From patchwork Wed Jul 21 16:02:59 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12391433 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DEC9C636C9 for ; Wed, 21 Jul 2021 16:05:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4630360FF3 for ; Wed, 21 Jul 2021 16:05:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230162AbhGUPYh (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Jul 2021 11:24:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50026 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230079AbhGUPYg (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Jul 2021 11:24:36 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22AF8C061575 for ; Wed, 21 Jul 2021 09:05:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dude.hi.pengutronix.de ([2001:67c:670:100:1d::7]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1m6Ei2-0007F5-OS; Wed, 21 Jul 2021 18:04:34 +0200 Received: from afa by dude.hi.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1m6Ehw-0004VU-OE; Wed, 21 Jul 2021 18:04:28 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , Sumit Garg , David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Andreas Rammhold , Ahmad Fatoum , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: fix use as module when CONFIG_TCG_TPM=m Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 18:02:59 +0200 Message-Id: <20210721160258.7024-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:67c:670:100:1d::7 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Since commit 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework"), trusted.ko built with CONFIG_TCG_TPM=CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=m will not register the TPM trusted key type at runtime. This is because, after that rework, CONFIG_DEPENDENCY of the TPM and TEE backends were checked with #ifdef, but that's only true when they're built-in. Fix this by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols: TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate dependencies and use them to check which backends are available. This also has a positive effect on user experience: - It's now possible to use TEE trusted keys without CONFIG_TCG_TPM - It's now possible to enable CONFIG_TCG_TPM, but exclude TPM from available trust sources - TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y no longer leads to TEE support being silently dropped Any code depending on the TPM trusted key backend or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure it's reachable for module builds. This currently only affects CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE, so it's fixed up here as well. Reported-by: Andreas Rammhold Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Tested-By: Andreas Rammhold Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg --- (Implicit) v1 was as a preparatory patch for CAAM trusted keys[1] with the goal of fixing the Kconfig inflexibility after the TEE trusted key rework. Unbeknownst to me, it also fixes a regression, which was later reported by Andreas[2] along with a patch. I split out the fix from the CAAM series and adjusted the commit message to explain the regression. v1 -> v2: - Move rest of TPM-related selects from TRUSTED_KEYS to TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM (Sumit) - Remove left-over line in Makefile (Sumit) - added Fixes: tag - adjust commit message to reference the regression reported by Andreas - have ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE depend on TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM, because it references global symbols that are exported by the trusted key TPM backend. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/f8285eb0135ba30c9d846cf9dd395d1f5f8b1efc.1624364386.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210719091335.vwfebcpkf4pag3wm@wrt/T/#t To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Morris To: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: James Bottomley To: Mimi Zohar To: Sumit Garg To: David Howells To: Herbert Xu To: "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 2 +- security/keys/Kconfig | 18 ++++++-------- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 8 +++---- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 1f1f004dc757..8886eddbf881 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE config ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE tristate "Asymmetric TPM backed private key subtype" depends on TCG_TPM - depends on TRUSTED_KEYS + depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 64b81abd087e..9ec302962fe2 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -70,23 +70,19 @@ config BIG_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" - depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO - select ASN1_ENCODER - select OID_REGISTRY - select ASN1 + depends on KEYS help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, - generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, - if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever - see encrypted blobs. + generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time. + Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +if TRUSTED_KEYS +source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig" +endif + config ENCRYPTED_KEYS tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c163cfeedff6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM + bool "TPM-based trusted keys" + depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER + select OID_REGISTRY + select ASN1 + help + Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key + backend. Trusted keys are are random number symmetric keys, + which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. + The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other + criteria match. + +config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE + bool "TEE-based trusted keys" + depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + help + Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted + key backend. + +if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE +comment "No trust source selected!" +endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index feb8b6c3cc79..2e2371eae4d5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o $(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o -trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o -trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index d5c891d8d353..8cab69e5d0da 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { -#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops }, #endif -#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, #endif };