From patchwork Tue Apr 5 13:11:16 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12801623 X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB22FC4167D for ; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 14:32:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238474AbiDEOda (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 10:33:30 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50010 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1387056AbiDEO33 (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 10:29:29 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 599521207D8; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 06:11:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4KXnyW2G6Cz685VR; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 21:08:35 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 15:11:28 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [POC][USER SPACE][PATCH] Introduce LSM to protect pinned objects Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 15:11:16 +0200 Message-ID: <20220405131116.3810418-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml754-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.204) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Introduce a new LSM to protect pinned objects in a bpf filesystem instance. This is useful for example to ensure that an LSM will always enforce its policy, even despite root tries to unload the corresponding eBPF program. Achieve the protection by denying inode unlink and unmount of the protected bpf filesystem instance. Since protected inodes hold a reference of the link of loaded programs (e.g. LSM hooks), denying operations on them will prevent the ref count of the links from reaching zero, ensuring that the programs remain always active. Enable the protection only for the instance created by the user space counterpart of the LSM, and don't interfere with other instances, so that their behavior remains unchanged. Suggested-by: Djalal Harouni Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- .gitignore | 4 +++ Makefile | 18 ++++++++++++++ bpffs_lsm_kern.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ bpffs_lsm_user.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 145 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .gitignore create mode 100644 Makefile create mode 100644 bpffs_lsm_kern.c create mode 100644 bpffs_lsm_user.c diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7fa02964f1dc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.o +vmlinux.h +bpffs_lsm_kern.skel.h +bpffs_lsm_user diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3d805759db3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +all: bpffs_lsm_user + +clean: + rm -rf bpffs_lsm.skel.h vmlinux.h bpffs_lsm_kern.o bpffs_lsm_user + +vmlinux.h: + /usr/sbin/bpftool btf dump file /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux format c > \ + vmlinux.h + +bpffs_lsm_kern.skel.h: bpffs_lsm_kern.o + bpftool gen skeleton $< > $@ + +bpffs_lsm_kern.o: bpffs_lsm_kern.c vmlinux.h + clang -Wall -Werror -g -O2 -target bpf -c $< -o $@ + +bpffs_lsm_user: bpffs_lsm_user.c bpffs_lsm_kern.skel.h bpffs_lsm_kern.o + cc -Wall -Werror -g -o $@ $< -lbpf diff --git a/bpffs_lsm_kern.c b/bpffs_lsm_kern.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b3ccb2a75c95 --- /dev/null +++ b/bpffs_lsm_kern.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Authors: + * Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement an LSM to protect a bpf filesystem instance. + */ + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +uint32_t monitored_pid = 0; + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE); + __uint(map_flags, BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); + __type(key, int); + __type(value, sizeof(uint8_t)); +} inode_storage_map SEC(".maps"); + +SEC("lsm/sb_set_mnt_opts") +int BPF_PROG(sb_set_mnt_opts, struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +{ + u32 pid; + + pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; + if (pid != monitored_pid) + return 0; + + if (!bpf_inode_storage_get(&inode_storage_map, sb->s_root->d_inode, 0, + BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} + +SEC("lsm/inode_unlink") +int BPF_PROG(inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (bpf_inode_storage_get(&inode_storage_map, + dir->i_sb->s_root->d_inode, 0, 0)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} + +SEC("lsm/sb_umount") +int BPF_PROG(sb_umount, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + if (bpf_inode_storage_get(&inode_storage_map, + mnt->mnt_sb->s_root->d_inode, 0, 0)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/bpffs_lsm_user.c b/bpffs_lsm_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e20180cc5db9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bpffs_lsm_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement the user space side of the LSM for bpffs. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "bpffs_lsm_kern.skel.h" + +#define MOUNT_FLAGS (MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME) + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + char mntpoint[] = "/tmp/bpf_private_mountXXXXXX"; + char path[PATH_MAX]; + struct bpffs_lsm_kern *skel; + int ret, i; + + skel = bpffs_lsm_kern__open_and_load(); + if (!skel) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = bpffs_lsm_kern__attach(skel); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_destroy; + + mkdtemp(mntpoint); + + skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid(); + ret = mount(mntpoint, mntpoint, "bpf", MOUNT_FLAGS, NULL); + skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0; + + if (ret < 0) + goto out_destroy; + + for (i = 0; i < skel->skeleton->prog_cnt; i++) { + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", mntpoint, + skel->skeleton->progs[i].name); + ret = bpf_link__pin(*skel->skeleton->progs[i].link, path); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_destroy; + } + + ret = 0; +out_destroy: + bpffs_lsm_kern__destroy(skel); + return ret; +}