From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:20 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556687 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D291C433EF for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7246460E96 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237612AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:48828 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234061AbhJMTIn (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:43 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5E16720B9CFD; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 5E16720B9CFD DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=RwgWTI2lR1liQo0Ep2pQkcohF0BcSh0Qv3HDZoX5XD8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=QziEqF8OA2o0+cfTWdItqUlvp4kjFL6QRVRgDFlPRGydWgRs3y6gqZuYDkuKdNPAH Sb+WbVYBIA8oLI3KGlv4IPle+YiE4oS1BfZ1SY0DEB+eojqKWTq30De/8+yG/kpuOo IuJ1mEwttHonq9tNqAQf/Xbo5VaPI9MWx7j08k+c= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 01/16] security: add ipe lsm & initial context creation Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:20 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-2-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is that every process in the kernel is associated with a context that determines the policy for what is trusted by said process and its descendents, starting with 'init'. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Split up patch 02/11 into three parts: 1. context creation (new) [this patch] 2. parser (refactored) 3. evaluation loop * Refactor series to: 1. Support a context structure, enabling easier testing --- MAINTAINERS | 6 ++ security/Kconfig | 11 +-- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 19 +++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 11 +++ security/ipe/ctx.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ctx.h | 28 ++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 58 +++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 16 +++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 57 +++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 19 +++++ 11 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ctx.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ctx.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index e0bca0de0df7..f1e76f791d47 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9279,6 +9279,12 @@ S: Supported T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git F: security/integrity/ima/ +INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) +M: Deven Bowers +M: Fan Wu +S: Supported +F: security/ipe/ + INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER M: Antonino Daplas L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 0ced7fd33e4d..6ed9b3b5a75c 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -278,11 +279,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf,ipe" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf,ipe" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c4503083e92d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement subsystem + allowing systems to enforce integrity having no dependencies + on filesystem metadata, making its decisions based off of kernel- + resident features and data structures. A key feature of IPE is a + customizable policy to allow admins to reconfigure integrity + requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ba3df729e252 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + ctx.o \ + hooks.o \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c24f5d1d41bd --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ctx.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * ipe_current_ctx: Helper to retrieve the ipe_context for the current task. + * + * Return: + * See ipe_get_ctx_rcu + */ +struct ipe_context *ipe_current_ctx(void) +{ + return ipe_get_ctx_rcu(*ipe_tsk_ctx(current)); +} + +/** + * ipe_tsk_ctx: Retrieve the RCU-protected address of the task + * that contains the ipe_context. + * @tsk: Task to retrieve the address from. + * + * Callers need to use the rcu* family functions to interact with + * the ipe_context, or ipe_get_ctx_rcu. + * + * Return: + * Valid Address to a location containing an RCU-protected ipe_context. + */ +struct ipe_context __rcu **ipe_tsk_ctx(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return tsk->security + ipe_blobs.lbs_task; +} + +/** + * ipe_get_ctx_rcu: Retrieve the underlying ipe_context in an rcu protected + * address space. + * @ctx: Context to dereference. + * + * This function will increment the reference count of the dereferenced + * ctx, ensuring that it is valid outside of the rcu_read_lock. + * + * However, if a context has a reference count of 0 (and thus being) + * freed, this API will return NULL. + * + * Return: + * !NULL - Valid context + * NULL - the dereferenced context will not exist outside after the + * next grace period. + */ +struct ipe_context *ipe_get_ctx_rcu(struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx) +{ + struct ipe_context *rv = NULL; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + rv = rcu_dereference(ctx); + if (!rv || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&rv->refcount)) + rv = NULL; + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rv; +} + +/** + * free_ctx_work: Worker function to deallocate a context structure. + * @work: work_struct passed to schedule_work + */ +static void free_ctx_work(struct work_struct *const work) +{ + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = container_of(work, struct ipe_context, free_work); + + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * create_ctx: Allocate a context structure. + * + * The reference count at this point will be set to 1. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - Lack of memory. + */ +static struct ipe_context *create_ctx(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + INIT_WORK(&ctx->free_work, free_ctx_work); + refcount_set(&ctx->refcount, 1); + spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); + + return ctx; + +err: + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + +/** + * ipe_put_ns: Decrement the reference of an ipe_context structure, + * scheduling a free as necessary.s + * @ctx: Structure to free + * + * This function no-ops on error and null values for @ctx, and the + * deallocation will only occur if the refcount is 0. + */ +void ipe_put_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ctx) || !refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->refcount)) + return; + + schedule_work(&ctx->free_work); +} + +/** + * ipe_init_ctx: Initialize the init context. + * + * This is called at LSM init, and marks the kernel init process + * with a context. All processes descendent from kernel + * init will inherit this context. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -ENOMEM: Not enough memory to allocate the init context. + */ +int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_context *lns = NULL; + + lns = create_ctx(); + if (IS_ERR(lns)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(lns); + goto err; + } + + rcu_assign_pointer(*ipe_tsk_ctx(current), lns); + + return 0; +err: + ipe_put_ctx(lns); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.h b/security/ipe/ctx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..69a2c92c0a8c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_CONTEXT_H +#define IPE_CONTEXT_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct ipe_context { + refcount_t refcount; + /* Protects concurrent writers */ + spinlock_t lock; + + struct work_struct free_work; +}; + +int __init ipe_init_ctx(void); +struct ipe_context __rcu **ipe_tsk_ctx(struct task_struct *tsk); +struct ipe_context *ipe_current_ctx(void); +struct ipe_context *ipe_get_ctx_rcu(struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx); +void ipe_put_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx); + +#endif /* IPE_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ed0c886eaa5a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ctx.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * ipe_task_alloc: Assign a new context for an associated task structure. + * @task: Supplies the task structure to assign a context to. + * @clone_flags: unused. + * + * The context assigned is always the context of the current task. + * Reference counts are dropped by ipe_task_free + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -ENOMEM - Out of Memory + */ +int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + struct ipe_context __rcu **ctx = NULL; + struct ipe_context *current_ctx = NULL; + + current_ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + ctx = ipe_tsk_ctx(task); + rcu_assign_pointer(*ctx, current_ctx); + refcount_inc(¤t_ctx->refcount); + + ipe_put_ctx(current_ctx); + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_task_free: Drop a reference to an ipe_context associated with @task. + * If there are no tasks remaining, the context is freed. + * @task: Supplies the task to drop an ipe_context reference to. + */ +void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + /* + * This reference was the initial creation, no need to increment + * refcount + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + ctx = rcu_dereference(*ipe_tsk_ctx(task)); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e0ae3c7dfb5b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_HOOKS_H +#define IPE_HOOKS_H + +#include +#include + +int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long clone_flags); + +void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task); + +#endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d600346702e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ctx.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lbs_task = sizeof(struct ipe_context __rcu *), +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, ipe_task_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free), +}; + +/** + * ipe_init: Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE loads the properties compiled into + * the kernel, and register's IPE's hooks. The boot policy is loaded + * later, during securityfs init, at which point IPE will start + * enforcing its policy. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -ENOMEM - Context creation failed. + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + + rc = ipe_init_ctx(); + if (rc) + return rc; + + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe"); + + return rc; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..09c492b8fd03 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_H +#define IPE_H + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE " fmt "\n" + +#include "ctx.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs; + +#endif /* IPE_H */ From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:21 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556693 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B54E3C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98EDE610F9 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238877AbhJMTIt (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:49 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:48848 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236537AbhJMTIn (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:43 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 76EC320B9CE1; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 76EC320B9CE1 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=MY4BLlBH7yfJXATWb05+GEk0Q/Ik2x0bfG/P66TvFok=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=PlUZ/M18mNxQmE0odicjxxwp2jz+SiiKyak62t0sAhWwZ7WHAceWeo54l6uRjwzhv aUrS+LOiQv3AhQfI6lInp7TMhOsG92JzAQ1BJwbXIfloV3CZHultNOsDNl5QEmm9nh 3FJVaOd+HlvV07YMweWidyIrF/KUuuE8wyJQLUYk= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:21 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-3-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to choose the best one to seek their needs. This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that trust/integrity providers, like fs-verity or dm-verity, can plug into the policy with minimal code changes. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Refactor policy parser to make code cleaner via introducing clearly defined passes, with specific goal states. * Split up patch 03/12 into two parts: 1. parser [02/16] (this patch) 2. userspace interface [04/16] --- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 16 + security/ipe/Makefile | 6 + security/ipe/ipe.c | 63 ++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 4 + security/ipe/ipe_parser.h | 59 ++ security/ipe/modules.c | 109 +++ security/ipe/modules.h | 17 + security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h | 33 + security/ipe/parsers.c | 139 ++++ security/ipe/parsers/Makefile | 12 + security/ipe/parsers/default.c | 106 +++ security/ipe/parsers/policy_header.c | 126 ++++ security/ipe/policy.c | 946 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 97 +++ 14 files changed, 1733 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe_parser.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/parsers.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/parsers/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/parsers/default.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/parsers/policy_header.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.h diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h index f2984af2b85b..91abbacbaf8d 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h @@ -278,6 +278,20 @@ #define EARLY_LSM_TABLE() #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE +#define IPE_PARSER_TABLE() . = ALIGN(8); \ + __start_ipe_parsers = .; \ + KEEP(*(.ipe_parsers)) \ + __end_ipe_parsers = .; +#define IPE_MODULE_TABLE() . = ALIGN(8); \ + __start_ipe_modules = .; \ + KEEP(*(.ipe_modules)) \ + __end_ipe_modules = .; +#else +#define IPE_PARSER_TABLE() +#define IPE_MODULE_TABLE() +#endif + #define ___OF_TABLE(cfg, name) _OF_TABLE_##cfg(name) #define __OF_TABLE(cfg, name) ___OF_TABLE(cfg, name) #define OF_TABLE(cfg, name) __OF_TABLE(IS_ENABLED(cfg), name) @@ -436,6 +450,8 @@ KEEP(*(__tracepoints_ptrs)) /* Tracepoints: pointer array */ \ __stop___tracepoints_ptrs = .; \ *(__tracepoints_strings)/* Tracepoints: strings */ \ + IPE_PARSER_TABLE() \ + IPE_MODULE_TABLE() \ } \ \ .rodata1 : AT(ADDR(.rodata1) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \ diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index ba3df729e252..9a97efd8a190 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -5,7 +5,13 @@ # Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. # +ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/ipe/modules + obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ ctx.o \ hooks.o \ ipe.o \ + modules.o \ + parsers/ \ + parsers.o \ + policy.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index d600346702e5..b58b372327a1 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "ctx.h" #include "hooks.h" +#include "ipe_parser.h" +#include "modules/ipe_module.h" +#include "modules.h" #include #include @@ -24,6 +27,58 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free), }; +/** + * load_parsers: Load all the parsers compiled into IPE. This needs + * to be called prior to the boot policy being loaded. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +static int load_parsers(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_parser *parser; + + for (parser = __start_ipe_parsers; parser < __end_ipe_parsers; ++parser) { + rc = ipe_register_parser(parser); + if (rc) { + pr_err("failed to initialize '%s'", parser->first_token); + return rc; + } + + pr_info("initialized parser module '%s'", parser->first_token); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * load_modules: Load all the modules compiled into IPE. This needs + * to be called prior to the boot policy being loaded. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +static int load_modules(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_module *m; + + for (m = __start_ipe_modules; m < __end_ipe_modules; ++m) { + rc = ipe_register_module(m); + if (rc) { + pr_err("failed to initialize '%s'", m->name); + return rc; + } + + pr_info("initialized module '%s'", m->name); + } + + return 0; +} + /** * ipe_init: Entry point of IPE. * @@ -41,6 +96,14 @@ static int __init ipe_init(void) { int rc = 0; + rc = load_parsers(); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = load_modules(); + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = ipe_init_ctx(); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index 09c492b8fd03..ad16d2bebfec 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -9,11 +9,15 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE " fmt "\n" #include "ctx.h" +#include "ipe_parser.h" +#include "modules/ipe_module.h" #include #include #include extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs; +extern struct ipe_parser __start_ipe_parsers[], __end_ipe_parsers[]; +extern struct ipe_module __start_ipe_modules[], __end_ipe_modules[]; #endif /* IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe_parser.h b/security/ipe/ipe_parser.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f7c5c11bde44 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe_parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_PARSER_H +#define IPE_PARSER_H + +#include "policy.h" + +#include +#include + +/* + * Struct used to define internal parsers that effect the policy, + * but do not belong as policy modules, as they are not used to make + * decisions in the event loop, and only effect the internal workings + * of IPE. + * + * These structures are used in pass2, and policy deallocation. + */ +struct ipe_parser { + u8 version; + const char *first_token; + + int (*parse)(const struct ipe_policy_line *line, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol); + int (*free)(struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol); + int (*validate)(const struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol); +}; + +int ipe_parse_op(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok, + enum ipe_operation *op); + +int ipe_parse_action(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok, + enum ipe_action *action); + +/* + * Optional struct to make structured parsers easier. + */ +struct ipe_token_parser { + const char *key; + int (*parse_token)(const struct ipe_policy_token *t, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p); +}; + +const struct ipe_parser *ipe_lookup_parser(const char *first_token); + +int ipe_for_each_parser(int (*view)(const struct ipe_parser *parser, + void *ctx), + void *ctx); + +int ipe_register_parser(struct ipe_parser *p); + +#define IPE_PARSER(parser) \ + static struct ipe_parser __ipe_parser_##parser \ + __used __section(".ipe_parsers") \ + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) + +#endif /* IPE_PARSER_MODULE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/modules.c b/security/ipe/modules.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb100c14cce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "modules.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +static struct rb_root module_root = RB_ROOT; + +struct module_container { + struct rb_node node; + const struct ipe_module *mod; +}; + +/** + * cmp_node: Comparator for a node in the module lookup tree. + * @n: First node to compare + * @nn: Second node to compare + * + * Return: + * <0 - @n's key is lexigraphically before @nn. + * 0 - n's key is identical to @nn + * >0 - n's key is legxigraphically after @nn + */ +static int cmp_node(struct rb_node *n, const struct rb_node *nn) +{ + const struct module_container *c1; + const struct module_container *c2; + + c1 = container_of(n, struct module_container, node); + c2 = container_of(nn, struct module_container, node); + + return strcmp(c1->mod->name, c2->mod->name); +} + +/** + * cmp_key: Comparator to find a module in the tree by key. + * @key: Supplies a pointer to a null-terminated string key + * @n: Node to compare @key against + * + * Return: + * <0 - Desired node is to the left of @n + * 0 - @n is the desired node + * >0 - Desired node is to the right of @n + */ +static int cmp_key(const void *key, const struct rb_node *n) +{ + struct module_container *mod; + + mod = container_of(n, struct module_container, node); + + return strcmp((const char *)key, mod->mod->name); +} + +/** + * ipe_lookup_module: Attempt to find a ipe_pmodule structure by @key. + * @key: The key to look for in the tree. + * + * Return: + * !NULL - OK + * NULL - No property exists under @key + */ +const struct ipe_module *ipe_lookup_module(const char *key) +{ + struct rb_node *n; + + n = rb_find(key, &module_root, cmp_key); + if (!n) + return NULL; + + return container_of(n, struct module_container, node)->mod; +} + +/** + * ipe_register_module: Register a policy module to be used in IPE's policy. + * @m: Module to register. + * + * This function allows parsers (policy constructs that represent integrations + * with other subsystems, to be leveraged in rules) to be leveraged in IPE policy. + * This must be called prior to any policies being loaded. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_register_module(struct ipe_module *m) +{ + struct rb_node *n = NULL; + struct module_container *c = NULL; + + c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!c) + return -ENOMEM; + + c->mod = m; + + n = rb_find_add(&c->node, &module_root, cmp_node); + if (n) { + kfree(c); + return -EEXIST; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/modules.h b/security/ipe/modules.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b897bdd870b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_MODULES_H +#define IPE_MODULES_H + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include + +const struct ipe_module *ipe_lookup_module(const char *key); +int ipe_register_module(struct ipe_module *m); + +#endif /* IPE_MODULES_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..397a54cbc4db --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_MODULE_H +#define IPE_MODULE_H + +#include + +/** + * ipe_module: definition of an extensible module for IPE properties. + * These structures are used to implement 'key=value' pairs + * in IPE policy, which will be evaluated on every IPE policy + * evaluation. + * + * Integrity mechanisms should be define as a module, and modules + * should manage their own dependencies via KConfig. @name is both + * the key half of the key=value pair in the policy, and the unique + * identifier for the module. + */ +struct ipe_module { + const char *const name; /* required */ + u16 version; /* required */ + int (*parse)(const char *valstr, void **value); /* required */ + int (*free)(void **value); /* optional */ +}; + +#define IPE_MODULE(parser) \ + static struct ipe_module __ipe_module_##parser \ + __used __section(".ipe_modules") \ + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) + +#endif /* IPE_MODULE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/parsers.c b/security/ipe/parsers.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..80dc4704ae40 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/parsers.c @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "policy.h" +#include "ipe_parser.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +static struct rb_root ipe_parser_root = RB_ROOT; + +struct parser_container { + struct rb_node node; + const struct ipe_parser *parser; +}; + +/** + * cmp_key: Comparator for the nodes within the parser tree by key + * @key: Supplies a the key to evaluate nodes against + * @n: Supplies a pointer to the node to compare. + * + * Return: + * <0 - @key is to the left of @n + * 0 - @key identifies @n + * >0 - @key is to the right of @n + */ +static int cmp_key(const void *key, const struct rb_node *n) +{ + const struct parser_container *node; + + node = container_of(n, struct parser_container, node); + + return strcmp((const char *)key, node->parser->first_token); +} + +/** + * cmp_node: Comparator for the nodes within the parser tree + * @n: Supplies a pointer to the node to compare + * @nn: Supplies a pointer to the another node to compare. + * + * Return: + * <0 - @n is lexigraphically before @nn + * 0 - @n is identical @nn + * >0 - @n is lexigraphically after @nn + */ +static int cmp_node(struct rb_node *n, const struct rb_node *nn) +{ + const struct parser_container *c1; + const struct parser_container *c2; + + c1 = container_of(n, struct parser_container, node); + c2 = container_of(nn, struct parser_container, node); + + return strcmp(c1->parser->first_token, c2->parser->first_token); +} + +/** + * ipe_lookup_parser: Attempt to find a ipe_property structure by @first_token. + * @first_token: The key to look for in the tree. + * + * Return: + * !NULL - OK + * NULL - No property exists under @key + */ +const struct ipe_parser *ipe_lookup_parser(const char *first_token) +{ + struct rb_node *n; + + n = rb_find(first_token, &ipe_parser_root, cmp_key); + if (!n) + return NULL; + + return container_of(n, struct parser_container, node)->parser; +} + +/** + * ipe_for_each_parser: Iterate over all currently-registered parsers + * calling @fn on the values, and providing @view @ctx. + * @view: The function to call for each property. This is given the property + * structure as the first argument, and @ctx as the second. + * @ctx: caller-specified context that is passed to the function. Can be NULL. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Proper errno as returned by @view. + */ +int ipe_for_each_parser(int (*view)(const struct ipe_parser *parser, + void *ctx), + void *ctx) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct rb_node *node; + struct parser_container *val; + + for (node = rb_first(&ipe_parser_root); node; node = rb_next(node)) { + val = container_of(node, struct parser_container, node); + + rc = view(val->parser, ctx); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_register_parser: Register a parser to be used in IPE's policy. + * @p: Parser to register. + * + * This function allows parsers (policy constructs that effect IPE's + * internal functionality) to be leveraged in IPE policy. This must + * be called prior to any policies being loaded. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_register_parser(struct ipe_parser *p) +{ + struct rb_node *n = NULL; + struct parser_container *c = NULL; + + c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!c) + return -ENOMEM; + + c->parser = p; + + n = rb_find_add(&c->node, &ipe_parser_root, cmp_node); + if (n) { + kfree(c); + return -EEXIST; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/parsers/Makefile b/security/ipe/parsers/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a19a094724f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/parsers/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/ipe + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + default.o \ + policy_header.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/parsers/default.c b/security/ipe/parsers/default.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..30181d2cc4ed --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/parsers/default.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe_parser.h" + +static int set_op_default(enum ipe_operation op, enum ipe_action act, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol) +{ + size_t i, remap_len; + const enum ipe_operation *remap; + + if (!ipe_is_op_alias(op, &remap, &remap_len)) { + if (pol->rules[op].default_action != ipe_action_max) + return -EBADMSG; + + pol->rules[op].default_action = act; + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < remap_len; ++i) { + if (pol->rules[remap[i]].default_action != ipe_action_max) + return -EBADMSG; + + pol->rules[remap[i]].default_action = act; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_default(const struct ipe_policy_line *line, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t idx = 0; + struct ipe_policy_token *tok = NULL; + enum ipe_operation op = ipe_operation_max; + enum ipe_action act = ipe_action_max; + + list_for_each_entry(tok, &line->tokens, next) { + switch (idx) { + case 0: + if (strcmp("DEFAULT", tok->key) || tok->value) + return -EBADMSG; + break; + case 1: + /* schema 1 - operation, followed by action */ + rc = ipe_parse_op(tok, &op); + if (!rc) { + ++idx; + continue; + } + + if (pol->global_default != ipe_action_max) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* schema 2 - action */ + rc = ipe_parse_action(tok, &pol->global_default); + if (!rc) + return rc; + + return -EBADMSG; + case 2: + rc = ipe_parse_action(tok, &act); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return set_op_default(op, act, pol); + default: + return -EBADMSG; + } + ++idx; + } + + /* met no schema */ + return -EBADMSG; +} + +static int validate_defaults(const struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + size_t i = 0; + + if (p->global_default != ipe_action_max) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) { + if (p->rules[i].default_action == ipe_action_max) + return -EBADMSG; + } + + return 0; +} + +IPE_PARSER(default_decl) = { + .first_token = "DEFAULT", + .version = 1, + .parse = parse_default, + .free = NULL, + .validate = validate_defaults, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/parsers/policy_header.c b/security/ipe/parsers/policy_header.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4d3c1a42c915 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/parsers/policy_header.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ipe_parser.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe_parser.h" + +static int parse_name(const struct ipe_policy_token *t, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + if (p->name) + return -EBADMSG; + + p->name = kstrdup_const(t->value, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p->name) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_ver(const struct ipe_policy_token *t, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *dup = NULL; + char *dup2 = NULL; + char *token = NULL; + size_t sep_count = 0; + u16 *const cv[] = { &p->version.major, &p->version.minor, &p->version.rev }; + + dup = kstrdup(t->value, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dup) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + dup2 = dup; + + while ((token = strsep(&dup, ".\n")) != NULL) { + /* prevent overflow */ + if (sep_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(cv)) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + rc = kstrtou16(token, 10, cv[sep_count]); + if (rc) + goto err; + + ++sep_count; + } + + /* prevent underflow */ + if (sep_count != ARRAY_SIZE(cv)) + rc = -EBADMSG; + +err: + kfree(dup2); + return rc; +} + +static const struct ipe_token_parser parsers[] = { + { .key = "policy_name", .parse_token = parse_name }, + { .key = "policy_version", .parse_token = parse_ver }, +}; + +static int parse_policy_hdr(const struct ipe_policy_line *line, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t idx = 0; + struct ipe_policy_token *tok = NULL; + const struct ipe_token_parser *p = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry(tok, &line->tokens, next) { + if (!tok->value || idx >= sizeof(parsers)) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + p = &parsers[idx]; + + if (strcmp(p->key, tok->key)) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + rc = p->parse_token(tok, pol); + if (rc) + goto err; + + ++idx; + } + + return 0; + +err: + return rc; +} + +static int free_policy_hdr(struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol) +{ + kfree(pol->name); + return 0; +} + +static int validate_policy_hdr(const struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + return !p->name ? -EBADMSG : 0; +} + +IPE_PARSER(policy_header) = { + .first_token = "policy_name", + .version = 1, + .parse = parse_policy_hdr, + .free = free_policy_hdr, + .validate = validate_policy_hdr, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9dd60dd34477 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,946 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "ipe_parser.h" +#include "modules.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define START_COMMENT '#' +#define KEYVAL_DELIMIT '=' + +static inline bool is_quote(char ch) +{ + return ch == '\'' || ch == '\"'; +} + +/** + * is_key_char: Determine whether @ch is an acceptable character for a + * key type + * @ch: Supplies the character to evaluate. + * + * Return: + * true - Character is acceptable. + * false - Character is not acceptable. + */ +static inline bool is_key_char(char ch) +{ + return isalnum(ch) || ch == '_'; +} + +/** + * is_val_char: Determine whether @ch is an acceptable character for a + * value type + * @ch: Supplies the character to evaluate. + * + * Return: + * true - Character is acceptable. + * false - Character is not acceptable. + */ +static inline bool is_val_char(char ch) +{ + return isgraph(ch) || ch == ' ' || ch == '\t'; +} + +/** + * free_parser: Callback to invoke, freeing data allocated by parsers. + * @parser: parser to free data. + * @ctx: ctx object passed to ipe_for_each_parser. + * + * This function is intended to be used with ipe_for_each_parser only. + * + * Return: + * 0 - Always + */ +static int free_parser(const struct ipe_parser *parser, void *ctx) +{ + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol = ctx; + + if (parser->free) + parser->free(pol); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * free_rule: free an ipe_rule. + * @r: Supplies the rule to free. + * + * This function is safe to call if @r is NULL or ERR_PTR. + */ +static void free_rule(struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + struct ipe_policy_mod *p, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(r)) + return; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, &r->modules, next) { + if (p->mod->free) + p->mod->free(p->mod_value); + + kfree(p); + } + + kfree(r); +} + +static void free_parsed_policy(struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + size_t i = 0; + struct ipe_rule *pp, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) + list_for_each_entry_safe(pp, t, &p->rules[i].rules, next) + free_rule(pp); + + (void)ipe_for_each_parser(free_parser, p); + kfree(p); +} + +/** + * free_parsed_line: free a single parsed line of tokens. + * @line: Supplies the line to free. + * + * This function is safe to call if @line is NULL or ERR_PTR. + */ +static void free_parsed_line(struct ipe_policy_line *line) +{ + struct ipe_policy_token *p, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(line)) + return; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, &line->tokens, next) + kfree(p); +} + +/** + * free_parsed_text: free a 2D list representing a tokenized policy. + * @parsed: Supplies the policy to free. + * + * This function is safe to call if @parsed is NULL or ERR_PTR. + */ +static void free_parsed_text(struct list_head *parsed) +{ + struct ipe_policy_line *p, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(parsed)) + return; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, parsed, next) + free_parsed_line(p); +} + +/** + * trim_quotes: Edit @str to remove a single instance of a trailing and + * leading quotes. + * @str: Supplies the string to edit. + * + * If the string is not quoted, @str will be returned. This function is + * safe to call if @str is NULL. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG) - Quote mismatch. + */ +static char *trim_quotes(char *str) +{ + char s; + size_t len; + + if (!str) + return str; + + s = *str; + + if (is_quote(s)) { + len = strlen(str) - 1; + + if (str[len] != s) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + + str[len] = '\0'; + ++str; + } + + return str; +} + +/** + * parse_token: Parse a string into a proper token representation. + * @token: Supplies the token string to parse. + * + * @token will be edited destructively. Pass a copy if you wish to retain + * the state of the original. + * + * This function will emit an error to pr_err when a parsing error occurs. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG) - An invalid character was encountered while parsing. + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - No Memory + */ +static struct ipe_policy_token *parse_token(char *token) +{ + size_t i, len = 0; + char *key = token; + char *value = NULL; + struct ipe_policy_token *local = NULL; + + len = strlen(token); + + for (i = 0; (i < len) && token[i] != KEYVAL_DELIMIT; ++i) + if (!is_key_char(token[i])) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + + token[i] = '\0'; + ++i; + + /* there is a value */ + if (i < len) { + value = trim_quotes(&token[i]); + if (IS_ERR(value)) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + + len = strlen(value); + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + if (!is_val_char(value[i])) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + local = kzalloc(sizeof(*local), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!local) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&local->next); + local->key = key; + local->value = value; + + return local; +} + +/** + * append_token: Parse and append a token into an ipe_policy_line structure. + * @p: Supplies the ipe_policy_line structure to append to. + * @token: Supplies the token to parse and append to. + * + * @token will be edited during the parsing destructively. Pass a copy if you + * wish to retain the original. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EBADMSG - Parsing error of @token + */ +static int append_token(struct ipe_policy_line *p, char *token) +{ + struct ipe_policy_token *t = NULL; + + t = parse_token(token); + if (IS_ERR(t)) + return PTR_ERR(t); + + list_add_tail(&t->next, &p->tokens); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * alloc_line: Allocate an ipe_policy_line structure. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * -EBADMSG - Parsing error of @token + */ +static struct ipe_policy_line *alloc_line(void) +{ + struct ipe_policy_line *l = NULL; + + l = kzalloc(sizeof(*l), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!l) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&l->next); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&l->tokens); + + return l; +} + +/** + * insert_token: Append a token to @line. + * @token: Supplies the token to append to @line. + * @line: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_policy_line structure to append to. + * + * If @line is NULL, it will be allocated on behalf of the caller. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -ENOMEM - No Memory + * -EBADMSG - Parsing error of @token + */ +static int insert_token(char *token, struct ipe_policy_line **line) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy_line *local = *line; + + if (!local) { + local = alloc_line(); + if (IS_ERR(local)) + return PTR_ERR(local); + + *line = local; + } + + rc = append_token(local, token); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_tokenize_line: Parse a line of text into a list of token structures. + * @line: Supplies the line to parse. + * + * The final result can be NULL, which represents no tokens were parsed. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * NULL - OK, no tokens were parsed. + * ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG) - Invalid policy syntax + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - No Memory + */ +static struct ipe_policy_line *tokenize_line(char *line) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t i = 0; + size_t len = 0; + char *tok = NULL; + char quote = '\0'; + struct ipe_policy_line *p = NULL; + + /* nullterm guaranteed by strsep */ + len = strlen(line); + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + if (quote == '\0' && is_quote(line[i])) { + quote = line[i]; + continue; + } + + if (quote != '\0' && line[i] == quote) { + quote = '\0'; + continue; + } + + if (quote == '\0' && line[i] == START_COMMENT) { + tok = NULL; + break; + } + + if (isgraph(line[i]) && !tok) + tok = &line[i]; + + if (quote == '\0' && isspace(line[i])) { + line[i] = '\0'; + + if (!tok) + continue; + + rc = insert_token(tok, &p); + if (rc) + goto err; + + tok = NULL; + } + } + + if (quote != '\0') { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + if (tok) { + rc = insert_token(tok, &p); + if (rc) + goto err; + } + + return p; + +err: + free_parsed_line(p); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + +/** + * parse_pass1: parse @policy into a 2D list, representing tokens on each line. + * @policy: Supplies the policy to parse. Must be nullterminated, and is + * edited. + * + * In pass1 of the parser, the policy is tokenized. Minor structure checks + * are done (mismatching quotes, invalid characters). + * + * Caller must maintain the lifetime of @policy while the return value is + * alive. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - Out of Memory + * ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG) - Parsing Error + */ +static int parse_pass1(char *policy, struct list_head *tokens) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *p = NULL; + + while ((p = strsep(&policy, "\n\0")) != NULL) { + struct ipe_policy_line *t = NULL; + + t = tokenize_line(p); + if (IS_ERR(t)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(t); + goto err_free_parsed; + } + + if (!t) + continue; + + list_add_tail(&t->next, tokens); + } + + return 0; + +err_free_parsed: + free_parsed_text(tokens); + return rc; +} + +/** + * parse_pass2: Take the 2D list of tokens generated from pass1, and transform + * it into a partial ipe_policy. + * @parsed: Supplies the list of tokens generated from pass1. + * @p: Policy to manipulate with parsed tokens. + * + * This function is where various declarations and references are parsed into + * policy. All declarations and references required to parse rules should be + * done here as a parser, and then in pass3 these can be utilized. + * + * Return: + * !0 - OK + * -EBADMSG - Syntax Parsing Errors + * -ENOENT - No handler for a token. + * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + */ +static int parse_pass2(struct list_head *parsed, struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol) +{ + int rc = 0; + const struct ipe_parser *p = NULL; + struct ipe_policy_line *line = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy_token *token = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry(line, parsed, next) { + token = list_first_entry(&line->tokens, struct ipe_policy_token, next); + p = ipe_lookup_parser(token->key); + if (!p) + continue; + + rc = p->parse(line, pol); + if (rc) + return rc; + + line->consumed = true; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_parse_op: parse a token to an operation value. + * @tok: Token to parse + * @op: Operation Parsed. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EINVAL - Invalid key or value. + */ +int ipe_parse_op(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok, + enum ipe_operation *op) +{ + substring_t match[MAX_OPT_ARGS] = { 0 }; + const match_table_t ops = { + { ipe_op_alias_max, NULL }, + }; + + if (strcmp(tok->key, "op") || !tok->value) + return -EINVAL; + + *op = match_token((char *)tok->value, ops, match); + if ((*op) == (int)ipe_op_alias_max) + return -ENOENT; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_parse_action: parse a token to an operation value. + * @tok: Token to parse + * @action: action parsed. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EINVAL - Invalid key or value. + */ +int ipe_parse_action(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok, + enum ipe_action *action) +{ + substring_t match[MAX_OPT_ARGS] = { 0 }; + const match_table_t actions = { + { ipe_action_allow, "ALLOW" }, + { ipe_action_deny, "DENY" }, + { ipe_action_max, NULL }, + }; + + if (strcmp(tok->key, "action") || !tok->value) + return -EINVAL; + + *action = match_token((char *)tok->value, actions, match); + + if (*action == ipe_action_max) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * parse_mod_to_rule: Parse a module token and append the values to the + * provided rule. + * @t: Supplies the token to parse. + * @r: Supplies the rule to modify with the result. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -ENOENT - No such module to handle @t. + * -ENOMEM - No memory. + * Others - Module defined errors. + */ +static int parse_mod_to_rule(const struct ipe_policy_token *t, struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy_mod *p = NULL; + const struct ipe_module *m = NULL; + + m = ipe_lookup_module(t->key); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(m)) { + rc = (m) ? PTR_ERR(m) : -ENOENT; + goto err; + } + + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->next); + p->mod = m; + + rc = m->parse(t->value, &p->mod_value); + if (rc) + goto err2; + + list_add_tail(&p->next, &r->modules); + return 0; +err2: + kfree(p); +err: + return rc; +} + +/** + * parse_rule: Parse a policy line into an ipe_rule structure. + * @line: Supplies the line to parse. + * + * Return: + * Valid ipe_rule - OK + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - Out of Memory + * ERR_PTR(-ENOENT) - No such module to handle a token + * ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) - An unacceptable value has been encountered. + * ERR_PTR(...) - Module defined errors. + */ +static struct ipe_rule *parse_rule(const struct ipe_policy_line *line) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_rule *r = NULL; + const struct list_head *node = NULL; + + r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!r) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->next); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->modules); + r->op = (int)ipe_op_alias_max; + r->action = ipe_action_max; + + list_for_each(node, &line->tokens) { + const struct ipe_policy_token *token = NULL; + + token = container_of(node, struct ipe_policy_token, next); + + if (list_is_first(node, &line->tokens)) { + enum ipe_operation op; + + rc = ipe_parse_op(token, &op); + if (rc) + goto err; + + r->op = op; + continue; + } + + if (list_is_last(node, &line->tokens)) { + enum ipe_action action; + + rc = ipe_parse_action(token, &action); + if (rc) + goto err; + + r->action = action; + continue; + } + + rc = parse_mod_to_rule(token, r); + if (rc) + goto err; + } + + if (r->action == ipe_action_max || r->op == (int)ipe_op_alias_max) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + return r; +err: + free_rule(r); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + +/** + * parse_pass3: Take the partially parsed list of tokens from pass 1 and the + * parial policy from pass 2, and finalize the policy. + * @parsed: Supplies the tokens parsed from pass 1. + * @p: Supplies the partial policy from pass 2. + * + * This function finalizes the IPE policy by parsing all rules in the + * policy. This must occur in pass3, as in pass2, references are resolved + * that can be used in pass3. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Standard errno + */ +static int parse_pass3(struct list_head *parsed, + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t i = 0; + size_t remap_len = 0; + struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; + struct ipe_policy_line *line = NULL; + const enum ipe_operation *remap; + + list_for_each_entry(line, parsed, next) { + if (line->consumed) + continue; + + rule = parse_rule(line); + if (IS_ERR(rule)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(rule); + goto err; + } + + if (ipe_is_op_alias(rule->op, &remap, &remap_len)) { + for (i = 0; i < remap_len; ++i) { + rule->op = remap[i]; + list_add_tail(&rule->next, &p->rules[rule->op].rules); + rule = parse_rule(line); + } + + free_rule(rule); + } else { + list_add_tail(&rule->next, &p->rules[rule->op].rules); + } + + line->consumed = true; + } + + return 0; +err: + free_rule(rule); + return rc; +} + +/** + * parser_validate: Callback to invoke, validating parsers as necessary + * @parser: parser to call to validate data. + * @ctx: ctx object passed to ipe_for_each_parser. + * + * This function is intended to be used with ipe_for_each_parser only. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Validation failed. + */ +static int parser_validate(const struct ipe_parser *parser, void *ctx) +{ + int rc = 0; + const struct ipe_parsed_policy *pol = ctx; + + if (parser->validate) + rc = parser->validate(pol); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * validate_policy: Given a policy structure that was just parsed, validate + * that all necessary fields are present, initialized + * correctly, and all lines parsed are have been consumed. + * @parsed: Supplies the policy lines that were parsed in pass1. + * @policy: Supplies the fully parsed policy. + * + * A parsed policy can be an invalid state for use (a default was undefined, + * a header was undefined) by just parsing the policy. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EBADMSG - Policy is invalid. + */ +static int validate_policy(const struct list_head *parsed, + const struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + const struct ipe_policy_line *line = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry(line, parsed, next) { + if (!line->consumed) + return -EBADMSG; + } + + rc = ipe_for_each_parser(parser_validate, + (struct ipe_parsed_policy *)p); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * new_parsed_policy: Allocate and initialize a parsed policy to its default + * values. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + */ +static struct ipe_parsed_policy *new_parsed_policy(void) +{ + size_t i = 0; + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_operation_table *t = NULL; + + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + p->global_default = ipe_action_max; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) { + t = &p->rules[i]; + + t->default_action = ipe_action_max; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&t->rules); + } + + return p; +} + +/** + * parse_policy: Given a string, parse the string into an IPE policy + * structure. + * @p: partially filled ipe_policy structure to populate with the result. + * + * @p must have text and textlen set. + * + * Return: + * Valid ipe_policy structure - OK + * ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG) - Invalid Policy Syntax (Unrecoverable) + * ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) - Out of Memory + */ +static int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *dup = NULL; + LIST_HEAD(parsed); + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pp = NULL; + + if (!p->textlen) + return -EBADMSG; + + dup = kmemdup_nul(p->text, p->textlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dup) + return -ENOMEM; + + pp = new_parsed_policy(); + if (IS_ERR(pp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(pp); + goto out; + } + + rc = parse_pass1(dup, &parsed); + if (rc) + goto err; + + rc = parse_pass2(&parsed, pp); + if (rc) + goto err; + + rc = parse_pass3(&parsed, pp); + if (rc) + goto err; + + rc = validate_policy(&parsed, pp); + if (rc) + goto err; + + p->parsed = pp; + + goto out; +err: + free_parsed_policy(pp); +out: + free_parsed_text(&parsed); + kfree(dup); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_is_op_alias: Determine if @op is an alias for one or more operations + * @op: Supplies the operation to check. Should be either ipe_operation or + * ipe_op_alias. + * @map: Supplies a pointer to populate with the mapping if @op is an alias + * @size: Supplies the size of @map if @op is an alias. + * + * Return: + * true - @op is an alias + * false - @op is not an alias + */ +bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size) +{ + switch (op) { + default: + return false; + } +} + +/** + * ipe_free_policy: Deallocate a given IPE policy. + * @p: Supplies the policy to free. + * + * Safe to call on IS_ERR/NULL. + */ +void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p) || !refcount_dec_and_test(&p->refcount)) + return; + + free_parsed_policy(p->parsed); + if (!p->pkcs7) + kfree(p->text); + kfree(p->pkcs7); + kfree(p); +} + +static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p = ctx; + + p->text = (const char *)data; + p->textlen = len; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_new_policy: allocate and parse an ipe_policy structure. + * + * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain-text policy to parse. + * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text. + * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a pkcs7-signed IPE policy. + * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7. + * + * @text/@textlen Should be NULL/0 if @pkcs7/@pkcs7len is set. + * + * The result will still need to be associated with a context via + * ipe_add_policy. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - Success + */ +struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *new = NULL; + + new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + refcount_set(&new->refcount, 1); + + if (!text) { + new->pkcs7len = pkcs7len; + new->pkcs7 = kmemdup(pkcs7, pkcs7len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new->pkcs7) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len, NULL, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + set_pkcs7_data, new); + if (rc) + goto err; + } else { + new->textlen = textlen; + new->text = kstrndup(text, textlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new->text) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + } + + rc = parse_policy(new); + if (rc) + goto err; + + return new; +err: + ipe_put_policy(new); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d78788db238c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef IPE_POLICY_H +#define IPE_POLICY_H + +#include +#include +#include + +struct ipe_policy_token { + struct list_head next; /* type: policy_token */ + + const char *key; + const char *value; +}; + +struct ipe_policy_line { + struct list_head next; /* type: policy_line */ + struct list_head tokens; /* type: policy_token */ + + bool consumed; +}; + +struct ipe_module; + +enum ipe_operation { + ipe_operation_max = 0, +}; + +/* + * Extension to ipe_operation, representing operations + * that are just one or more operations under the hood + */ +enum ipe_op_alias { + ipe_op_alias_max = ipe_operation_max, +}; + +enum ipe_action { + ipe_action_allow = 0, + ipe_action_deny, + ipe_action_max, +}; + +struct ipe_policy_mod { + const struct ipe_module *mod; + void *mod_value; + + struct list_head next; +}; + +struct ipe_rule { + enum ipe_operation op; + enum ipe_action action; + + struct list_head modules; + + struct list_head next; +}; + +struct ipe_operation_table { + struct list_head rules; + enum ipe_action default_action; +}; + +struct ipe_parsed_policy { + const char *name; + struct { + u16 major; + u16 minor; + u16 rev; + } version; + + enum ipe_action global_default; + + struct ipe_operation_table rules[ipe_operation_max]; +}; + +struct ipe_policy { + const char *pkcs7; + size_t pkcs7len; + + const char *text; + size_t textlen; + + struct ipe_parsed_policy *parsed; + + refcount_t refcount; +}; + +struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len); +void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol); +bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size); + +#endif /* IPE_POLICY_H */ From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:22 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556697 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E9B0C433F5 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11705610FE for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238844AbhJMTIs (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:48 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:48868 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236646AbhJMTIn (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:43 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8E62820B9CFE; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 8E62820B9CFE DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=w3obODL05MfKRl8vk4Y/hfY4hQkZQqVTucc0wPjAJGE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gLhfLIX5BRTPM8vOIsLmRzeXA38//A+wKlF7R/4AEoUIi6kQeWyg8lwzmNrPCvwnd AsJO64/JjUQNGVCV7wbFVWNgjg4+luOGRRYV8yrmutX73ayWQ5dSVFhDqGsUn7zolR z5dYoQtZavHj0hOWKNbfj0P5UaEuyMhOm6vRx7C8= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:22 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-4-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers IPE must have a centralized function to evaluate incoming callers against IPE's policy. This iteration of the policy for against the rules for that specific caller is known as the evaluation loop. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Refactor patch to support a context structure, enabling easier testing * Split up patch 02/12 into four parts: 1. context creation [01/16] 2. audit [07/16] 3. evaluation loop [03/16] (this patch) 4. access control hooks [05/16] --- security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/ctx.c | 57 ++++++++++++ security/ipe/ctx.h | 6 ++ security/ipe/eval.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/eval.h | 26 ++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 4 + security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h | 3 + security/ipe/policy.c | 27 ++++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 4 + 9 files changed, 270 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 9a97efd8a190..0db69f13e82a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/ipe/modules obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ ctx.o \ + eval.o \ hooks.o \ ipe.o \ modules.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c index c24f5d1d41bd..9274e51eff52 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.c +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "ctx.h" +#include "policy.h" #include #include @@ -76,10 +77,25 @@ struct ipe_context *ipe_get_ctx_rcu(struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx) */ static void free_ctx_work(struct work_struct *const work) { + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; ctx = container_of(work, struct ipe_context, free_work); + /* Make p->ctx no longer have any references */ + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + list_for_each_entry(p, &ctx->policies, next) + rcu_assign_pointer(p->ctx, NULL); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + /* + * locking no longer necessary - nothing can get a reference to ctx, + * so list is guaranteed stable. + */ + list_for_each_entry(p, &ctx->policies, next) + ipe_put_policy(p); + kfree(ctx); } @@ -104,6 +120,7 @@ static struct ipe_context *create_ctx(void) } INIT_WORK(&ctx->free_work, free_ctx_work); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->policies); refcount_set(&ctx->refcount, 1); spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); @@ -114,6 +131,46 @@ static struct ipe_context *create_ctx(void) return ERR_PTR(rc); } +/** + * remove_policy: Remove a policy from its context + * @p: Supplies a pointer to a policy that will be removed from its context + * + * Decrements @p's reference by 1. + */ +void ipe_remove_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + ctx = ipe_get_ctx_rcu(p->ctx); + if (!ctx) + return; + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + list_del_init(&p->next); + rcu_assign_pointer(p->ctx, NULL); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + /* drop the reference representing the list */ + ipe_put_policy(p); +} + +/** + * ipe_add_policy: Associate @p with @ctx + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_context structure to associate @p with. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_policy structure to associate. + */ +void ipe_add_policy(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(p->ctx, ctx); + list_add_tail(&p->next, &ctx->policies); + refcount_inc(&p->refcount); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); +} + /** * ipe_put_ns: Decrement the reference of an ipe_context structure, * scheduling a free as necessary.s diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.h b/security/ipe/ctx.h index 69a2c92c0a8c..a0da92da818c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.h +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.h @@ -12,10 +12,14 @@ #include struct ipe_context { + struct ipe_policy __rcu *active_policy; + refcount_t refcount; /* Protects concurrent writers */ spinlock_t lock; + struct list_head policies; /* type: ipe_policy */ + struct work_struct free_work; }; @@ -24,5 +28,7 @@ struct ipe_context __rcu **ipe_tsk_ctx(struct task_struct *tsk); struct ipe_context *ipe_current_ctx(void); struct ipe_context *ipe_get_ctx_rcu(struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx); void ipe_put_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx); +void ipe_add_policy(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p); +void ipe_remove_policy(struct ipe_policy *p); #endif /* IPE_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b732f76cfd05 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "ctx.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "hooks.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "modules/ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * build_ctx: Build an evaluation context. + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file to associated with the evaluation + * @op: Supplies the IPE policy operation associated with the evaluation + * @hook: Supplies the LSM hook associated with the evaluation. + * + * The current IPE Context will have a reference count increased by one until + * this is deallocated. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + */ +static struct ipe_eval_ctx *build_ctx(const struct file *file, + enum ipe_operation op, + enum ipe_hook hook) +{ + struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + ctx->file = file; + ctx->op = op; + ctx->hook = hook; + ctx->ci_ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + return ctx; +} + +/** + * free_ctx: Deallocate a previously-allocated ipe_eval_ctx + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the evaluation context to free. + */ +static void free_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ctx)) + return; + + ipe_put_ctx(ctx->ci_ctx); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * evaluate: Analyze @ctx against the active policy and return the result. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * This is the loop where all policy evaluation happens against IPE policy. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EACCES - @ctx did not pass evaluation. + * !0 - Error + */ +static int evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool match = false; + enum ipe_action action; + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy_mod *module = NULL; + const struct ipe_operation_table *rules = NULL; + + pol = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->ci_ctx->active_policy); + if (!pol) + goto out; + + rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op]; + + list_for_each_entry(rule, &rules->rules, next) { + match = true; + + list_for_each_entry(module, &rule->modules, next) + match = match && module->mod->eval(ctx, module->mod_value); + + if (match) + break; + } + + if (match) { + action = rule->action; + } else if (rules->default_action != ipe_action_max) { + action = rules->default_action; + } else { + action = pol->parsed->global_default; + } + + if (action == ipe_action_deny) + rc = -EACCES; + +out: + ipe_put_policy(pol); + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_process_event: Submit @file for verification against IPE's policy + * @file: Supplies an optional pointer to the file being submitted. + * @op: IPE Policy Operation to associate with @file + * @hook: LSM Hook to associate with @file + * + * @file can be NULL and will be submitted for evaluation like a non-NULL + * file. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * -EACCES - @file did not pass verification + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, + enum ipe_hook hook) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = build_ctx(file, op, hook); + if (IS_ERR(ctx)) + return PTR_ERR(ctx); + + rc = evaluate(ctx); + + free_ctx(ctx); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..db6da2998a20 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_EVAL_H +#define IPE_EVAL_H + +#include + +#include "ctx.h" +#include "hooks.h" +#include "policy.h" + +struct ipe_eval_ctx { + enum ipe_hook hook; + enum ipe_operation op; + + const struct file *file; + struct ipe_context *ci_ctx; +}; + +int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, + enum ipe_hook hook); + +#endif /* IPE_EVAL_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index e0ae3c7dfb5b..58ed4a612e26 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ #include #include +enum ipe_hook { + ipe_hook_max = 0 +}; + int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h index 397a54cbc4db..b4f975e9218a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h +++ b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #define IPE_MODULE_H #include +#include "../eval.h" /** * ipe_module: definition of an extensible module for IPE properties. @@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ struct ipe_module { u16 version; /* required */ int (*parse)(const char *valstr, void **value); /* required */ int (*free)(void **value); /* optional */ + bool (*eval)(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, /* required */ + const void *val); }; #define IPE_MODULE(parser) \ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index 9dd60dd34477..8970f96453d6 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -874,6 +874,32 @@ void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) kfree(p); } +/** + * ipe_get_policy_rcu: Dereference rcu-protected @p and increase the reference + * count. + * @p: rcu-protected pointer to dereference + * + * Not safe to call on IS_ERR. + * + * Return: + * !NULL - reference count of @p was valid, and increased by one. + * NULL - reference count of @p is not valid. + */ +struct ipe_policy *ipe_get_policy_rcu(struct ipe_policy __rcu *p) +{ + struct ipe_policy *rv = NULL; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + rv = rcu_dereference(p); + if (!rv || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&rv->refcount)) + rv = NULL; + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rv; +} + static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen) { @@ -912,6 +938,7 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); refcount_set(&new->refcount, 1); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->next); if (!text) { new->pkcs7len = pkcs7len; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index d78788db238c..2b5041c5a75a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -87,11 +87,15 @@ struct ipe_policy { struct ipe_parsed_policy *parsed; refcount_t refcount; + + struct list_head next; /* type: ipe_policy */ + struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx; }; struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len); void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol); bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size); +struct ipe_policy *ipe_get_policy_rcu(struct ipe_policy __rcu *p); #endif /* IPE_POLICY_H */ From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:23 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556689 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95188C4167E for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CB7D60E96 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238757AbhJMTIr (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:47 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:48888 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236703AbhJMTIn (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:43 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A513820B9CFF; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com A513820B9CFF DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=umwm8Kpg6kU2t3Jjy02gwlm/Zk0Xi63fhE6PV4jIuZo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jICy86BrsvrLryholTlSWkcpak5dbYjg1b0NeCzBoaF0aoCLMpsXV6x62m1Shds04 4877sw4BXCU+CdxrAzLmrw5wf+nUMEb4o+kKfnhvq/YkWDqSPsWXpnJUF0hyWLDLjv qSHidPugs10KuVolsIXOV8KxQIoQCNQ6tRDz3iyw= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 04/16] ipe: add userspace interface Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:23 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-5-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Refactor series to: 1. Support a context structure, enabling easier testing * Split up patch 03/12 into two parts: 1. parser [02/16] 2. userspace interface [04/16] (this patch) * Interface changes: 1. "raw" was renamed to "pkcs7" and made read only 2. "raw"'s write functionality (update a policy) moved to "update" 3. introduced "version", "policy_name" nodes. 4. "content" renamed to "policy" 5. The boot policy can now be updated like any other policy. --- security/ipe/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/ctx.c | 121 +++++++++ security/ipe/ctx.h | 6 + security/ipe/fs.c | 170 +++++++++++++ security/ipe/fs.h | 13 + security/ipe/policy.c | 41 ++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 4 + security/ipe/policyfs.c | 528 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 885 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/policyfs.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 0db69f13e82a..d5660a17364c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/ipe/modules obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ ctx.o \ eval.o \ + fs.o \ hooks.o \ ipe.o \ modules.o \ parsers/ \ parsers.o \ policy.o \ + policyfs.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c index 9274e51eff52..664c671a4f9c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.c +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -13,6 +13,29 @@ #include #include +/** + * ver_to_u64: convert an internal ipe_policy_version to a u64 + * @p: Policy to extract the version from + * + * Bits (LSB is index 0): + * [48,32] -> Major + * [32,16] -> Minor + * [16, 0] -> Revision + * + * Return: + * u64 version of the embedded version structure. + */ +static inline u64 ver_to_u64(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + u64 r = 0; + + r = (((u64)p->parsed->version.major) << 32) + | (((u64)p->parsed->version.minor) << 16) + | ((u64)(p->parsed->version.rev)); + + return r; +} + /** * ipe_current_ctx: Helper to retrieve the ipe_context for the current task. * @@ -96,6 +119,7 @@ static void free_ctx_work(struct work_struct *const work) list_for_each_entry(p, &ctx->policies, next) ipe_put_policy(p); + securityfs_remove(ctx->policy_root); kfree(ctx); } @@ -160,6 +184,9 @@ void ipe_remove_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) * ipe_add_policy: Associate @p with @ctx * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_context structure to associate @p with. * @p: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_policy structure to associate. + * + * This will increase @p's reference count by one. + * */ void ipe_add_policy(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p) { @@ -168,7 +195,101 @@ void ipe_add_policy(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p) list_add_tail(&p->next, &ctx->policies); refcount_inc(&p->refcount); spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); +} + +/** + * ipe_replace_policy: Replace @old with @new in the list of policies in @ctx + * @ctx: Supplies the context object to manipulate. + * @old: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_policy to replace with @new + * @new: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_policy structure to replace @old with + */ +int ipe_replace_policy(struct ipe_policy *old, struct ipe_policy *new) +{ + int rc = -EINVAL; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + struct ipe_policy *cursor; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + ctx = ipe_get_ctx_rcu(old->ctx); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOENT; + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + list_for_each_entry(cursor, &ctx->policies, next) { + if (!strcmp(old->parsed->name, cursor->parsed->name)) { + if (ipe_is_policy_active(old)) { + if (ver_to_u64(old) > ver_to_u64(new)) + break; + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->active_policy, new); + } + list_replace_init(&cursor->next, &new->next); + refcount_inc(&new->refcount); + rcu_assign_pointer(new->ctx, old->ctx); + p = cursor; + rc = 0; + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + ipe_put_policy(p); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_set_active_pol: Make @p the active policy. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to make active. + */ +int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = ipe_get_ctx_rcu(p->ctx); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + ap = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + if (ap && ver_to_u64(ap) > ver_to_u64(p)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->active_policy, p); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); synchronize_rcu(); + +out: + ipe_put_policy(ap); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return rc; +} + +/** + * ipe_is_policy_active: Determine wehther @p is the active policy + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to check. + * + * Return: + * true - @p is the active policy of @ctx + * false - @p is not the active policy of @ctx + */ +bool ipe_is_policy_active(const struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + bool rv; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ctx = rcu_dereference(p->ctx); + rv = !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ctx) && rcu_access_pointer(ctx->active_policy) == p; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rv; } /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.h b/security/ipe/ctx.h index a0da92da818c..fe11fb767788 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.h +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -20,6 +21,8 @@ struct ipe_context { struct list_head policies; /* type: ipe_policy */ + struct dentry *policy_root; + struct work_struct free_work; }; @@ -30,5 +33,8 @@ struct ipe_context *ipe_get_ctx_rcu(struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx); void ipe_put_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx); void ipe_add_policy(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p); void ipe_remove_policy(struct ipe_policy *p); +int ipe_replace_policy(struct ipe_policy *old, struct ipe_policy *new); +int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p); +bool ipe_is_policy_active(const struct ipe_policy *p); #endif /* IPE_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10ad23f8bf92 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include "ipe.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "policy.h" + +#include +#include + +static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *config __ro_after_init; + +/** + * new_policy: Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *copy = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + copy = memdup_user_nul(data, len); + if (IS_ERR(copy)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(copy); + goto err; + } + + p = ipe_new_policy(NULL, 0, copy, len); + if (IS_ERR(p)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(p); + goto err; + } + + rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(ctx, p); + if (rc) + goto err; + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p); +err: + ipe_put_policy(p); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return (rc < 0) ? rc : len; +} + +/** + * get_config: Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/config" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t get_config(struct file *f, char __user *data, size_t len, + loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *buf = NULL; + size_t buflen = 0; + char tmp[30] = { 0 }; + struct ipe_parser *p = NULL; + struct ipe_module *m = NULL; + + for (p = __start_ipe_parsers; p < __end_ipe_parsers; ++p) + buflen += snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s=%d\n", p->first_token, p->version); + for (m = __start_ipe_modules; m < __end_ipe_modules; ++m) + buflen += snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s=%d\n", m->name, m->version); + + ++buflen; + buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + for (p = __start_ipe_parsers; p < __end_ipe_parsers; ++p) { + memset(tmp, 0x0, ARRAY_SIZE(tmp)); + scnprintf(tmp, ARRAY_SIZE(tmp), "%s=%d\n", p->first_token, p->version); + strcat(buf, tmp); + } + + for (m = __start_ipe_modules; m < __end_ipe_modules; ++m) { + memset(tmp, 0x0, ARRAY_SIZE(tmp)); + scnprintf(tmp, ARRAY_SIZE(tmp), "%s=%d\n", m->name, m->version); + strcat(buf, tmp); + } + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, buf, buflen); +out: + kfree(buf); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations cfg_fops = { + .read = get_config, +}; + +static const struct file_operations np_fops = { + .write = new_policy, +}; + +/** + * ipe_init_securityfs: Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit + * + * Return: + * !0 - Error + * 0 - OK + */ +static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + root = securityfs_create_dir("ipe", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(root)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(root); + goto err; + } + + np = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops); + if (IS_ERR(np)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(np); + goto err; + } + + config = securityfs_create_file("config", 0400, root, NULL, + &cfg_fops); + if (IS_ERR(config)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(config); + goto err; + } + + ctx->policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->policy_root)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(ctx->policy_root); + goto err; + } + + return 0; +err: + securityfs_remove(np); + securityfs_remove(root); + securityfs_remove(config); + securityfs_remove(ctx->policy_root); + return rc; +} + +fs_initcall(ipe_init_securityfs); diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.h b/security/ipe/fs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4ab2f4e8c454 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/fs.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_FS_H +#define IPE_FS_H + +void ipe_soft_del_policyfs(struct ipe_policy *p); +int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p); +void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p); + +#endif /* IPE_FS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index 8970f96453d6..b766824cc08f 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include "ipe.h" +#include "fs.h" #include "policy.h" #include "ipe_parser.h" #include "modules.h" @@ -867,6 +868,8 @@ void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p) || !refcount_dec_and_test(&p->refcount)) return; + ipe_del_policyfs_node(p); + securityfs_remove(p->policyfs); free_parsed_policy(p->parsed); if (!p->pkcs7) kfree(p->text); @@ -911,6 +914,44 @@ static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, return 0; } +/** + * ipe_update_policy: parse a new policy and replace @old with it. + * @old: Supplies a pointer to the policy to replace + * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain text policy + * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text + * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a buffer containing a pkcs7 message. + * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7len + * + * @text/@textlen is mutually exclusive with @pkcs7/@pkcs7len - see + * ipe_new_policy. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + */ +struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct ipe_policy *old, + const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *new; + + new = ipe_new_policy(text, textlen, pkcs7, pkcs7len); + if (IS_ERR(new)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(new); + goto err; + } + + if (strcmp(new->parsed->name, old->parsed->name)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + rc = ipe_replace_policy(old, new); +err: + ipe_put_policy(new); + return (rc < 0) ? ERR_PTR(rc) : new; +} + /** * ipe_new_policy: allocate and parse an ipe_policy structure. * diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index 2b5041c5a75a..6818f6405dd0 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -88,12 +88,16 @@ struct ipe_policy { refcount_t refcount; + struct dentry *policyfs; struct list_head next; /* type: ipe_policy */ struct ipe_context __rcu *ctx; }; struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len); +struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct ipe_policy *old, const char *text, + size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, + size_t pkcs7len); void ipe_put_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol); bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size); struct ipe_policy *ipe_get_policy_rcu(struct ipe_policy __rcu *p); diff --git a/security/ipe/policyfs.c b/security/ipe/policyfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d34c22e99225 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policyfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include "ipe.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "fs.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define MAX_VERSION_SIZE ARRAY_SIZE("65535.65535.65535") + +/** + * find_policy: Follow the i_private field of a dentry, returning the address + * of the resulting policy structure. + * @f: Securityfs object that contains a link to the dentry containing the + * policy structure. + * + * Return: + * Always-Valid Address Pointer + */ +static inline struct ipe_policy __rcu **find_policy(struct file *f) +{ + struct dentry *link; + + link = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry)->i_private; + + return (struct ipe_policy __rcu **)&(d_inode(link)->i_private); +} + +/** + * ipefs_file: defines a file in securityfs + */ +struct ipefs_file { + const char *name; + umode_t access; + const struct file_operations *fops; +}; + +/** + * read_pkcs7: Read handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/pkcs7" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the pkcs7 blob representing the policy + * on success. If the policy is unsigned (like the boot policy), this + * will return -ENOENT. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_pkcs7(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) + return -ENOENT; + + if (!p->pkcs7) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len); + +out: + ipe_put_policy(p); + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_policy: Read handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/policy" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the plain-text version of the policy + * on success. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_policy(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) + return -ENOENT; + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->text, p->textlen); + + ipe_put_policy(p); + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_name: Read handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/name" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the policy_name attribute on success + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_name(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) + return -ENOENT; + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->parsed->name, + strlen(p->parsed->name)); + + ipe_put_policy(p); + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_version: Read handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/version" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the version string on success. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_version(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + ssize_t rc = 0; + size_t bufsize = 0; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + char buffer[MAX_VERSION_SIZE] = { 0 }; + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) + return -ENOENT; + + bufsize = scnprintf(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer), "%hu.%hu.%hu", + p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor, + p->parsed->version.rev); + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, buffer, bufsize); + + ipe_put_policy(p); + return rc; +} + +/** + * setactive: Write handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/active" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setactive(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value = false; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + goto out; + + if (!value) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + ctx = ipe_get_ctx_rcu(p->ctx); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = ipe_set_active_pol(p); + +out: + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p); + return (rc < 0) ? rc : len; +} + +/** + * getactive: Read handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/active" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Suppleis a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the 1 or 0 depending on if the + * corresponding policy is active. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getactive(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + const char *str; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + str = ipe_is_policy_active(p) ? "1" : "0"; + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, str, 2); + +out: + ipe_put_policy(p); + return rc; +} + +/** + * update_policy: Write handler for the securityfs node, + * "ipe/policies/$name/active" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * On success this updates the policy represented by $name, + * in-place. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t update_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *copy = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *new = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *old = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + struct ipe_policy __rcu **addr = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOENT; + + addr = find_policy(f); + old = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*addr); + if (!old) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto err; + } + + copy = memdup_user(data, len); + if (IS_ERR(copy)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(copy); + goto err; + } + + new = ipe_update_policy(old, NULL, 0, copy, len); + if (IS_ERR(new)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(new); + goto err; + } + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(*addr, new); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + swap(new->policyfs, old->policyfs); + + kfree(copy); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(old); + return len; +err: + kfree(copy); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(new); + ipe_put_policy(old); + return rc; +} + +/** + * delete_policy: write handler for securityfs dir, "ipe/policies/$name/delete" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * On success this deletes the policy represented by $name. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t delete_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value = false; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + goto out; + + if (!value) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*find_policy(f)); + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + if (ipe_is_policy_active(p)) { + rc = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + + ctx = ipe_get_ctx_rcu(p->ctx); + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + ipe_remove_policy(p); +out: + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p); + return (rc < 0) ? rc : len; +} + +static const struct file_operations content_fops = { + .read = read_policy, +}; + +static const struct file_operations pkcs7_fops = { + .read = read_pkcs7, +}; + +static const struct file_operations name_fops = { + .read = read_name, +}; + +static const struct file_operations ver_fops = { + .read = read_version, +}; + +static const struct file_operations active_fops = { + .write = setactive, + .read = getactive, +}; + +static const struct file_operations update_fops = { + .write = update_policy, +}; + +static const struct file_operations delete_fops = { + .write = delete_policy, +}; + +/** + * policy_subdir: files under a policy subdirectory + */ +static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = { + { "pkcs7", 0444, &pkcs7_fops }, + { "policy", 0444, &content_fops }, + { "name", 0444, &name_fops }, + { "version", 0444, &ver_fops }, + { "active", 0600, &active_fops }, + { "update", 0200, &update_fops }, + { "delete", 0200, &delete_fops }, +}; + +/** + * soft_del_policyfs - soft delete the policyfs tree, preventing new + * accesses to the interfaces for this policy. + * @p - Policy to soft delete the tree for. + */ +static void soft_del_policyfs(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + struct inode *ino = NULL; + struct ipe_policy __rcu **addr = NULL; + + ino = d_inode(p->policyfs); + addr = (struct ipe_policy __rcu **)&ino->i_private; + + inode_lock(ino); + rcu_assign_pointer(*addr, NULL); + inode_unlock(ino); + synchronize_rcu(); +} + +/** + * ipe_del_policyfs_node: Delete a securityfs entry for @p + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to delete a securityfs entry for. + */ +void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + size_t i = 0; + struct dentry *d = NULL; + const struct ipefs_file *f = NULL; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p->policyfs)) + return; + + soft_del_policyfs(p); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policy_subdir); ++i) { + f = &policy_subdir[i]; + + d = lookup_positive_unlocked(f->name, p->policyfs, + strlen(f->name)); + if (IS_ERR(d)) + continue; + + securityfs_remove(d); + dput(d); + } + + securityfs_remove(p->policyfs); +} + +/** + * ipe_new_policyfs_node: Create a securityfs entry for @p + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to a context structure that contains the root of + * the policy tree. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to create a securityfs entry for. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_context *ctx, struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t i = 0; + struct dentry *d = NULL; + struct ipe_policy **addr = NULL; + const struct ipefs_file *f = NULL; + + p->policyfs = securityfs_create_dir(p->parsed->name, ctx->policy_root); + if (IS_ERR(p->policyfs)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(p->policyfs); + goto err; + } + + addr = (struct ipe_policy **)&(d_inode(p->policyfs)->i_private); + *addr = p; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policy_subdir); ++i) { + f = &policy_subdir[i]; + + d = securityfs_create_file(f->name, f->access, p->policyfs, p->policyfs, + f->fops); + if (IS_ERR(d)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(d); + goto err; + } + } + + return 0; +err: + ipe_del_policyfs_node(p); + return rc; +} From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:24 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556711 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0A24C4167E for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2439611C5 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239248AbhJMTJN (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:13 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49062 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236935AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BD16120B9D00; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com BD16120B9D00 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=IxYst3FiNb/kY3ikZe2nWCnkf57ca9R+8i/DDEvqFOY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hl3m88SnYHDr7975V7Zl8YyNcB5uZfa1XLHlldlDU+1D3VDPrBpIrkkM61j5j1anq 0XDaZ+B+jTwDXyRbMBO2Ps0brW3DskGy8QXJcO0PpzVQuJWpYxCj8fFgKqXTxAlFBe kDbFcFzu3AsljvRlmzXi8eNmcUDnziTjbaG4Ydtc= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 05/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:24 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-6-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for execve, mprotect, mmap, kernel_load_data and kernel_read_data. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Split up patch 02/12 into four parts: 1. context creation [01/16] 2. audit [07/16] 3. evaluation loop [03/16] 4. access control hooks [05/16] (this patch) --- security/ipe/hooks.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 23 ++++++- security/ipe/ipe.c | 5 ++ security/ipe/policy.c | 23 +++++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 12 +++- 5 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index ed0c886eaa5a..216242408a80 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -6,11 +6,15 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "ctx.h" #include "hooks.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include /** * ipe_task_alloc: Assign a new context for an associated task structure. @@ -56,3 +60,148 @@ void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task) ipe_put_ctx(ctx); rcu_read_unlock(); } + +/** + * ipe_on_exec: LSM hook called when a process is loaded through the exec + * family of system calls. + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file + * being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_on_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return ipe_process_event(bprm->file, ipe_operation_exec, ipe_hook_exec); +} + +/** + * ipe_on_mmap: LSM hook called when a file is loaded through the mmap + * family of system calls. + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory. + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and + * system configuration. + * @flags: Unused. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_on_mmap(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + if (prot & PROT_EXEC || reqprot & PROT_EXEC) + return ipe_process_event(f, ipe_operation_exec, ipe_hook_mmap); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_on_mprotect: LSM hook called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing + * its protections via mprotect. + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and + * system configuration. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_on_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + /* Already Executable */ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) + return 0; + + if (((prot & PROT_EXEC) || reqprot & PROT_EXEC)) + return ipe_process_event(vma->vm_file, ipe_operation_exec, + ipe_hook_mprotect); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_on_kernel_read: LSM hook called when a file is being read in from + * disk. + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. + * @contents: Unused. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_on_kernel_read(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + enum ipe_operation op; + + switch (id) { + case READING_FIRMWARE: + op = ipe_operation_firmware; + break; + case READING_MODULE: + op = ipe_operation_kernel_module; + break; + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + op = ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs; + break; + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + op = ipe_operation_kexec_image; + break; + case READING_POLICY: + op = ipe_operation_ima_policy; + break; + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + op = ipe_operation_ima_x509; + break; + default: + op = ipe_operation_max; + } + + return ipe_process_event(file, op, ipe_hook_kernel_read); +} + +/** + * ipe_on_kernel_load_data: LSM hook called when a buffer is being read in from + * disk. + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. + * @contents: Unused. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) +{ + enum ipe_operation op; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + op = ipe_operation_firmware; + break; + case LOADING_MODULE: + op = ipe_operation_kernel_module; + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + op = ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs; + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + op = ipe_operation_kexec_image; + break; + case LOADING_POLICY: + op = ipe_operation_ima_policy; + break; + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + op = ipe_operation_ima_x509; + break; + default: + op = ipe_operation_max; + } + + return ipe_process_event(NULL, op, ipe_hook_kernel_load); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 58ed4a612e26..c99a0b7f45f7 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -5,11 +5,19 @@ #ifndef IPE_HOOKS_H #define IPE_HOOKS_H +#include #include #include +#include +#include enum ipe_hook { - ipe_hook_max = 0 + ipe_hook_exec = 0, + ipe_hook_mmap, + ipe_hook_mprotect, + ipe_hook_kernel_read, + ipe_hook_kernel_load, + ipe_hook_max }; int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, @@ -17,4 +25,17 @@ int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task); +int ipe_on_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); + +int ipe_on_mmap(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags); + +int ipe_on_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot); + +int ipe_on_kernel_read(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents); + +int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); + #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index b58b372327a1..3f9d43783293 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, ipe_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_on_exec), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_on_mmap), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_on_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_on_kernel_read), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_on_kernel_load_data), }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index b766824cc08f..048500229365 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -483,6 +483,14 @@ int ipe_parse_op(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok, { substring_t match[MAX_OPT_ARGS] = { 0 }; const match_table_t ops = { + { ipe_operation_exec, "EXECUTE" }, + { ipe_operation_firmware, "FIRMWARE" }, + { ipe_operation_kernel_module, "KMODULE" }, + { ipe_operation_kexec_image, "KEXEC_IMAGE" }, + { ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS"}, + { ipe_operation_ima_policy, "IMA_POLICY" }, + { ipe_operation_ima_x509, "IMA_X509_CERT" }, + { ipe_op_alias_kernel_read, "KERNEL_READ" }, { ipe_op_alias_max, NULL }, }; @@ -838,6 +846,15 @@ static int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) return rc; } +static const enum ipe_operation alias_kread[] = { + ipe_operation_firmware, + ipe_operation_kernel_module, + ipe_operation_ima_policy, + ipe_operation_ima_x509, + ipe_operation_kexec_image, + ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs, +}; + /** * ipe_is_op_alias: Determine if @op is an alias for one or more operations * @op: Supplies the operation to check. Should be either ipe_operation or @@ -852,9 +869,15 @@ static int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size) { switch (op) { + case ipe_op_alias_kernel_read: + *map = alias_kread; + *size = ARRAY_SIZE(alias_kread); + break; default: return false; } + + return true; } /** diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index 6818f6405dd0..ca37af46e5af 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -26,7 +26,14 @@ struct ipe_policy_line { struct ipe_module; enum ipe_operation { - ipe_operation_max = 0, + ipe_operation_exec = 0, + ipe_operation_firmware, + ipe_operation_kernel_module, + ipe_operation_kexec_image, + ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs, + ipe_operation_ima_policy, + ipe_operation_ima_x509, + ipe_operation_max }; /* @@ -34,7 +41,8 @@ enum ipe_operation { * that are just one or more operations under the hood */ enum ipe_op_alias { - ipe_op_alias_max = ipe_operation_max, + ipe_op_alias_kernel_read = ipe_operation_max, + ipe_op_alias_max, }; enum ipe_action { From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:25 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556713 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A04C2C43219 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81DDC61163 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239229AbhJMTJN (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:13 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49066 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236976AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D3D7520B9D01; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com D3D7520B9D01 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634151999; bh=yIxQ/i84K/WAWPXS3Zi8wDxbgHtCOMqXXBG94r/Of8Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=K6wGOGS+Ey7bkWdMeWCjxzJKMzzFdZXH+M3f46+W4anu6w4EJhH+EO2ui6Rz0NFXm GFlg8s5fkqvAQf8aBR8XlKYr7HnPNTtQvsScPHpRgMK4Z/Oh+Y2Osa4Wdg3q193Pad 1XSkidWOiJ6s/wIqg7jgpyLrymzluhi+AvQOTCzU= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 06/16] uapi|audit: add trust audit message definitions Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:25 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-7-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Introduce new definitions to audit.h centered around trust decisions and policy loading and activation, as an extension of the mandatory access control fields. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Change audit records to MAC region (14XX) from Integrity region (18XX), as IPE is an effectively a MAC system around trust versus an extension to the integrity subsystem. * Generalize the #defines to support the class of trust-based Access-Control LSMs. --- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index daa481729e9b..3a83b3605896 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ +#define AUDIT_TRUST_RESULT 1420 /* IPE Denial or Grant */ +#define AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_LOAD 1421 /* IPE Policy Load */ +#define AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_ACTIVATE 1422 /* IPE Policy Activate */ +#define AUDIT_TRUST_STATUS 1423 /* IPE enforcing,permissive */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:26 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556715 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 873D9C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60151611B0 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239277AbhJMTJR (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:17 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49068 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237143AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EA73820B9D02; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EA73820B9D02 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=BM3rJKCXfcZEtw4PeOjJxoZpUH7vJt73PAtSiLZhUuY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dv+mPR5aOVAYjSI44vi9DBuLOdhl2uhmmaK9owh03SA0/8v9X2dk3cot23rCj33os Zj960padefav7toxPPy6dvDqvnS/PKnA2WzXKfBiyOX01uz9UfiDgLrB2akiNvd1FV mTmrPW7PUr5hMxWUe5BkEgWPNd4XUlsxoIZkIyQI= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 07/16] ipe: add auditing support Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:26 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-8-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systens with respect to IPE itself. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Split up patch 02/12 into four parts: 1. context creation [01/16] 2. audit [07/16] (this patch) 3. evaluation loop [03/16] 4. access control hooks [05/16] --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 52 ++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/audit.c | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/audit.h | 36 ++++ security/ipe/ctx.c | 18 ++ security/ipe/ctx.h | 2 + security/ipe/eval.c | 8 + security/ipe/eval.h | 7 + security/ipe/fs.c | 79 +++++++++ security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h | 2 + 10 files changed, 470 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index c4503083e92d..ef556b66e674 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -17,3 +17,55 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE requirements on the fly. If unsure, answer N. + +if SECURITY_IPE + +choice + prompt "Hash algorithm used in auditing policies" + default IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA1 + depends on AUDIT + help + Specify the hash algorithm used when auditing policies. + The hash is used to uniquely identify a policy from other + policies on the system. + + If unsure, leave default. + + config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA1 + bool "sha1" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA1 + help + Use the SHA128 algorithm to hash policies + in the audit records. + + config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA256 + bool "sha256" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256 + help + Use the SHA256 algorithm to hash policies + in the audit records. + + config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA384 + bool "sha384" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 + help + Use the SHA384 algorithm to hash policies + in the audit records + + config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA512 + bool "sha512" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA512 + help + Use the SHA512 algorithm to hash policies + in the audit records +endchoice + +config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG + string + depends on AUDIT + default "sha1" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA1 + default "sha256" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA256 + default "sha384" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA384 + default "sha512" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA512 + +endif diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index d5660a17364c..6d9ac818e8c6 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ parsers.o \ policy.o \ policyfs.o \ + +obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5f6c0a52b0cb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "hooks.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" +#include "modules/ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NULLSTR(x) ((x) == NULL ? "NULL" : "!NULL") +#define ACTSTR(x) ((x) == ipe_action_allow ? "ALLOW" : "DENY") + +#define POLICY_LOAD_FMT "IPE policy_name=%s policy_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ + CONFIG_IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG "=" + +static const char *const audit_hook_names[ipe_hook_max] = { + "EXECVE", + "MMAP", + "MPROTECT", + "KERNEL_READ", + "KERNEL_LOAD", +}; + +static const char *const audit_op_names[ipe_operation_max] = { + "EXECUTE", + "FIRMWARE", + "KMODULE", + "KEXEC_IMAGE", + "KEXEC_INITRAMFS", + "IMA_X509_CERT", + "IMA_POLICY", +}; + +/** + * audit_pathname: retrieve the absoute path to a file being evaluated. + * @f: File to retrieve the absolute path for. + * + * This function walks past symlinks and mounts. + * + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + */ +static char *audit_pathname(const struct file *f) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *pos = NULL; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + char *temp_path = NULL; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(f)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + + pathbuf = __getname(); + if (!pathbuf) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + pos = d_absolute_path(&f->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); + if (IS_ERR(pos)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(pos); + goto err; + } + + temp_path = __getname(); + if (!temp_path) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + strscpy(temp_path, pos, PATH_MAX); + __putname(pathbuf); + + return temp_path; +err: + __putname(pathbuf); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + +/** + * audit_eval_ctx: audit an evaluation context structure. + * @ab: Supplies a poniter to the audit_buffer to append to. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the evaluation context to audit + * @enforce: Supplies a boolean representing the enforcement state + */ +static void audit_eval_ctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, + const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, bool enforce) +{ + char *abspath = NULL; + + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_pid=%d ", task_tgid_nr(current)); + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_op=%s ", audit_op_names[ctx->op]); + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_hook=%s ", audit_hook_names[ctx->hook]); + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_ns_enforce=%d ", enforce); + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_comm="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm, ARRAY_SIZE(current->comm)); + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + + /* best effort */ + if (ctx->file) { + abspath = audit_pathname(ctx->file); + if (!IS_ERR(abspath)) { + audit_log_format(ab, "ctx_pathname="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, abspath, PATH_MAX); + __putname(abspath); + } + + audit_log_format(ab, " ctx_ino=%ld ctx_dev=%s", + ctx->file->f_inode->i_ino, + ctx->file->f_inode->i_sb->s_id); + } +} + +/** + * audit_rule: audit an IPE policy rule approximation. + * @ab: Supplies a poniter to the audit_buffer to append to. + * @r: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_rule to approximate a string form for. + * + * This is an approximation because aliases like "KERNEL_READ" will be + * emitted in their expanded form. + */ +static void audit_rule(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + const struct ipe_policy_mod *ptr; + + audit_log_format(ab, "rule=\"op=%s ", audit_op_names[r->op]); + + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &r->modules, next) { + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", ptr->mod->name); + + ptr->mod->audit(ab, ptr->mod_value); + + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + } + + audit_log_format(ab, "action=%s\"", ACTSTR(r->action)); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_match: audit a match for IPE policy. + * @ctx: Supplies a poniter to the evaluation context that was used in the + * evaluation. + * @match_type: Supplies the scope of the match: rule, operation default, + * global default. + * @act: Supplies the IPE's evaluation decision, deny or allow. + * @r: Supplies a pointer to the rule that was matched, if possible. + * @enforce: Supplies the enforcement/permissive state at the point + * the enforcement decision was made. + */ +void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + enum ipe_match match_type, + enum ipe_action act, const struct ipe_rule *const r, + bool enforce) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + bool success_audit; + + rcu_read_lock(); + success_audit = READ_ONCE(ctx->ci_ctx->success_audit); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (act != ipe_action_deny && !success_audit) + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TRUST_RESULT); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "IPE "); + audit_eval_ctx(ab, ctx, enforce); + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + + if (match_type == ipe_match_rule) + audit_rule(ab, r); + else if (match_type == ipe_match_table) + audit_log_format(ab, "rule=\"DEFAULT op=%s action=%s\"", + audit_op_names[ctx->op], ACTSTR(act)); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "rule=\"DEFAULT action=%s\"", + ACTSTR(act)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * audit_policy: Audit a policy's name, version and thumprint to @ab + * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit buffer to append to. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit + */ +static void audit_policy(struct audit_buffer *ab, + const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + u8 *digest = NULL; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(CONFIG_IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + digest = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_init(desc)) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_update(desc, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len)) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_final(desc, digest)) + goto out; + + audit_log_format(ab, POLICY_LOAD_FMT, p->parsed->name, + p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor, + p->parsed->version.rev); + audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm)); + +out: + kfree(digest); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_policy_activation: Audit a policy being made the active policy. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit + */ +void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_ACTIVATE); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_policy(ab, p); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_policy_load: Audit a policy being loaded into the kernel. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit + */ +void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_LOAD); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_policy(ab, p); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b6880f6e8e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_AUDIT_H +#define IPE_AUDIT_H + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + enum ipe_match match_type, + enum ipe_action act, const struct ipe_rule *const r, + bool enforce); +void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p); +void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const p); +#else +static inline void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + enum ipe_match match_type, + enum ipe_action act, const struct ipe_rule *const r, + bool enforce) +{ +} + +static inline void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ +} + +static inline void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#endif /* IPE_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c index 664c671a4f9c..77475aedbfe9 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.c +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -6,12 +6,16 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "ctx.h" #include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" #include #include #include #include #include +#include + +static bool success_audit; /** * ver_to_u64: convert an internal ipe_policy_version to a u64 @@ -265,6 +269,7 @@ int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p) spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); synchronize_rcu(); + ipe_audit_policy_activation(p); out: ipe_put_policy(ap); ipe_put_ctx(ctx); @@ -330,6 +335,10 @@ int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) goto err; } + spin_lock(&lns->lock); + WRITE_ONCE(lns->success_audit, success_audit); + spin_unlock(&lns->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(*ipe_tsk_ctx(current), lns); return 0; @@ -337,3 +346,12 @@ int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) ipe_put_ctx(lns); return rc; } + +/* Set the right module name */ +#ifdef KBUILD_MODNAME +#undef KBUILD_MODNAME +#define KBUILD_MODNAME "ipe" +#endif + +module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled"); diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.h b/security/ipe/ctx.h index fe11fb767788..31aea2fb9e49 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.h +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct ipe_context { struct ipe_policy __rcu *active_policy; + bool __rcu success_audit; + refcount_t refcount; /* Protects concurrent writers */ spinlock_t lock; diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index b732f76cfd05..dcb62179e4bf 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "hooks.h" #include "policy.h" #include "modules/ipe_module.h" +#include "audit.h" #include #include @@ -73,7 +74,9 @@ static int evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) { int rc = 0; bool match = false; + bool enforcing = true; enum ipe_action action; + enum ipe_match match_type; struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; const struct ipe_policy_mod *module = NULL; @@ -97,12 +100,17 @@ static int evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) if (match) { action = rule->action; + match_type = ipe_match_rule; } else if (rules->default_action != ipe_action_max) { action = rules->default_action; + match_type = ipe_match_table; } else { action = pol->parsed->global_default; + match_type = ipe_match_global; } + ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule, enforcing); + if (action == ipe_action_deny) rc = -EACCES; diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index db6da2998a20..8c08eed5af2b 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { struct ipe_context *ci_ctx; }; +enum ipe_match { + ipe_match_rule = 0, + ipe_match_table, + ipe_match_global, + ipe_match_max +}; + int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, enum ipe_hook hook); diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index 10ad23f8bf92..c202c0753755 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "fs.h" #include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" #include #include @@ -12,6 +13,70 @@ static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *config __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *success_audit __ro_after_init; + +/** + * setaudit: Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setaudit(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + WRITE_ONCE(ctx->success_audit, value); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return len; +} + +/** + * getaudit: Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + const char *result; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + rcu_read_lock(); + result = ((READ_ONCE(ctx->success_audit)) ? "1" : "0"); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 2); +} /** * new_policy: Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy" @@ -54,6 +119,7 @@ static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, goto err; ipe_add_policy(ctx, p); + ipe_audit_policy_load(p); err: ipe_put_policy(p); ipe_put_ctx(ctx); @@ -119,6 +185,11 @@ static const struct file_operations np_fops = { .write = new_policy, }; +static const struct file_operations audit_fops = { + .write = setaudit, + .read = getaudit, +}; + /** * ipe_init_securityfs: Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit * @@ -152,6 +223,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + success_audit = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root, + NULL, &audit_fops); + if (IS_ERR(success_audit)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(success_audit); + goto err; + } + ctx->policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); if (IS_ERR(ctx->policy_root)) { rc = PTR_ERR(ctx->policy_root); @@ -163,6 +241,7 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) securityfs_remove(np); securityfs_remove(root); securityfs_remove(config); + securityfs_remove(success_audit); securityfs_remove(ctx->policy_root); return rc; } diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h index b4f975e9218a..6855815d72da 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h +++ b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #define IPE_MODULE_H #include +#include #include "../eval.h" /** @@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ struct ipe_module { int (*free)(void **value); /* optional */ bool (*eval)(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, /* required */ const void *val); + void (*audit)(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *val); /* required */ }; #define IPE_MODULE(parser) \ From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:27 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556717 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC206C10DCE for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C63A8611BF for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238337AbhJMTJS (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:18 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49064 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234675AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0DF7520B9D03; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 0DF7520B9D03 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=U+g085wgU+Is+WzDTIguYGX9/BIK0TB3mTgcW+hbXss=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hNWiwCq4PZL2yfdogwdKCdQzIhozD2pXyjeq1alhyFFQS2IdxtBRY0w40JMuUiKo4 dzNG/ohizceyGgAxhO2vN3w4omLWd2a1BfaGK430qFK/MXvCzAMGLpvtCkgVOAaxpD hzTrXyM7OaVRQFh7FfukHeApI5y6JLRYTZ+dD4DQ= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:27 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-9-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their programs. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Refactor series to: 1. Support a context structure, enabling easier testing 2. Make parser code cleaner * Split up patch 02/12 into four parts: 1. context creation [01/16] 2. audit [07/16] 3. evaluation loop [03/16] 4. access control hooks [05/16] 5. permissive mode [08/16] --- security/ipe/audit.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/audit.h | 5 +++ security/ipe/ctx.c | 6 ++++ security/ipe/ctx.h | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 6 ++++ security/ipe/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 136 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index 5f6c0a52b0cb..82bf94b83fe1 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -262,3 +262,43 @@ void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) audit_log_end(ab); } + +/** + * ipe_audit_enforce: Audit a change in IPE's enforcement state + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the contexts whose state changed. + */ +void ipe_audit_enforce(const struct ipe_context *const ctx) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + bool enforcing = false; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TRUST_STATUS); + if (!ab) + return; + + rcu_read_lock(); + enforcing = READ_ONCE(ctx->enforce); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + audit_log_format(ab, "IPE enforce=%d", enforcing); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * emit_enforcement: Emit the enforcement state of IPE started with. + * + * Return: + * 0 - Always + */ +static int emit_enforcement(void) +{ + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + ipe_audit_enforce(ctx); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return 0; +} + +late_initcall(emit_enforcement); diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h index 6b6880f6e8e7..a9d16323a3c8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.h +++ b/security/ipe/audit.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, bool enforce); void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p); void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const p); +void ipe_audit_enforce(const struct ipe_context *const ctx); #else static inline void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, enum ipe_match match_type, @@ -31,6 +32,10 @@ static inline void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) static inline void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const p) { } + +static inline void ipe_audit_enforce(const struct ipe_context *const ctx) +{ +} #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ #endif /* IPE_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c index 77475aedbfe9..fc9b8e467bc9 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.c +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include static bool success_audit; +static bool enforce = true; /** * ver_to_u64: convert an internal ipe_policy_version to a u64 @@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ static struct ipe_context *create_ctx(void) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->policies); refcount_set(&ctx->refcount, 1); spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); + WRITE_ONCE(ctx->enforce, true); return ctx; @@ -337,6 +339,7 @@ int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) spin_lock(&lns->lock); WRITE_ONCE(lns->success_audit, success_audit); + WRITE_ONCE(lns->enforce, enforce); spin_unlock(&lns->lock); rcu_assign_pointer(*ipe_tsk_ctx(current), lns); @@ -355,3 +358,6 @@ int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400); MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled"); + +module_param(enforce, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Start IPE in enforce or permissive mode"); diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.h b/security/ipe/ctx.h index 31aea2fb9e49..d7bf9fc6426a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.h +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct ipe_context { struct ipe_policy __rcu *active_policy; + bool __rcu enforce; bool __rcu success_audit; diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index dcb62179e4bf..e520ce521c05 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ static int evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) if (!pol) goto out; + rcu_read_lock(); + enforcing = READ_ONCE(ctx->ci_ctx->enforce); + rcu_read_unlock(); + rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op]; list_for_each_entry(rule, &rules->rules, next) { @@ -114,6 +118,8 @@ static int evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) if (action == ipe_action_deny) rc = -EACCES; + if (!enforcing) + rc = 0; out: ipe_put_policy(pol); return rc; diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index c202c0753755..e6b36291e62f 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -13,8 +13,73 @@ static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *config __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *enforce __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *success_audit __ro_after_init; +/** + * setenforce: Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + spin_lock(&ctx->lock); + WRITE_ONCE(ctx->enforce, value); + spin_unlock(&ctx->lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + ipe_audit_enforce(ctx); + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return len; +} + +/** + * getenforce: Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall + * @len: Supplies the length of @data + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getenforce(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + const char *result; + struct ipe_context *ctx; + + ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + + rcu_read_lock(); + result = ((READ_ONCE(ctx->enforce)) ? "1" : "0"); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + ipe_put_ctx(ctx); + return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 2); +} + /** * setaudit: Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. @@ -185,6 +250,11 @@ static const struct file_operations np_fops = { .write = new_policy, }; +static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = { + .write = setenforce, + .read = getenforce, +}; + static const struct file_operations audit_fops = { .write = setaudit, .read = getaudit, @@ -230,6 +300,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + enforce = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL, + &enforce_fops); + if (IS_ERR(enforce)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(enforce); + goto err; + } + ctx->policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); if (IS_ERR(ctx->policy_root)) { rc = PTR_ERR(ctx->policy_root); @@ -241,6 +318,7 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) securityfs_remove(np); securityfs_remove(root); securityfs_remove(config); + securityfs_remove(enforce); securityfs_remove(success_audit); securityfs_remove(ctx->policy_root); return rc; From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556719 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4247FC10F04 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A292611B0 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238374AbhJMTJM (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:12 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49070 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237515AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 24F5220B9D04; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 24F5220B9D04 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=vPDUb/m3bGKN9+A7eENQEJKyUNGHba18u7Od5BYjvuY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jB2bYI59Di22UGsVxoFJS4H7cUj9BVlFngq1WDYrwQvqDUR0E/JHPDpkG4/4ArlmP 2Ttb0+zFuYHVuRKFVbQWmO/cpXJDnQ/tWwtdQzOwDMD49xokXaceVTBwsV5FelfpX2 43xKOQP9iDqfAAkSp1cIgIyLN3k+T6LfxjR7hKdk= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 09/16] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:28 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-10-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust, which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies the kernel and the initramfs. As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and it's typically already verified by the bootloader, introduce a property that causes the first superblock to have an execution to be "pinned", which is typically initramfs. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Reword and refactor patch 04/12 to [09/16] --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 2 + security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/eval.h | 5 ++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 14 ++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 2 + security/ipe/ipe.c | 1 + security/ipe/modules.c | 25 ++++++++++ security/ipe/modules/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++ security/ipe/modules/Makefile | 8 ++++ security/ipe/modules/boot_verified.c | 24 ++++++++++ security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h | 2 + 12 files changed, 175 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/boot_verified.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index ef556b66e674..fcf82a8152ec 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -68,4 +68,6 @@ config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG default "sha384" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA384 default "sha512" if IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA512 +source "security/ipe/modules/Kconfig" + endif diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 6d9ac818e8c6..1e7b2d7fcd9e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ fs.o \ hooks.o \ ipe.o \ + modules/ \ modules.o \ parsers/ \ parsers.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index e520ce521c05..361efccebad4 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -11,10 +11,62 @@ #include "modules/ipe_module.h" #include "audit.h" +#include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include + +static struct super_block *pinned_sb; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pin_lock); + +#define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) + +/** + * pin_sb: pin the underlying superblock of @f, marking it as trusted + * @f: Supplies a file structure to source the super_block from. + */ +static void pin_sb(const struct file *f) +{ + if (!f) + return; + + spin_lock(&pin_lock); + + if (pinned_sb) + goto out; + + pinned_sb = FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f); + +out: + spin_unlock(&pin_lock); +} + +/** + * from_pinned: determine whether @f is source from the pinned super_block. + * @f: Supplies a file structure to check against the pinned super_block. + * + * Return: + * true - @f is sourced from the pinned super_block + * false - @f is not sourced from the pinned super_block + */ +static bool from_pinned(const struct file *f) +{ + bool rv; + + if (!f) + return false; + + spin_lock(&pin_lock); + + rv = !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_sb) && pinned_sb == FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f); + + spin_unlock(&pin_lock); + + return rv; +} /** * build_ctx: Build an evaluation context. @@ -42,6 +94,7 @@ static struct ipe_eval_ctx *build_ctx(const struct file *file, ctx->op = op; ctx->hook = hook; ctx->ci_ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); + ctx->from_init_sb = from_pinned(file); return ctx; } @@ -145,6 +198,9 @@ int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, int rc = 0; struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx = NULL; + if (op == ipe_operation_exec) + pin_sb(file); + ctx = build_ctx(file, op, hook); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); @@ -154,3 +210,18 @@ int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, free_ctx(ctx); return rc; } + +/** + * ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb: if @mnt_sb is the pinned superblock, ensure + * nothing can match it again. + * @mnt_sb: super_block to check against the pinned super_block + */ +void ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(const struct super_block *mnt_sb) +{ + spin_lock(&pin_lock); + + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_sb) && mnt_sb == pinned_sb) + pinned_sb = ERR_PTR(-EIO); + + spin_unlock(&pin_lock); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 8c08eed5af2b..42fb7fdf2599 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define IPE_EVAL_H #include +#include #include "ctx.h" #include "hooks.h" @@ -18,6 +19,8 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { const struct file *file; struct ipe_context *ci_ctx; + + bool from_init_sb; }; enum ipe_match { @@ -30,4 +33,6 @@ enum ipe_match { int ipe_process_event(const struct file *file, enum ipe_operation op, enum ipe_hook hook); +void ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(const struct super_block *mnt_sb); + #endif /* IPE_EVAL_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 216242408a80..2d4a4f0eead0 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -205,3 +205,17 @@ int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) return ipe_process_event(NULL, op, ipe_hook_kernel_load); } + +/** + * ipe_bdev_free_security: free nested structures within IPE's LSM blob + * in super_blocks + * @mnt_sb: Supplies a pointer to a super_block that contains the structure + * to free. + * + * IPE does not have any structures with mnt_sb, but uses this hook to + * invalidate a pinned super_block. + */ +void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) +{ + ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(mnt_sb); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index c99a0b7f45f7..e7f107ab5620 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -38,4 +38,6 @@ int ipe_on_kernel_read(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); +void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb); + #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 3f9d43783293..1382d50078ec 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_on_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_on_kernel_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_on_kernel_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, ipe_sb_free_security), }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/modules.c b/security/ipe/modules.c index fb100c14cce5..3aa9a38fdc0d 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules.c +++ b/security/ipe/modules.c @@ -107,3 +107,28 @@ int ipe_register_module(struct ipe_module *m) return 0; } + +/** + * ipe_bool_parse: parse a boolean in IPE's policy and associate + * it as @value in IPE's policy. + * @valstr: Supplies the string parsed from the policy + * @value: Supplies a pointer to be populated with the result. + * + * Modules can use this function for simple true/false values + * instead of defining their own. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_bool_parse(const char *valstr, void **value) +{ + if (!strcmp(valstr, "TRUE")) + *value = (void *)true; + else if (!strcmp(valstr, "FALSE")) + *value = (void *)false; + else + return -EBADMSG; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fad96ba534e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ + +menu "IPE Trust Providers" + +config IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED + bool "Enable trust for initramfs" + depends on SECURITY_IPE + default N + help + This option enables the property 'boot_verified' in IPE policy. + This property 'pins' the initial superblock when something + is evaluated as an execution. This property will evaluate + to true when the file being evaluated originates from this + superblock. + + This property is useful to authorize a signed initramfs. + + If unsure, answer N. + + +endmenu diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Makefile b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e0045ec65434 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED) += boot_verified.o diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/boot_verified.c b/security/ipe/modules/boot_verified.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ab944a485c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/boot_verified.c @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include + +static bool bv_eval(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const void *val) +{ + bool expect = (bool)val; + + return expect == ctx->from_init_sb; +} + +IPE_MODULE(bv) = { + .name = "boot_verified", + .version = 1, + .parse = ipe_bool_parse, + .free = NULL, + .eval = bv_eval, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h index 6855815d72da..08835627bd72 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h +++ b/security/ipe/modules/ipe_module.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include "../eval.h" +int ipe_bool_parse(const char *valstr, void **value); + /** * ipe_module: definition of an extensible module for IPE properties. * These structures are used to implement 'key=value' pairs From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556691 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7867BC433F5 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59F9F60E96 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238918AbhJMTIt (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:49 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49072 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237211AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3C1A220B9D05; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 3C1A220B9D05 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=5b0dlRjYEYs3ME+JBGgTXi0z1SJn/k4P+Ka+6jJy8+k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=LSctLHtvRkRgTDchAUatrZX/yleyL1+NQez30vpw4z90F1Nr8yVZIrrFnF7S5rWkE k5KhstfhXaJpPuvJ4NAfA50mkhsGNql1VSJflk8GlFiYwqukB3gLJZiSRvsGmbG/KC lA9zz2u6pqJ74RYG8O+PkeoZUPJGf4DeQQ9ADJyI= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 10/16] fs|dm-verity: add block_dev LSM blob and submit dm-verity data Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:29 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-11-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers dm-verity operates on the block_device level. In order to allow IPE to determine if a file is sourced from a dm-verity volume, and how that dm-verity volume was created, create an LSM blob with the signature data and roothash information, allowing IPE to make decisions about controls to a resource based on dm-verity information. Co-developed-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v5: * Change if statement condition in security_bdev_setsecurity to be more concise, as suggested by Casey Schaufler and Al Viro Relevant changes since v6: * Squash patch 05/12, 07/12, 09/12 to [10/16] --- block/bdev.c | 7 ++++ drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 20 ++++++++- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 16 +++++-- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h | 10 +++-- include/linux/blk_types.h | 1 + include/linux/device-mapper.h | 3 ++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 22 ++++++++++ security/security.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index 485a258b0ab3..4c0d6aaa1f08 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -393,6 +394,11 @@ static struct inode *bdev_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) if (!ei) return NULL; memset(&ei->bdev, 0, sizeof(ei->bdev)); + + if (unlikely(security_bdev_alloc(&ei->bdev))) { + kmem_cache_free(bdev_cachep, ei); + return NULL; + } return &ei->vfs_inode; } @@ -402,6 +408,7 @@ static void bdev_free_inode(struct inode *inode) free_percpu(bdev->bd_stats); kfree(bdev->bd_meta_info); + security_bdev_free(bdev); if (!bdev_is_partition(bdev)) { if (bdev->bd_disk && bdev->bd_disk->bdi) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index 22a5ac82446a..e62480803e56 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -13,11 +13,14 @@ * access behavior. */ +#include "dm-core.h" #include "dm-verity.h" #include "dm-verity-fec.h" #include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" +#include "dm-core.h" #include #include +#include #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity" @@ -1051,6 +1054,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) sector_t hash_position; char dummy; char *root_hash_digest_to_validate; + struct block_device *bdev; v = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity), GFP_KERNEL); if (!v) { @@ -1084,6 +1088,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) } v->version = num; + bdev = dm_table_get_md(ti->table)->disk->part0; + if (!bdev) { + ti->error = "Mapped device lookup failed"; + r = -ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + r = dm_get_device(ti, argv[1], FMODE_READ, &v->data_dev); if (r) { ti->error = "Data device lookup failed"; @@ -1216,7 +1227,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) } /* Root hash signature is a optional parameter*/ - r = verity_verify_root_hash(root_hash_digest_to_validate, + r = verity_verify_root_hash(bdev, root_hash_digest_to_validate, strlen(root_hash_digest_to_validate), verify_args.sig, verify_args.sig_size); @@ -1289,12 +1300,17 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) ti->per_io_data_size = roundup(ti->per_io_data_size, __alignof__(struct dm_verity_io)); + r = security_bdev_setsecurity(bdev, + DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME, + v->root_digest, v->digest_size); + if (r) + goto bad; + verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args); return 0; bad: - verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args); verity_dtr(ti); diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c index db61a1f43ae9..1672a35f292b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include +#include "dm-core.h" #include "dm-verity.h" #include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" @@ -97,14 +100,17 @@ int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, * verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device * using builtin trusted keys. * + * @bdev: block_device representing the device-mapper created block device. + * Used by the security hook, to set information about the block_device. * @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified. * @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified. * @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data. * @sig_len: Size of the signature. * */ -int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len, - const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len) +int verity_verify_root_hash(struct block_device *bdev, const void *root_hash, + size_t root_hash_len, const void *sig_data, + size_t sig_len) { int ret; @@ -126,8 +132,12 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len, NULL, #endif VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; - return ret; + return security_bdev_setsecurity(bdev, + DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME, + sig_data, sig_len); } void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h index 3987c7141f79..31692fff92e4 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h @@ -20,8 +20,9 @@ struct dm_verity_sig_opts { #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 2 -int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len, - const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len); +int verity_verify_root_hash(struct block_device *bdev, const void *data, + size_t data_len, const void *sig_data, + size_t sig_len); bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name); int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, @@ -34,8 +35,9 @@ void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts); #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 0 -static inline int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len, - const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len) +int verity_verify_root_hash(struct block_device *bdev, const void *data, + size_t data_len, const void *sig_data, + size_t sig_len) { return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/blk_types.h b/include/linux/blk_types.h index be622b5a21ed..58def70aa653 100644 --- a/include/linux/blk_types.h +++ b/include/linux/blk_types.h @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct block_device { #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST bool bd_make_it_fail; #endif + void *security; } __randomize_layout; #define bdev_whole(_bdev) \ diff --git a/include/linux/device-mapper.h b/include/linux/device-mapper.h index 114553b487ef..0f5bdcfcf337 100644 --- a/include/linux/device-mapper.h +++ b/include/linux/device-mapper.h @@ -665,4 +665,7 @@ static inline unsigned long to_bytes(sector_t n) return (n << SECTOR_SHIFT); } +#define DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME DM_NAME ".verity-sig" +#define DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME DM_NAME ".verity-rh" + #endif /* _LINUX_DEVICE_MAPPER_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 2adeea44c0d5..b148a01b2cef 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -402,3 +402,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, perf_event_free, struct perf_event *event) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_read, struct perf_event *event) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event) #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ + +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setsecurity, struct block_device *bdev, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 5c4c5c0602cb..43d357e6ab47 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1545,6 +1545,17 @@ * * @what: kernel feature being accessed * + * @bdev_alloc_security: + * Initialize the security field inside a block_device structure. + * + * @bdev_free_security: + * Cleanup the security information stored inside a block_device structure. + * + * @bdev_setsecurity: + * Set a security property associated with @name for @bdev with + * value @value. @size indicates the size of @value in bytes. + * If a @name is not implemented, return -ENOSYS. + * * Security hooks for perf events * * @perf_event_open: @@ -1592,6 +1603,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_ipc; int lbs_msg_msg; int lbs_task; + int lbs_bdev; }; /* diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 5b7288521300..98af3f645cb6 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -472,6 +472,11 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what); +int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev); +void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev); +int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) @@ -1348,6 +1353,23 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) { return 0; } + +static inline int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev) +{ +} + +static inline int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 9ffa9e9c5c55..d7ac9f01500b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 @@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); } /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ @@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); + init_debug("bdev blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); /* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -659,6 +662,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) return 0; } +/** + * lsm_bdev_alloc - allocate a composite block_device blob + * @bdev: the block_device that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the block_device blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_bdev == 0) { + bdev->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + bdev->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bdev->security) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + /** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob @@ -2599,6 +2624,51 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); +int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + int rc = 0; + + rc = lsm_bdev_alloc(bdev); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bdev_alloc_security, 0, bdev); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bdev_free(bdev); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_alloc); + +void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + if (!bdev->security) + return; + + call_void_hook(bdev_free_security, bdev); + + kfree(bdev->security); + bdev->security = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_free); + +int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct security_hook_list *p; + + hlist_for_each_entry(p, &security_hook_heads.bdev_setsecurity, list) { + rc = p->hook.bdev_setsecurity(bdev, name, value, size); + if (rc && rc != -ENOSYS) + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setsecurity); + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556709 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19204C4167B for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAFAA61168 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239201AbhJMTJL (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:11 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49082 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237718AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 53A0520B9D07; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 53A0520B9D07 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=xG/zPHHutL8T5eRrGb1/Q/GV2nZZLBHINhuwqkApUsA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NG1/fJodDX3frNqh45lSR0U+Sja/o98n348hhFBUDCNgfE7l2ldnR31WITY3dQ2YT RnFzfr/PZTkOuJt0rNvSKDTZc9cTu5E8LzeIe+Q3Xl26g6th/566pJx8OPzVus+Aiq PTYXuWypkkfNBzqNNHW/RpssYdC6V++XcF/5jt9M= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:30 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-12-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all signed dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature". Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Squash patch 08/12, 10/12 to [11/16] --- security/ipe/eval.c | 5 ++ security/ipe/eval.h | 10 +++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 6 ++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 9 +++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 3 + security/ipe/modules/Kconfig | 23 +++++++ security/ipe/modules/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/modules/dmverity_roothash.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/modules/dmverity_signature.c | 25 +++++++ 10 files changed, 211 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/dmverity_roothash.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/dmverity_signature.c diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 361efccebad4..facc05c753f4 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static struct super_block *pinned_sb; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pin_lock); #define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) +#define FILE_BLOCK_DEV(f) (FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f)->s_bdev) /** * pin_sb: pin the underlying superblock of @f, marking it as trusted @@ -95,6 +96,10 @@ static struct ipe_eval_ctx *build_ctx(const struct file *file, ctx->hook = hook; ctx->ci_ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); ctx->from_init_sb = from_pinned(file); + if (file) { + if (FILE_BLOCK_DEV(file)) + ctx->ipe_bdev = ipe_bdev(FILE_BLOCK_DEV(file)); + } return ctx; } diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 42fb7fdf2599..25d2d8d55702 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ #include "hooks.h" #include "policy.h" +struct ipe_bdev { + const u8 *sigdata; + size_t siglen; + + const u8 *hash; + size_t hashlen; +}; + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_hook hook; enum ipe_operation op; @@ -20,6 +28,8 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { const struct file *file; struct ipe_context *ci_ctx; + const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev; + bool from_init_sb; }; diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 2d4a4f0eead0..470fb48e490c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -219,3 +220,50 @@ void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) { ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(mnt_sb); } + +/** + * ipe_bdev_free_security: free nested structures within IPE's LSM blob + * in block_devices + * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the structure + * to free. + */ +void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev); + + kfree(blob->sigdata); +} + +/** + * ipe_bdev_setsecurity: associate some data from the block device layer + * with IPE's LSM blob. + * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the LSM blob. + * @key: Supplies the string key that uniquely identifies the value. + * @value: Supplies the value to store. + * @len: The length of @value. + */ +int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, + const void *value, size_t len) +{ + struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev); + + if (!strcmp(key, DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME)) { + blob->siglen = len; + blob->sigdata = kmemdup(value, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob->sigdata) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; + } + + if (!strcmp(key, DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME)) { + blob->hashlen = len; + blob->hash = kmemdup(value, len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob->hash) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; + } + + return -ENOSYS; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index e7f107ab5620..285f35187188 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum ipe_hook { ipe_hook_exec = 0, @@ -40,4 +41,9 @@ int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb); +void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev); + +int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, + const void *value, size_t len); + #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 1382d50078ec..215936cb4574 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "ipe_parser.h" #include "modules/ipe_module.h" #include "modules.h" +#include "eval.h" #include #include @@ -20,8 +21,14 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_task = sizeof(struct ipe_context __rcu *), + .lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev), }; +struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) +{ + return b->security + ipe_blobs.lbs_bdev; +} + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, ipe_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free), @@ -31,6 +38,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_on_kernel_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_on_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, ipe_sb_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setsecurity, ipe_bdev_setsecurity), }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index ad16d2bebfec..6b4c7e07f204 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ #include #include +#include #include extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs; extern struct ipe_parser __start_ipe_parsers[], __end_ipe_parsers[]; extern struct ipe_module __start_ipe_modules[], __end_ipe_modules[]; +struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b); + #endif /* IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig index fad96ba534e2..a6ea06cf0737 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig @@ -16,5 +16,28 @@ config IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED If unsure, answer N. +config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE + bool "Enable support for signed dm-verity volumes" + depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + default Y + help + This option enables the property 'dmverity_signature' in + IPE policy. This property evaluates to TRUE when a file + is evaluated against a dm-verity volume that was mounted + with a signed root-hash. + + If unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH + bool "Enable support for dm-verity volumes" + depends on DM_VERITY + default Y + help + This option enables the property 'dmverity_roothash' in + IPE policy. This property evaluates to TRUE when a file + is evaluated against a dm-verity volume whose root hash + matches the supplied value. + + If unsure, answer Y. endmenu diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Makefile b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile index e0045ec65434..84fadce85193 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile @@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED) += boot_verified.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE) += dmverity_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH) += dmverity_roothash.o diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_roothash.c b/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_roothash.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0f82bec3b842 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_roothash.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include + +struct counted_array { + size_t len; + u8 *data; +}; + +static int dvrh_parse(const char *valstr, void **value) +{ + int rv = 0; + struct counted_array *arr; + + arr = kzalloc(sizeof(*arr), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!arr) { + rv = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + arr->len = (strlen(valstr) / 2); + + arr->data = kzalloc(arr->len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!arr->data) { + rv = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + rv = hex2bin(arr->data, valstr, arr->len); + if (rv != 0) + goto err2; + + *value = arr; + return rv; +err2: + kfree(arr->data); +err: + kfree(arr); + return rv; +} + +static bool dvrh_eval(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const void *val) +{ + const u8 *src; + struct counted_array *expect = (struct counted_array *)val; + + if (!ctx->ipe_bdev) + return false; + + if (ctx->ipe_bdev->hashlen != expect->len) + return false; + + src = ctx->ipe_bdev->hash; + + return !memcmp(expect->data, src, expect->len); +} + +static int dvrh_free(void **val) +{ + struct counted_array *expect = (struct counted_array *)val; + + kfree(expect->data); + kfree(expect); + + return 0; +} + +IPE_MODULE(dvrh) = { + .name = "dmverity_roothash", + .version = 1, + .parse = dvrh_parse, + .free = dvrh_free, + .eval = dvrh_eval, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_signature.c b/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_signature.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..08746fcbcb3e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/dmverity_signature.c @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include + +static bool dvv_eval(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const void *val) +{ + bool expect = (bool)val; + bool eval = ctx->ipe_bdev && (!!ctx->ipe_bdev->sigdata); + + return expect == eval; +} + +IPE_MODULE(dvv) = { + .name = "dmverity_signature", + .version = 1, + .parse = ipe_bool_parse, + .free = NULL, + .eval = dvv_eval, +}; From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556703 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86B86C43217 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65A2A60E0B for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239182AbhJMTJK (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:10 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49084 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237644AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6AFE820B9D08; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 6AFE820B9D08 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=Ir+wHn78Ha/CpgYRRf54IWj37u4GCDvYeMB66jhtFJo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jEJ+qzkE8sVGc2k5tN4GNhe6MyvudBw7B0KtqjRClfKxvNtPjUuhLWB0K0kS2KZyY xNLYhbhNxhEPFgPcFyths5QATre4gZEdzBg7Fkc3h+jgBLUdEfOwq7q5BngFXI4G7T fXWWwYkoq6NQjSz1xTmShT2WgPORVC5QTg64qjeU= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 12/16] fsverity|security: add security hooks to fsverity digest and signature Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:31 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-13-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Fan Wu Add security_inode_setsecurity to fsverity signature verification. This can let LSMs save the signature data and digest hashes provided by fsverity. Also changes the implementaion inside the hook function to let multiple LSMs can add hooks. Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- fs/verity/open.c | 12 ++++++++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/fsverity.h | 3 +++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 1 + security/security.c | 6 +++--- 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index 92df87f5fa38..1f36dae01c22 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "fsverity_private.h" +#include #include static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep; @@ -177,6 +178,17 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err); goto out; } + + err = security_inode_setsecurity((struct inode *)inode, + FS_VERITY_DIGEST_SEC_NAME, + vi->file_digest, + vi->tree_params.hash_alg->digest_size, + 0); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d inode setsecurity hook", err); + goto out; + } + pr_debug("Computed file digest: %s:%*phN\n", vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest); diff --git a/fs/verity/signature.c b/fs/verity/signature.c index 143a530a8008..20e585d5fa6d 100644 --- a/fs/verity/signature.c +++ b/fs/verity/signature.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -84,7 +85,9 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, pr_debug("Valid signature for file digest %s:%*phN\n", hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->file_digest); - return 0; + return security_inode_setsecurity((struct inode *)inode, + FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME, + signature, sig_size, 0); } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index b568b3c7d095..dfd7b5a85c67 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -233,4 +233,7 @@ static inline bool fsverity_active(const struct inode *inode) return fsverity_get_info(inode) != NULL; } +#define FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME "fsverity.verity-sig" +#define FS_VERITY_DIGEST_SEC_NAME "fsverity.verity-digest" + #endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 470fb48e490c..d76e60a3f511 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev) struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev); kfree(blob->sigdata); + kfree(blob->hash); } /** diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d7ac9f01500b..81751a91f438 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct security_hook_list *hp; - int rc; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); @@ -1472,10 +1472,10 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags); - if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) + if (rc && rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) return rc; } - return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); + return rc; } int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556705 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C34B5C10F09 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4F376117A for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239156AbhJMTJH (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:07 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49092 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237779AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 81C9520B9D09; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 81C9520B9D09 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=mlyLB653erZlNw5CD5zMHBUnb6jgdKf8+Lje6CHRKd8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SmS3KOkenIvgXCpDDU5QK5h8SotNnCj+IagKbqMTdYPJcXNSvFgJFQDAKaoocbT0S tV1XzFB9FYjH3XRmxN45vfMmhsCHLjajSJ1aIDNfpZzac/zd41U7v3SnZ6inlPYFSu h6rANyNFC41rgNeBCMgoco/OYnJRI9qGA5IX5yQg= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:32 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-14-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Fan Wu Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest" and all fsverity signed by a key via "fsverity_signature". Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Add FSVerity Support (Introduced) --- security/ipe/eval.c | 1 + security/ipe/eval.h | 9 +++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 7 ++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 8 +++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 1 + security/ipe/modules/Kconfig | 23 +++++++ security/ipe/modules/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/modules/fsverity_digest.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/modules/fsverity_signature.c | 33 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 222 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/fsverity_digest.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/modules/fsverity_signature.c diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index facc05c753f4..8f8b91c714c2 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static struct ipe_eval_ctx *build_ctx(const struct file *file, ctx->ci_ctx = ipe_current_ctx(); ctx->from_init_sb = from_pinned(file); if (file) { + ctx->ipe_inode = ipe_inode(file->f_inode); if (FILE_BLOCK_DEV(file)) ctx->ipe_bdev = ipe_bdev(FILE_BLOCK_DEV(file)); } diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 25d2d8d55702..d51280f0519f 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -21,6 +21,14 @@ struct ipe_bdev { size_t hashlen; }; +struct ipe_inode { + const u8 *sigdata; + size_t siglen; + + const u8 *hash; + size_t hashlen; +}; + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_hook hook; enum ipe_operation op; @@ -29,6 +37,7 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { struct ipe_context *ci_ctx; const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev; + const struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode; bool from_init_sb; }; diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index d76e60a3f511..78bb3451220a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -268,3 +268,61 @@ int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, return -ENOSYS; } + +/** + * ipe_inode_setsecurity: Sets the a certain field of a inode security + * blob, based on @key. + * @inode: The inode to source the security blob from. + * @name: The name representing the information to be stored. + * @value: The value to be stored. + * @size: The size of @value. + * @flags: unused + * + * Saves fsverity signature & digest into inode security blob + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, + int flags) +{ + struct ipe_inode *inode_sec = ipe_inode(inode); + + if (!strcmp(name, FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME)) { + inode_sec->siglen = size; + inode_sec->sigdata = kmemdup(value, size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!inode_sec->sigdata) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; + } + + if (!strcmp(name, FS_VERITY_DIGEST_SEC_NAME)) { + inode_sec->hashlen = size; + inode_sec->hash = kmemdup(value, size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!inode_sec->hash) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; + } + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +/** + * ipe_node_free_security: Frees all fields of IPE's inode security blob. + * @inode: The inode structure to source the security blob from. + * + * The deallocation of the blob itself is performed later by the LSM + * infrastructure, (on behalf of all LSMs) in lsm_free_file. + * + */ +void ipe_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ipe_inode *inode_sec = ipe_inode(inode); + + kfree(inode_sec->sigdata); + kfree(inode_sec->hash); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 285f35187188..d6f8c05a8011 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include enum ipe_hook { @@ -46,4 +47,10 @@ void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev); int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, const void *value, size_t len); +void ipe_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode); + +int ipe_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, + int flags); + #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 215936cb4574..c7ecd542c317 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_task = sizeof(struct ipe_context __rcu *), .lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev), + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ipe_inode), }; struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) @@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) return b->security + ipe_blobs.lbs_bdev; } +struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return inode->i_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_inode; +} + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, ipe_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free), @@ -40,6 +46,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, ipe_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setsecurity, ipe_bdev_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, ipe_inode_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ipe_inode_free_security), }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index 6b4c7e07f204..16d843614fac 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -22,5 +22,6 @@ extern struct ipe_parser __start_ipe_parsers[], __end_ipe_parsers[]; extern struct ipe_module __start_ipe_modules[], __end_ipe_modules[]; struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b); +struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode); #endif /* IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig index a6ea06cf0737..8f823a1edf96 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Kconfig @@ -40,4 +40,27 @@ config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH If unsure, answer Y. +config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE + bool "Enable property for signed fs-verity files" + depends on FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + help + This option enables IPE's integration with FSVerity's + signed hashes. This enables the usage of the property, + "fsverity_signature" in IPE's policy. + + if unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_DIGEST + bool "Enable property for authorizing fs-verity files via digest" + depends on FS_VERITY + help + This option enables IPE's integration with FSVerity. + This enables the usage of the property "fsverity_digest" in IPE's + policy. This property allows authorization or revocation via a + a hex-string representing the digest of a fsverity file. + + if unsure, answer Y. + + + endmenu diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/Makefile b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile index 84fadce85193..890440b9050f 100644 --- a/security/ipe/modules/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/modules/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED) += boot_verified.o obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE) += dmverity_signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH) += dmverity_roothash.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE) += fsverity_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_DIGEST) += fsverity_digest.o diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_digest.c b/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_digest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..67944ebbb8d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_digest.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include + +struct counted_array { + size_t len; + u8 *data; +}; + +static int parse(const char *valstr, void **value) +{ + int rv = 0; + struct counted_array *arr; + + arr = kzalloc(sizeof(*arr), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!arr) { + rv = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + arr->len = (strlen(valstr) / 2); + + arr->data = kzalloc(arr->len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!arr->data) { + rv = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + rv = hex2bin(arr->data, valstr, arr->len); + if (rv != 0) + goto err2; + + *value = arr; + return rv; +err2: + kfree(arr->data); +err: + kfree(arr); + return rv; +} + +static bool evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const void *val) +{ + const u8 *src; + struct counted_array *expect = (struct counted_array *)val; + + if (!ctx->ipe_inode) + return false; + + if (ctx->ipe_inode->hashlen != expect->len) + return false; + + src = ctx->ipe_inode->hash; + + return !memcmp(expect->data, src, expect->len); +} + +static int free_value(void **val) +{ + struct counted_array *expect = (struct counted_array *)val; + + kfree(expect->data); + kfree(expect); + + return 0; +} + +IPE_MODULE(fsv_digest) = { + .name = "fsverity_digest", + .version = 1, + .parse = parse, + .free = free_value, + .eval = evaluate, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_signature.c b/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_signature.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8930a8961f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/modules/fsverity_signature.c @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe_module.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static bool evaluate(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const void *value) +{ + bool expect = (bool)value; + + if (!ctx->file) + return false; + + if (!IS_VERITY(ctx->file->f_inode) || !ctx->ipe_inode) + return false; + + return (!!ctx->ipe_inode->sigdata) == expect; +} + +IPE_MODULE(fsvs) = { + .name = "fsverity_signature", + .version = 1, + .parse = ipe_bool_parse, + .free = NULL, + .eval = evaluate, +}; From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556701 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3D3DC41535 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7A63611AE for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239171AbhJMTJH (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:07 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49094 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237738AbhJMTIp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:45 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 98A7D20B9D0A; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 98A7D20B9D0A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=mStA1CiElH9sJhNsB0BIIO5Ubb1vgZLKd117rmoKAGc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=UEdAvs9PmGHXUawOS05q6OkDy4PM9snsXmmjkO86TrA3uoBH2QN/rVGfuZolnyI7+ PQ8+6sNMP/4a2Rv2DaCZdh5bxW1888WsnrGbuVHwIU8CM2W/eReqRUpUnm4Fg5Oi+O rApewjghAAWVPeq+uTF2kxYWg0Cx3foBKePCukvI= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:33 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-15-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Enables an IPE policy to be enforced from kernel start, enabling access control based on trust from kernel startup. This is accomplished by transforming an IPE policy indicated by CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY into a c-string literal that is parsed at kernel startup as an unsigned policy. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Move patch 01/12 to [14/16] of the series --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + scripts/Makefile | 1 + scripts/ipe/Makefile | 2 + scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore | 1 + scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile | 6 ++ scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/.gitignore | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 10 +++ security/ipe/Makefile | 13 +++ security/ipe/ctx.c | 18 +++++ 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/.gitignore diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index f1e76f791d47..a84ca781199b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9283,6 +9283,7 @@ INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) M: Deven Bowers M: Fan Wu S: Supported +F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/ INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index 9adb6d247818..a31da6d57a36 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ targets += module.lds subdir-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS) += gcc-plugins subdir-$(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS) += genksyms subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe # Let clean descend into subdirs subdir- += basic dtc gdb kconfig mod diff --git a/scripts/ipe/Makefile b/scripts/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e87553fbb8d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +subdir-y := polgen diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore b/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..80f32f25d200 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +polgen diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile b/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..066060c22b4a --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +hostprogs-always-y := polgen +HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += \ + -I$(srctree)/include \ + -I$(srctree)/include/uapi \ + diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73cf13e743f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void usage(const char *const name) +{ + printf("Usage: %s OutputFile (PolicyFile)\n", name); + exit(EINVAL); +} + +static int policy_to_buffer(const char *pathname, char **buffer, size_t *size) +{ + int rc = 0; + FILE *fd; + char *lbuf; + size_t fsize; + size_t read; + + fd = fopen(pathname, "r"); + if (!fd) { + rc = errno; + goto out; + } + + fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END); + fsize = ftell(fd); + rewind(fd); + + lbuf = malloc(fsize); + if (!lbuf) { + rc = ENOMEM; + goto out_close; + } + + read = fread((void *)lbuf, sizeof(*lbuf), fsize, fd); + if (read != fsize) { + rc = -1; + goto out_free; + } + + *buffer = lbuf; + *size = fsize; + fclose(fd); + + return rc; + +out_free: + free(lbuf); +out_close: + fclose(fd); +out: + return rc; +} + +static int write_boot_policy(const char *pathname, const char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int rc = 0; + FILE *fd; + size_t i; + + fd = fopen(pathname, "w"); + if (!fd) { + rc = errno; + goto err; + } + + fprintf(fd, "/* This file is automatically generated."); + fprintf(fd, " Do not edit. */\n"); + fprintf(fd, "#include \n"); + fprintf(fd, "\nextern const char *const ipe_boot_policy;\n\n"); + fprintf(fd, "const char *const ipe_boot_policy =\n"); + + if (!buf || size == 0) { + fprintf(fd, "\tNULL;\n"); + fclose(fd); + return 0; + } + + fprintf(fd, "\t\""); + + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) { + switch (buf[i]) { + case '"': + fprintf(fd, "\\\""); + break; + case '\'': + fprintf(fd, "'"); + break; + case '\n': + fprintf(fd, "\\n\"\n\t\""); + break; + case '\\': + fprintf(fd, "\\\\"); + break; + case '\t': + fprintf(fd, "\\t"); + break; + case '\?': + fprintf(fd, "\\?"); + break; + default: + fprintf(fd, "%c", buf[i]); + } + } + fprintf(fd, "\";\n"); + fclose(fd); + + return 0; + +err: + if (fd) + fclose(fd); + return rc; +} + +int main(int argc, const char *const argv[]) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t len = 0; + char *policy = NULL; + + if (argc < 2) + usage(argv[0]); + + if (argc > 2) { + rc = policy_to_buffer(argv[2], &policy, &len); + if (rc != 0) + goto cleanup; + } + + rc = write_boot_policy(argv[1], policy, len); +cleanup: + if (policy) + free(policy); + if (rc != 0) + perror("An error occurred during policy conversion: "); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/.gitignore b/security/ipe/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..eca22ad5ed22 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +boot-policy.c \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index fcf82a8152ec..39df680b67a2 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE if SECURITY_IPE +config IPE_BOOT_POLICY + string "Integrity policy to apply on system startup" + help + This option specifies a filepath to a IPE policy that is compiled + into the kernel. This policy will be enforced until a policy update + is deployed via the $securityfs/ipe/policies/$policy_name/active + interface. + + If unsure, leave blank. + choice prompt "Hash algorithm used in auditing policies" default IPE_AUDIT_HASH_SHA1 diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 1e7b2d7fcd9e..89fec670f954 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,18 @@ ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/ipe/modules +quiet_cmd_polgen = IPE_POL $(2) + cmd_polgen = scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen security/ipe/boot-policy.c $(2) + +$(eval $(call config_filename,IPE_BOOT_POLICY)) + +targets += boot-policy.c + +$(obj)/boot-policy.c: scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen $(IPE_BOOT_POLICY_FILENAME) FORCE + $(call if_changed,polgen,$(IPE_BOOT_POLICY_FILENAME)) + obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + boot-policy.o \ ctx.o \ eval.o \ fs.o \ @@ -21,3 +32,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ policyfs.o \ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o + +clean-files := boot-policy.c \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx.c b/security/ipe/ctx.c index fc9b8e467bc9..879acf4ceac5 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ctx.c +++ b/security/ipe/ctx.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include +extern const char *const ipe_boot_policy; static bool success_audit; static bool enforce = true; @@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ void ipe_put_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx) int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) { int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; struct ipe_context *lns = NULL; lns = create_ctx(); @@ -342,10 +344,26 @@ int __init ipe_init_ctx(void) WRITE_ONCE(lns->enforce, enforce); spin_unlock(&lns->lock); + if (ipe_boot_policy) { + p = ipe_new_policy(ipe_boot_policy, strlen(ipe_boot_policy), + NULL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(p)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(lns); + goto err; + } + + ipe_add_policy(lns, p); + rc = ipe_set_active_pol(p); + if (!rc) + goto err; + } + rcu_assign_pointer(*ipe_tsk_ctx(current), lns); + ipe_put_policy(p); return 0; err: + ipe_put_policy(p); ipe_put_ctx(lns); return rc; } From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:34 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556695 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C7ADC15500 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40CCB61139 for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:06:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238947AbhJMTIu (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:50 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49064 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S238374AbhJMTIq (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:46 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AF6F620B9D0B; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com AF6F620B9D0B DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=ousWeedsgO2t3dP0RTto2gM0Bh3q3C1Isu/HZSqQ0R4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=cAC49FghiB4x3KtAlKjmbzn87sE6+UFRPzrLZRZ6/W23nQok4DQSw40g3taLZYTCP q+bzu+e4Wmfc/TqfFjSHEWrjrWhP0d0gUVBfCGfEpWZdL9XLUsFd8ycagWrJjNb4HX jR+Zv1QvgmncD7zqQ8NQJV7Em98PzQ1sGrIybpMk= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 15/16] ipe: kunit tests Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:34 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-16-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Add various happy/unhappy unit tests for both IPE's parser and evaluation loop, testing the core of IPE. The missing test gap remains the interface with userspace. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Add Kunit tests (Introduced) --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 + security/ipe/Makefile | 3 + security/ipe/ctx_test.c | 732 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/eval.c | 4 + security/ipe/policy_parser_tests.c | 299 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 1055 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/ctx_test.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_parser_tests.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index 39df680b67a2..e1ec8740392c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -80,4 +80,21 @@ config IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG source "security/ipe/modules/Kconfig" +config SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST + bool "Build KUnit tests for IPE" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + depends on KUNIT=y + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + help + This builds the IPE KUnit tests. + + KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log + in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs + running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a + production build. + + For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer + to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/. + + If unsure, say N. + endif diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 89fec670f954..f11a9ac24f2e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -33,4 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST) += \ + policy_parser_tests.o \ + clean-files := boot-policy.c \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ctx_test.c b/security/ipe/ctx_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..163cc8aa8861 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ctx_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,732 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "ctx.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +struct eval_case { + const char *const desc; + const char *const policy; + int errno; + + const struct file *fake_file; + const struct ipe_bdev *bdev_sec; + const struct ipe_inode *inode_sec; + bool initsb; +}; + +static const u8 fake_digest[] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF }; + +static const struct ipe_bdev fake_bdev_no_data = {}; +static const struct ipe_bdev fake_bdev_no_sig = { + .hash = fake_digest, + .hashlen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), +}; + +static const struct ipe_bdev fake_bdev_signed = { + .sigdata = fake_digest, + .siglen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), + .hash = fake_digest, + .hashlen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), +}; + +static const struct ipe_inode fake_ino_no_data = {}; + +static const struct ipe_inode fake_ino_no_sig = { + .hash = fake_digest, + .hashlen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), +}; + +static const struct ipe_inode fake_ino_signed = { + .sigdata = fake_digest, + .siglen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), + .hash = fake_digest, + .hashlen = ARRAY_SIZE(fake_digest), +}; + +static struct inode fake_inode = { + .i_flags = S_VERITY +}; + +static const struct file fake_verity = { + .f_inode = &fake_inode, +}; + +static const struct eval_case cases[] = { + { + "boot_verified_trust_no_source", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, NULL, NULL, false + }, + { + "boot_verified_distrust", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=FALSE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ boot_verified=FALSE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, false + }, + { + "boot_verified_trust", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, true + }, + { + "boot_verified_trust", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=FALSE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ boot_verified=FALSE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, NULL, NULL, true + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_trust_no_bdev", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, true + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_distrust_no_bdev", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, NULL, NULL, false + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_distrust_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_data, false + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_trust_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, NULL, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_data, true + }, + { + "dmverity_roothash_trust_no_bdev", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, NULL, NULL, true + }, + { + "dmverity_roothash_distrust_no_bdev", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=deadbeef action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_roothash=deadbeef action=DENY\n", + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, false + }, + { + "dmverity_roothash_trust_hash", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n", + 0, NULL, &fake_bdev_no_sig, &fake_ino_no_data, false + }, + { + "dmverity_roothash_distrust_hash", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n", + -EACCES, NULL, &fake_bdev_no_sig, &fake_ino_no_data, false + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_revoke_hash", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_roothash=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, NULL, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_data, false + }, + { + "fsverity_signature_trust_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_no_data, &fake_ino_signed, false + }, + { + "fsverity_signature_distrust_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_signature=TRUE action=DENY\n", + -EACCES, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_no_data, &fake_ino_signed, false + }, + { + "fsverity_signature_trust_no_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_signature=FALSE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_sig, true + }, + { + "fsverity_signature_distrust_no_sigdata", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=FALSE action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_signature=FALSE action=DENY\n", + -EACCES, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_sig, true + }, + { + "fsverity_digest_trust_hash", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=ALLOW\n", + 0, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_no_sig, true + }, + { + "fsverity_digest_revoke_hash", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_signed, true + }, + { + "dmverity_signature_revoke_fsverity_digest", + "policy_name='Test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ fsverity_digest=DEADBEEF action=DENY\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + -EACCES, &fake_verity, &fake_bdev_signed, &fake_ino_signed, false + }, +}; + +static void case_to_desc(const struct eval_case *c, char *desc) +{ + strncpy(desc, c->desc, KUNIT_PARAM_DESC_SIZE); +} + +KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(ipe_eval, cases, case_to_desc); + +/** + * fake_free_ctx: Fake function to deallocate a context structure. + */ +static void fake_free_ctx(struct ipe_context *ctx) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry(p, &ctx->policies, next) + ipe_put_policy(p); + + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * create_fake_ctx: Build a fake ipe_context for use + * in a test. + * Return: + * !IS_ERR - OK + */ +static struct ipe_context *create_fake_ctx(void) +{ + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->policies); + refcount_set(&ctx->refcount, 1); + spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); + WRITE_ONCE(ctx->enforce, true); + + return ctx; +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_eval_test: Parse a policy, and run a mock through the + * evaluation loop to check the functional result. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_eval_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + int rc = 0; + enum ipe_operation i = ipe_operation_exec; + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + struct ipe_eval_ctx eval = { 0 }; + const struct eval_case *t = test->param_value; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + pol = ipe_new_policy(t->policy, strlen(t->policy), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, pol); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(pol)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, refcount_read(&pol->refcount), 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->policyfs, NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->pkcs7, NULL); + + eval.hook = ipe_hook_max; + eval.ipe_bdev = t->bdev_sec; + eval.ipe_inode = t->inode_sec; + eval.from_init_sb = t->initsb; + eval.ci_ctx = ctx; + eval.file = t->fake_file; + + for (i = ipe_operation_exec; i < ipe_operation_max; ++i) { + eval.op = i; + rc = evaluate(&eval); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, rc, t->errno); + } + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(pol); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_eval_permissive_test: Parse a policy, and run a mock through the + * evaluation loop to with permissive on, + * checking the functional result. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_eval_permissive_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + int rc = 0; + enum ipe_operation i = ipe_operation_exec; + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + struct ipe_eval_ctx eval = { 0 }; + const struct eval_case *t = test->param_value; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + WRITE_ONCE(ctx->enforce, false); + + pol = ipe_new_policy(t->policy, strlen(t->policy), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, pol); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(pol)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, refcount_read(&pol->refcount), 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->policyfs, NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->pkcs7, NULL); + + eval.hook = ipe_hook_max; + eval.ipe_bdev = t->bdev_sec; + eval.ipe_inode = t->inode_sec; + eval.from_init_sb = t->initsb; + eval.ci_ctx = ctx; + eval.file = t->fake_file; + + for (i = ipe_operation_exec; i < ipe_operation_max; ++i) { + eval.op = i; + rc = evaluate(&eval); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, rc, 0); + } + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(pol); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_default_eval_test: Ensure an operation-level default + * is taken over a global-level default. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_default_eval_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + struct ipe_eval_ctx eval = { 0 }; + const char *const policy = + "policy_name=Test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + pol = ipe_new_policy(policy, strlen(policy), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, pol->parsed->global_default, ipe_action_deny); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, pol->parsed->rules[ipe_operation_exec].default_action, + ipe_action_allow); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, pol); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(pol)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, refcount_read(&pol->refcount), 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->policyfs, NULL); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pol->pkcs7, NULL); + + eval.hook = ipe_hook_max; + eval.ipe_bdev = NULL; + eval.ipe_inode = NULL; + eval.from_init_sb = NULL; + eval.ci_ctx = ctx; + eval.file = NULL; + eval.op = ipe_operation_exec; + + rc = evaluate(&eval); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, rc, 0); + + eval.op = ipe_operation_kexec_image; + rc = evaluate(&eval); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, rc, -EACCES); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(pol); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_replace_policy - Associate a policy with a context, then replace it. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_replace_policy(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *pp = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + p2 = ipe_new_policy(policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p2); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, list_is_singular(&ctx->policies)); + + pp = list_first_entry(&ctx->policies, struct ipe_policy, next); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + + ipe_replace_policy(p1, p2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, list_is_singular(&ctx->policies)); + pp = list_first_entry(&ctx->policies, struct ipe_policy, next); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p2); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_replace_policy - Associate a policy with a context, mark the policy active, + * then replace it. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_replace_active_policy(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *pp = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + p2 = ipe_new_policy(policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p2); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(p1)); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + ipe_replace_policy(p1, p2); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p2); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_update_policy - Associate a policy with a context, then update it. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. This function differs from replace above, + * as it performs additional error checking. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_update_policy(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *pp = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + ipe_set_active_pol(p1); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + p2 = ipe_update_policy(p1, policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p2); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p2); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_update_wrong_policy - Associate a policy with a context, then + * attempt update it with the wrong policy. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_update_wrong_policy(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *pp = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t2 policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + ipe_set_active_pol(p1); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + p2 = ipe_update_policy(p1, policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, PTR_ERR(p2), -EINVAL); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_update_wrong_policy - Associate a policy with a context, mark it active, + * then attempt update it with a stale policy. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_update_rollback_policy(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *pp = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(p1)); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + p2 = ipe_update_policy(p1, policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, PTR_ERR(p2), -EINVAL); + + rcu_read_lock(); + pp = ipe_get_policy_rcu(ctx->active_policy); + rcu_read_unlock(); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, pp, p1); + ipe_put_policy(pp); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_rollback - Associate two policies with a context, then + * attempt rollback the active policy. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_rollback(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t2 policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, ipe_set_active_pol(p1)); + + p2 = ipe_new_policy(policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p2); + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p2); + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, -EINVAL, ipe_set_active_pol(p2)); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +/** + * ipe_ctx_update_rollback_inactive - Associate a policy with a context, then + * attempt update it with a stale policy. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_ctx_update_rollback_inactive(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p1 = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p2 = NULL; + struct ipe_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *const policy1 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + const char *const policy2 = "policy_name=t policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n"; + + ctx = create_fake_ctx(); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ctx); + + p1 = ipe_new_policy(policy1, strlen(policy1), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p1); + + ipe_add_policy(ctx, p1); + + p2 = ipe_update_policy(p1, policy2, strlen(policy2), NULL, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p2); + + fake_free_ctx(ctx); + ipe_put_policy(p1); + ipe_put_policy(p2); +} + +static struct kunit_case ipe_ctx_test_cases[] = { + KUNIT_CASE_PARAM(ipe_ctx_eval_test, ipe_eval_gen_params), + KUNIT_CASE_PARAM(ipe_ctx_eval_permissive_test, ipe_eval_gen_params), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_default_eval_test), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_replace_active_policy), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_replace_policy), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_update_policy), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_update_wrong_policy), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_update_rollback_policy), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_update_rollback_inactive), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_ctx_rollback), +}; + +static struct kunit_suite ipe_ctx_test_suite = { + .name = "ipe-context", + .test_cases = ipe_ctx_test_cases, +}; + +kunit_test_suite(ipe_ctx_test_suite); diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 8f8b91c714c2..9a45548118c8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -231,3 +231,7 @@ void ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(const struct super_block *mnt_sb) spin_unlock(&pin_lock); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST +#include "ctx_test.c" +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser_tests.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser_tests.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9bc97f0e0a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser_tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "policy.h" + +struct policy_case { + const char *const policy; + int errno; + const char *const desc; +}; + +static const struct policy_case policy_cases[] = { + { + "policy_name=\"allowall\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "basic", + }, + { + "policy_name='trailing comment' policy_version=152.0.0 #This is comment\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "trailing comment", + }, + { + "policy_name=allowallnewline policy_version=0.2.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "\n", + 0, + "trailing newline", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"carriage return\tline feed\" policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "\r\n", + 0, + "clrf newline", + }, + { + "policy_name='whitespace' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n" + " \t DEFAULT \t op=EXECUTE action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "# this is a\tcomment\t\t\t\t\n" + "DEFAULT \t op=KERNEL_READ\t\t\t action=DENY\r\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, + "various whitespaces and nested default", + }, + { + "policy_name='boot verified' policy_version=-1236.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n", + -EINVAL, + "negative version", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"# this is not a comment\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "quoted '#'", + }, + { + "policy_name=$@!*&^%%\\:;{}() policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "special characters", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=999999.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -ERANGE, + "overflow version", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=255.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "incomplete version", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=111.0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "extra version", + }, + { + "", + -EBADMSG, + "0-length policy", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\"\0policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "random null in header", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "\0DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "incomplete policy from NULL", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n\0" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, + "NULL truncates policy", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=abc action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid property type", + }, + { + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "missing policy header", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n", + -EBADMSG, + "missing default definition", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=KERNEL_READ dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + 0, + "aliased operation", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "dmverity_signature=TRUE op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW", + -EINVAL, + "invalid rule ordering" + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "action=ALLOW op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE", + -EINVAL, + "invalid rule ordering (2)", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid version", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=UNKNOWN dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + -ENOENT, + "unknown operation", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"asdv\"policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "missing space after quote", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\xFF\xEF\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + 0, + "expanded ascii", + }, + { + "policy_name=\"test\xFF\xEF\" policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=\"GOOD DOG\" action=ALLOW", + -EINVAL, + "invalid property value (2)", + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.1.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "double header" + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "double default" + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DENY\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "double operation default" + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DEN\n", + -EINVAL, + "invalid allow value" + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action\n", + -EINVAL, + "invalid allow value (2)" + }, + { + "policy_name='test' policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "UNKNOWN value=true\n", + -EINVAL, + "unrecognized statement" + } +}; + +static void pol_to_desc(const struct policy_case *c, char *desc) +{ + strncpy(desc, c->desc, KUNIT_PARAM_DESC_SIZE); +} + +KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(ipe_policies, policy_cases, pol_to_desc); + +/** + * ipe_parser_unsigned_test: Throw policies at the parser and check the result. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. This test does not check the correctness + * of the policy, but ensures that errors are handled correctly. Functional + * validation of correctly-parsed policies are done in the evaluation unit tests. + */ +static void ipe_parser_unsigned_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + const struct policy_case *p = test->param_value; + struct ipe_policy *pol = ipe_new_policy(p->policy, strlen(p->policy), NULL, 0); + + if (p->errno) { + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, PTR_ERR(pol), p->errno); + return; + } + + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, refcount_read(&pol->refcount)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, NULL, pol->ctx); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol->parsed); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, NULL, pol->policyfs); + KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, pol->text, p->policy); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, NULL, pol->pkcs7); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, pol->pkcs7len); + KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, list_empty(&pol->next)); + + ipe_put_policy(pol); +} + +/** + * ipe_parser_widestring_test: Ensure a wide string policy causes a failure. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_parser_widestring_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + const unsigned short policy[] = L"policy_name=Test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + L"DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + + pol = ipe_new_policy((const char *)policy, (ARRAY_SIZE(policy) - 1) * 2, NULL, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pol)); + + ipe_put_policy(pol); +} + +static struct kunit_case ipe_parser_test_cases[] = { + KUNIT_CASE_PARAM(ipe_parser_unsigned_test, ipe_policies_gen_params), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_parser_widestring_test), +}; + +static struct kunit_suite ipe_parser_test_suite = { + .name = "ipe-parser", + .test_cases = ipe_parser_test_cases, +}; + +kunit_test_suite(ipe_parser_test_suite); From patchwork Wed Oct 13 19:06:35 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Deven Bowers X-Patchwork-Id: 12556707 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 269F4C4332F for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F25BE610FE for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239141AbhJMTJG (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:06 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49068 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S238337AbhJMTIq (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:46 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C6F4820B9D0C; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com C6F4820B9D0C DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=dQ+u9TNfPDEJUjM64WZr/miBrXoUBKgng6ViWxPtixc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=b29+pJ6FM1zVt4i4+Ggxjywi0M8X7qZH7waixVR0fsPRpL/piBDpiyAuyNzNbz4jC QDLyBe2h+hTdXATF3rhAnULcTDekL/bgYma24lzTqdbcoPJahAprHP5oS3HUEGlfDv 2VEsE4KlefPAKod+1IFdVvrg5PDcI2i/MqQTFPTI= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:35 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-17-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Deven Bowers Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree. Co-developed-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Add additional developer-level documentation * Update admin-guide docs to reflect changes. * Drop Acked-by due to significant changes --- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 587 ++++++++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/ipe.rst | 339 ++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 2 + 6 files changed, 942 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/ipe.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst index a6ba95fbaa9f..ce63be6d64ad 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst @@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ subdirectories. tomoyo Yama SafeSetID + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..56a9fa2fe59b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) +================================== + +.. NOTE:: + + This is the documentation for admins, system builders, or individuals + attempting to use IPE, without understanding all of its internal systems. + If you're looking for documentation to extend IPE, understand the design + decisions behind IPE, or are just curious about the internals, please + see :ref:`Documentation/security/ipe.rst` + +Overview +-------- + +IPE is a Linux Security Module which imposes a complimentary model +of mandatory access control to other LSMs. Whereas the existing LSMs +impose access control based on labels or paths, IPE imposes access +control based on the trust of the resource. Simply put, IPE +or restricts access to a resource based on the trust of said resource. + +Trust requirements are established via IPE's policy, sourcing multiple +different implementations within the kernel to build a cohesive trust +model, based on how the system was built. + +Trust vs Integrity +------------------ + +Trust, with respect to computing, is a concept that designates a set +of entities who will endorse a set of resources as non-malicious. +Traditionally, this is done via signatures, which is the act of endorsing +a resource. Integrity, on the other hand, is the concept of ensuring that a +resource has not been modified since a point of time. This is typically done +through cryptography or signatures. + +Trust and integrity are very closely tied together concepts, as integrity +is the way you can prove trust for a resource; otherwise it could have +been modified by an entity who is untrusted. + +IPE provides a way for a user to express trust of resources, by using +pre-existing systems which provide the integrity half of the equation. + +Use Cases +--------- + +IPE works best in fixed-function devices: Devices in which their purpose +is clearly defined and not supposed to be changed (e.g. network firewall +device in a data center, an IoT device, etcetera), where all software and +configuration is built and provisioned by the system owner. + +IPE is a long-way off for use in general-purpose computing: +the Linux community as a whole tends to follow a decentralized trust +model, known as the Web of Trust, which IPE has no support for as of yet. +Instead, IPE supports the PKI Trust Model, which generally designates a +set of entities that provide a measure absolute trust. + +Additionally, while most packages are signed today, the files inside +the packages (for instance, the executables), tend to be unsigned. This +makes it difficult to utilize IPE in systems where a package manager is +expected to be functional, without major changes to the package manager +and ecosystem behind it. + +For the highest level of security, platform firmware should verify the +the kernel and optionally the root filesystem (for example, via U-Boot +verified boot). This forms a chain of trust from the hardware, ensuring +that every stage of the system is trusted. + +Known Gaps +---------- + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of anonymous executable memory, such as +the trampolines created by gcc closures and libffi (<3.4.2), or JIT'd code. +Unfortunately, as this is dynamically generated code, there is no way +for IPE to ensure the integrity of this code to form a trust basis. In all +cases, the return result for these operations will be whatever the admin +configures the DEFAULT action for "EXECUTE". + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of interpreted languages' programs when +these scripts invoked via `` ``. This is because the +way interpreters execute these files, the scripts themselves are not +evaluated as executable code through one of IPE's hooks. Interpreters +can be enlightened to the usage of IPE by trying to mmap a file into +executable memory (+X), after opening the file and responding to the +error code appropriately. This also applies to included files, or high +value files, such as configuration files of critical system components [#]_. + +.. [#] Mickaël Salaün's `trusted_for patchset `_ + can be used to leverage this. + +Threat Model +------------ + +The threat type addressed by IPE is tampering of executable user-land +code beyond the initially booted kernel, and the initial verification of +kernel modules that are loaded in userland through ``modprobe`` or +``insmod``. + +Tampering violates integrity, and being unable to verify the integrity, +results in a lack of trust. IPE's role in mitigating this threat is to +verify the integrity (and authenticity) of all executable code and to +deny their use if they cannot be trusted (as integrity verification fails). +IPE generates audit logs which may be utilized to detect failures resulting +from failure to pass policy. + +Tampering threat scenarios include modification or replacement of +executable code by a range of actors including: + +- Actors with physical access to the hardware +- Actors with local network access to the system +- Actors with access to the deployment system +- Compromised internal systems under external control +- Malicious end users of the system +- Compromised end users of the system +- Remote (external) compromise of the system + +IPE does not mitigate threats arising from malicious authorized +developers, or compromised developer tools used by authorized +developers. Additionally, IPE draws hard security boundary between user +mode and kernel mode. As a result, IPE does not provide any protections +against a kernel level exploit, and a kernel-level exploit can disable +or tamper with IPE's protections. + +Policy +------ + +IPE policy is a plain-text [#]_ policy composed of multiple statements +over several lines. There is one required line, at the top of the +policy, indicating the policy name, and the policy version, for +instance:: + + policy_name="Ex Policy" policy_version=0.0.0 + +The policy name is a unique key identifying this policy in a human +readable name. This is used to create nodes under securityfs as well as +uniquely identify policies to deploy new policies vs update existing +policies. + +The policy version indicates the current version of the policy (NOT the +policy syntax version). This is used to prevent rollback of policy to +potentially insecure previous versions of the policy. + +The next portion of IPE policy, are rules. Rules are formed by key=value +pairs, known as properties. IPE rules require two properties: "action", +which determines what IPE does when it encounters a match against the +rule, and "op", which determines when that rule should be evaluated. +The ordering is significant, a rule must start with "op", and end with +"action". Thus, a minimal rule is:: + + op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +This example will allow any execution. Additional properties are used to +restrict attributes about the files being evaluated. These properties +are intended to be descriptions of systems within the kernel, that can +provide a measure of integrity verification, such that IPE can determine +the trust of the resource based on the "value" half of the property. + +Rules are evaluated top-to-bottom. As a result, any revocation rules, +or denies should be placed early in the file to ensure that these rules +are evaluated before as rule with "action=ALLOW" is hit. + +IPE policy is designed to be only forward compatible. Userspace can read +what the parser's current configuration (supported statements, properties, +etcetera) via reading the securityfs entry, 'ipe/config' + +IPE policy supports comments. The character '#' will function as a +comment, ignoring all characters to the right of '#' until the newline. + +The default behavior of IPE evaluations can also be expressed in policy, +through the ``DEFAULT`` statement. This can be done at a global level, +or a per-operation level:: + + # Global + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + + # Operation Specific + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +A default must be set for all known operations in IPE. If you want to +preserve older policies being compatible with newer kernels that can introduce +new operations, please set a global default of 'ALLOW', and override the +defaults on a per-operation basis. + +With configurable policy-based LSMs, there's several issues with +enforcing the configurable policies at startup, around reading and +parsing the policy: + +1. The kernel *should* not read files from userland, so directly reading + the policy file is prohibited. +2. The kernel command line has a character limit, and one kernel module + should not reserve the entire character limit for its own + configuration. +3. There are various boot loaders in the kernel ecosystem, so handing + off a memory block would be costly to maintain. + +As a result, IPE has addressed this problem through a concept of a "boot +policy". A boot policy is a minimal policy, compiled into the kernel. +This policy is intended to get the system to a state where userland is +setup and ready to receive commands, at which point a more complex +policy ("user policies") can be deployed via securityfs. The boot policy +can be specified via the Kconfig, ``SECURITY_IPE_BOOT_POLICY``, which +accepts a path to a plain-text version of the IPE policy to apply. This +policy will be compiled into the kernel. If not specified, IPE will be +disabled until a policy is deployed and activated through securityfs. + +.. [#] Please see the :ref:`Documentation/security/ipe.rst` for more on this + topic. + +Deploying Policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +User policies as explained above, are policies that are deployed from +userland, through securityfs. These policies are signed to enforce some +level of authorization of the policies (prohibiting an attacker from +gaining root, and deploying an "allow all" policy), through the PKCS#7 +enveloped data format. These policies must be signed by a certificate +that chains to the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. Through openssl, the +signing can be done via:: + + openssl smime -sign -in "$MY_POLICY" -signer "$MY_CERTIFICATE" \ + -inkey "$MY_PRIVATE_KEY" -binary -outform der -noattr -nodetach \ + -out "$MY_POLICY.p7s" + +Deploying the policies is done through securityfs, through the +``new_policy`` node. To deploy a policy, simply cat the file into the +securityfs node:: + + cat "$MY_POLICY.p7s" > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/new_policy + +Upon success, this will create one subdirectory under +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/``. The subdirectory will be the +``policy_name`` field of the policy deployed, so for the example above, +the directory will be ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/Ex\ Policy``. +Within this directory, there will be five files: ``pkcs7``, ``policy``, +``active``, ``update``, and ``delete``. + +The ``pkcs7`` file is rw, reading will provide the raw PKCS#7 data that +was provided to the kernel, representing the policy. Writing, will +deploy an in-place policy update - if this policy is the currently +running policy, the new updated policy will replace it immediately upon +success. If the policy being read is the boot policy, when read, this +will return ENOENT. + +The ``policy`` file is read only. Reading will provide the PKCS#7 inner +content of the policy, which will be the plain text policy. + +The ``active`` file is used to set a policy as the currently active policy. +This file is rw, and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to set the policy as active. +Since only a single policy can be active at one time, all other policies +will be marked inactive. The policy being marked active must have a policy +version greater or equal to the currently-running version. + +The ``update`` file is used to update a policy that is already present in +the kernel. This file is write-only and accepts a PKCS#7 signed policy. +One check will be performed on this policy: the policy_names must match +with the updated version and the existing version. If the policy being +updated is the active policy, the updated policy must have a policy version +greater or equal to the currently-running version. + +The ``delete`` file is used to remove a policy that is no longer needed. +This file is write-only and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to delete the policy. +On deletion, the securityfs node representing the policy will be removed. +The policy that is currently active, cannot be deleted. + +Similarly, the writes to both ``update`` and ``new_policy`` above will +result in an error upon syntactically invalid or untrusted policies. +It will also error if a policy already exists with the same ``policy_name``, +in the case of ``new_policy``. + +Deploying these policies will *not* cause IPE to start enforcing this +policy. Once deployment is successful, a policy can be marked as active, +via ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/active``. IPE will enforce +whatever policy is marked as active. For our example, we can activate +the ``Ex Policy`` via:: + + echo "1" > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/Ex Policy/active" + +At which point, ``Ex Policy`` will now be the enforced policy on the +system. + +IPE also provides a way to delete policies. This can be done via the +``delete`` securityfs node, ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete``. +Writing ``1`` to that file will delete that node:: + + echo "1" > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete" + +There is only one requirement to delete a policy: + +1. The policy being deleted must not be the active policy. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack), all + writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Modes +~~~~~ + +IPE supports two modes of operation: permissive (similar to SELinux's +permissive mode) and enforce. Permissive mode performs the same checks +as enforce mode, and logs policy violations, but will not enforce the +policy. This allows users to test policies before enforcing them. + +The default mode is enforce, and can be changed via the kernel command +line parameter ``ipe.enforce=(0|1)``, or the securityfs node +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/enforce``. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Audit Events +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Success Auditing +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +IPE supports success auditing. When enabled, all events that pass IPE +policy and are not blocked will emit an audit event. This is disabled by +default, and can be enabled via the kernel command line +``ipe.success_audit=(0|1)`` or the securityfs node, +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/success_audit``. + +This is very noisy, as IPE will check every user-mode binary on the +system, but is useful for debugging policies. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Properties +-------------- + +As explained above, IPE properties are ``key=value`` pairs expressed in +IPE policy. Two properties are built-into the policy parser: 'op' and +'action'. The other properties are determinstic attributes to express +across files. Currently those properties are: 'boot_verified', +'dmverity_signature', 'dmverity_roothash', 'fsverity_signature', +'fsverity_digest'. A description of all properties supported by IPE +are listed below: + +op +~~ + +Indicates the operation for a rule to apply to. Must be in every rule, +as the first token. IPE supports the following operations: + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +``EXECUTE`` + + Pertains to any file attempting to be executed, or loaded as an + executable. + +``FIRMWARE``: + + Pertains to firmware being loaded via the firmware_class interface. + This covers both the preallocated buffer and the firmware file + itself. + +``KMODULE``: + + Pertains to loading kernel modules via ``modprobe`` or ``insmod``. + +``KEXEC_IMAGE``: + + Pertains to kernel images loading via ``kexec``. + +``KEXEC_INITRAMFS`` + + Pertains to initrd images loading via ``kexec --initrd``. + +``POLICY``: + + Controls loading IMA policies through the + ``/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy`` securityfs entry. + +``X509_CERT``: + + Controls loading IMA certificates through the Kconfigs, + ``CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH`` and ``CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH``. + +``KERNEL_READ``: + + Short hand for all of the following: ``FIRMWARE``, ``KMODULE``, + ``KEXEC_IMAGE``, ``KEXEC_INITRAMFS``, ``POLICY``, and ``X509_CERT``. + +action +~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +Determines what IPE should do when a rule matches. Must be in every +rule, as the final clause. Can be one of: + +``ALLOW``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly allow access to the resource to proceed + without executing any more rules. + +``DENY``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly prohibit access to the resource to + proceed without executing any more rules. + +boot_verified +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of the first super-block +that executes a file. This is almost always init. Typically this is used +for systems with an initramfs or other initial disk, where this is unmounted +before the system becomes available, and is not covered by any other property. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig, ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED``. +The format of this property is:: + + boot_verified=(TRUE|FALSE) + + +.. WARNING:: + + This property will trust any disk where the first execution evaluation + occurs. If you do *NOT* have a startup disk that is unpacked and unmounted + (like initramfs), then it will automatically trust the root filesystem and + potentially overauthorize the entire disk. + +dmverity_roothash +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of +specific dm-verity volumes, identified via root hash. It has a +dependency on the DM_VERITY module. This property is controlled by the +Kconfig ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH``. The format of this property +is:: + + dmverity_roothash=HashHexDigest + +dmverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of all dm-verity volumes +that have a signed roothash that chains to a keyring specified by dm-verity's +configuration, either the system trusted keyring, or the secondary keyring. +It has an additional dependency on the ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` +Kconfig. This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE``. The format of this property is:: + + dmverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +fsverity_digest +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ +This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of +specific fsverity enabled file, identified via its fsverity digest, +which is the hash of a struct contains the file's roothash and hashing +parameters. It has a dependency on the FS_VERITY module. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_DIGEST``. The format of this property is:: + + fsverity_digest=HashHexDigest + +fsverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of all fsverity enabled +files that is verified by fsverity. The keyring that is verifies against +is subject to fsverity's configuration, which is typically the fsverity +keyring. It has a dependency on the ``CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES`` +Kconfig. This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE``. The format of this property is:: + + fsverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +Policy Examples +--------------- + +Allow all +~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +Allow only initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All Initial SB" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed dm-verity volume and the initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution from a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow only a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedFSVerity" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution of a specific fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="ProhibitSpecificFSVF" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=fd88f2b8824e197f850bf4c5109bea5cf0ee38104f710843bb72da796ba5af9e action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Additional Information +---------------------- + +- `Github Repository `_ +- `Design Documentation `_ + +FAQ +--- + +:Q: What's the difference between other LSMs which provide trust-based + access control, for instance, IMA? + +:A: IMA is a fantastic option when needing measurement in addition to the + trust-based access model. All of IMA is centered around their measurement + hashes, so you save time when doing both actions. IPE, on the other hand, + is a highly performant system that does not rely (and explicitly prohibits), + generating its own integrity mechanisms - separating measurement and access + control. Simply put, IPE provides only the enforcement of trust, while other + subsystems provide the integrity guarantee that IPE needs to determine the + trust of a resource. IMA provides both the integrity guarantee, and the + enforcement of trust. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 43dc35fe5bc0..85dd654e642f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2096,6 +2096,18 @@ ipcmni_extend [KNL] Extend the maximum number of unique System V IPC identifiers from 32,768 to 16,777,216. + ipe.enforce= [IPE] + Format: + Determine whether IPE starts in permissive (0) or + enforce (1) mode. The default is enforce. + + ipe.success_audit= + [IPE] + Format: + Start IPE with success auditing enabled, emitting + an audit event when a binary is allowed. The default + is 0. + irqaffinity= [SMP] Set the default irq affinity mask The argument is a cpu list, as described above. diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index 16335de04e8c..c06530b50514 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e691e08e0303 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) - Design Documents +===================================================== + +.. NOTE:: + + This is the documentation for kernel developers and other individuals + who want to understand the reason behind why IPE is designed the way it + is, as well as a tour of the implementation. If you're looking for + documentation on the usage of IPE, please see + :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst` + +Role and Scope +-------------- + +IPE originally started with a simple goal: create a system that can +ensure that only trusted usermode binaries are allowed to be executed. + +During the design phase it was apparent that there are multiple systems +within the Linux kernel that can provide some level of integrity +verification, and by association, trust for its content: + + 1. DM-Verity + 2. FS-Verity + 3. IMA + EVM + +However, of those systems only the third option has the ability to enforce +trust requirements on the whole system. Its architecture, however is centered +around its own form of verifications, and a multitude of actions surrounding +those verifications with various purposes, the most prominent being measurement +and verification (appraisal). This makes it unsuitable from a layering and +architectural purpose, as IPE's goal is limited to ensure just trusted usermode +binaries are executed, with the intentional goal of supporting multiple methods +from a higher subsystem layer (i.e. fs, block, or super_block). + +The two other options, dm-verity and fs-verity are missing a crucial component +to accomplish the goal of IPE: a policy to indicate the requirements of +answering the question "What is Trusted?" and a system-wide level of enforcing +those requirements. + +Therefore, IPE was designed around: + + 1. Easy configuration of trust mechanisms + 2. Ease of integration with other layers + 3. Ease of use for platform administrators. + +Design Decisions +---------------- + +Policy +~~~~~~ + +Plain Text +^^^^^^^^^^ + +Unlike other LSMs, IPE's policy is plain-text. This introduces slightly larger +policy files than other LSMs, but solves two major problems that occurs with +other trust-based access control systems. + +The first issue is one of code maintenance and duplication. To author policies, +the policy has to be some form of string representation (be it structured, +through XMl, JSON, YAML, etcetera), to allow the policy author to understand +what is being written. In a hypothetical binary policy design, that a serializer +must be written to write said binary form, for a *majority* of humans to be +able to utilize it properly. + +Additionally, a deserializer will eventually be needed to transform the binary +back into text with as much information preserved. Without a deserializer, a +user of this access control system will have to keep a lookup table of either +a checksum, or the file itself to try to understand what policies have been +deployed on this system and what policies have not. For a single user, this +may be alright, as old policies can be discarded almost immediately after +the update takes hold. + +For users that manage fleets in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, +this quickly becomes an issue, as stale policies from years ago may be present, +quickly resulting in the need to recover the policy or fund extensive +infrastructure to track what each policy contains. + +Secondly, a serializer is still needed with a plain-text policy (as the plain +text policy still has to be serialized to a data structure in the kernel), so +not much is saved. + +The second issue is one of transparency. As IPE controls access based on trust, +it's policy must also be trusted to be changed. This is done through signatures, +chaining to the SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING. The confidence of signing a plain-text +policy in which you can see every aspect of what is being signed is a step higher +than signing an opaque binary blob. + +Boot Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Additionally, IPE shouldn't have any obvious gaps in its enforcement story. +That means, a policy that configures trust requirements, if specified, must +be enforced as soon as the kernel starts up. That can be accomplished one +of three ways: + + 1. The policy file(s) live on disk and the kernel loads the policy prior + to an code path that would result in an enforcement decision. + 2. The policy file(s) are passed by the bootloader to the kernel, who + parses the policy. + 3. There is a policy file that is compiled into the kernel that is + parsed and enforced on initialization. + +The first option has problems: the kernel reading files from userspace +is typically discouraged and very uncommon in the kernel. + +The second option also has problems: Linux supports a variety of bootloaders +across its entire ecosystem - every bootloader would have to support this +new methodology or there must be an independent source. Additionally, it +would likely result in more drastic changes to the kernel startup than +necessary. + +The third option is the best but it's important to be aware that the policy +will take disk space against the kernel it's compiled in. It's important to +keep this policy generalized enough that userspace can load a new, more +complicated policy, but restrictive enough that it will not overauthorize +and cause security issues. + +The initramfs, provides a way that this bootup path can be established. The +kernel starts with a minimal policy, that just trusts the initramfs. Inside +the initramfs, when the real rootfs is mounted, but not yet transferred to, +it deploys and activates a policy that trusts the new root filesystem(s). +This prevents overauthorization at any step, and keeps the kernel policy +to a minimal size. + +Startup +^^^^^^^ + +Not every system, however starts with an initramfs, so the startup policy +compiled into the kernel will need some flexibility to express how trust +is established for the next phase of the bootup. To this end, if we just +make the compiled-in policy a full IPE policy, it allows system builders +to express the first stage bootup requirements appropriately. + +Updatable, Rebootless Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +As time goes on, trust requirements are changed (vulnerabilities are found in +previously trusted applcations, keys roll, etcetera). Updating a kernel to +change the trust requirements is not always a suitable option, as updates +are not always risk-free and without consequence. This means IPE requires +a policy that can be completely updated from a source external to the kernel. + +Additionally, since the kernel is relatively stateless between invocations, +and we've established that reading policy files off the disk from kernel +space is a *bad idea*, then the policy updates have to be done rebootlessly. + +To allow an update from an external source, it could be potentially malicious, +so this policy needs to have a way to be identified as trusted. This will be +done via a signature, chained to a trust source in the kernel. Arbitrarily, +this will be the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``, a keyring that is initially +populated at kernel compile-time, as this matches the expectation that the +author of the compiled-in policy described above is the same entity that can +deploy policy updates. + +Anti-Rollback / Anti-Replay +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Over time, vulnerabilities are found and trusted resources may not be +trusted anymore. IPE's policy has no exception to this. There can be +instances where a mistaken policy author deploys an insecure policy, +before correcting it with a secure policy. + +Assuming that as soon as the insecure policy was signed, an attacker +can acquire the insecure policy, IPE needs a way to prevent rollback +from the secure policy update, to the insecure policy update. + +Initially, IPE's policy can have a policy_version that states the +minimum required version across all policies that can be active on +the system. This will prevent rollback while the system is live. + +.. WARNING:: + + However, since the kernel is stateless across boots, this policy + version will be reset to 0.0.0 on the next boot. System builders + need to be aware of this, and ensure the new secure policies are + deployed ASAP after a boot to ensure that the window of + opportunity is minimal for an attacker to deploy the insecure policy[#]_. + +Implementation +-------------- + +Context +~~~~~~~ + +An ``ipe_context`` structure represent a context in which IPE can be enforced. +It contains all the typical values that one would expect are global: + + 1. Enforce/Permissive State + 2. Active Policy + 3. List of Policies + 4. Success Auditing State + +A context is created at boot time and attached to the ``task_struct`` as a +security blob. All new ``task_struct`` will inherit the original ``ipe_context`` +that the system boots with. This structure is reference counted. + +Initially, a system will only ever have one context; for ``init``, and since +all userspace processes are descendents of ``init``, all of usermode will have +this execution context. + +This architecture has some advantages - namely, it allows for a natural +extension for IPE to create new contexts - such as applying a different +policy for trust for a privledged container from that of its host. + +Anonymous Memory +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Anonymous memory isn't treated any differently than any other access in IPE. +When anonymous memory is mapped with ``+X``, it still comes into the ``file_mmap`` +hook, but with a ``NULL`` file object. This is submitted to the evaluation, like +any other file, however, all trust mechanisms will return false as there is +nothing to evaluate. This means anonymous memory execution is subject to +whatever the ``DEFAULT`` is for ``EXECUTE``. + +.. WARNING:: + + This also occurs with the ``kernel_load_data`` hook, which is used by signed + and compressed kernel modules. Using this with IPE will result in the + ``DEFAULT`` for ``KMODULE`` being taken. + +Policy Parser +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The policy parser is the staple of IPE's functionality, providing a +modular way to introduce new integrations. As such, it's functionality +is divided into 4 passes. This gives the benefit of clearly defined pre +and post-condition states after each pass, giving debugging benefits +when something goes wrong. + +In pass1, the policy is transformed into a 2D, jagged, array of tokens, +where a token is defined as a "key=value" pair, or a singular token, +for example, "DEFAULT". Quoted values are parsed as a single value-pair, +which is why ```` parser is insufficient - it does not +understand quoted values. + +In pass2, the jagged array produced in pass1 is partially ingested, +creating a partially populated policy, where no rules have been parsed +yet, but metadata and references are created that can be now used in +pass3. + +Examples of parsing that would be done in pass2:: + + policy_name="my-policy" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + +As these lines are not rules in of themselves, but effect the policy +itself. + +In pass3, the remaining lines in the jagged array produced in pass1 and +partially-consumed in pass2 is consumed completely, parsing all the +rules in IPE policy. This can leverage the data used in pass2. +Example lines parsed in pass3:: + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=DENY + +A rule is strictly defined as starts with the op token and ends with +the action token. + +After this pass, a policy is deemed fully constructed but not yet valid, +as there could be missing elements (such as a required DEFAULT for all +actions, missing a policy_name), etc. + +Additionally, as IPE policy supports operation aliases (an operation +that maps to two or more other operations), support is added here. + +The purpose in the division of pass2 and pass3 is to allow for +declarations in IPE's syntax. For example, in the future, if we were +to introduce this syntax:: + + CERTIFICATE=FakeCert thumbprint=DEADBEEF CN="Contoso" + +And use it like so:: + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=FakeCert action=ALLOW + +The ``CERTIFICATE`` lines can be grouped together at any place in the policy. + +After pass3, an IPE policy can still be technically invalid for use, as +a policy can be lacking required elements to eliminated the possibility +of undefined or unknown behavior. + +A concrete example is when a policy does not define a default action for +all possibilities:: + + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +At this point, while a technically syntactically and semantically valid +policy, it does not contain enough information to determine what should +be done for an operation other than "EXECUTE". As IPE's design +explicitly prohibits the implicit setting of a DEFAULT, it is important +for cases like these are prevented from occurring. + +To resolve all these cases, a final check on the policy is done to ensure +it valid for use. + +In all cases, the parser is the number one bottleneck when it comes to +IPE's performance, but has the benefit of happening rarely, and as a +direct consequence of user-input. + +Module vs Parser +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A "module", "trust provider", or "property" as defined in IPE's code and +commits is an integration with an external subsystem that provides a way +to identify a resource as trusted. It's the code that powers the key=value +pairs in between the ``op`` token and the ``action`` token. These are called +in pass3 when parsing a policy (via the ``parse`` method), and during +evaluation when evaluating a access attempt (via the ``eval`` method). These +discrete modules are single files in ``security/ipe/modules`` and are +versioned independently. The documentation in the admin guide and be used +to cross reference what version supports what syntax. + +A "parser", on the other hand is a discrete unit of code that is *only* +used when parsing a policy in pass2. The intention is to make it easy +to introduce statements, like the ``DEFAULT`` statement:: + + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +or, the policy header:: + + policy_name="MyPolicy" policy_version=0.0.0 + +These individual fragments of code, as such, gain access to manipulating +IPE's policy structure directly, as opposed to the opaque ``void *`` that +modules get. + +.. [#] This is something we're interested in solving, using some + persistent storage + +Tests +~~~~~ + +IPE initially has KUnit Tests, testing primarily the parser and the context +structures. A majority of these are table-based testing, please contribute +to them, especially when adding new properties. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index a84ca781199b..909db5ba6f87 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9283,6 +9283,8 @@ INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) M: Deven Bowers M: Fan Wu S: Supported +F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst +F: Documentation/security/ipe.rst F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/