HYBQHXzveFGLg== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 7/7] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:34 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-8-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210518_002215_605737_F6C2EB77 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 25.43 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore index 1f651e85ed60..da92ded5a27c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore @@ -21,5 +21,6 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.* split_huge_page_test diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile index 73e1cc96d7c2..266580ea938c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap @@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..93e7e7ffed33 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2021 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "../kselftest.h" + +#define fail(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_fail(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define pass(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_pass(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define skip(fmt, ...) ksft_test_result_skip(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +#ifdef __NR_memfd_secret + +#define PATTERN 0x55 + +static const int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; +static const int mode = MAP_SHARED; + +static unsigned long page_size; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_cur; +static unsigned long mlock_limit_max; + +static int memfd_secret(unsigned int flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, flags); +} + +static void test_file_apis(int fd) +{ + char buf[64]; + + if ((read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) >= 0) || + (pread(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0) || + (pwrite(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0) >= 0)) + fail("unexpected file IO\n"); + else + pass("file IO is blocked as expected\n"); +} + +static void test_mlock_limit(int fd) +{ + size_t len; + char *mem; + + len = mlock_limit_cur; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + munmap(mem, len); + + len = mlock_limit_max * 2; + mem = mmap(NULL, len, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem != MAP_FAILED) { + fail("unexpected mlock limit violation\n"); + munmap(mem, len); + return; + } + + pass("mlock limit is respected\n"); +} + +static void try_process_vm_read(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + struct iovec liov, riov; + char buf[64]; + char *mem; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + liov.iov_len = riov.iov_len = sizeof(buf); + liov.iov_base = buf; + riov.iov_base = mem; + + if (process_vm_readv(getppid(), &liov, 1, &riov, 1, 0) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + exit(KSFT_SKIP); + exit(KSFT_PASS); + } + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void try_ptrace(int fd, int pipefd[2]) +{ + pid_t ppid = getppid(); + int status; + char *mem; + long ret; + + if (read(pipefd[0], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + perror("pipe write"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ppid, 0, 0); + if (ret) { + perror("ptrace_attach"); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + ret = waitpid(ppid, &status, WUNTRACED); + if ((ret != ppid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) { + fprintf(stderr, "weird waitppid result %ld stat %x\n", + ret, status); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); + } + + if (ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, ppid, mem, 0)) + exit(KSFT_PASS); + + exit(KSFT_FAIL); +} + +static void check_child_status(pid_t pid, const char *name) +{ + int status; + + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + + if (WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_SKIP) { + skip("%s is not supported\n", name); + return; + } + + if ((WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == KSFT_PASS) || + WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + pass("%s is blocked as expected\n", name); + return; + } + + fail("%s: unexpected memory access\n", name); +} + +static void test_remote_access(int fd, const char *name, + void (*func)(int fd, int pipefd[2])) +{ + int pipefd[2]; + pid_t pid; + char *mem; + + if (pipe(pipefd)) { + fail("pipe failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + fail("fork failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + if (pid == 0) { + func(fd, pipefd); + return; + } + + mem = mmap(NULL, page_size, prot, mode, fd, 0); + if (mem == MAP_FAILED) { + fail("Unable to mmap secret memory\n"); + return; + } + + ftruncate(fd, page_size); + memset(mem, PATTERN, page_size); + + if (write(pipefd[1], &mem, sizeof(mem)) < 0) { + fail("pipe write: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + check_child_status(pid, name); +} + +static void test_process_vm_read(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "process_vm_read", try_process_vm_read); +} + +static void test_ptrace(int fd) +{ + test_remote_access(fd, "ptrace", try_ptrace); +} + +static int set_cap_limits(rlim_t max) +{ + struct rlimit new; + cap_t cap = cap_init(); + + new.rlim_cur = max; + new.rlim_max = max; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &new)) { + perror("setrlimit() returns error"); + return -1; + } + + /* drop capabilities including CAP_IPC_LOCK */ + if (cap_set_proc(cap)) { + perror("cap_set_proc() returns error"); + return -2; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void prepare(void) +{ + struct rlimit rlim; + + page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); + if (!page_size) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Failed to get page size %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to detect mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + mlock_limit_cur = rlim.rlim_cur; + mlock_limit_max = rlim.rlim_max; + + printf("page_size: %ld, mlock.soft: %ld, mlock.hard: %ld\n", + page_size, mlock_limit_cur, mlock_limit_max); + + if (page_size > mlock_limit_cur) + mlock_limit_cur = page_size; + if (page_size > mlock_limit_max) + mlock_limit_max = page_size; + + if (set_cap_limits(mlock_limit_max)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Unable to set mlock limit: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); +} + +#define NUM_TESTS 4 + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int fd; + + prepare(); + + ksft_print_header(); + ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS); + + fd = memfd_secret(0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + ksft_exit_skip("memfd_secret is not supported\n"); + else + ksft_exit_fail_msg("memfd_secret failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + } + + test_mlock_limit(fd); + test_file_apis(fd); + test_process_vm_read(fd); + test_ptrace(fd); + + close(fd); + + ksft_exit(!ksft_get_fail_cnt()); +} + +#else /* __NR_memfd_secret */ + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("skip: skipping memfd_secret test (missing __NR_memfd_secret)\n"); + return KSFT_SKIP; +} + +#endif /* __NR_memfd_secret */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh index e953f3cd9664..95a67382f132 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh @@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode