From patchwork Thu Feb 24 13:39:05 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 12758621 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 30512C433FE for ; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:42:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1]:59304 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNEOB-00039L-4D for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:42:35 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]:35086) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNELG-0000qT-Qz for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:39:38 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org ([145.40.68.75]:46398) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNELE-0001yH-HC for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:39:34 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E898B825CD; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 78D31C340E9; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="OBkhNZ+u" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1645709964; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=pLZQWdHZ8lpp8TrT2AHt2rKbsHEeRqBQfQFSJqzrY8E=; b=OBkhNZ+uMvd78P2oRT7NxwjwEr+PYhqcJwHUQqt5K75dEo1gIq3vq5xsa25GTvs1vjpkLf BO7LAEOmd2wr0w5/w5+h6XBc6xiubOUTwFoGiQgdNJ5VaImu6Q7Vhdi2/ypFX2rCdQv4Uo PjJYMjSP6xSjmZ5UXklxzYUmHh9e1N4= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 3e2bbf8d (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:24 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] random: add mechanism for VM forks to reinitialize crng Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 14:39:05 +0100 Message-Id: <20220224133906.751587-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20220224133906.751587-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20220224133906.751587-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=145.40.68.75; envelope-from=SRS0=7c/N=TH=zx2c4.com=Jason@kernel.org; helo=ams.source.kernel.org X-Spam_score_int: -67 X-Spam_score: -6.8 X-Spam_bar: ------ X-Spam_report: (-6.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , mst@redhat.com, raduweis@amazon.com, linux@dominikbrodowski.net, kys@microsoft.com, ardb@kernel.org, wei.liu@kernel.org, sthemmin@microsoft.com, ben@skyportsystems.com, Eric Biggers , decui@microsoft.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, lersek@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, adrian@parity.io, jannh@google.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, graf@amazon.com, tytso@mit.edu, colmmacc@amazon.com, berrange@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, imammedo@redhat.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" When a VM forks, we must immediately mix in additional information to the stream of random output so that two forks or a rollback don't produce the same stream of random numbers, which could have catastrophic cryptographic consequences. This commit adds a simple API, add_vmfork_ randomness(), for that, by force reseeding the crng. This has the added benefit of also draining the entropy pool and setting its timer back, so that any old entropy that was there prior -- which could have already been used by a different fork, or generally gone stale -- does not contribute to the accounting of the next 256 bits. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- drivers/char/random.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- include/linux/random.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9fb06fc298d3..e8b84791cefe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -289,14 +289,14 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { }; /* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force); /* * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a - * sufficient amount of entropy available, in order to mitigate bruteforcing - * of newly added bits. + * sufficient amount of entropy available or force is true, in order to + * mitigate bruteforcing of newly added bits. */ -static void crng_reseed(void) +static void crng_reseed(bool force) { unsigned long flags; unsigned long next_gen; @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) bool finalize_init = false; /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ - if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) + if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key), force)) return; /* @@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], * in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. */ if (unlikely(time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))) - crng_reseed(); + crng_reseed(false); local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags); crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs); @@ -771,10 +771,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there - * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior: + * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior or force is true: * * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) - * static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) + * static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force) * **********************************************************************/ @@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits) } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS) - crng_reseed(); + crng_reseed(false); } /* @@ -882,16 +882,16 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) } /* - * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we - * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then - * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). + * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool unless force + * is true, and then we set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch + * any data). Only then can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). */ -static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force) { unsigned int entropy_count; do { entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) + if (!force && entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) return false; } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); @@ -915,6 +915,7 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); + * void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that @@ -946,6 +947,10 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. * + * add_vmfork_randomness() adds a unique (but not necessarily secret) ID + * representing the current instance of a VM to the pool, without crediting, + * and then force-reseeds the crng so that it takes effect immediately. + * * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64 @@ -1175,6 +1180,21 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); +/* + * Handle a new unique VM ID, which is unique, not secret, so we + * don't credit it, but we do immediately force a reseed after so + * that it's used by the crng posthaste. + */ +void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size) +{ + add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, size); + if (crng_ready()) { + crng_reseed(true); + pr_notice("crng reseeded due to virtual machine fork\n"); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness); + struct fast_pool { union { u32 pool32[4]; @@ -1564,7 +1584,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (crng_init < 2) return -ENODATA; - crng_reseed(); + crng_reseed(false); return 0; default: return -EINVAL; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 6148b8d1ccf3..51b8ed797732 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy); +extern void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size); extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); From patchwork Thu Feb 24 13:39:06 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 12758634 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 37CA4C433F5 for ; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:46:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1]:37488 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNESO-0007Xe-2W for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:46:56 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([209.51.188.92]:35138) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNELY-00011c-WA for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:39:56 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org ([145.40.68.75]:46522) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nNELW-0001zi-BO for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:39:52 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C2DDB825D9; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 719BFC340E9; Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="F16u3hqk" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1645709971; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=lYbQlfYwy3SS5X0HOdFFYvoNBz5G3sVCk/xavGBSEMs=; b=F16u3hqk6rgXMYjXwJovbqFW0rcAe8BXY7ibheND+y5a4f7/AF4I7irMImUvxyjZqPC0IN GR1vGcuyrut6eAtUpPu1USrzJkmRdM3C1fvKGp4uILAXOuEgOTO2ZLig7mWvztBV6P+e0s RSp5TuonuY11VJe8LCEC49BtAbpOszA= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 09e92e51 (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:39:31 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] virt: vmgenid: introduce driver for reinitializing RNG on VM fork Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 14:39:06 +0100 Message-Id: <20220224133906.751587-3-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20220224133906.751587-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20220224133906.751587-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=145.40.68.75; envelope-from=SRS0=7c/N=TH=zx2c4.com=Jason@kernel.org; helo=ams.source.kernel.org X-Spam_score_int: -67 X-Spam_score: -6.8 X-Spam_bar: ------ X-Spam_report: (-6.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , mst@redhat.com, raduweis@amazon.com, linux@dominikbrodowski.net, kys@microsoft.com, ardb@kernel.org, wei.liu@kernel.org, sthemmin@microsoft.com, ben@skyportsystems.com, decui@microsoft.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, lersek@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, adrian@parity.io, jannh@google.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, graf@amazon.com, tytso@mit.edu, colmmacc@amazon.com, berrange@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, imammedo@redhat.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at , and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, , as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in . And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in . Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per , so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. This driver builds on prior work from Adrian Catangiu at Amazon, and it is my hope that that team can resume maintenance of this driver. Cc: Adrian Catangiu Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek --- drivers/virt/Kconfig | 9 +++ drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/vmgenid.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/virt/vmgenid.c diff --git a/drivers/virt/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/Kconfig index 8061e8ef449f..d3276dc2095c 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/virt/Kconfig @@ -13,6 +13,15 @@ menuconfig VIRT_DRIVERS if VIRT_DRIVERS +config VMGENID + tristate "Virtual Machine Generation ID driver" + default y + depends on ACPI + help + Say Y here to use the hypervisor-provided Virtual Machine Generation ID + to reseed the RNG when the VM is cloned. This is highly recommended if + you intend to do any rollback / cloning / snapshotting of VMs. + config FSL_HV_MANAGER tristate "Freescale hypervisor management driver" depends on FSL_SOC diff --git a/drivers/virt/Makefile b/drivers/virt/Makefile index 3e272ea60cd9..108d0ffcc9aa 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Makefile +++ b/drivers/virt/Makefile @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_HV_MANAGER) += fsl_hypervisor.o +obj-$(CONFIG_VMGENID) += vmgenid.o obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ diff --git a/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5da4dc8f25e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Virtual Machine Generation ID driver + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2020 Amazon. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +ACPI_MODULE_NAME("vmgenid"); + +enum { VMGENID_SIZE = 16 }; + +static struct { + u8 this_id[VMGENID_SIZE]; + u8 *next_id; +} state; + +static int vmgenid_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) +{ + struct acpi_buffer buffer = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER }; + union acpi_object *pss; + phys_addr_t phys_addr; + acpi_status status; + int ret = 0; + + if (!device) + return -EINVAL; + + status = acpi_evaluate_object(device->handle, "ADDR", NULL, &buffer); + if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { + ACPI_EXCEPTION((AE_INFO, status, "Evaluating ADDR")); + return -ENODEV; + } + pss = buffer.pointer; + if (!pss || pss->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE || pss->package.count != 2 || + pss->package.elements[0].type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER || + pss->package.elements[1].type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + phys_addr = (pss->package.elements[0].integer.value << 0) | + (pss->package.elements[1].integer.value << 32); + state.next_id = acpi_os_map_memory(phys_addr, VMGENID_SIZE); + if (!state.next_id) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + device->driver_data = &state; + + memcpy(state.this_id, state.next_id, sizeof(state.this_id)); + add_device_randomness(state.this_id, sizeof(state.this_id)); + +out: + ACPI_FREE(buffer.pointer); + return ret; +} + +static int vmgenid_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device) +{ + if (!device || acpi_driver_data(device) != &state) + return -EINVAL; + device->driver_data = NULL; + if (state.next_id) + acpi_os_unmap_memory(state.next_id, VMGENID_SIZE); + state.next_id = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void vmgenid_acpi_notify(struct acpi_device *device, u32 event) +{ + u8 old_id[VMGENID_SIZE]; + + if (!device || acpi_driver_data(device) != &state) + return; + memcpy(old_id, state.this_id, sizeof(old_id)); + memcpy(state.this_id, state.next_id, sizeof(state.this_id)); + if (!memcmp(old_id, state.this_id, sizeof(old_id))) + return; + add_vmfork_randomness(state.this_id, sizeof(state.this_id)); +} + +static const struct acpi_device_id vmgenid_ids[] = { + {"VMGENID", 0}, + {"QEMUVGID", 0}, + { }, +}; + +static struct acpi_driver acpi_driver = { + .name = "vm_generation_id", + .ids = vmgenid_ids, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .ops = { + .add = vmgenid_acpi_add, + .remove = vmgenid_acpi_remove, + .notify = vmgenid_acpi_notify, + } +}; + +static int __init vmgenid_init(void) +{ + return acpi_bus_register_driver(&acpi_driver); +} + +static void __exit vmgenid_exit(void) +{ + acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&acpi_driver); +} + +module_init(vmgenid_init); +module_exit(vmgenid_exit); + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, vmgenid_ids); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Virtual Machine Generation ID"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");