From patchwork Tue Jun 28 12:27:46 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12898217 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F993CCA487 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:28:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345749AbiF1M22 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:28 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55694 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345735AbiF1M2S (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:18 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C357513E8E; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:28:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LXP2N50Cpz6H7sD; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:25:48 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:28:05 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , Roberto Sassu , Joanne Koong Subject: [PATCH v6 1/5] bpf: Export bpf_dynptr_get_size() Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:27:46 +0200 Message-ID: <20220628122750.1895107-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml751-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.201) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Export bpf_dynptr_get_size(), so that kernel code dealing with eBPF dynamic pointers can obtain the real size of data carried by this data structure. Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index d05e1495a06e..3ec0f167e9d7 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -2521,5 +2521,6 @@ void bpf_dynptr_init(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, void *data, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, u32 offset, u32 size); void bpf_dynptr_set_null(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr); int bpf_dynptr_check_size(u32 size); +u32 bpf_dynptr_get_size(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr); #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index a1c84d256f83..3f5ff8dbd3cb 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ static void bpf_dynptr_set_type(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, enum bpf_dynptr_typ ptr->size |= type << DYNPTR_TYPE_SHIFT; } -static u32 bpf_dynptr_get_size(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr) +u32 bpf_dynptr_get_size(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr) { return ptr->size & DYNPTR_SIZE_MASK; } From patchwork Tue Jun 28 12:27:47 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12898214 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73366CCA479 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:28:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345712AbiF1M20 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:26 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55698 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345713AbiF1M2S (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:18 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BAF429591; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:28:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.201]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LXP4D0GVqz689NX; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:27:24 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:28:06 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v6 2/5] KEYS: Move KEY_LOOKUP_ to include/linux/key.h Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:27:47 +0200 Message-ID: <20220628122750.1895107-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml751-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.201) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org In preparation for the patch that introduces the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() eBPF helper, move KEY_LOOKUP_ definitions to include/linux/key.h, to be able to validate the helper parameters. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- include/linux/key.h | 3 +++ security/keys/internal.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 7febc4881363..a297e075038c 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ enum key_need_perm { KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK, /* Special: permission check is deferred */ }; +#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01 +#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL 0x02 + struct seq_file; struct user_struct; struct signal_struct; diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 9b9cf3b6fcbb..3c1e7122076b 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data); -#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01 -#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL 0x02 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name); extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); From patchwork Tue Jun 28 12:27:48 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12898215 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BCD3CCA482 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:28:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345726AbiF1M20 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:26 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56582 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345736AbiF1M2S (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:18 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC265175AC; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:28:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LXP4F0H3Tz689Py; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:27:25 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:28:07 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v6 3/5] scripts: Handle unsigned type prefix in bpf_doc.py Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:27:48 +0200 Message-ID: <20220628122750.1895107-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml751-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.201) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org While unsigned long is an accepted parameter type, the regular expression validating helper prototypes does not correctly take into account types composed by multiple words. The regular expression: ((const )?(struct )?(\w+|\.\.\.)( \**\w+)?) accepts only const and struct as prefix before the type. The following part of the regular expression expects a word with [a-zA-Z0-9_] characters (without space), so it would get just unsigned. Parsing words with \w+ in greedy mode makes the regular expression work even if the type is composed by two words, but not always. It wouldn't have been the case in possessive mode \w++ (don't give back characters to match the regular expression). Simply adding unsigned as possible prefix is not correct, as the struct unsigned combination is not legal. Make instead struct and unsigned as alternatives, so that the following new combinations are legal: unsigned type struct type const unsigned type and not: struct unsigned type The regular expression is a preliminary check. The type, other than being legal, must be also present in the known_types array. Don't mention the change in the regular expression description, as it is assumed that type implies also multiple words types. At this point, don't switch from greedy to possessive mode (\w+ -> \w++) to avoid partial parsing of the type of helper parameters, as this functionality has only been added recently in Python 3.11. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- scripts/bpf_doc.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/bpf_doc.py b/scripts/bpf_doc.py index a0ec321469bd..25e79d811487 100755 --- a/scripts/bpf_doc.py +++ b/scripts/bpf_doc.py @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ class HeaderParser(object): # - Same as above, with "const" and/or "struct" in front of type # - "..." (undefined number of arguments, for bpf_trace_printk()) # There is at least one term ("void"), and at most five arguments. - p = re.compile(' \* ?((.+) \**\w+\((((const )?(struct )?(\w+|\.\.\.)( \**\w+)?)(, )?){1,5}\))$') + p = re.compile(' \* ?((.+) \**\w+\((((const )?((struct )|(unsigned )?)(\w+|\.\.\.)( \**\w+)?)(, )?){1,5}\))$') capture = p.match(self.line) if not capture: raise NoHelperFound From patchwork Tue Jun 28 12:27:49 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12898218 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DD9EC43334 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:28:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345756AbiF1M22 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:28 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55696 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345716AbiF1M2W (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:28:22 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E00AC27CD0; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:28:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LXP2R5dTFz6H7ry; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:25:51 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:28:08 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , Roberto Sassu , kernel test robot Subject: [PATCH v6 4/5] bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:27:49 +0200 Message-ID: <20220628122750.1895107-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml751-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.201) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Add the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper, to give eBPF security modules the ability to check the validity of a signature against supplied data, by using user-provided or system-provided keys as trust anchor. The new helper makes it possible to enforce mandatory policies, as eBPF programs might be allowed to make security decisions only based on data sources the system administrator approves. The caller should provide both the data to be verified and the signature as eBPF dynamic pointers (to minimize the number of parameters). The caller should also provide a trusted keyring serial, together with key lookup-specific flags, to determine which keys can be used for signature verification. Alternatively, the caller could specify zero as serial value (not valid, serials must be positive), and provide instead a special keyring ID. Key lookup flags are defined in include/linux/key.h and can be: 1, to request that special keyrings be created if referred to directly; 2 to permit partially constructed keys to be found. Special IDs are defined in include/linux/verification.h and can be: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of system keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring (where keys can be added only if they are vouched for by existing keys in those keyrings); 2 for the platform keyring (primarily used by the integrity subsystem to verify a kexec'ed kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reported-by: kernel test robot (cast warning) --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 24 +++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 24 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 111 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index e81362891596..b4f5ad863281 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -5325,6 +5325,29 @@ union bpf_attr { * **-EACCES** if the SYN cookie is not valid. * * **-EPROTONOSUPPORT** if CONFIG_IPV6 is not builtin. + * + * long bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, u32 trusted_keyring_serial, unsigned long lookup_flags, unsigned long trusted_keyring_id) + * Description + * Verify the PKCS#7 signature *sig_ptr* against the supplied + * *data_ptr* with keys in a keyring with serial + * *trusted_keyring_serial*, searched with *lookup_flags*, if the + * parameter value is positive, or alternatively in a keyring with + * special ID *trusted_keyring_id* if *trusted_keyring_serial* is + * zero. + * + * *lookup_flags* are defined in include/linux/key.h and can be: 1, + * to request that special keyrings be created if referred to + * directly; 2 to permit partially constructed keys to be found. + * + * Special IDs are defined in include/linux/verification.h and can + * be: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of system + * keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring (where keys + * can be added only if they are vouched for by existing keys in + * those keyrings); 2 for the platform keyring (primarily used by + * the integrity subsystem to verify a kexec'ed kerned image and, + * possibly, the initramfs signature). + * Return + * 0 on success, a negative value on error. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -5535,6 +5558,7 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(tcp_raw_gen_syncookie_ipv6), \ FN(tcp_raw_check_syncookie_ipv4), \ FN(tcp_raw_check_syncookie_ipv6), \ + FN(verify_pkcs7_signature), \ /* */ /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index c1351df9f7ee..401bda01ad84 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop * function where a BPF program can be attached. @@ -132,6 +134,62 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_attach_cookie_proto = { .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, data_ptr, + struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, sig_ptr, u32, trusted_keyring_serial, + unsigned long, lookup_flags, unsigned long, trusted_keyring_id) +{ + key_ref_t trusted_keyring_ref; + struct key *trusted_keyring; + int ret; + + /* Keep in sync with defs in include/linux/key.h. */ + if (lookup_flags > KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Keep in sync with defs in include/linux/verification.h. */ + if (trusted_keyring_id > (unsigned long)VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) + return -EINVAL; + + if (trusted_keyring_serial) { + trusted_keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(trusted_keyring_serial, + lookup_flags, + KEY_NEED_SEARCH); + if (IS_ERR(trusted_keyring_ref)) + return PTR_ERR(trusted_keyring_ref); + + trusted_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(trusted_keyring_ref); + goto verify; + } + + trusted_keyring = (struct key *)trusted_keyring_id; +verify: + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(data_ptr->data, + bpf_dynptr_get_size(data_ptr), + sig_ptr->data, + bpf_dynptr_get_size(sig_ptr), + trusted_keyring, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, + NULL); + if (trusted_keyring_serial) + key_put(trusted_keyring); + + return ret; +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature_proto = { + .func = bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, + .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, + .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, + .arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING, + .allowed = bpf_ima_inode_hash_allowed, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ + static const struct bpf_func_proto * bpf_lsm_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) { @@ -158,6 +216,11 @@ bpf_lsm_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return prog->aux->sleepable ? &bpf_ima_file_hash_proto : NULL; case BPF_FUNC_get_attach_cookie: return bpf_prog_has_trampoline(prog) ? &bpf_get_attach_cookie_proto : NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + case BPF_FUNC_verify_pkcs7_signature: + return prog->aux->sleepable ? + &bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature_proto : NULL; +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ default: return tracing_prog_func_proto(func_id, prog); } diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index e81362891596..b4f5ad863281 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -5325,6 +5325,29 @@ union bpf_attr { * **-EACCES** if the SYN cookie is not valid. * * **-EPROTONOSUPPORT** if CONFIG_IPV6 is not builtin. + * + * long bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, u32 trusted_keyring_serial, unsigned long lookup_flags, unsigned long trusted_keyring_id) + * Description + * Verify the PKCS#7 signature *sig_ptr* against the supplied + * *data_ptr* with keys in a keyring with serial + * *trusted_keyring_serial*, searched with *lookup_flags*, if the + * parameter value is positive, or alternatively in a keyring with + * special ID *trusted_keyring_id* if *trusted_keyring_serial* is + * zero. + * + * *lookup_flags* are defined in include/linux/key.h and can be: 1, + * to request that special keyrings be created if referred to + * directly; 2 to permit partially constructed keys to be found. + * + * Special IDs are defined in include/linux/verification.h and can + * be: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of system + * keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring (where keys + * can be added only if they are vouched for by existing keys in + * those keyrings); 2 for the platform keyring (primarily used by + * the integrity subsystem to verify a kexec'ed kerned image and, + * possibly, the initramfs signature). + * Return + * 0 on success, a negative value on error. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -5535,6 +5558,7 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(tcp_raw_gen_syncookie_ipv6), \ FN(tcp_raw_check_syncookie_ipv4), \ FN(tcp_raw_check_syncookie_ipv6), \ + FN(verify_pkcs7_signature), \ /* */ /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper From patchwork Tue Jun 28 12:27:50 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12898219 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40CA6C433EF for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:29:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345794AbiF1M3b (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:29:31 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58396 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345789AbiF1M32 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:29:28 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 267E6B3A; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:29:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.226]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LXP1t6sG4z686lS; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 20:25:22 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-ThinkStation-P620.huawei.com (10.204.63.22) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:29:23 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , , , , , , , , CC: , , , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v6 5/5] selftests/bpf: Add test for bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:27:50 +0200 Message-ID: <20220628122750.1895107-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20220628122750.1895107-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.63.22] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml751-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.201) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Ensure that signature verification is performed successfully from an eBPF program, with the new bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper. Generate a testing signature key and compile sign-file from scripts/, so that the test is selfcontained. Also, search for the tcb_bic.ko kernel module, parse it in user space to extract the raw PKCS#7 signature and send it to the eBPF program for signature verification. If tcb_bic.ko is not found, the test does not fail. The additional verification of a kernel module is necessary to test lookup of a keyring with a special ID (primary, secondary or platform) since, if kernel modules are signed, the public key is also added at kernel build time to one of those keyrings. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 14 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 2 + .../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 359 ++++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 79 ++++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 104 +++++ 5 files changed, 555 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile index 4fbd88a8ed9e..cad3607e9a6f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ BPFTOOLDIR := $(TOOLSDIR)/bpf/bpftool APIDIR := $(TOOLSINCDIR)/uapi GENDIR := $(abspath ../../../../include/generated) GENHDR := $(GENDIR)/autoconf.h +HOSTPKG_CONFIG := pkg-config ifneq ($(wildcard $(GENHDR)),) GENFLAGS := -DHAVE_GENHDR @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ TEST_PROGS := test_kmod.sh \ test_xsk.sh TEST_PROGS_EXTENDED := with_addr.sh \ - with_tunnels.sh ima_setup.sh \ + with_tunnels.sh ima_setup.sh verify_sig_setup.sh \ test_xdp_vlan.sh test_bpftool.py # Compile but not part of 'make run_tests' @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED = test_sock_addr test_skb_cgroup_id_user \ test_lirc_mode2_user xdping test_cpp runqslower bench bpf_testmod.ko \ xdpxceiver xdp_redirect_multi xdp_synproxy -TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS = $(OUTPUT)/urandom_read +TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS = $(OUTPUT)/urandom_read $(OUTPUT)/sign-file # Emit succinct information message describing current building step # $1 - generic step name (e.g., CC, LINK, etc); @@ -189,6 +190,12 @@ $(OUTPUT)/urandom_read: urandom_read.c urandom_read_aux.c $(OUTPUT)/liburandom_r -fuse-ld=$(LLD) -Wl,-znoseparate-code \ -Wl,-rpath=. -Wl,--build-id=sha1 -o $@ +$(OUTPUT)/sign-file: ../../../../scripts/sign-file.c + $(call msg,SIGN-FILE,,$@) + $(Q)$(CC) $(shell $(HOSTPKG_CONFIG)--cflags libcrypto 2> /dev/null) \ + $< -o $@ \ + $(shell $(HOSTPKG_CONFIG) --libs libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo -lcrypto) + $(OUTPUT)/bpf_testmod.ko: $(VMLINUX_BTF) $(wildcard bpf_testmod/Makefile bpf_testmod/*.[ch]) $(call msg,MOD,,$@) $(Q)$(RM) bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.ko # force re-compilation @@ -512,7 +519,8 @@ TRUNNER_EXTRA_SOURCES := test_progs.c cgroup_helpers.c trace_helpers.c \ TRUNNER_EXTRA_FILES := $(OUTPUT)/urandom_read $(OUTPUT)/bpf_testmod.ko \ $(OUTPUT)/liburandom_read.so \ $(OUTPUT)/xdp_synproxy \ - ima_setup.sh \ + $(OUTPUT)/sign-file \ + ima_setup.sh verify_sig_setup.sh \ $(wildcard progs/btf_dump_test_case_*.c) TRUNNER_BPF_BUILD_RULE := CLANG_BPF_BUILD_RULE TRUNNER_BPF_CFLAGS := $(BPF_CFLAGS) $(CLANG_CFLAGS) -DENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config index c05904d631ec..76b65acd897e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config @@ -63,3 +63,5 @@ CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_STATE=y CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=y CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_SYNPROXY=y CONFIG_IP_NF_RAW=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y +CONFIG_KEYS=y diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..85552dc48333 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "test_verify_pkcs7_sig.skel.h" + +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024 +#define LOG_BUF_SIZE 16384 + +/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ +#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" + +/* + * Module signature information block. + * + * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: + * + * - Signer's name + * - Key identifier + * - Signature data + * - Information block + */ +struct module_signature { + u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */ + u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */ + u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */ + u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */ + u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */ + u8 __pad[3]; + __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ +}; + +struct data { + u8 data[MAX_DATA_SIZE]; + u32 data_len; + u8 sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE]; + u32 sig_len; +}; + +static int _run_setup_process(const char *setup_dir, const char *cmd) +{ + int child_pid, child_status; + + child_pid = fork(); + if (child_pid == 0) { + execlp("./verify_sig_setup.sh", "./verify_sig_setup.sh", cmd, + setup_dir, NULL); + exit(errno); + + } else if (child_pid > 0) { + waitpid(child_pid, &child_status, 0); + return WEXITSTATUS(child_status); + } + + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int populate_data_item_str(const char *tmp_dir, struct data *data_item) +{ + struct stat st; + char data_template[] = "/tmp/dataXXXXXX"; + char path[PATH_MAX]; + int ret, fd, child_status, child_pid; + + data_item->data_len = 4; + memcpy(data_item->data, "test", data_item->data_len); + + fd = mkstemp(data_template); + if (fd == -1) + return -errno; + + ret = write(fd, data_item->data, data_item->data_len); + + close(fd); + + if (ret != data_item->data_len) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + + child_pid = fork(); + + if (child_pid == -1) { + ret = -errno; + goto out; + } + + if (child_pid == 0) { + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/signing_key.pem", tmp_dir); + + return execlp("./sign-file", "./sign-file", "-d", "sha256", + path, path, data_template, NULL); + } + + waitpid(child_pid, &child_status, 0); + + ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_status); + if (ret) + goto out; + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.p7s", data_template); + + ret = stat(path, &st); + if (ret == -1) { + ret = -errno; + goto out; + } + + if (st.st_size > sizeof(data_item->sig)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_sig; + } + + data_item->sig_len = st.st_size; + + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) { + ret = -errno; + goto out_sig; + } + + ret = read(fd, data_item->sig, data_item->sig_len); + + close(fd); + + if (ret != data_item->sig_len) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out_sig; + } + + ret = 0; +out_sig: + unlink(path); +out: + unlink(data_template); + return ret; +} + +static int populate_data_item_mod(struct data *data_item) +{ + char mod_path[PATH_MAX], *mod_path_ptr; + struct stat st; + void *mod; + FILE *fp; + struct module_signature ms; + int ret, fd, modlen, marker_len, sig_len; + + data_item->data_len = 0; + + if (stat("/lib/modules", &st) == -1) + return 0; + + /* Requires CONFIG_TCP_CONG_BIC=m. */ + fp = popen("find /lib/modules/$(uname -r) -name tcp_bic.ko", "r"); + if (!fp) + return 0; + + mod_path_ptr = fgets(mod_path, sizeof(mod_path), fp); + pclose(fp); + + if (!mod_path_ptr) + return 0; + + mod_path_ptr = strchr(mod_path, '\n'); + if (!mod_path_ptr) + return 0; + + *mod_path_ptr = '\0'; + + if (stat(mod_path, &st) == -1) + return 0; + + modlen = st.st_size; + marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + + fd = open(mod_path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) + return -errno; + + mod = mmap(NULL, st.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); + + close(fd); + + if (mod == MAP_FAILED) + return -errno; + + if (strncmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + modlen -= marker_len; + + memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); + + sig_len = __be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); + modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); + + if (modlen > sizeof(data_item->data)) { + ret = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(data_item->data, mod, modlen); + data_item->data_len = modlen; + + if (sig_len > sizeof(data_item->sig)) { + ret = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(data_item->sig, mod + modlen, sig_len); + data_item->sig_len = sig_len; + ret = 0; +out: + munmap(mod, st.st_size); + return ret; +} + +void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) +{ + char tmp_dir_template[] = "/tmp/verify_sigXXXXXX"; + char *tmp_dir; + char *buf = NULL; + struct test_verify_pkcs7_sig *skel = NULL; + struct bpf_map *map; + struct data data; + int ret, zero = 0; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_object_open_opts, opts); + + /* Trigger creation of session keyring. */ + syscall(__NR_request_key, "keyring", "_uid.0", NULL, + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + tmp_dir = mkdtemp(tmp_dir_template); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(tmp_dir, "mkdtemp")) + return; + + ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "setup"); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "_run_setup_process")) + goto close_prog; + + buf = malloc(LOG_BUF_SIZE); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(buf, "malloc")) + goto close_prog; + + opts.kernel_log_buf = buf; + opts.kernel_log_size = LOG_BUF_SIZE; + opts.kernel_log_level = 1; + + skel = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__open_opts(&opts); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__open_opts")) + goto close_prog; + + ret = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__load(skel); + + if (ret < 0 && strstr(buf, "unknown func bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature")) { + printf( + "%s:SKIP:bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper not supported\n", + __func__); + test__skip(); + goto close_prog; + } + + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__load")) + goto close_prog; + + ret = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__attach(skel); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__attach")) + goto close_prog; + + map = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(skel->obj, "data_input"); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(map, "data_input not found")) + goto close_prog; + + ret = populate_data_item_str(tmp_dir, &data); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "populate_data_item_str")) + goto close_prog; + + skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid(); + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_serial = KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING; + + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "bpf_map_update_elem")) + goto close_prog; + + /* Search the verification key in the testing keyring. */ + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_serial = syscall(__NR_request_key, + "keyring", + "ebpf_testing_keyring", + NULL, + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "bpf_map_update_elem")) + goto close_prog; + + /* Corrupt data (signature verification should fail). */ + data.data[0] = 'a'; + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_LT(ret, 0, "bpf_map_update_elem data_input")) + goto close_prog; + + ret = populate_data_item_mod(&data); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "populate_data_item_mod")) + goto close_prog; + + if (data.data_len) { + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_serial = 0; + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_id = 0; + + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, + BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "bpf_map_update_elem")) + goto close_prog; + + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_id = 1; + + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, + BPF_ANY); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "bpf_map_update_elem")) + goto close_prog; + + /* Verification key is not in the platform keyring. */ + skel->bss->trusted_keyring_id = 2; + + ret = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(map), &zero, &data, + BPF_ANY); + ASSERT_LT(ret, 0, "bpf_map_update_elem"); + } + +close_prog: + _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "cleanup"); + free(buf); + + if (!skel) + return; + + skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0; + test_verify_pkcs7_sig__destroy(skel); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9937f1ec541 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024 + +typedef __u8 u8; +typedef __u16 u16; +typedef __u32 u32; +typedef __u64 u64; + +u32 monitored_pid; +u32 trusted_keyring_serial; +unsigned long trusted_keyring_id; + +struct data { + u8 data[MAX_DATA_SIZE]; + u32 data_len; + u8 sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE]; + u32 sig_len; +}; + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, struct data); +} data_input SEC(".maps"); + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +SEC("lsm.s/bpf") +int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) +{ + struct bpf_dynptr data_ptr, sig_ptr; + struct data *data_val; + u32 pid; + u64 value; + int ret, zero = 0; + + pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; + if (pid != monitored_pid) + return 0; + + data_val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&data_input, &zero); + if (!data_val) + return 0; + + bpf_probe_read(&value, sizeof(value), &attr->value); + + bpf_copy_from_user(data_val, sizeof(struct data), + (void *)(unsigned long)value); + + if (data_val->data_len > sizeof(data_val->data)) + return -EINVAL; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(data_val->data, data_val->data_len, 0, &data_ptr); + + if (data_val->sig_len > sizeof(data_val->sig)) + return -EINVAL; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(data_val->sig, data_val->sig_len, 0, &sig_ptr); + + return bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(&data_ptr, &sig_ptr, + trusted_keyring_serial, 0, + trusted_keyring_id); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..ba08922b4a27 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +set -e +set -u +set -o pipefail + +VERBOSE="${SELFTESTS_VERBOSE:=0}" +LOG_FILE="$(mktemp /tmp/verify_sig_setup.log.XXXXXX)" + +x509_genkey_content="\ +[ req ] +default_bits = 2048 +distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name +prompt = no +string_mask = utf8only +x509_extensions = myexts + +[ req_distinguished_name ] +CN = eBPF Signature Verification Testing Key + +[ myexts ] +basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE +keyUsage=digitalSignature +subjectKeyIdentifier=hash +authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid +" + +usage() +{ + echo "Usage: $0 " + exit 1 +} + +setup() +{ + local tmp_dir="$1" + + echo "${x509_genkey_content}" > ${tmp_dir}/x509.genkey + + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 \ + -batch -x509 -config ${tmp_dir}/x509.genkey \ + -outform PEM -out ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.pem \ + -keyout ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.pem 2>&1 + + openssl x509 -in ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.pem -out \ + ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.der -outform der + + key_id=$(cat ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.der | keyctl padd asymmetric ebpf_testing_key @s) + + keyring_id=$(keyctl newring ebpf_testing_keyring @s) + keyctl link $key_id $keyring_id +} + +cleanup() { + local tmp_dir="$1" + + keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s asymmetric ebpf_testing_key) @s + keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s keyring ebpf_testing_keyring) @s + rm -rf ${tmp_dir} +} + +catch() +{ + local exit_code="$1" + local log_file="$2" + + if [[ "${exit_code}" -ne 0 ]]; then + cat "${log_file}" >&3 + fi + + rm -f "${log_file}" + exit ${exit_code} +} + +main() +{ + [[ $# -ne 2 ]] && usage + + local action="$1" + local tmp_dir="$2" + + [[ ! -d "${tmp_dir}" ]] && echo "Directory ${tmp_dir} doesn't exist" && exit 1 + + if [[ "${action}" == "setup" ]]; then + setup "${tmp_dir}" + elif [[ "${action}" == "cleanup" ]]; then + cleanup "${tmp_dir}" + else + echo "Unknown action: ${action}" + exit 1 + fi +} + +trap 'catch "$?" "${LOG_FILE}"' EXIT + +if [[ "${VERBOSE}" -eq 0 ]]; then + # Save the stderr to 3 so that we can output back to + # it incase of an error. + exec 3>&2 1>"${LOG_FILE}" 2>&1 +fi + +main "$@" +rm -f "${LOG_FILE}"