From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:03:58 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301599 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52F93C48BC2 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:27:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 474CE613EF for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:27:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230010AbhFEP3l (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 11:29:41 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.18]:42997 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229930AbhFEP3k (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 11:29:40 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622906786; bh=V+/W+fEoSiOjB3w8FDJE2wQ1DNe8mLPtzk6quPwutvo=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=iojLmS3oTN1DZsuRR/9kSaXZCGZfZFJdGoPfE4LYE35NzhqE+PH0i8QWuoSoO3ig4 0JngVPtJQX19ChfEqfqd/uYPbTfQMIgFOXT9yfcsDzgp5iQWkZ6M5rdwdgYtppmBQ+ AgsMyUCQsUzlrWcQ2uUUGoVQflciOPKlRo41cXxA= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx005 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1MxUnz-1lQzxz0ynB-00xwA9; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 17:26:26 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:03:58 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-2-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:AXIG8C6g+ihrnMi0Z4HkpARpgiKyCwVIo4zDsrAYAVY7GlNoZU6 7O/98xMjJRXPp5Qat/wXAqITJjdc3Cg9KVDUkv9jMTAC4TmaJiwFSk+4T6TOSiObnjiNVug 5nZhRlb2yHN0s2og2Qe+i3xYhvcGTiItAt6TDApjVwCMOjKleIr60AAiwo95nL9p1fVQ/6I S8e6Adp97nN0pqVcqVFpQ== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:+rmuCovomkA=:ToTPjaCqTPRANlpKwgY+BI Td9B1Od85sW7rN2BHlZx0S9yGMlNrRoNPYKw30EdwZpFQCw0MJ1R0CK7jNGYsnXyO/JWmtABx BP8IkODttWs14kSIcSCNKNy4q9JWsUjjZTaSYWrXwi64xsSYLhWaaddKFpk8MUuuvSv9uqJAX E/hUUtc0B9GArMYdIA78pHLTWuSIdCh8Q6yZFjSzqfSAR3zBStXRTFgc6GEb7llc9k4u8FD+R XtlGDWysWOLPvtgnghV5DjcNE6AUKsVR7/3NR/PDlkpUufHxi09Ppq7iL9YoFl0WE5upzqFIj q2ZzkVHB18mUQ06x7p6IFopYkvLGrVWFazETXmveEJbPqu/5Xu7Riy03cOUfz3v11HrIzMpMz +aIux0EuCwEfa60cVU4z8Nv7Zm4W7JsHaheyBhL6dxdOf/4gr4Hgajen8Eh3d8F6FbVSPOsxt s6Uybc/P9ER94vsN5/ev4rT+BM0jb2diW8cHTOUaV3rYTpxStwxWfbvo2PowP9gpvZVXNz+hx TSva2yUeepFKks37O8PHbO7IArxS+MAlRplA68Dn18k9iGuaEofOOzhOSpZcTTyMvillCS1iM xqv87MAi6Ut/ohkzwdAmStfNxUwBmvnY7nV9e8iChfcxFcplTo9Rx6RldUnyeSImra4jB7Vzx RpXyAAGqsDguITO8wNAo58W2qV5VbIh+W+g4Bv/8q+pxIopd3BEaf7KRG3D8XZq/xwcthsF6j wqyLd1NJlM3kM3uZl0ZVlHGMTBb4M37rkjQU5DqMJuu5YsZffDQO5e6ZNnBtcnt+pa8zge1yT auceOueO8F+cLAD8VsMsN/Y5wu6H3S0/kPvI24SydTLiJRY6XYuHqkDh2qVoyPCJnfkeGgDa7 l+JKO2UYiadlnCcOEv/DRYUnCcD3MQAWGmIgoIUXbLesQfwXrIwoUVlqfxVLY+/2X5KxnltMR lU21EnKuEaYy41oQ7lvgOfWYYsSQ4i/w/egMQ05Hi30jVL3FoXlaWlI9UMRBTcs13VMp4M3JP cpn10EqaCybbccD3nURqqCVccxWiBfvbdBPp/8NvdtR7Uibubz38DMLWBhCZoPwm+Cn4J4NwY 1+oTCRz76ExaLmdSmDYJMKJUpA2ai+aDo4z Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a security hook that allows a LSM to be notified when a task gets a fatal signal. This patch is a previous step on the way to compute the task crash period by the "brute" LSM (linux security module to detect and mitigate fork brute force attack against vulnerable userspace processes). Signed-off-by: John Wood Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++ kernel/signal.c | 1 + security/security.c | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 04c01794de83..e28468e84300 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_fatal_signal, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 5c4c5c0602cb..fc8bef0f15d9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -799,6 +799,10 @@ * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. * @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. + * @task_fatal_signal: + * This hook allows security modules to be notified when a task gets a + * fatal signal. + * @siginfo contains the signal information. * * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 06f7c50ce77f..609c76c6c764 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); +void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); @@ -1183,6 +1184,9 @@ static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { } +static inline void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ } + static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index f7c6ffcbd044..4380763b3d8d 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -2804,6 +2804,7 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig) /* * Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump. */ + security_task_fatal_signal(&ksig->info); current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED; if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b38155b2de83..208e3e7d4284 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1891,6 +1891,11 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); } +void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ + call_void_hook(task_fatal_signal, siginfo); +} + int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:03:59 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301607 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 019C2C4743D for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:49:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E30B6613EF for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:49:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229978AbhFEPu7 (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 11:50:59 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.15]:57561 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229933AbhFEPu7 (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 11:50:59 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622908090; bh=NR7CetDZEJKb4urZklHxpJH9CQk1kXh04lqUmzV2VFQ=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Z14fX/BDAt8rlYVCQ2W1JNECZ3Nbr3z0zf696jh81htz40qSfRY0BFqa+OTqs6UQc hvOtA2fzDnez1/y9ZLgQArJDKGPCzM/rXnk57dikoUY9XQfyIovRJX/elMzmWInjJv 6DwSejwqkhFwEpT48eX/PirFuddTqMi8EzKAWEEU= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx005 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1M3DJv-1loAYJ1jtF-003cjU; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 17:48:10 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and add sysctl attributes Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:03:59 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-3-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:JXaQJfGTcSR0lvHjmBWsXjH1ZKVaVjnn0UvOhP+EbAQRPkBCgI1 DA5IRh+UNu+/Foy/9XrfO0tedY3Jna3eK8GYRvg5YfgDHkZ7aOB3/f0QHPN7+Xwm1B4ggPX oF4zge1gUtstoNA8epEYi/+IrvFgxXlA4pXzn/AIm0P9Bl8GLGwwVUWvJtu5nqZzbSYriSE +2Dl2rhtjTEbB952r9mdQ== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:cIMC9mC3TMU=:NSGpjSHDR71UOOzUcq+D8h Fvx5o+hh92fPHWJCoZImAzaaAYFpFyeKLItdngS+TtLrwYzlxS5ehrb0bG2LB3XMbKLFnv5PN 86dABR0nSTk4K5FhenkeF1vC+e3YB0zPVW1D8a/L+MHgpcaFAukMHa6/Xd2qZ0s9gumf5ig2E aFn+4Pm19jsGKmko6OkS6LGmhJC2VwimAPKxzREORk+DP38nR0F2i6aSoNNFomvi4iu/JQ8af AX2dWNn34sgzR2i0YxwZ8uhnXaJFeeh2SQBf/NxU2HXBG7glOAXU7S56KabsefLvuNI6AI63h u8ZvIvGsTYpnMB7VhiuhMn+ASse+6vwL256Z2pVvJvpwkdl5wnbwPT5L72/3x0aNS9ovS6zW3 Cn2SFf63wFtkEnZRqiALV/MjmUNCYwFrP8wnIXLprTMCV8tXD3EfpRKBf6GtJ0v7O6Kpx+4if Al0gDypbLmy17cwltnXRkgQEvbwRew2GjgCsc+KDzHnOXtgn7XT6AvWkyVR9McpKuk9fFIvXQ Owgbv6OroIa/dya2wgqLir3LJlYDY30Rs7z+U5ppuHxm7P49ZPyAwGDaQOaS9KPyPVrhuSkzt smBNh4Nr7Kb6gwyJwXSKj4jcZEWLR8pvUlUSgqFXv4jOWL4paYEf4STwbgo0cQ1/wq8PTN3Aj 2OItlA9Enz/vdLPDvU1gO3EQeGyvTtm/nMU2IbvVh/sl6/7rHzOIej1+Lr9FCEklzzvlsCr7t K5tXszJ84GAtLCxVMORdG4gBi2cCfPWZB5SrByb9lRO7AD7DSAnk+JU3dTuzRbhar1mgxlCJR FoXUuG/OzuXs20SRiZBnSKPHTfMnHtTs+0eGJ8/w+B717zAQUWyZgp+3UQPyyyC5IsxT9JmCZ Tac1sRS76dMFqsIBzpvBcsvW4PkMoodb47xx67mLHqQk4K5xH7wb2X0HhoUmB4EmASOkhAN+i VgySvfPQLrQ+gYDr9NYu++wjRGK1Pjtld6lDxH5TCy7H0iY4WOaGoIGjpn1exHdSn9Ux3Zh/Z 0TF1EvxFSXr8CfmUXLr2i92Ix//Yxg/C/pof6d9SQ+neM6joiowcHIDTaW6ibQ9qZnkcDdkZy 4MJn6crPtaslDjYPO3bcXnVV5uPB8XftL+X Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a new Kconfig file to define a menu entry under "Security options" to enable the "Fork brute force attack detection and mitigation" feature. The detection of a brute force attack can be based on the number of faults per application and its crash rate. There are two types of brute force attacks that can be detected. The first one is a slow brute force attack that is detected if the maximum number of faults per fork hierarchy is reached. The second type is a fast brute force attack that is detected if the application crash period falls below a certain threshold. The application crash period must be a value that is not prone to change due to spurious data and follows the real crash period. So, to compute it, the exponential moving average (EMA) will be used. This kind of average defines a weight (between 0 and 1) for the new value to add and applies the remainder of the weight to the current average value. This way, some spurious data will not excessively modify the average and only if the new values are persistent, the moving average will tend towards them. Mathematically the application crash period's EMA can be expressed as follows: period_ema = period * weight + period_ema * (1 - weight) Moreover, it is important to note that a minimum number of faults is needed to guarantee a trend in the crash period when the EMA is used. So, based on all the previous information define a LSM with five sysctl attributes that will be used to fine tune the attack detection. ema_weight_numerator ema_weight_denominator max_faults min_faults crash_period_threshold This patch is a previous step on the way to fine tune the attack detection. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- security/Kconfig | 11 +-- security/Makefile | 2 + security/brute/Kconfig | 14 ++++ security/brute/Makefile | 2 + security/brute/brute.c | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/brute/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/brute/Makefile create mode 100644 security/brute/brute.c -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 0ced7fd33e4d..2df1727f2c2c 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" +source "security/brute/Kconfig" choice prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized" @@ -278,11 +279,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,brute,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,brute,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,brute,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,brute,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,brute,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 47e432900e24..94d325256413 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE) += brute # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE) += brute/ # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity diff --git a/security/brute/Kconfig b/security/brute/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5da314d221aa --- /dev/null +++ b/security/brute/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +config SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE + bool "Fork brute force attack detection and mitigation" + depends on SECURITY + help + This is an LSM that stops any fork brute force attack against + vulnerable userspace processes. The detection method is based on + the application crash period and as a mitigation procedure all the + offending tasks are killed. Also, the executable file involved in the + attack will be marked as "not allowed" and new execve system calls + using this file will fail. Like capabilities, this security module + stacks with other LSMs. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/brute/Makefile b/security/brute/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d3f233a132a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/brute/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE) += brute.o diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0edb89a58ab0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include + +/** + * DOC: brute_ema_weight_numerator + * + * Weight's numerator of EMA. + */ +static unsigned int brute_ema_weight_numerator __read_mostly = 7; + +/** + * DOC: brute_ema_weight_denominator + * + * Weight's denominator of EMA. + */ +static unsigned int brute_ema_weight_denominator __read_mostly = 10; + +/** + * DOC: brute_max_faults + * + * Maximum number of faults. + * + * If a brute force attack is running slowly for a long time, the application + * crash period's EMA is not suitable for the detection. This type of attack + * must be detected using a maximum number of faults. + */ +static unsigned int brute_max_faults __read_mostly = 200; + +/** + * DOC: brute_min_faults + * + * Minimum number of faults. + * + * The application crash period's EMA cannot be used until a minimum number of + * data has been applied to it. This constraint allows getting a trend when this + * moving average is used. + */ +static unsigned int brute_min_faults __read_mostly = 5; + +/** + * DOC: brute_crash_period_threshold + * + * Application crash period threshold. + * + * A fast brute force attack is detected when the application crash period falls + * below this threshold. The units are expressed in seconds. + */ +static unsigned int brute_crash_period_threshold __read_mostly = 30; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static unsigned int uint_max = UINT_MAX; +#define SYSCTL_UINT_MAX (&uint_max) + +/* + * brute_sysctl_path - Sysctl attributes path. + */ +static struct ctl_path brute_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "brute", }, + { } +}; + +/* + * brute_sysctl_table - Sysctl attributes. + */ +static struct ctl_table brute_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "ema_weight_numerator", + .data = &brute_ema_weight_numerator, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_ema_weight_numerator), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = &brute_ema_weight_denominator, + }, + { + .procname = "ema_weight_denominator", + .data = &brute_ema_weight_denominator, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_ema_weight_denominator), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &brute_ema_weight_numerator, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_UINT_MAX, + }, + { + .procname = "max_faults", + .data = &brute_max_faults, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_max_faults), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &brute_min_faults, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_UINT_MAX, + }, + { + .procname = "min_faults", + .data = &brute_min_faults, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_min_faults), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, + .extra2 = &brute_max_faults, + }, + { + .procname = "crash_period_threshold", + .data = &brute_crash_period_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_crash_period_threshold), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_UINT_MAX, + }, + { } +}; + +/** + * brute_init_sysctl() - Initialize the sysctl interface. + */ +static void __init brute_init_sysctl(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl_paths(brute_sysctl_path, brute_sysctl_table)) + panic("sysctl registration failed\n"); +} + +#else +static inline void brute_init_sysctl(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +/** + * brute_init() - Initialize the brute LSM. + * + * Return: Always returns zero. + */ +static int __init brute_init(void) +{ + pr_info("becoming mindful\n"); + brute_init_sysctl(); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(brute) = { + .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, + .init = brute_init, +}; From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:00 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301639 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E0E05C4743D for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:11:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C117C61420 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:11:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229959AbhFEQMz (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:12:55 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.18]:36221 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229930AbhFEQMy (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:12:54 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622909395; bh=W3NGJ8OdbIbyLxD47M77jyb5srEITX0+cZKdDbqIKSM=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Q4/YT4LHiPqhAU+jh8unfGiVd4DTzqC55mjMvf3IKrW5w5iP8r/SWZgpgO4axAfhP 8gM4+QKrB2NmfdUzLa2AF802eHIxbo6+MJsFmWilCRo/u1JiaCp7s5t2+sqpBvxDci FdORCADbTCyJThyov6d1RuIlmDUN8BJ+Q2Vr5+EQ= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx004 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1MpUUw-1l1vFW2iTM-00pxBg; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 18:09:54 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:00 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-4-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:Zv70seLqYLHHbp/V3v17O3ky/MJsPOEfBxfqGdPQokbs5j89PV+ xwGFR2cfv/HIjEV8gImhMG4TaKQ9d53hvfDPrX6UnC8JR503Y7tRPS22UOG/lOivCCEOmm1 K734bJaVnWGsT0u6rZ/gYd80WH18Aex668hIkKeswhCKdW5U9Jy/ThT/lkoau+/YPISj5aE kPnmEWBRQw5HsVGzXGm8Q== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:sBIU1bRE5DM=:NoSqzpuvbPGtJqAMrDyN5n RJ46zjsSQ+XZxGvtHYMfzofM01QzNGHarUbYZG3ah7oEktZOL2scJGhqRlp1I6nP+8Ljshl/h mVV/SqCWPl/9gSDFK4Iuoer3D8qRO3Y6HwAjPHpIz0BCMVozHK5EwpBKt13AofdiGt3eF4dkX lQWQrWWvEeBQs2wvxetswApZ4h5GGb9GxjlcycjUPnLtK1l9RZ0RYZ19DMY/+zHtCtMnwygBy OVCApJHW6GpNbmR6HB9QIz0tKpmMUalBntZD5Ly4wCmQf54OeBfRMvYmkFrJ+gE/6ubAYu8jc vc8xTrEfMHXihteTl1HAywDtF/VPbVMRgYq5IuFbsF9T3/Cbd8WrQN6MONs19TrmfkhD7ZI3M YqzKdnhoQPvzVDCW7+A8X9jVv+gl9EjFBRkaU3j3xAzA5iqlOD/s8X0EGzIH0pDdF0SpYEAM3 v+YazlI9M0UyLPEYWiioIJg+1s+8E2VTCcC8FSW2+nwhgCatlwSBw9aJnCyvBiNwDnFBuZnp7 E3Vbu8zJJcb65whr5rdKV4aKYpYodot3bdg4G0EWOQpkCC4IA3D6Fynd2mPfRXTQVpv6V+PUz whM1yqQENfL21Hf+ZefeEsSWyev8aZIphTwXQHvAO6V+GzSmUPzw5tE8XCci79m8lTDWOZML2 AiF03ffkQL97vHvZ7cngkpS98cIh33DP8d+pHAVlnlB1/ku3ajF+DJIClanYdgnAQMHKAvOiJ NHjZ7y7N5UzAlD6EZGXJH+60v8tfpmpGZ+PnB4lOagoPhuUVRtqNnwLDeOmvcxxyBi5W5Ckpo in6VYsMfXVqdeKLlO11+hZjEhKDcFBYxt1W+VA8bNvapAZqsMnCavdKiXdJpveg3xMU6IKWuP eqRfjPvt6UF4XaxG2f6+SQcFRsKQqCIxuU5M+ok9mlCwYvVcEQV/eKr+hOCANfN6ASOAYRiQK tGKIcQtoBFJ7IPFn6VJN61nQyHbnLO0KSinGx74MfmqWna0wkUrEMCGUaZLCVWX0lojsmLjwD tawDx+XfS0xykwtPOnf3MQEGY+ZZkawWVn/sN5yPs5DcwMbxSurTPiQcR6afHHNb83Opv30fw R4XPlln7g1eoU600GhsWFzxSqj6ImI9tJJG Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org For a correct management of a fork brute force attack it is necessary to track all the information related to the application crashes. To do so, use the extended attributes (xattr) of the executable files and define a statistical data structure to hold all the necessary information shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. This info is the number of crashes, the last crash timestamp and the crash period's moving average. The same can be achieved using a pointer to the fork hierarchy statistical data held by the task_struct structure. But this has an important drawback: a brute force attack that happens through the execve system call losts the faults info since these statistics are freed when the fork hierarchy disappears. Using this method makes not possible to manage this attack type that can be successfully treated using extended attributes. Also, to avoid false positives during the attack detection it is necessary to narrow the possible cases. So, only the following scenarios are taken into account: 1.- Launching (fork()/exec()) a setuid/setgid process repeatedly until a desirable memory layout is got (e.g. Stack Clash). 2.- Connecting to an exec()ing network daemon (e.g. xinetd) repeatedly until a desirable memory layout is got (e.g. what CTFs do for simple network service). 3.- Launching processes without exec() (e.g. Android Zygote) and exposing state to attack a sibling. 4.- Connecting to a fork()ing network daemon (e.g. apache) repeatedly until the previously shared memory layout of all the other children is exposed (e.g. kind of related to HeartBleed). In each case, a privilege boundary has been crossed: Case 1: setuid/setgid process Case 2: network to local Case 3: privilege changes Case 4: network to local To mark that a privilege boundary has been crossed it is only necessary to create a new stats for the executable file via the extended attribute and only if it has no previous statistical data. This is done using four different LSM hooks, one per privilege boundary: setuid/setgid process --> bprm_creds_from_file hook (based on secureexec flag). network to local -------> socket_accept hook (taking into account only external connections). privilege changes ------> task_fix_setuid and task_fix_setgid hooks. To detect a brute force attack it is necessary that the executable file statistics be updated in every fatal crash and the most important data to update is the application crash period. To do so, use the new "task_fatal_signal" LSM hook added in a previous step. The application crash period must be a value that is not prone to change due to spurious data and follows the real crash period. So, to compute it, the exponential moving average (EMA) is used. Based on the updated statistics two different attacks can be handled. A slow brute force attack that is detected if the maximum number of faults per fork hierarchy is reached and a fast brute force attack that is detected if the application crash period falls below a certain threshold. Moreover, only the signals delivered by the kernel are taken into account with the exception of the SIGABRT signal since the latter is used by glibc for stack canary, malloc, etc failures, which may indicate that a mitigation has been triggered. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 3 + security/brute/brute.c | 500 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 503 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h index 9463db2dfa9d..ce1c8497dceb 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_BRUTE_SUFFIX "brute" +#define XATTR_NAME_BRUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_BRUTE_SUFFIX + #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS "posix_acl_access" #define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT "posix_acl_default" diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c index 0edb89a58ab0..03bebfd1ed1f 100644 --- a/security/brute/brute.c +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -2,8 +2,85 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#include #include #include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * struct brute_stats - Fork brute force attack statistics. + * @faults: Number of crashes. + * @nsecs: Last crash timestamp as the number of nanoseconds in the + * International Atomic Time (TAI) reference. + * @period: Crash period's moving average. + * @flags: Statistics flags as a whole. + * @not_allowed: Not allowed executable file flag. + * @unused: Remaining unused flags. + * + * This structure holds the statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy + * processes. + */ +struct brute_stats { + u32 faults; + u64 nsecs; + u64 period; + union { + u8 flags; + struct { + u8 not_allowed : 1; + u8 unused : 7; + }; + }; +}; + +/** + * struct brute_raw_stats - Raw fork brute force attack statistics. + * @faults: Number of crashes. + * @nsecs: Last crash timestamp as the number of nanoseconds in the + * International Atomic Time (TAI) reference. + * @period: Crash period's moving average. + * @flags: Statistics flags. + * + * This structure holds the statistical data on disk as an extended attribute. + * Since the filesystems on which extended attributes are stored might also be + * used on architectures with a different byte order and machine word size, care + * should be taken to store attribute values in an architecture-independent + * format. + */ +struct brute_raw_stats { + __le32 faults; + __le64 nsecs; + __le64 period; + u8 flags; +} __packed; + +/** + * brute_get_current_exe_file() - Get the current task's executable file. + * + * Since all the kernel threads associated with a task share the same executable + * file, get the thread group leader's executable file. + * + * Context: The file must be released via fput(). + * Return: NULL if the current task has no associated executable file. A pointer + * to the executable file otherwise. + */ +static struct file *brute_get_current_exe_file(void) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + struct file *exe_file; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!thread_group_leader(task)) + task = rcu_dereference(task->group_leader); + get_task_struct(task); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task); + put_task_struct(task); + return exe_file; +} /** * DOC: brute_ema_weight_numerator @@ -19,6 +96,18 @@ static unsigned int brute_ema_weight_numerator __read_mostly = 7; */ static unsigned int brute_ema_weight_denominator __read_mostly = 10; +/** + * brute_mul_by_ema_weight() - Multiply by EMA weight. + * @value: Value to multiply by EMA weight. + * + * Return: The result of the multiplication operation. + */ +static inline u64 brute_mul_by_ema_weight(u64 value) +{ + return mul_u64_u32_div(value, brute_ema_weight_numerator, + brute_ema_weight_denominator); +} + /** * DOC: brute_max_faults * @@ -30,6 +119,56 @@ static unsigned int brute_ema_weight_denominator __read_mostly = 10; */ static unsigned int brute_max_faults __read_mostly = 200; +/** + * brute_update_crash_period() - Update the application crash period. + * @stats: Statistics that hold the application crash period to update. Cannot + * be NULL. + * + * The application crash period must be a value that is not prone to change due + * to spurious data and follows the real crash period. So, to compute it, the + * exponential moving average (EMA) is used. + * + * This kind of average defines a weight (between 0 and 1) for the new value to + * add and applies the remainder of the weight to the current average value. + * This way, some spurious data will not excessively modify the average and only + * if the new values are persistent, the moving average will tend towards them. + * + * Mathematically the application crash period's EMA can be expressed as + * follows: + * + * period_ema = period * weight + period_ema * (1 - weight) + * + * If the operations are applied: + * + * period_ema = period * weight + period_ema - period_ema * weight + * + * If the operands are ordered: + * + * period_ema = period_ema - period_ema * weight + period * weight + * + * Finally, this formula can be written as follows: + * + * period_ema -= period_ema * weight; + * period_ema += period * weight; + */ +static void brute_update_crash_period(struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + u64 current_period; + u64 now = ktime_get_clocktai_ns(); + + if (stats->faults >= (u32)brute_max_faults) + return; + + if (stats->nsecs) { + current_period = now > stats->nsecs ? now - stats->nsecs : 0; + stats->period -= brute_mul_by_ema_weight(stats->period); + stats->period += brute_mul_by_ema_weight(current_period); + } + + stats->nsecs = now; + stats->faults += 1; +} + /** * DOC: brute_min_faults * @@ -51,6 +190,365 @@ static unsigned int brute_min_faults __read_mostly = 5; */ static unsigned int brute_crash_period_threshold __read_mostly = 30; +/** + * brute_attack_running() - Test if a brute force attack is happening. + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. Cannot + * be NULL. + * + * The decision if a brute force attack is running is based on the statistical + * data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. + * + * There are two types of brute force attacks that can be detected using the + * statistical data. The first one is a slow brute force attack that is detected + * if the maximum number of faults per fork hierarchy is reached. The second + * type is a fast brute force attack that is detected if the application crash + * period falls below a certain threshold. + * + * Moreover, it is important to note that no attacks will be detected until a + * minimum number of faults have occurred. This allows to have a trend in the + * crash period when the EMA is used. + * + * Return: True if a brute force attack is happening. False otherwise. + */ +static bool brute_attack_running(const struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + u64 threshold; + + if (stats->faults < (u32)brute_min_faults) + return false; + + if (stats->faults >= (u32)brute_max_faults) + return true; + + threshold = (u64)brute_crash_period_threshold * (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC; + return stats->period < threshold; +} + +/** + * brute_print_attack_running() - Warn about a fork brute force attack. + */ +static inline void brute_print_attack_running(void) +{ + pr_warn("fork brute force attack detected [pid %d: %s]\n", current->pid, + current->comm); +} + +/** + * brute_get_xattr_stats() - Get the stats from an extended attribute. + * @dentry: The dentry of the file to get the extended attribute. + * @inode: The inode of the file to get the extended attribute. + * @stats: The stats where to store the info obtained from the extended + * attribute. Cannot be NULL. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get the statistical data. Zero + * otherwise. + */ +static int brute_get_xattr_stats(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + int rc; + struct brute_raw_stats raw_stats; + + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_BRUTE, &raw_stats, + sizeof(raw_stats)); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + stats->faults = le32_to_cpu(raw_stats.faults); + stats->nsecs = le64_to_cpu(raw_stats.nsecs); + stats->period = le64_to_cpu(raw_stats.period); + stats->flags = raw_stats.flags; + return 0; +} + +/** + * brute_set_xattr_stats() - Set the stats to an extended attribute. + * @dentry: The dentry of the file to set the extended attribute. + * @inode: The inode of the file to set the extended attribute. + * @stats: The stats from where to extract the info to set the extended attribute. + * Cannot be NULL. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to set the statistical data. Zero + * otherwise. + */ +static int brute_set_xattr_stats(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + const struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + struct brute_raw_stats raw_stats; + + raw_stats.faults = cpu_to_le32(stats->faults); + raw_stats.nsecs = cpu_to_le64(stats->nsecs); + raw_stats.period = cpu_to_le64(stats->period); + raw_stats.flags = stats->flags; + + return __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_BRUTE, + &raw_stats, sizeof(raw_stats), 0); +} + +/** + * brute_update_xattr_stats() - Update the stats of a file. + * @file: The file that holds the statistical data to update. Cannot be NULL. + * + * For a correct management of a fork brute force attack it is only necessary to + * update the statistics and test if an attack is happening based on these data. + * It is important to note that if the file has no stats nothing is updated nor + * created. This way, the scenario where an application has not crossed any + * privilege boundary is avoided since the existence of the extended attribute + * denotes the crossing of bounds. + */ +static void brute_update_xattr_stats(const struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct brute_stats stats; + int rc; + + inode_lock(inode); + rc = brute_get_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + WARN_ON_ONCE(rc && rc != -ENODATA); + if (rc) { + inode_unlock(inode); + return; + } + + brute_update_crash_period(&stats); + if (brute_attack_running(&stats)) { + brute_print_attack_running(); + stats.not_allowed = true; + } + + rc = brute_set_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + WARN_ON_ONCE(rc); + inode_unlock(inode); +} + +/** + * brute_reset_stats() - Reset the statistical data. + * @stats: Statistics to be reset. Cannot be NULL. + */ +static inline void brute_reset_stats(struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats)); +} + +/** + * brute_new_xattr_stats() - New statistics for a file. + * @file: The file in which to create the new statistical data. Cannot be NULL. + * + * Only if the file has no statistical data create it. This function will be + * called to mark that a privilege boundary has been crossed so, if new stats + * are required, they do not contain any useful data. The existence of the + * extended attribute denotes the crossing of privilege bounds. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical + * data. Zero otherwise. + */ +static int brute_new_xattr_stats(const struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct brute_stats stats; + int rc; + + inode_lock(inode); + rc = brute_get_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) + goto unlock; + + if (rc == -ENODATA) { + brute_reset_stats(&stats); + rc = brute_set_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + } + +unlock: + inode_unlock(inode); + return rc; +} + +/** + * brute_current_new_xattr_stats() - New stats for the current task's exe file. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical + * data. Zero otherwise. + */ +static int brute_current_new_xattr_stats(void) +{ + struct file *exe_file; + int rc; + + exe_file = brute_get_current_exe_file(); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!exe_file)) + return -ENOENT; + + rc = brute_new_xattr_stats(exe_file); + WARN_ON_ONCE(rc); + fput(exe_file); + return rc; +} + +/** + * brute_signal_from_user() - Test if a signal is coming from userspace. + * @siginfo: Contains the signal information. + * + * To avoid false positives during the attack detection it is necessary to + * narrow the possible cases. So, only the signals delivered by the kernel are + * taken into account with the exception of the SIGABRT signal since the latter + * is used by glibc for stack canary, malloc, etc failures, which may indicate + * that a mitigation has been triggered. + * + * Return: True if the signal is coming from usersapce. False otherwise. + */ +static inline bool brute_signal_from_user(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ + return siginfo->si_signo == SIGKILL && siginfo->si_code != SIGABRT; +} + +/** + * brute_task_fatal_signal() - Target for the task_fatal_signal hook. + * @siginfo: Contains the signal information. + * + * To detect a brute force attack it is necessary, as a first step, to test in + * every fatal crash if the signal is delibered by the kernel. If so, update the + * statistics and act based on these data. + */ +static void brute_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ + struct file *exe_file; + + if (brute_signal_from_user(siginfo)) + return; + + exe_file = brute_get_current_exe_file(); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!exe_file)) + return; + + brute_update_xattr_stats(exe_file); + fput(exe_file); +} + +/** + * brute_task_execve() - Target for the bprm_creds_from_file hook. + * @bprm: Contains the linux_binprm structure. + * @file: Binary that will be executed without an interpreter. + * + * This hook is useful to mark that a privilege boundary (setuid/setgid process) + * has been crossed. This is done based on the "secureexec" flag. + * + * To be defensive return an error code if it is not possible to get or set the + * stats using an extended attribute since this blocks the execution of the + * file. This scenario is treated as an attack. + * + * It is important to note that here the brute_new_xattr_stats function could be + * used with a previous test of the secureexec flag. However it is better to use + * the basic xattr functions since in a future commit a test if the execution is + * allowed (via the brute_stats::not_allowed flag) will be necessary. This way, + * the stats of the file will be get only once. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical + * data. Zero otherwise. + */ +static int brute_task_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(bprm->file); + struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); + struct brute_stats stats; + int rc; + + inode_lock(inode); + rc = brute_get_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rc && rc != -ENODATA)) + goto unlock; + + if (rc == -ENODATA && bprm->secureexec) { + brute_reset_stats(&stats); + rc = brute_set_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rc)) + goto unlock; + } + + rc = 0; +unlock: + inode_unlock(inode); + return rc; +} + +/** + * brute_task_change_priv() - Target for the task_fix_setid hooks. + * @new: The set of credentials that will be installed. + * @old: The set of credentials that are being replaced. + * @flags: Contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values. + * + * This hook is useful to mark that a privilege boundary (privilege changes) has + * been crossed. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical + * data. Zero otherwise. + */ +static int brute_task_change_priv(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) +{ + return brute_current_new_xattr_stats(); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6 +/** + * brute_local_ipv6_rcv_saddr() - Test if an ipv6 rcv_saddr is local. + * @sk: The sock that contains the ipv6 address. + * + * Return: True if the ipv6 rcv_saddr is local. False otherwise. + */ +static inline bool brute_local_ipv6_rcv_saddr(const struct sock *sk) +{ + return ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, &in6addr_loopback); +} +#else +static inline bool brute_local_ipv6_rcv_saddr(const struct sock *sk) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK +/** + * brute_socket_accept() - Target for the socket_accept hook. + * @sock: Contains the listening socket structure. + * @newsock: Contains the newly created server socket for connection. + * + * This hook is useful to mark that a privilege boundary (network to local) has + * been crossed. This is done only if the listening socket accepts external + * connections. The sockets for inter-process communication (IPC) and those that + * are listening on loopback addresses are not taken into account. + * + * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical + * data. Zero otherwise. + */ +static int brute_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + + if (sk->sk_family == AF_UNIX || sk->sk_family == AF_NETLINK || + sk->sk_rcv_saddr == htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK) || + brute_local_ipv6_rcv_saddr(sk)) + return 0; + + return brute_current_new_xattr_stats(); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +/* + * brute_hooks - Targets for the LSM's hooks. + */ +static struct security_hook_list brute_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fatal_signal, brute_task_fatal_signal), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, brute_task_execve), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, brute_task_change_priv), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, brute_task_change_priv), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, brute_socket_accept), +#endif +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static unsigned int uint_max = UINT_MAX; #define SYSCTL_UINT_MAX (&uint_max) @@ -137,6 +635,8 @@ static inline void brute_init_sysctl(void) { } static int __init brute_init(void) { pr_info("becoming mindful\n"); + security_add_hooks(brute_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(brute_hooks), + KBUILD_MODNAME); brute_init_sysctl(); return 0; } From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:01 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301653 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 478DBC4743E for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:32:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24A3F61287 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:32:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229964AbhFEQee (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:34:34 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.19]:53599 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229930AbhFEQee (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:34:34 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622910700; bh=d0ThzL6H3ZgX1iy++Zve4fg1GWGCL9gUNpUEh/9SJtk=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=BuDP4OKL2j+CO6onsweK/K1KkYYu7I/kH+jhZ5PntqQFdTIH5E8AtMJIcqgrDvBVP VvU7zSrKp+ubV7jeVznxxj8uhJ95HiQNaUsJmFq1kZPdS58nh04QD77n1icWS+x4Co ywVo6FBtmOUJHa0SRZK8zoeb6HPdd4rnxOvUy4E8= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx005 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1MeU4s-1lHKJz3J9Y-00aT8a; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 18:31:40 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 4/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:01 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-5-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:eaoHbte0dcns/AzvPwU3vjWvzTt5OyHKFhMvw3CoF2yDAezUQXG HNL+Dz0RMocznxqLc/uqoDMWEiwIy9oVQAmVywfZcYdM0FqRELNwtjOp3/3Ez4hQkjUTbBe 3kE1mRljNdwia+or7ZFdi/nK+l1r97CttJ0H2x4emoeySF4meERwpAfOMWx4y+7eTpkASXL asnTW9LUdyzRx3OBp+gpQ== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:Me4GWsjU9Io=:avuErcXWGckyfqeykMNLff v4oTeRj6F4cphQX08iNfKJbo7vA+WlE3ckHPPwaVQ6wN8qw+YEjPDb++wvEOD/tHdAo1MzILj 2DexURIr+Sb2AOWd/fF2RJTFpZzdOXenT4cKFcpQwA2ihfzVOqd5g33IxkUO9S6Z84liq797Z wIn+YwhKBnEUFgKUjn+WeBsDIBKB2zj3pcM3oJRI/OdsQVIqeYFmABL/ZLo6vH0yhJyLct1f/ /ZkKOAZzQfawoB8d6Ur6KdJUJMvb7gcuvsBooEnDiqvrMoL9GYA1oZoXuXbUUJc2zVjQgxSzJ UzIe7Dh07sq9k3zh7ZTxw2gNIm7DNUZsKctYzHIwHtTPTFQBHW58tif6qwdeGwxKXcZvqH0J7 48GVCvMUJrA8KAaGXLTvSgkRT4tGkJddivRbIxSrw/q9GNsuHYmzONOko9Lz//1Mq5JLdYp8t YZ+qSODc7EIT2gnjhYMUCnN9OaEY9BzzZtQYUr5fK2QdeIovdOwpmJBdYopW9p5iL8gxj8PJx UsCctXYdxfbDnS0qyqXs1lWA1tpePBa5sHFKEiC/eoc5J1fa70wo187nk3pZsWF9vi2ebtAbm ttkry6c+SPJiTy4AKv9V6YnHW1O/1kWXzpIgm3007gmUVaxN7tqz0M3fzcWBptPKKlbuoPuuO X5T+73RnwlcVvuV7DxpeVAxTtMKYfcvNNMZsVLCcpW+DTL0hgkMh8bxQxM6Cxj+MpHvkruRgh Ur9pUukiUmy4UKsxoTkyGU5Tm7huEkMm0sN/ariuHZOwzfKsySy2E/2+XpW2tKqpU3wtSqDeP RRJNC+GohDqsTbpHVrHOjGH5dfELUurgOoX89iPvA9FqW+H0/2moxpITU2zDam6oH1oriN6qG bXbuPXLEqqhPt/dV+5/yzNzZfpHeH2NtoQzbAlrUVA7QRAhlQjPPltNDkntGt1oMRxzffpay5 4GjXCHAjJhqv+7IpIPrG3j+NYvjYt/GWIAq3zz5r1M67nbvynw8pHL3LKnVVMY9fWIjdrHqd+ OqYMyUXnZnKywfcnKCAjX+3OeRGApG9iGv2Ju0y6hrZq9ZRzeA9aBpVCRON9jUrLAYC20rcQd CfSeyyC/3WD+4GONhvNRIpyVK5RBzbR5TZk Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org When a brute force attack is detected all the offending tasks involved in the attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all the tasks that are executing the same file that is running during the brute force attack. Also, to prevent the executable involved in the attack from being respawned by a supervisor, and thus prevent a brute force attack from being started again, test the "not_allowed" flag and avoid the file execution based on this. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- security/brute/brute.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c index 03bebfd1ed1f..4e0fd23990c8 100644 --- a/security/brute/brute.c +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -233,6 +233,88 @@ static inline void brute_print_attack_running(void) current->comm); } +/** + * brute_print_file_not_allowed() - Warn about a file not allowed. + * @dentry: The dentry of the file not allowed. + */ +static void brute_print_file_not_allowed(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + char *buf, *path; + + buf = __getname(); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!buf)) + return; + + path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buf, PATH_MAX); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(path))) + goto free; + + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s not allowed\n", path); +free: + __putname(buf); +} + +/** + * brute_is_same_file() - Test if two files are the same. + * @file1: First file to compare. Cannot be NULL. + * @file2: Second file to compare. Cannot be NULL. + * + * Two files are the same if they have the same inode number and the same block + * device. + * + * Return: True if the two files are the same. False otherwise. + */ +static inline bool brute_is_same_file(const struct file *file1, + const struct file *file2) +{ + struct inode *inode1 = file_inode(file1); + struct inode *inode2 = file_inode(file2); + + return inode1->i_ino == inode2->i_ino && + inode1->i_sb->s_dev == inode2->i_sb->s_dev; +} + +/** + * brute_kill_offending_tasks() - Kill the offending tasks. + * @file: The file executed during a brute force attack. Cannot be NULL. + * + * When a brute force attack is detected all the offending tasks involved in the + * attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all the tasks + * that are executing the same file that is running during the brute force + * attack. Moreover, the processes that have the same group_leader that the + * current task must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. + * + * The for_each_process loop is protected by the tasklist_lock acquired in read + * mode instead of rcu_read_lock to avoid that the newly created processes + * escape this RCU read lock. + */ +static void brute_kill_offending_tasks(const struct file *file) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct file *exe_file; + bool is_same_file; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(task) { + if (task->group_leader == current->group_leader) + continue; + + exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task); + if (!exe_file) + continue; + + is_same_file = brute_is_same_file(exe_file, file); + fput(exe_file); + if (!is_same_file) + continue; + + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task, PIDTYPE_PID); + pr_warn_ratelimited("offending process %d [%s] killed\n", + task->pid, task->comm); + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +} + /** * brute_get_xattr_stats() - Get the stats from an extended attribute. * @dentry: The dentry of the file to get the extended attribute. @@ -295,6 +377,10 @@ static int brute_set_xattr_stats(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, * created. This way, the scenario where an application has not crossed any * privilege boundary is avoided since the existence of the extended attribute * denotes the crossing of bounds. + * + * Also, do not update the statistics if the execution of the file is not + * allowed and kill all the offending tasks when a brute force attack is + * detected. */ static void brute_update_xattr_stats(const struct file *file) { @@ -306,7 +392,7 @@ static void brute_update_xattr_stats(const struct file *file) inode_lock(inode); rc = brute_get_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); WARN_ON_ONCE(rc && rc != -ENODATA); - if (rc) { + if (rc || (!rc && stats.not_allowed)) { inode_unlock(inode); return; } @@ -320,6 +406,9 @@ static void brute_update_xattr_stats(const struct file *file) rc = brute_set_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); WARN_ON_ONCE(rc); inode_unlock(inode); + + if (stats.not_allowed) + brute_kill_offending_tasks(file); } /** @@ -433,21 +522,17 @@ static void brute_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) * @bprm: Contains the linux_binprm structure. * @file: Binary that will be executed without an interpreter. * - * This hook is useful to mark that a privilege boundary (setuid/setgid process) - * has been crossed. This is done based on the "secureexec" flag. + * If there are statistics, test the "not_allowed" flag and avoid the file + * execution based on this. Also, this hook is useful to mark that a privilege + * boundary (setuid/setgid process) has been crossed. This is done based on the + * "secureexec" flag. * * To be defensive return an error code if it is not possible to get or set the * stats using an extended attribute since this blocks the execution of the * file. This scenario is treated as an attack. * - * It is important to note that here the brute_new_xattr_stats function could be - * used with a previous test of the secureexec flag. However it is better to use - * the basic xattr functions since in a future commit a test if the execution is - * allowed (via the brute_stats::not_allowed flag) will be necessary. This way, - * the stats of the file will be get only once. - * - * Return: An error code if it is not possible to get or set the statistical - * data. Zero otherwise. + * Return: -EPERM if the execution of the file is not allowed. An error code if + * it is not possible to get or set the statistical data. Zero otherwise. */ static int brute_task_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { @@ -461,6 +546,12 @@ static int brute_task_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rc && rc != -ENODATA)) goto unlock; + if (!rc && stats.not_allowed) { + brute_print_file_not_allowed(dentry); + rc = -EPERM; + goto unlock; + } + if (rc == -ENODATA && bprm->secureexec) { brute_reset_stats(&stats); rc = brute_set_xattr_stats(dentry, inode, &stats); From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:02 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301659 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70E82C4743F for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:54:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 516E561420 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 16:54:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230025AbhFEQz5 (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:55:57 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.19]:36119 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229938AbhFEQz4 (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 12:55:56 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622912003; bh=otmxS+gVRgDAzJeQxOs2w6E0luu3FW83ow2bhZxo5gQ=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=G5KbARdHQQQgNxI2FJvfcRscUaHQrno2MD/rSTc1sOcDqCu+W2cSs5q7ODICA39oD OX18lDrwumasVhPx8MmJgy/v1yAcCg5E6HR2RS7KuVMY2nHwnEdRk2rM/FiE+jBvQo rCDAPt4XCpFD+aQ+AwHw6aJ6q/Zx9R7lOf/L0lM0= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx005 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1MAfYw-1leWwF0r1M-00B0Vt; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 18:53:23 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 5/8] security/brute: Notify to userspace "task killed" Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:02 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-6-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:uMv9ak4LGcurS/eU8qDGWIbV7ZOGW4XEx+44iIG6e1cPWgqWEGP N+VtYyKNxdTodFiZDDUreZ0Lw/IpX7v1VxMLM6ib8SjyCDaE4Glk3bDXlSsJpB0Zkh9Nkgs YHAH6jEyjdBBQXDTcpFNrYUrcWXKAiBec3gm7IdiuE3TeWdFaJNdO5/bK2W3GNfylflM/eC GcVQPik7Oxw+qmi76Hi8Q== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:dBg1cf3l2FQ=:eI4Ff6J8VEeAXIlSK8bfjf JvIXuoaFJIwHbWyqbBddFSh61VfbnlACb5DLLeRkKDekuYtqo2z2+Xil6A9aq8M9Af8XKzq15 PISbhVm6du8fhWAzRvm/kKplKjonR3Ddp0VqF8111vt4tJ2lTymdWB7RjswWHJJZ+lpj2dfyk oL2j5jRDyIjzWsLD7zQBA96sUzcfU/RW53vQdaX/i8YNTm2TZnMv6ujs0yQ7vbmwixaBd8cFq i/Gh2IKDFb5teFZ58u78Jb2+B0YFfIVJ+Rwwvaiu2zbjgfiyCOTRUfQfxDUHnAkNp0Su/Lq5K QQpFanD5gt2g3tEh6S3mVonERL7aFQq4WbqXAQKoGRyS+wcU2o9qnNXjHf3AOrTXMmBb9BnGw cam6fX58C+wIH2kWIbgYCyNKvVLyppNt0XNIkI5156zDK3DIHpt4CVEUmXZAZcxHlmJFzywg7 W3Pca1XU29HSD0u1h3l1MmQmUbNr7ryQSBzW+iEiBO68RmpdhAffDDnETMxFuFVNnaHaBrkj1 jMEchE3fBTmsB99bmugtYYs63C+5RnswLfyjTJiuuGVrqKdKIWbigjDu6QFjAk23fjw3flu7D Do0BxkGxvUVlNox7Kc5CdDhiMcE6H9cSS17O7agVmzpAunYc3DM91vjII3d5FkedJJtXw7BwV bNhrTV3UMy2wwjlFRqhEBeDxPyYiQqiV26khAbaVyWF+jH9WWZfkX9/PHIjDFVwoYDk2VvZZ5 9ufUQ6V1LeeC5StXzgrx88eIKw9KTp84VfT+uVUUK2A4ssNqPAjXjUNkqj/SZO1SXWC6BZxe5 8ePpfD6brOcPXcB0i1xa06f9JBk2fn8P8NZeBvnYxi3m7zoY/N86odrHJ6ugQlTVQGVdjZu3Y Ax9ZFGoBEJ+9ZssMQVgejuWAxbbXTagYVrh7n7BUR6oLSpjJKYrVlzDzaW/qVzS2c8Q+UCnbt euj7oKJlO2FMXia604ARVnNV5LjEfo0eAvqFqE1vkGMzEvJK6LAU4pdN9h+0r4n9BV6M7c/Qt CezP04VqsBqLbQrYf95Ng9qD0CHNinJYePv8QrU9GnmHKVCzTKCFsMLEo9zq++WButnFNoQED so4TOFDtcJqRmv858pVip1oFdB7ggLegj8b Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add a new SIGCHLD si_code to notify to userspace, using the "waitid" system call, that a task has been killed by Brute LSM to mitigate a brute force attack. This is useful to supervisors in order to decide if a process that has been killed to avoid an attack needs to be respawned. This way, it is possible to avoid the scenario where a brute force attack can be continued due to the respawn of a process. Although the xattr of the executable is accessible from userspace, in complex daemons this file may not be visible directly by the supervisor as it may be run through some wrapper. So, the waitid notification is necessary. To achieve this, use the task_struct security blob to hold a flag that shows when a task has been killed by Brute LSM, and also, test this flag in the "wait_task_zombie" and "do_notify_parent" functions. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: John Wood --- arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- include/brute/brute.h | 16 ++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- kernel/exit.c | 6 ++- kernel/signal.c | 4 +- security/brute/brute.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/brute/brute.h -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c index 06743ec054d2..d4656f1b6341 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9); BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS != 5); BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 6); - BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6); + BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 7); BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSYS != 2); /* This is part of the ABI and can never change in size: */ diff --git a/include/brute/brute.h b/include/brute/brute.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8531a7038711 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/brute/brute.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _BRUTE_H_ +#define _BRUTE_H_ + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE +bool brute_task_killed(const struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline bool brute_task_killed(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + +#endif /* _BRUTE_H_ */ diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h index 5a3c221f4c9d..ffc3ed2d4bce 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h @@ -274,7 +274,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo { #define CLD_TRAPPED 4 /* traced child has trapped */ #define CLD_STOPPED 5 /* child has stopped */ #define CLD_CONTINUED 6 /* stopped child has continued */ -#define NSIGCHLD 6 +#define CLD_BRUTE 7 /* child was killed by brute LSM */ +#define NSIGCHLD 7 /* * SIGPOLL (or any other signal without signal specific si_codes) si_codes diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index fd1c04193e18..69bcbd00d277 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ #include #include +#include + static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead) { nr_threads--; @@ -1001,6 +1003,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) pid_t pid = task_pid_vnr(p); uid_t uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), task_uid(p)); struct waitid_info *infop; + bool killed_by_brute = brute_task_killed(p); if (!likely(wo->wo_flags & WEXITED)) return 0; @@ -1114,7 +1117,8 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) infop->cause = CLD_EXITED; infop->status = status >> 8; } else { - infop->cause = (status & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED; + infop->cause = (status & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : + killed_by_brute ? CLD_BRUTE : CLD_KILLED; infop->status = status & 0x7f; } infop->pid = pid; diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 4380763b3d8d..c85c091ecc27 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ #include #include +#include + /* * SLAB caches for signal bits. */ @@ -2012,7 +2014,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig) if (tsk->exit_code & 0x80) info.si_code = CLD_DUMPED; else if (tsk->exit_code & 0x7f) - info.si_code = CLD_KILLED; + info.si_code = brute_task_killed(tsk) ? CLD_BRUTE : CLD_KILLED; else { info.si_code = CLD_EXITED; info.si_status = tsk->exit_code >> 8; diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c index 4e0fd23990c8..e5c9098addf9 100644 --- a/security/brute/brute.c +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -56,6 +56,59 @@ struct brute_raw_stats { u8 flags; } __packed; +/** + * struct brute_task - Task info. + * @killed: Task killed to mitigate a brute force attack. + */ +struct brute_task { + u8 killed : 1; +}; + +/* + * brute_blob_sizes - LSM blob sizes. + */ +static struct lsm_blob_sizes brute_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lbs_task = sizeof(struct brute_task), +}; + +/** + * brute_task() - Get the task info. + * @task: The task to get the info. + * + * Return: A pointer to the brute_task structure. + */ +static inline struct brute_task *brute_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->security + brute_blob_sizes.lbs_task; +} + +/** + * brute_set_task_killed() - Set task killed to mitigate a brute force attack. + * @task: The task to set. + */ +static inline void brute_set_task_killed(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct brute_task *task_info; + + task_info = brute_task(task); + task_info->killed = true; +} + +/** + * brute_task_killed() - Test if a task has been killed to mitigate an attack. + * @task: The task to test. + * + * Return: True if the task has been killed to mitigate a brute force attack. + * False otherwise. + */ +inline bool brute_task_killed(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct brute_task *task_info; + + task_info = brute_task(task); + return task_info->killed; +} + /** * brute_get_current_exe_file() - Get the current task's executable file. * @@ -296,8 +349,10 @@ static void brute_kill_offending_tasks(const struct file *file) read_lock(&tasklist_lock); for_each_process(task) { - if (task->group_leader == current->group_leader) + if (task->group_leader == current->group_leader) { + brute_set_task_killed(task); continue; + } exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task); if (!exe_file) @@ -311,6 +366,7 @@ static void brute_kill_offending_tasks(const struct file *file) do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task, PIDTYPE_PID); pr_warn_ratelimited("offending process %d [%s] killed\n", task->pid, task->comm); + brute_set_task_killed(task); } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } @@ -735,4 +791,5 @@ static int __init brute_init(void) DEFINE_LSM(brute) = { .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, .init = brute_init, + .blobs = &brute_blob_sizes, }; From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:03 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301681 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AE7BC4743F for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:16:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06914613DF for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:16:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230048AbhFERSS (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 13:18:18 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.17.20]:59473 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229933AbhFERSR (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 13:18:17 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622913309; bh=n09vl0Qi955c0FFlwEbTMm5JhNR/MCo9V3zzQRkL+oI=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=TVdFfiFbg6tNuSDK1EnSO4mtTbjz/F9xIVSzvk/yY7yzGgvx9eMQz4wmWpjFfmlhK Jz9snPAupOyOiIthsnxojbscFpimdIQkMq5ByPxLBIAPcbbBYSpAcDGw7caObxAtNI XtbJtApZyAoc+AeO6HWOKZ8FPNW7NZkoS0b62l7k= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx104 [212.227.17.174]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1Mw9QC-1lZ10S3Npc-00s4aG; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 19:15:09 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:03 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-7-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:DtjoHAETHk4xGDZFpK9+7KXukSk5D6Su3506SD5xQyJNEHT/Msb C0+ipAxxT7EQtxPug3EGTNT471AZFtU/nhXAh+9Yukyj9xcB8SpKZltr4aP+gZPYcVLeLAN CJedZwSGUe2aDoI2xezzqGdkhrQFMo0ySy+FMobwT9nedex2ek0koSOQEV5XwNg1lstNQf9 gQGj17Dc2mchjJPJ48grw== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:dUgzQiRyfpU=:LrUUAWdlWwsuT+lDThaKc4 vc6YBl8vTgX5Q3t10Q/NQGh3aRFvOj2hKbGu/AZ7m4kn3vHwQvWpQypUcod08Fl1wu5w+TLgK ISzWAp9a18UcRrGV1kPKe/KIQVKf7Kg5OCh6jYRHnVRuM2R20pCoytlV2C/hUQTpa0frPoxSf QKlupC+srZIGTD799PhxEfDtQ49KgJhjpKYzwMHDykTOdQrcXJtPXA2wHTH8I3GUanF6cgvJQ eKot2StW8eQ2b4spdLn72BBcWwMrjO+frA5unN9PkNX3ld9jlLTkZnHvIhFHsm88Cza8Ul/QG xL4eSnRO6q6j5RGiZzgmiyGnSovx4lP4IR0BWQJNGV9+0SLHPQ67IkYYVZ1QEA1wxYrx+PYPO cqpluXnN8nVDOr+tyhr3hp5s5/YjuVoHLD6VtxwBBIDbuZXIx+wuLMC5Cpy/mwIJfTNEMCYwk DJwCGzHL756OgwgZRGRCvRZ65ShUs6GoNJ9JdUZPcIxm/Iv3BNvo6jkScEJCUEGHxEDMkKxOn qlIb0vZ4smzx5gbsKA2789AztAmUsIsw6NAZHqECtARFxbbXIVHTVL18HieJDWYLtUvgMt39Q XZ5smKfL8WR9Gi/8cF1usL/sEOItdmm/n490sjoG2i+QsWxdBD7dccqIKb5B2aqs9B60Yli+Q 9SMG4x6EAVahGh3FGZwgfC3fVHt5xDralZMvnB1GU+7xyXRTnruFJJLGr7WrXD8PMNbSNsJj7 b3C/NSRA+KYGDIZCJcBpXrGCm5mHe3z5wW4ZVti3kQe8PHJHsNNY7PcbTrcC+OieotJBJc/2s Be/GkgrJChFrd+ZD68tLsl0B3pX9Z1UogeVTzSKUlHaED1wuBY8dq4UZPGwieDMERgO1QhL96 ggttYik8nqSbiYR/29Ih6qDIpyGlgbAQTExN/2n9TDk95l6SHnAGo98PkRDKWfoPrdYuteD2n WWZONe9XCsL+Bmsb9hunvr5B6z1MPAot0sYC2c0tSt68UFeQYbFxBj7Etcz7QwieZ6k7OsdJG NgT3M5cTamzxAUz7ELwYe0UDidYH0I+6lS4Rh+wqW8HhCtF7+vVuFSITzZACxzdkhFnf5nYlS fvtDDGhx+raVB0no97W8jNWnfQmPIXFG6iB Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add tests to check the Brute LSM functionality and cover fork/exec brute force attacks crossing the following privilege boundaries: 1.- setuid process 2.- privilege changes 3.- network to local Also, as a first step check that fork/exec brute force attacks without crossing any privilege boundary already commented doesn't trigger the detection and mitigation stage. Moreover, test if the userspace notification, via "waitid" system call, is sent when an attack is mitigated (to inform that all the offending tasks involved in the attack have been killed by Brute LSM). Once a brute force attack is detected, the "test" executable is marked as "not allowed". To start again a new test, use the "rmxattr" app to revert this state. This way, all the tests can be run using the same binary. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/brute/.gitignore | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/brute/Makefile | 5 + tools/testing/selftests/brute/config | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/brute/exec.c | 46 ++ tools/testing/selftests/brute/rmxattr.c | 34 ++ tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.c | 507 +++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.sh | 269 ++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 866 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/exec.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/rmxattr.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.c create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.sh -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index bc3299a20338..5c413a010849 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ TARGETS = arm64 TARGETS += bpf TARGETS += breakpoints +TARGETS += brute TARGETS += capabilities TARGETS += cgroup TARGETS += clone3 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a02aa79249a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +exec +rmxattr +test diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3975338c1ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 +TEST_PROGS := test.sh +TEST_GEN_FILES := exec rmxattr test +include ../lib.mk diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/config b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/config new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3587b7bf6c23 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/config @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE=y diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/exec.c b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/exec.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a7fc5705f97c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/exec.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static __attribute__((noreturn)) void error_failure(const char *message) +{ + perror(message); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +#define PROG_NAME basename(argv[0]) +#define CLD_BRUTE 7 /* child was killed by brute LSM */ + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + pid_t pid; + int rc; + siginfo_t siginfo; + + if (argc < 2) { + printf("Usage: %s \n", PROG_NAME); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + error_failure("fork"); + + /* Child process */ + if (!pid) { + execve(argv[1], &argv[1], NULL); + error_failure("execve"); + } + + /* Parent process */ + rc = waitid(P_PID, pid, &siginfo, WEXITED); + if (rc) + error_failure("waitid"); + + return siginfo.si_code != CLD_BRUTE; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/rmxattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/rmxattr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ed90409d337 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/rmxattr.c @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static __attribute__((noreturn)) void error_failure(const char *message) +{ + perror(message); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +#define PROG_NAME basename(argv[0]) + +#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security." +#define XATTR_BRUTE_SUFFIX "brute" +#define XATTR_NAME_BRUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_BRUTE_SUFFIX + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int rc; + + if (argc < 2) { + printf("Usage: %s \n", PROG_NAME); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + + rc = removexattr(argv[1], XATTR_NAME_BRUTE); + if (rc) + error_failure("removexattr"); + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..44c32f446dca --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.c @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const char *message = "message"; + +enum mode { + MODE_NONE, + MODE_CRASH, + MODE_SERVER_CRASH, + MODE_CLIENT, +}; + +enum crash_after { + CRASH_AFTER_NONE, + CRASH_AFTER_FORK, + CRASH_AFTER_EXEC, +}; + +enum signal_from { + SIGNAL_FROM_NONE, + SIGNAL_FROM_USER, + SIGNAL_FROM_KERNEL, +}; + +struct args { + uint32_t ip; + uint16_t port; + int counter; + long timeout; + enum mode mode; + enum crash_after crash_after; + enum signal_from signal_from; + unsigned char has_counter : 1; + unsigned char has_change_priv : 1; + unsigned char has_ip : 1; + unsigned char has_port : 1; + unsigned char has_timeout : 1; +}; + +#define OPT_STRING "hm:c:s:n:Ca:p:t:" + +static void usage(const char *prog) +{ + printf("Usage: %s \n", prog); + printf("OPTIONS:\n"); + printf(" -h: Show this help and exit. Optional.\n"); + printf(" -m (crash | server_crash | client): Mode. Required.\n"); + printf("Options for crash mode:\n"); + printf(" -c (fork | exec): Crash after. Optional.\n"); + printf(" -s (user | kernel): Signal from. Required.\n"); + printf(" -n counter: Number of crashes.\n"); + printf(" Required if the option -c is used.\n"); + printf(" Not used without the option -c.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to INT_MAX.\n"); + printf(" -C: Change privileges before crash. Optional.\n"); + printf("Options for server_crash mode:\n"); + printf(" -a ip: Ip v4 address to accept. Required.\n"); + printf(" -p port: Port number. Required.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to UINT16_MAX.\n"); + printf(" -t secs: Accept timeout. Required.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to LONG_MAX.\n"); + printf(" -c (fork | exec): Crash after. Required.\n"); + printf(" -s (user | kernel): Signal from. Required.\n"); + printf(" -n counter: Number of crashes. Required.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to INT_MAX.\n"); + printf("Options for client mode:\n"); + printf(" -a ip: Ip v4 address to connect. Required.\n"); + printf(" -p port: Port number. Required.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to UINT16_MAX.\n"); + printf(" -t secs: Connect timeout. Required.\n"); + printf(" Range from 1 to LONG_MAX.\n"); +} + +static __attribute__((noreturn)) void info_failure(const char *message, + const char *prog) +{ + printf("%s\n", message); + usage(prog); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +static enum mode get_mode(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + if (!strcmp(text, "crash")) + return MODE_CRASH; + + if (!strcmp(text, "server_crash")) + return MODE_SERVER_CRASH; + + if (!strcmp(text, "client")) + return MODE_CLIENT; + + info_failure("Invalid mode option [-m].", prog); +} + +static enum crash_after get_crash_after(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + if (!strcmp(text, "fork")) + return CRASH_AFTER_FORK; + + if (!strcmp(text, "exec")) + return CRASH_AFTER_EXEC; + + info_failure("Invalid crash after option [-c].", prog); +} + +static enum signal_from get_signal_from(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + if (!strcmp(text, "user")) + return SIGNAL_FROM_USER; + + if (!strcmp(text, "kernel")) + return SIGNAL_FROM_KERNEL; + + info_failure("Invalid signal from option [-s]", prog); +} + +static int get_counter(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + int counter; + + counter = atoi(text); + if (counter > 0) + return counter; + + info_failure("Invalid counter option [-n].", prog); +} + +static __attribute__((noreturn)) void error_failure(const char *message) +{ + perror(message); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +static uint32_t get_ip(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t ip; + + ret = inet_pton(AF_INET, text, &ip); + if (!ret) + info_failure("Invalid ip option [-a].", prog); + else if (ret < 0) + error_failure("inet_pton"); + + return ip; +} + +static uint16_t get_port(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + long port; + + port = atol(text); + if ((port > 0) && (port <= UINT16_MAX)) + return htons(port); + + info_failure("Invalid port option [-p].", prog); +} + +static long get_timeout(const char *text, const char *prog) +{ + long timeout; + + timeout = atol(text); + if (timeout > 0) + return timeout; + + info_failure("Invalid timeout option [-t].", prog); +} + +static void check_args(const struct args *args, const char *prog) +{ + if (args->mode == MODE_CRASH && args->crash_after != CRASH_AFTER_NONE && + args->signal_from != SIGNAL_FROM_NONE && args->has_counter && + !args->has_ip && !args->has_port && !args->has_timeout) + return; + + if (args->mode == MODE_CRASH && args->signal_from != SIGNAL_FROM_NONE && + args->crash_after == CRASH_AFTER_NONE && !args->has_counter && + !args->has_ip && !args->has_port && !args->has_timeout) + return; + + if (args->mode == MODE_SERVER_CRASH && args->has_ip && args->has_port && + args->has_timeout && args->crash_after != CRASH_AFTER_NONE && + args->signal_from != SIGNAL_FROM_NONE && args->has_counter && + !args->has_change_priv) + return; + + if (args->mode == MODE_CLIENT && args->has_ip && args->has_port && + args->has_timeout && args->crash_after == CRASH_AFTER_NONE && + args->signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_NONE && !args->has_counter && + !args->has_change_priv) + return; + + info_failure("Invalid use of options.", prog); +} + +static uid_t get_non_root_uid(void) +{ + struct passwd *pwent; + uid_t uid; + + while (true) { + errno = 0; + pwent = getpwent(); + if (!pwent) { + if (errno) { + perror("getpwent"); + endpwent(); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + break; + } + + if (pwent->pw_uid) { + uid = pwent->pw_uid; + endpwent(); + return uid; + } + } + + endpwent(); + printf("A user different of root is needed.\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +static inline void do_sigsegv(void) +{ + int *p = NULL; + *p = 0; +} + +static void do_sigkill(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = kill(getpid(), SIGKILL); + if (ret) + error_failure("kill"); +} + +static void crash(enum signal_from signal_from, bool change_priv) +{ + int ret; + + if (change_priv) { + ret = setuid(get_non_root_uid()); + if (ret) + error_failure("setuid"); + } + + if (signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_KERNEL) + do_sigsegv(); + + do_sigkill(); +} + +static void execve_crash(char *const argv[]) +{ + execve(argv[0], argv, NULL); + error_failure("execve"); +} + +static void exec_crash_user(void) +{ + char *const argv[] = { + "./test", "-m", "crash", "-s", "user", NULL, + }; + + execve_crash(argv); +} + +static void exec_crash_user_change_priv(void) +{ + char *const argv[] = { + "./test", "-m", "crash", "-s", "user", "-C", NULL, + }; + + execve_crash(argv); +} + +static void exec_crash_kernel(void) +{ + char *const argv[] = { + "./test", "-m", "crash", "-s", "kernel", NULL, + }; + + execve_crash(argv); +} + +static void exec_crash_kernel_change_priv(void) +{ + char *const argv[] = { + "./test", "-m", "crash", "-s", "kernel", "-C", NULL, + }; + + execve_crash(argv); +} + +static void exec_crash(enum signal_from signal_from, bool change_priv) +{ + if (signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_USER && !change_priv) + exec_crash_user(); + if (signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_USER && change_priv) + exec_crash_user_change_priv(); + if (signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_KERNEL && !change_priv) + exec_crash_kernel(); + if (signal_from == SIGNAL_FROM_KERNEL && change_priv) + exec_crash_kernel_change_priv(); +} + +static void do_crash(enum crash_after crash_after, enum signal_from signal_from, + int counter, bool change_priv) +{ + pid_t pid; + int status; + + if (crash_after == CRASH_AFTER_NONE) + crash(signal_from, change_priv); + + while (counter > 0) { + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + error_failure("fork"); + + /* Child process */ + if (!pid) { + if (crash_after == CRASH_AFTER_FORK) + crash(signal_from, change_priv); + + exec_crash(signal_from, change_priv); + } + + /* Parent process */ + counter -= 1; + pid = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if (pid < 0) + error_failure("waitpid"); + } +} + +static __attribute__((noreturn)) void error_close_failure(const char *message, + int fd) +{ + perror(message); + close(fd); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +static void do_server(uint32_t ip, uint16_t port, long accept_timeout) +{ + int sockfd; + int ret; + struct sockaddr_in address; + struct timeval timeout; + int newsockfd; + + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sockfd < 0) + error_failure("socket"); + + address.sin_family = AF_INET; + address.sin_addr.s_addr = ip; + address.sin_port = port; + + ret = bind(sockfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&address, sizeof(address)); + if (ret) + error_close_failure("bind", sockfd); + + ret = listen(sockfd, 1); + if (ret) + error_close_failure("listen", sockfd); + + timeout.tv_sec = accept_timeout; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; + ret = setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, + (const struct timeval *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)); + if (ret) + error_close_failure("setsockopt", sockfd); + + newsockfd = accept(sockfd, NULL, NULL); + if (newsockfd < 0) + error_close_failure("accept", sockfd); + + close(sockfd); + close(newsockfd); +} + +static void do_client(uint32_t ip, uint16_t port, long connect_timeout) +{ + int sockfd; + int ret; + struct timeval timeout; + struct sockaddr_in address; + + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sockfd < 0) + error_failure("socket"); + + timeout.tv_sec = connect_timeout; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; + ret = setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, + (const struct timeval *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)); + if (ret) + error_close_failure("setsockopt", sockfd); + + address.sin_family = AF_INET; + address.sin_addr.s_addr = ip; + address.sin_port = port; + + ret = connect(sockfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&address, + sizeof(address)); + if (ret) + error_close_failure("connect", sockfd); + + ret = write(sockfd, message, strlen(message)); + if (ret < 0) + error_close_failure("write", sockfd); + + close(sockfd); +} + +#define PROG_NAME basename(argv[0]) + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int opt; + struct args args = { + .mode = MODE_NONE, + .crash_after = CRASH_AFTER_NONE, + .signal_from = SIGNAL_FROM_NONE, + .has_counter = false, + .has_change_priv = false, + .has_ip = false, + .has_port = false, + .has_timeout = false, + }; + + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, OPT_STRING)) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'h': + usage(PROG_NAME); + return EXIT_SUCCESS; + case 'm': + args.mode = get_mode(optarg, PROG_NAME); + break; + case 'c': + args.crash_after = get_crash_after(optarg, PROG_NAME); + break; + case 's': + args.signal_from = get_signal_from(optarg, PROG_NAME); + break; + case 'n': + args.counter = get_counter(optarg, PROG_NAME); + args.has_counter = true; + break; + case 'C': + args.has_change_priv = true; + break; + case 'a': + args.ip = get_ip(optarg, PROG_NAME); + args.has_ip = true; + break; + case 'p': + args.port = get_port(optarg, PROG_NAME); + args.has_port = true; + break; + case 't': + args.timeout = get_timeout(optarg, PROG_NAME); + args.has_timeout = true; + break; + default: + usage(PROG_NAME); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + } + + check_args(&args, PROG_NAME); + + if (args.mode == MODE_CRASH) { + do_crash(args.crash_after, args.signal_from, args.counter, + args.has_change_priv); + } else if (args.mode == MODE_SERVER_CRASH) { + do_server(args.ip, args.port, args.timeout); + do_crash(args.crash_after, args.signal_from, args.counter, + false); + } else if (args.mode == MODE_CLIENT) { + do_client(args.ip, args.port, args.timeout); + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..393b651ab635 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/brute/test.sh @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +TCID="test.sh" + +KSFT_PASS=0 +KSFT_FAIL=1 +KSFT_SKIP=4 + +errno=$KSFT_PASS + +check_root() +{ + local uid=$(id -u) + if [ $uid -ne 0 ]; then + echo $TCID: must be run as root >&2 + exit $KSFT_SKIP + fi +} + +tmp_files_setup() +{ + DMESG=$(mktemp --tmpdir -t brute-dmesg-XXXXXX) +} + +tmp_files_cleanup() +{ + rm -f "$DMESG" +} + +save_dmesg() +{ + dmesg > "$DMESG" +} + +count_attack_matches() +{ + dmesg | comm --nocheck-order -13 "$DMESG" - | \ + grep "brute: fork brute force attack detected" | wc -l +} + +assert_equal() +{ + local val1=$1 + local val2=$2 + + if [ $val1 -eq $val2 ]; then + echo "$TCID: $message [PASS]" + else + echo "$TCID: $message [FAIL]" + errno=$KSFT_FAIL + fi +} + +test_fork_user() +{ + COUNTER=20 + + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c fork -s user -n $COUNTER + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="fork attack (user signals, no bounds crossed)" + assert_equal $count 0 +} + +test_fork_kernel() +{ + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c fork -s kernel -n $COUNTER + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="fork attack (kernel signals, no bounds crossed)" + assert_equal $count 0 +} + +test_exec_user() +{ + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c exec -s user -n $COUNTER + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="exec attack (user signals, no bounds crossed)" + assert_equal $count 0 +} + +test_exec_kernel() +{ + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c exec -s kernel -n $COUNTER + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="exec attack (kernel signals, no bounds crossed)" + assert_equal $count 0 +} + +assert_not_equal() +{ + local val1=$1 + local val2=$2 + + if [ $val1 -ne $val2 ]; then + echo $TCID: $message [PASS] + else + echo $TCID: $message [FAIL] + errno=$KSFT_FAIL + fi +} + +remove_xattr() +{ + ./rmxattr test >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +test_fork_kernel_setuid() +{ + save_dmesg + chmod u+s test + ./test -m crash -c fork -s kernel -n $COUNTER + chmod u-s test + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="fork attack (kernel signals, setuid binary)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +test_exec_kernel_setuid() +{ + save_dmesg + chmod u+s test + ./test -m crash -c exec -s kernel -n $COUNTER + chmod u-s test + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="exec attack (kernel signals, setuid binary)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +test_fork_kernel_change_priv() +{ + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c fork -s kernel -n $COUNTER -C + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="fork attack (kernel signals, change privileges)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +test_exec_kernel_change_priv() +{ + save_dmesg + ./test -m crash -c exec -s kernel -n $COUNTER -C + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="exec attack (kernel signals, change privileges)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +network_ns_setup() +{ + local vnet_name=$1 + local veth_name=$2 + local ip_src=$3 + local ip_dst=$4 + + ip netns add $vnet_name + ip link set $veth_name netns $vnet_name + ip -n $vnet_name addr add $ip_src/24 dev $veth_name + ip -n $vnet_name link set $veth_name up + ip -n $vnet_name route add $ip_dst/24 dev $veth_name +} + +network_setup() +{ + VETH0_NAME=veth0 + VNET0_NAME=vnet0 + VNET0_IP=10.0.1.0 + VETH1_NAME=veth1 + VNET1_NAME=vnet1 + VNET1_IP=10.0.2.0 + + ip link add $VETH0_NAME type veth peer name $VETH1_NAME + network_ns_setup $VNET0_NAME $VETH0_NAME $VNET0_IP $VNET1_IP + network_ns_setup $VNET1_NAME $VETH1_NAME $VNET1_IP $VNET0_IP +} + +test_fork_kernel_network_to_local() +{ + INADDR_ANY=0.0.0.0 + PORT=65535 + TIMEOUT=5 + + save_dmesg + ip netns exec $VNET0_NAME ./test -m server_crash -a $INADDR_ANY \ + -p $PORT -t $TIMEOUT -c fork -s kernel -n $COUNTER & + sleep 1 + ip netns exec $VNET1_NAME ./test -m client -a $VNET0_IP -p $PORT \ + -t $TIMEOUT + sleep 1 + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="fork attack (kernel signals, network to local)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +test_exec_kernel_network_to_local() +{ + save_dmesg + ip netns exec $VNET0_NAME ./test -m server_crash -a $INADDR_ANY \ + -p $PORT -t $TIMEOUT -c exec -s kernel -n $COUNTER & + sleep 1 + ip netns exec $VNET1_NAME ./test -m client -a $VNET0_IP -p $PORT \ + -t $TIMEOUT + sleep 1 + count=$(count_attack_matches) + + message="exec attack (kernel signals, network to local)" + assert_not_equal $count 0 + remove_xattr +} + +network_cleanup() +{ + ip netns del $VNET0_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 + ip netns del $VNET1_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 + ip link delete $VETH0_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 + ip link delete $VETH1_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +test_waitid() +{ + ./exec test -m crash -c fork -s kernel -n $COUNTER -C + local rc=$? + + message="notification to userspace via waitid system call" + assert_equal $rc 0 + remove_xattr +} + +cleanup() +{ + network_cleanup + tmp_files_cleanup + chmod u-s test + remove_xattr +} +trap cleanup EXIT + +check_root +tmp_files_setup +test_fork_user +test_fork_kernel +test_exec_user +test_exec_kernel +test_fork_kernel_setuid +test_exec_kernel_setuid +test_fork_kernel_change_priv +test_exec_kernel_change_priv +network_setup +test_fork_kernel_network_to_local +test_exec_kernel_network_to_local +network_cleanup +test_waitid +exit $errno From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:04 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301691 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43AAAC4743E for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:37:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 278906141C for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:37:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230048AbhFERjd (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 13:39:33 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.18]:35725 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229964AbhFERjc (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 13:39:32 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622914614; bh=1hXV/yjZLA0wxI2MASfsKb+LCQQTwffVxcZC0DJ8vZc=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=LZJs/HfrhXXEYrxoffCqJHPONff2AbYWO7ycBaQyxZ3War/piYaNNsKqSLF/7FJ1w tzFS7umCnlXN+9Jm+yI35mAvFxV4M5A5XjfIHYWrY+WnOGDK0+/TMhAYgh46OPMMlr OFQ/nfxFm7SqPgeUgG38Snlab6GR8GxcX4MgstFs= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx005 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1Mel3n-1lH4QF0AxJ-00akS2; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 19:36:54 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:04 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-8-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:0KL9tDrO6fCH0+oVpAMP680+/i0P5U/y+YiqVSYK3DibHnISQsk ApRWspMjCltTb1smQIsTuiH1gj8a3MZ3Nk1qk6D0DkgkzyUmniVAgRCqb/u4ASwudQSG+hg ezL0FgYqc7qvDnnA6nUcE4I0DDcliEjIJ8mD0rwSWyT5b+qrge1jPahM43lfT3HTcujxHun fgH7iK8tok24hAG6EJtxg== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:jef2qRjYI5M=:bw6UHTDC/E2yoxW+Kxz/OF Y0bMnMn71GilFvcfkFrZS5HMQn3np2kZVdA7o/HUMWNb12gmNv5xrgWV7mMdl7tGKYgM7pXBv iO9dGd6L1tFuvsIZp4at/tOKtqIMfc+OCfY9ZTYp0ZbVT2ZQmJLG2OK0PdpaUpQK9fiL4xaFf 3diJODOM5zsYe1DpM3cHdnKQy75My0A01v/EIyVanYyBRl51ndtF0IziLtnifU9iMC7EnJonr vS1rDXhr7kqJFa5Dl4PLh6xPvjWnRsRcLlyyBeephHm6gtey/wkuvguNXLyFQUZoivVPg6cFs 2Fo+B13T5XOh3OATuUdgaGHLPnh3UibGoHhhTxz72BUQ62Xq5U4wEoAFpOQLnWjnGxhJFqqY4 tb3MuersWSow0RL4sAUwBrJgr6Ieg7pCwATyXAxjAWB/ejzv4Gm3bZwuPavpprWlltt8OmdMa PzgwpK6kR5R+UnwTDahZpS5g2KhZuQ8lbvmIVyTaVo6ZTei11vGVN6Rdf5pMjRCVpHePHeI4v PilI+R4iCy1g28Xqej1OwZMki09e5S4DPgxyZAmVDCJfCAbuzXDqbQ65wCuSzzeFmwcbXCU+w FwDm3mGgs/VrhtjwTt4aAh+ANLoosfPTUQnM4orRRwgmbAf/ytLx1WmuA5szL8b0pDvTHh5cA WITBIQJJAsCwhjCKMth0TYa8narIj31ZJqY4qCR8GhtS8/rMn6EJh2MrlAGZ74YNSpqeKS5uf 8FzFJN08McY26rYCj7W+9EbpGOb5RvUJCu42ACbcN8vEa6JPD0BiFiS9RCTR1ZMo29nwv8Xqq bvZ0G5pUVFJag4u0hHn21bO3/Ely+x0kbEFItKybXJOeChgefu57o4Zr3TyY7IaZRjk/m6qYX d4J5pcR9NHr4iznDB75dQ8k0zCBiUBx28thrDaNVhzhSlt80kmyV/wsV17VVu7dlLgYKH+SJJ IigU2ovbnta/dZL9RJaUA+wrNLTSW/chs9L+sbznt8DNwTum7Bw9lGmVWEuyvg7J3yLVEVLep zoX08B4QZb2g04hu33D2ZKhtYLPSGGhiqbfLE0Y9hUJsQRjHdRp5hCGFBShGo0Zu/4LH6PFY2 D7dY0tiPl9LjEaUrEsZEcMRJ6eb4kJov7Ur Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Add some info detailing what is the Brute LSM, its motivation, weak points of existing implementations, proposed solutions, notifications, enabling, disabling, configuration and self-tests. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst | 359 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + security/brute/Kconfig | 3 +- 3 files changed, 362 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..087da9c07374 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===== +Brute +===== + +Brute is a Linux Security Module that detects and mitigates fork brute force +attacks against vulnerable userspace processes. + + +Motivation +========== + +Attacks against vulnerable userspace applications with the purpose to break ASLR +or bypass canaries traditionally use some level of brute force with the help of +the fork system call. This is possible since when creating a new process using +fork its memory contents are the same as those of the parent process (the +process that called the fork system call). So, the attacker can test the memory +infinite times to find the correct memory values or the correct memory addresses +without worrying about crashing the application. + +Based on the above scenario it would be nice to have this detected and +mitigated, and this is the goal of this implementation. Specifically the +following attacks are expected to be detected: + + 1. Launching (fork()/exec()) a setuid/setgid process repeatedly until a + desirable memory layout is got (e.g. Stack Clash). + 2. Connecting to an exec()ing network daemon (e.g. xinetd) repeatedly until a + desirable memory layout is got (e.g. what CTFs do for simple network + service). + 3. Launching processes without exec() (e.g. Android Zygote) and exposing state + to attack a sibling. + 4. Connecting to a fork()ing network daemon (e.g. apache) repeatedly until the + previously shared memory layout of all the other children is exposed (e.g. + kind of related to HeartBleed). + +In each case, a privilege boundary has been crossed: + + | Case 1: setuid/setgid process + | Case 2: network to local + | Case 3: privilege changes + | Case 4: network to local + +So, what really needs to be detected are fork/exec brute force attacks that +cross any of the commented bounds. + + +Other implementations +===================== + +The public version of grsecurity, as a summary, is based on the idea of delaying +the fork system call if a child died due to some fatal signal (``SIGSEGV``, +``SIGBUS``, ``SIGKILL`` or ``SIGILL``). This has some issues: + +Bad practices +------------- + +Adding delays to the kernel is, in general, a bad idea. + +Scenarios not detected (false negatives) +---------------------------------------- + +This protection acts only when the fork system call is called after a child has +crashed. So, it would still be possible for an attacker to fork a big amount of +children (in the order of thousands), then probe all of them, and finally wait +the protection time before repeating the steps. + +Moreover, this method is based on the idea that the protection doesn't act if +the parent crashes. So, it would still be possible for an attacker to fork a +process and probe itself. Then, fork the child process and probe itself again. +This way, these steps can be repeated infinite times without any mitigation. + +Scenarios detected (false positives) +------------------------------------ + +Scenarios where an application rarely fails for reasons unrelated to a real +attack. + + +This implementation +=================== + +The main idea behind this implementation is to improve the existing ones +focusing on the weak points annotated before. Basically, the adopted solution is +to detect a fast crash rate instead of only one simple crash and to detect both +the crash of parent and child processes. Also, fine tune the detection focusing +on privilege boundary crossing. And finally, as a mitigation method, kill all +the offending tasks involved in the attack and mark the executable as "not +allowed" (to block the following executions) instead of using delays. + +To achieve this goal, and going into more details, this implementation is based +on the use of some statistical data shared across all the processes that can +have the same memory contents. Or in other words, a statistical data shared +between all the fork hierarchy processes after an execve system call. + +The purpose of these statistics is, basically, collect all the necessary info to +compute the application crash period in order to detect an attack. To track all +this information, the extended attributes (xattr) of the executable files are +used. More specifically, the name of the attribute is "brute" and uses the +"security" namespace. So, the full xattr name for the Brute LSM is: + + ``security.brute`` + +The same can be achieved using a pointer to the fork hierarchy statistical data +held by the ``task_struct`` structure, but this has an important drawback: a +brute force attack that happens through the execve system call losts the faults +info since these statistics are freed when the fork hierarchy disappears. Using +the last method (pointer in the ``task_struct`` structure) makes not possible to +manage this attack type that can be successfully treated using extended +attributes. + +To detect a brute force attack it is necessary that the statistics shared by all +the fork hierarchy processes be updated in every fatal crash and the most +important data to update is the application crash period. + +The crash period is the time between two consecutive faults, but this also has a +drawback: if an application crashes twice in a short period of time for some +reason unrelated to a real attack, a false positive will be triggered. To avoid +this scenario the exponential moving average (EMA) is used. This way, the +application crash period will be a value that is not prone to change due to +spurious data and follows the real crash period. + +These statistics are stored in the executables using the extended attributes +feature. So, the detection and mitigation of brute force attacks using this LSM +it is only feasible in filesystems that support xattr. + +.. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :identifiers: brute_raw_stats + +This is a fixed sized struct with a very small footprint. So, in reference to +memory usage, it is not expected to have problems storing it as an extended +attribute. + +Concerning to access rights to this statistical data, as stated above, the +"security" namespace is used. Since no custom policy, related to this extended +attribute, has been implemented for the Brute LSM, all processes have read +access to these statistics, and write access is limited to processes that have +the ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` capability. + +Attack detection +---------------- + +There are two types of brute force attacks that need to be detected. The first +one is an attack that happens through the fork system call and the second one is +an attack that happens through the execve system call. Moreover, these two +attack types have two variants. A slow brute force attack that is detected if a +maximum number of faults per fork hierarchy is reached and a fast brute force +attack that is detected if the application crash period falls below a certain +threshold. + +Attack mitigation +----------------- + +Once an attack has been detected, this is mitigated killing all the offending +tasks involved. Or in other words, once an attack has been detected, this is +mitigated killing all the processes that are executing the same file that is +running during the brute force attack. Also, to prevent the executable involved +in the attack from being respawned by a supervisor, and thus prevent a brute +force attack from being started again, the file is marked as "not allowed" and +the following executions are avoided based on this mark. This method allows +supervisors to implement their own policy: they can read the statistics, know if +the executable is blocked by the Brute LSM and why, and act based on this +information. If they want to respawn the offending executable it is only +necessary to remove the "``security.brute``" extended attribute and thus remove +the statistical data. + +Fine tuning the attack detection +-------------------------------- + +To avoid false positives during the attack detection it is necessary to narrow +the possible cases. To do so, and based on the threat scenarios that we want to +detect, this implementation also focuses on the crossing of privilege bounds. + +To be precise, only the following privilege bounds are taken into account: + + 1. setuid/setgid process + 2. network to local + 3. privilege changes + +Moreover, only the fatal signals delivered by the kernel are taken into account +avoiding the fatal signals sent by userspace applications (with the exception of +the ``SIGABRT`` user signal since this is used by glibc for stack canary, +malloc, etc. failures, which may indicate that a mitigation has been triggered). + +Userspace notification via waitid() system call +----------------------------------------------- + +Although the xattr of the executable is accessible from userspace, in complex +daemons this file may not be visible directly by the supervisor as it may be run +through some wrapper. So, an extension to the ``waitid()`` system call has been +added. + + ``int waitid(idtype_t idtype, id_t id, siginfo_t *infop, int options);`` + +Upon successful return, ``waitid()`` fills in the ``siginfo_t`` structure +pointed to by ``infop``, but now, the ``si_code`` field can be: + + ``CLD_BRUTE``: child was killed by brute LSM. Defined as value 7. + +in addition to the following codes: + + | ``CLD_EXITED``: child has called exit. Defined as value 1. + | ``CLD_KILLED``: child was killed by signal. Defined as value 2. + | ``CLD_DUMPED``: child terminated abnormally. Defined as value 3. + | ``CLD_TRAPPED``: traced child has trapped. Defined as value 4. + | ``CLD_STOPPED``: child has stopped. Defined as value 5. + | ``CLD_CONTINUED``: stopped child has continued. Defined as value 6. + +Exponential moving average (EMA) +-------------------------------- + +This kind of average defines a weight (between 0 and 1) for the new value to add +and applies the remainder of the weight to the current average value. This way, +some spurious data will not excessively modify the average and only if the new +values are persistent, the moving average will tend towards them. + +Mathematically the application crash period's EMA can be expressed as follows: + + period_ema = period * weight + period_ema * (1 - weight) + +Related to the attack detection, the EMA must guarantee that not many crashes +are needed. To demonstrate this, the scenario where an application has failed +and then has been running without any crashes for a month, will be used. + +The period's EMA can be written now as: + + period_ema[i] = period[i] * weight + period_ema[i - 1] * (1 - weight) + +If the new crash periods have insignificant values related to the first crash +period (a month in this case), the formula can be rewritten as: + + period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - 1] * (1 - weight) + +And by extension: + + | period_ema[i - 1] = period_ema[i - 2] * (1 - weight) + | period_ema[i - 2] = period_ema[i - 3] * (1 - weight) + | period_ema[i - 3] = period_ema[i - 4] * (1 - weight) + +So, if the substitution is made: + + | period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - 1] * (1 - weight) + | period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - 2] * (1 - weight)\ :sup:`2` + | period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - 3] * (1 - weight)\ :sup:`3` + | period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - 4] * (1 - weight)\ :sup:`4` + +And in a more generic form: + + period_ema[i] = period_ema[i - n] * (1 - weight)\ :sup:`n` + +Where "n" represents the number of iterations to obtain an EMA value. Or in +other words, the number of crashes to detect an attack. + +So, if we isolate the number of crashes: + + | period_ema[i] / period_ema[i - n] = (1 - weight)\ :sup:`n` + | log(period_ema[i] / period_ema[i - n]) = log((1 - weight)\ :sup:`n`) + | log(period_ema[i] / period_ema[i - n]) = n * log(1 - weight) + | n = log(period_ema[i] / period_ema[i - n]) / log(1 - weight) + +Then, in the commented scenario (an application has failed and then has been +running without any crashes for a month), the approximate number of crashes to +detect an attack (using the default implementation values for the weight and the +crash period threshold) is: + + | weight = 7 / 10 + | crash_period_threshold = 30 seconds + + | n = log(crash_period_threshold / seconds_per_month) / log(1 - weight) + | n = log(30 / (30 * 24 * 3600)) / log(1 - 0.7) + | n = 9.44 + +So, with 10 crashes for this scenario an attack will be detected. If these steps +are repeated for different scenarios and the results are collected: + + ======================== ===================================== + time without any crashes number of crashes to detect an attack + ======================== ===================================== + 1 month 9.44 + 1 year 11.50 + 10 years 13.42 + ======================== ===================================== + +However, this computation has a drawback. The first data added to the EMA not +obtains a real average showing a trend. So the solution is simple, the EMA needs +a minimum number of data to be able to be interpreted. This way, the case where +a few first faults are fast enough followed by no crashes is avoided. + +Per system enabling/disabling +----------------------------- + +This feature can be enabled at build time using the +``CONFIG_SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE`` option or using the visual config application +under the following menu: + + Security options ``--->`` Fork brute force attack detection and mitigation + +Also, at boot time, this feature can be disable too, by changing the "``lsm=``" +boot parameter. + +Per system configuration +------------------------ + +To customize the detection's sensibility there are five new sysctl attributes +for the Brute LSM that are accessible through the following path: + + ``/proc/sys/kernel/brute/`` + +More specifically, the files and their description are: + +**ema_weight_numerator** + + .. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :doc: brute_ema_weight_numerator + +**ema_weight_denominator** + + .. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :doc: brute_ema_weight_denominator + +**max_faults** + + .. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :doc: brute_max_faults + +**min_faults** + + .. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :doc: brute_min_faults + +**crash_period_threshold** + + .. kernel-doc:: security/brute/brute.c + :doc: brute_crash_period_threshold + +Kernel selftests +---------------- + +To validate all the expectations about this implementation, there is a set of +selftests. This tests cover fork/exec brute force attacks crossing the following +privilege boundaries: + + 1. setuid process + 2. privilege changes + 3. network to local + +Also, there are some tests to check that fork/exec brute force attacks without +crossing any privilege boundary already commented doesn't trigger the detection +and mitigation stage. Moreover, a test to verify the userspace notification via +the ``waitid()`` system call has also been added. + +To build the tests: + ``make -C tools/testing/selftests/ TARGETS=brute`` + +To run the tests: + ``make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=brute run_tests`` + +To package the tests: + ``make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=brute gen_tar`` diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst index a6ba95fbaa9f..1f68982bb330 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ subdirectories. :maxdepth: 1 apparmor + Brute LoadPin SELinux Smack diff --git a/security/brute/Kconfig b/security/brute/Kconfig index 5da314d221aa..d2dd33b08642 100644 --- a/security/brute/Kconfig +++ b/security/brute/Kconfig @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config SECURITY_FORK_BRUTE offending tasks are killed. Also, the executable file involved in the attack will be marked as "not allowed" and new execve system calls using this file will fail. Like capabilities, this security module - stacks with other LSMs. + stacks with other LSMs. Further information can be found in + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:04:05 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301715 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4330BC4743D for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:59:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2395B6141C for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:59:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230060AbhFESBP (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 14:01:15 -0400 Received: from mout.gmx.net ([212.227.15.15]:41791 "EHLO mout.gmx.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229964AbhFESBO (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Jun 2021 14:01:14 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622915918; bh=LJZMH4mKKG4Y4RH/IKRmcuoSuYAs3YZ6GSXZNks3Imw=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=EXvn/Qe1G20n0eCfzE5oqH9nCio58KhDVyrKq87mvUn5a8gNLLkdFSi6kOi+BoMnY 1hDvjbSm7pE5rTXadLV9eQ8lFHUU+l7oMzrA0fvIEEgGuFDDUwD7mQLglDQSkSDCKk 7YpGopCJ5tA0g8uLT9Zl3u6SXCYduGi1BElJOQoY= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c Received: from localhost.localdomain ([83.52.228.41]) by mail.gmx.net (mrgmx004 [212.227.17.184]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1M9FnZ-1llRpx0p9T-006QJB; Sat, 05 Jun 2021 19:58:38 +0200 From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:04:05 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-9-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:zkSY+Nk10Hb9RRhiRldy4BtP2AIFThepaw+IBLiQxGRKAu76Tfz u/xwkD/5Xjj+4nPrpcNbps49Prlmno1jLjtPMU0HsCFJ8K+bm+sJ7XuKlC6BGL7piwviohY sTlX6Cko1RB0w10cj7CJ1tXWloewJz9zjikX65FCu8KyF9jqJGcXtdHzxZDjQX0PCOxFvnd 7U8jbQRCot2JkQcmxsVhA== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:Zll4jERGK4o=:b0ECLFhKc1ov8XftBxIOl9 Bm00CA3vk6hTwdngrb1VLwvu2bvhDT96UWxpd5QHIfH1c2O5zW+gq6YD8aknBSKHms6Dub/s5 f7jMvDzfr5Mutwll/uQ5YbB8JC7nFGHTzf6hbcttzV66aa+9jlbs3/ABbaQDmtH+Ly+qYDQE6 FJpIA61UHheW6K0IyVh8t2m1+jHn7my8B3BQhdc+PrMe0gQHPjEU+ZJis00K5/gvkyrxTuGHo 3iKblKo1mjMcUN1oGVKrRjirMb/TSVxwz7XTUB/P51Velw8SgxuMTg53j1FnpuIvvv+ZG7xcM rmG1oAg0tdheQ+pPQogFWskdNK4Ag8VyzweuZ0fUVY+dWaKKtmpBQ874+29gkw6Y3+70hvc1t jKfB8ckTMcibE9oDb6mKVl78uE1GRAIS8nhyb/kne1ua2bEqJ7tysrbjFc8360U1qjgPFE4a8 kWRb0oTX6CQSAAeJ3YGCjz+WCiRyJYAMcfo4Gn83R2JOjPBXdJoPX6iGxF/2A24DJQBruU8hr Mt5TAwuaw/q+PHowLaTJbqCFVrXJ0aCas4utyh4tULM1nV2SfxU9vYtxtz598ePmrFz2Xgi0N dlWbtJrwwBzPMAiQBUv0awrFs6FmK0tviDCY30HkQcsnHvCZbJHH3BVCrJqzP/oRtfGvpjpF7 R6w3tXo5XyxV95pQb8np03wgVP40n7oGErvs5Elsw1r2nS4zDRzQKQ/0CQgjA4tAH2DIAd8fn NzoaFJZg0jIvsi7Mx8a575YtGSGwFGOSaMS2YstcN/TkldgpaI0M9AGAxklmmiTQ9w0ZRsBAD zAAsVtzFlfXsBbPEYB16GqQVR1GfJw+QirLv+4i1jFPM6vcesajUz1HKeqxtFjkNlHVVEZzTY thwIgWTL1P9kdR7uy66I1xegj0nPCui+X1+xHTtLWMLfBk6Ci9RK2kI28meJyPq0ITYlS6OGv N3iR4UwFaRr2RLHQPZFXPZW46bgHRTI7sKQOtVwRVVSEGZCyTVyf/dR8zdcZig0VOlLAIWyvz OGAAlfnYKEtf+eT3FDxtEzVc1viYBZUKzCl716RqEIlhUc1D9FYU7g/5bQrWTIyT/wv1i6IbI PubMFX8o76gckRAj7fkDwA2yyiLtOqwYun5 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org In order to maintain the code for the Brute LSM add a new entry to the maintainers list. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 503fd21901f1..665cd6aaadac 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3847,6 +3847,14 @@ L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Supported F: drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/ +BRUTE SECURITY MODULE +M: John Wood +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Brute.rst +F: include/brute/ +F: security/brute/ +F: tools/testing/selftests/brute/ + BSG (block layer generic sg v4 driver) M: FUJITA Tomonori L: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org