From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:40 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830782 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EA91C4332F for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:02:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347971AbiD1OFn (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:43 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34856 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346645AbiD1OFg (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:36 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9656AC06F for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 07:02:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-0000Ar-M0; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:51 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-005lwf-Ds; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i0u-Bj; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , Sumit Garg , David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Pankaj Gupta , Andreas Rammhold , Tim Harvey , Ahmad Fatoum , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , Matthias Schiffer , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 1/6] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:40 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-2-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues: - TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used - Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources is not possible - TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently dropped, which is not the best user experience Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols: TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate dependencies. Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet. Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold Tested-by: Tim Harvey Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- v7 -> v8: - add Pankaj's Reviewed-by and Tested-by v6 -> v7: - s/Tested-By/Tested-by/ v5 -> v6: - Rebased on asym_tpm removal v4 -> v5: - collected Jarkko's Reviewed-by v3 -> v4: - rebased on top of Andreas' regression fix and pulled it back into series v2 -> v3: - factored this patch out as a fix for backporting v1 -> v2: - Move rest of TPM-related selects from TRUSTED_KEYS to TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM (Sumit) - Remove left-over line in Makefile (Sumit) - added Fixes: tag - adjust commit message to reference the regression reported by Andreas - have ASYMMETRIC_TPM_KEY_SUBTYPE depend on TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM, because it references global symbols that are exported by the trusted key TPM backend. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/f8285eb0135ba30c9d846cf9dd395d1f5f8b1efc.1624364386.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210719091335.vwfebcpkf4pag3wm@wrt/T/#t To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Morris To: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: James Bottomley To: Mimi Zohar To: Sumit Garg To: David Howells To: Herbert Xu To: "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Pankaj Gupta Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- security/keys/Kconfig | 18 ++++++-------- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 8 +++---- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 0e30b361e1c1..abb03a1b2a5c 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -70,23 +70,19 @@ config BIG_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" - depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO - select ASN1_ENCODER - select OID_REGISTRY - select ASN1 + depends on KEYS help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, - generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, - if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever - see encrypted blobs. + generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time. + Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +if TRUSTED_KEYS +source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig" +endif + config ENCRYPTED_KEYS tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fc4abd581abb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM + bool "TPM-based trusted keys" + depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER + select OID_REGISTRY + select ASN1 + help + Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key + backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, + which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. + The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other + criteria match. + +config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE + bool "TEE-based trusted keys" + depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + help + Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted + key backend. + +if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE +comment "No trust source selected!" +endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index feb8b6c3cc79..2e2371eae4d5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o $(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o -trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o -trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 9b9d3ef79cbe..7cdbd16aed30 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { -#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops }, #endif -#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TEE) +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, #endif }; From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:41 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830784 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2DD03C433F5 for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:02:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1348051AbiD1OFx (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34886 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347883AbiD1OFg (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:36 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 78E6BAF1EA for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 07:02:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-0000Ax-M1; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:51 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iO-005lwr-8A; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:50 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i0z-CS; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Sumit Garg , Pankaj Gupta , David Gstir , Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jan Luebbe , Eric Biggers , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Matthias Schiffer , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 2/6] KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:41 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-3-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Acked-by: Sumit Garg Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- v7 -> v8: - add Pankaj's Tested-by v6 -> v7: - No changes v5 -> v6: - Squash with follow-up patch enabling trust sources to use kernel RNG if they don't define their own .get_random - Collected Jarkko's Reviewed-by v4 -> v5: - Changed trusted.kernel_rng bool option into a string trusted.rng option (Jarkko) - Typo fix in commit message (Jarkko) v3 -> v4: - Collected Acked-by's, Reviewed-by's and Tested-by v2 -> v3: - No change v1 -> v2: - Allow users to force use of kernel RNG (Jarkko) To: James Bottomley To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Pankaj Gupta Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 ++++++ .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 20 ++++++----- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 3f1cc5e317ed..4deed1908a75 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5963,6 +5963,16 @@ first trust source as a backend which is initialized successfully during iteration. + trusted.rng= [KEYS] + Format: + The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys. + Can be one of: + - "kernel" + - the same value as trusted.source: "tpm" or "tee" + - "default" + If not specified, "default" is used. In this case, + the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index f614dad7de12..2fe6fd1a2bbd 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -87,22 +87,26 @@ Key Generation Trusted Keys ------------ -New keys are created from random numbers generated in the trust source. They -are encrypted/decrypted using a child key in the storage key hierarchy. -Encryption and decryption of the child key must be protected by a strong -access control policy within the trust source. +New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using +a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the +child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the +trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the +selected trust source: - * TPM (hardware device) based RNG + * TPM: hardware device based RNG - Strength of random numbers may vary from one device manufacturer to - another. + Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary + from one device manufacturer to another. - * TEE (OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone) based RNG + * TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. +Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel +command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. + Encrypted Keys -------------- diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops { /* Unseal a key. */ int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); - /* Get a randomized key. */ + /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */ int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); /* Exit key interface. */ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 7cdbd16aed30..9235fb7d0ec9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -16,12 +16,17 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +static char *trusted_rng = "default"; +module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); + static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); @@ -312,8 +317,14 @@ struct key_type key_type_trusted = { }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); +static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len; +} + static int __init init_trusted(void) { + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); int i, ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) { @@ -322,6 +333,28 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name))) continue; + /* + * We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as + * well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source + * defines its own get_random callback. + */ + get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random; + if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) { + if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) { + get_random = kernel_get_random; + } else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) || + !get_random) { + pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel"); + if (get_random) + pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name); + pr_cont(", default\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + if (!get_random) + get_random = kernel_get_random; + static_call_update(trusted_key_init, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init); static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, @@ -329,7 +362,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal); static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random); + get_random); static_call_update(trusted_key_exit, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit); migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable; From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:42 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830783 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 277F8C43217 for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:02:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233414AbiD1OFo (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:44 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34708 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346644AbiD1OFf (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:35 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA7C1AC07B for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 07:02:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-0000B4-Qi; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:51 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iO-005lwx-Gp; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:51 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i14-DJ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Pankaj Gupta , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, David Gstir , Tim Harvey , Matthias Schiffer , Ahmad Fatoum , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , James Morris , Eric Biggers , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Jan Luebbe , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 3/6] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:42 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-4-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) can be used to protect user-defined data across system reboot: - When the system is fused and boots into secure state, the master key is a unique never-disclosed device-specific key - random key is encrypted by key derived from master key - data is encrypted using the random key - encrypted data and its encrypted random key are stored alongside - This blob can now be safely stored in non-volatile memory On next power-on: - blob is loaded into CAAM - CAAM writes decrypted data either into memory or key register Add functions to realize encrypting and decrypting into memory alongside the CAAM driver. They will be used in a later commit as a source for the trusted key seal/unseal mechanism. Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Tim Harvey Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Signed-off-by: Steffen Trumtrar Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- v7 -> v8: - remove unneeded new line in kernel doc (Jarkko) - Make comments parse as kernel-doc and fix associated warnings - add Pankaj's Tested-by v6 -> v7: - Added more verbose comment on how CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX adds up. - remove error message on kzalloc failure (checkpatch) - Replaced buffer arguments with structure containing them (Pankaj) v5 -> v6: - Dropped caam_blob_alloc_desc() in favor of kzalloc() with fixed size. This simplifies code and wastes at most 12 bytes which are freed at the end of the function anyway. - Factored out common code between caam_encap_blob and caam_decap_blob as both functions were largely identical - use append_seq_(in|out)_ptr_intlen for both encap/decap as a result - use reverse christmas tree order for caam_process_blob variable definitions. v4 -> v5: - Collected Reviewed-by's and Tested-by's - Note in CAAM patch what CAAM is (Jarkko) v3 -> v4: - Collected Acked-by's, Reviewed-by's and Tested-by - Fixed typo spotted by David v2 -> v3: - No change v1 -> v2: - Enforce maximum keymod size (Horia) - Use append_seq_(in|out)_ptr_intlen instead of append_seq_(in|out)_ptr (Horia) - Make blobifier handle private to CAAM glue code file (Horia) To: "Horia Geantă" To: Pankaj Gupta To: Herbert Xu To: "David S. Miller" Cc: James Bottomley Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 + drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 270 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig index 84ea7cba5ee5..ea9f8b1ae981 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API Selecting this will register the SEC4 hardware rng to the hw_random API for supplying the kernel entropy pool. +config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN + bool + endif # CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR endif # CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile index 3570286eb9ce..25f7ae5a4642 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += caamalg_qi.o caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API) += caamhash.o caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API) += caamrng.o caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API) += caampkc.o pkc_desc.o +caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN) += blob_gen.o caam-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += qi.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI),) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d0b1a0015308 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015 Pengutronix, Steffen Trumtrar + * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "compat.h" +#include "desc_constr.h" +#include "desc.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "intern.h" +#include "jr.h" +#include "regs.h" + +#define CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX \ + /* Command to initialize & stating length of descriptor */ \ + (CAAM_CMD_SZ + \ + /* Command to append the key-modifier + key-modifier data */ \ + CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH + \ + /* Command to include input key + pointer to the input key */ \ + CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX + \ + /* Command to include output key + pointer to the output key */ \ + CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX + \ + /* Command describing the operation to perform */ \ + CAAM_CMD_SZ) + +struct caam_blob_priv { + struct device jrdev; +}; + +struct caam_blob_job_result { + int err; + struct completion completion; +}; + +static void caam_blob_job_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context) +{ + struct caam_blob_job_result *res = context; + int ecode = 0; + + dev_dbg(dev, "%s %d: err 0x%x\n", __func__, __LINE__, err); + + if (err) + ecode = caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err); + + res->err = ecode; + + /* + * Upon completion, desc points to a buffer containing a CAAM job + * descriptor which encapsulates data into an externally-storable + * blob. + */ + complete(&res->completion); +} + +int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv, + struct caam_blob_info *info, bool encap) +{ + struct caam_blob_job_result testres; + struct device *jrdev = &priv->jrdev; + dma_addr_t dma_in, dma_out; + int op = OP_PCLID_BLOB; + size_t output_len; + u32 *desc; + int ret; + + if (info->key_mod_len > CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH) + return -EINVAL; + + if (encap) { + op |= OP_TYPE_ENCAP_PROTOCOL; + output_len = info->input_len + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD; + } else { + op |= OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL; + output_len = info->input_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD; + } + + desc = kzalloc(CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + dma_in = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->input, info->input_len, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dma_in)) { + dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map input DMA buffer\n"); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free; + } + + dma_out = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->output, output_len, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dma_out)) { + dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map output DMA buffer\n"); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_unmap_in; + } + + /* + * A data blob is encrypted using a blob key (BK); a random number. + * The BK is used as an AES-CCM key. The initial block (B0) and the + * initial counter (Ctr0) are generated automatically and stored in + * Class 1 Context DWords 0+1+2+3. The random BK is stored in the + * Class 1 Key Register. Operation Mode is set to AES-CCM. + */ + + init_job_desc(desc, 0); + append_key_as_imm(desc, info->key_mod, info->key_mod_len, + info->key_mod_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG); + append_seq_in_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_in, info->input_len, 0); + append_seq_out_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_out, output_len, 0); + append_operation(desc, op); + + print_hex_dump_debug("data@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->input, + info->input_len, false); + print_hex_dump_debug("jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, desc, + desc_bytes(desc), false); + + testres.err = 0; + init_completion(&testres.completion); + + ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, caam_blob_job_done, &testres); + if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { + wait_for_completion(&testres.completion); + ret = testres.err; + print_hex_dump_debug("output@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->output, + output_len, false); + } + + if (ret == 0) + info->output_len = output_len; + + dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_out, output_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); +out_unmap_in: + dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_in, info->input_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); +out_free: + kfree(desc); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_process_blob); + +struct caam_blob_priv *caam_blob_gen_init(void) +{ + struct device *jrdev; + + jrdev = caam_jr_alloc(); + if (IS_ERR(jrdev)) + return ERR_CAST(jrdev); + + return container_of(jrdev, struct caam_blob_priv, jrdev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_blob_gen_init); + +void caam_blob_gen_exit(struct caam_blob_priv *priv) +{ + caam_jr_free(&priv->jrdev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_blob_gen_exit); diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ec57eec4f2d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum + */ + +#ifndef __CAAM_BLOB_GEN +#define __CAAM_BLOB_GEN + +#include +#include + +#define CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH 16 +#define CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD (32 + 16) +#define CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN 4096 + +struct caam_blob_priv; + +/** + * struct caam_blob_info - information for CAAM blobbing + * @input: pointer to input buffer (must be DMAable) + * @input_len: length of @input buffer in bytes. + * @output: pointer to output buffer (must be DMAable) + * @output_len: length of @output buffer in bytes. + * @key_mod: key modifier + * @key_mod_len: length of @key_mod in bytes. + * May not exceed %CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH + */ +struct caam_blob_info { + void *input; + size_t input_len; + + void *output; + size_t output_len; + + const void *key_mod; + size_t key_mod_len; +}; + +/** + * caam_blob_gen_init - initialize blob generation + * Return: pointer to new caam_blob_priv instance on success + * and error pointer otherwise + */ +struct caam_blob_priv *caam_blob_gen_init(void); + +/** + * caam_blob_gen_exit - free blob generation resources + * @priv: instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init + */ +void caam_blob_gen_exit(struct caam_blob_priv *priv); + +/** + * caam_process_blob - encapsulate or decapsulate blob + * @priv: instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init + * @info: pointer to blobbing info describing key, blob and + * key modifier buffers. + * @encap: true for encapsulation, false for decapsulation + * + * Return: %0 and sets info->output_len on success and a negative + * error code otherwise. + */ +int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv, + struct caam_blob_info *info, bool encap); + +/** + * caam_encap_blob - encapsulate blob + * @priv: instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init + * @info: pointer to blobbing info describing input key, + * output blob and key modifier buffers. + * + * Return: %0 and sets @info->output_len on success and + * a negative error code otherwise. + */ +static inline int caam_encap_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv, + struct caam_blob_info *info) +{ + if (info->output_len < info->input_len + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD) + return -EINVAL; + + return caam_process_blob(priv, info, true); +} + +/** + * caam_decap_blob - decapsulate blob + * @priv: instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init + * @info: pointer to blobbing info describing output key, + * input blob and key modifier buffers. + * + * Return: %0 and sets @info->output_len on success and + * a negative error code otherwise. + */ +static inline int caam_decap_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv, + struct caam_blob_info *info) +{ + if (info->input_len < CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD || + info->output_len < info->input_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD) + return -EINVAL; + + return caam_process_blob(priv, info, false); +} + +#endif From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:43 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830781 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2DD0C433FE for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:02:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243086AbiD1OFg (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34354 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1343777AbiD1OFc (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:32 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A9C13AC074 for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 07:02:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-0000Au-SF; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:51 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iO-005lwl-24; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:50 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i19-E5; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jonathan Corbet , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, David Gstir , Pankaj Gupta , Tim Harvey , Matthias Schiffer , Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Biggers , Jan Luebbe , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:43 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-5-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material. This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES encryption/decryption of user data. This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys. Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these, provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys. Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Tim Harvey Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- v7 -> v8: - add Jarkko's Reviewed-by v6 -> v7: - Split off MAINTAINERS and documentation chanes into separate patches (Jarkko) - Use new struct caam_blob_info API (Pankaj) v5 -> v6: - Rename caam_trusted_key_ops to trusted_key_caam_ops for symmetry with other trust sources (Pankaj) - Collected Pankaj's Reviewed-by v4 -> v5: - Collected Reviewed-by's and Tested-by's - Changed modifier to SECURE_KEY for compatibility with linux-imx (Matthias) v3 -> v4: - Collected Acked-by's, Reviewed-by's and Tested-by v2 -> v3: - add MAINTAINERS entry v1 -> v2: - Extend trusted keys documentation for CAAM To: Jonathan Corbet To: David Howells To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley To: Mimi Zohar Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Pankaj Gupta Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 + include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 +++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 11 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +- 6 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 4deed1908a75..9afb7046ce97 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5958,6 +5958,7 @@ sources: - "tpm" - "tee" + - "caam" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_caam.h b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73fe2f32f65e --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum + */ + +#ifndef __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index fc4abd581abb..dbfdd8536468 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted key backend. -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE +config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM + bool "CAAM-based trusted keys" + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS + select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN + default y + help + Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module + (CAAM) as trusted key backend. + +if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM comment "No trust source selected!" endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 2e2371eae4d5..735aa0bc08ef 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o + +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..46cb2484ec36 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier; + +#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY" + +static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN); +static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN); + +static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct caam_blob_info info = { + .input = p->key, .input_len = p->key_len, + .output = p->blob, .output_len = MAX_BLOB_SIZE, + .key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1, + }; + + ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info); + if (ret) + return ret; + + p->blob_len = info.output_len; + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct caam_blob_info info = { + .input = p->blob, .input_len = p->blob_len, + .output = p->key, .output_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1, + }; + + ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info); + if (ret) + return ret; + + p->key_len = info.output_len; + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_caam_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init(); + if (IS_ERR(blobifier)) { + pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(blobifier); + } + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret) + caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier); + + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_caam_exit(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = trusted_caam_init, + .seal = trusted_caam_seal, + .unseal = trusted_caam_unseal, + .exit = trusted_caam_exit, +}; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 9235fb7d0ec9..c6fc50d67214 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) @@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) + { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:44 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830780 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFA48C433F5 for ; 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Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:50 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i1I-El; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jonathan Corbet , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Pankaj Gupta , Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Biggers , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Matthias Schiffer , Sumit Garg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 5/6] doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:44 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-6-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs. Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v7 -> v8: - add Pankaj's Reviewed-by v6 -> v7: - docs update split off as new Patch (Jarkko) - fixed typo in "Trusted Keys usage: CAAM" section To: Jonathan Corbet To: David Howells To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley To: Mimi Zohar Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Pankaj Gupta Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 2fe6fd1a2bbd..0bfb4c339748 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ safe. Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip fuses and is accessible to TEE only. + (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs) + + When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure + mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key + randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. + Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -46,6 +53,10 @@ safe. Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process. + (3) CAAM + + Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe. Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can be extended with TEE based measured boot process. + (3) CAAM + + Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs + for platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -74,10 +90,13 @@ safe. TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``. + (3) CAAM + + Interface is specific to silicon vendor. * Threat model - The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given + The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data. @@ -104,6 +123,12 @@ selected trust source: from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. + * CAAM: Kernel RNG + + The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the + CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device + is probed. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -193,6 +218,19 @@ Usage:: specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: CAAM +------------------------ + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a +CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- From patchwork Thu Apr 28 14:01:45 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12830779 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 299C0C43219 for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 14:02:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234496AbiD1OFf (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34508 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344483AbiD1OFd (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2022 10:05:33 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 87161AC079 for ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 07:02:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-0000As-ME; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:52 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iN-005lwi-Pl; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:50 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nk4iL-003i1O-FQ; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:49 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jarkko Sakkinen , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Pankaj Gupta , Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Biggers , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Matthias Schiffer , Sumit Garg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add myself as CAAM trusted key maintainer Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 16:01:45 +0200 Message-Id: <20220428140145.870527-7-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> References: <20220428140145.870527-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Add myself as maintainer for the just added trusted key integration with the NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module. Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- v7 -> v8: - add Pankaj's Reviewed-by v6 -> v7: - split off as separate patch (Jarkko) To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley To: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Pankaj Gupta Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- MAINTAINERS | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 5e8c2f611766..e58e6fc3016d 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10855,6 +10855,15 @@ S: Supported F: include/keys/trusted_tee.h F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c +KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM +M: Ahmad Fatoum +R: Pengutronix Kernel Team +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: include/keys/trusted_caam.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c + KEYS/KEYRINGS M: David Howells M: Jarkko Sakkinen