From patchwork Fri Nov 25 15:57:15 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nicolas Bouchinet X-Patchwork-Id: 13056120 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42F80C43219 for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2022 15:57:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229733AbiKYP5b (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Nov 2022 10:57:31 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48272 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229764AbiKYP5a (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Nov 2022 10:57:30 -0500 Received: from relay9-d.mail.gandi.net (relay9-d.mail.gandi.net [217.70.183.199]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A0ED394; Fri, 25 Nov 2022 07:57:25 -0800 (PST) Received: (Authenticated sender: nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org) by mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D8761FF80C; Fri, 25 Nov 2022 15:57:16 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2022 16:57:15 +0100 From: Nicolas Bouchinet To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, davem@davemloft.net, lucien.xin@gmail.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, mortonm@chromium.org, nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr, mic@digikod.net, cgzones@googlemail.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com Subject: [PATCH v5] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org From: Nicolas Bouchinet Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the `evm_protected_xattr_common` function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a `inode_init_security` hook returns 0 without initializing the given `struct xattr` fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks. The `call_int_hook_xattr` macro has been inlined into the `security_inode_init_security` hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init `xattrs`. Modify `evm_init_hmac` function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array. The `MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR` value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes. Changes the default return value of the `inode_init_security` hook definition to `-EOPNOTSUPP`. Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller). Cc: roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet --- Changes since v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1lElHVQGT%2F1Pa6O@archlinux/ * Updated the `security_inode_init_security()` hook documentation. * Moved the NULL pointer dereference check from `evm_protected_xattr_common()` inside the LSM hook calls loop of the `security_inode_init_security()` function (as suggested by Roberto Sassu). * Fixes the error return conditions of the `hlist_for_each_entry()` loop in the `security_inode_init_security()` function (as suggested by Roberto Sassu). * Fixes the `evm_xattr` pointer calculation before the `evm_inode_init_security()` call (as suggested by Roberto Sassu). Changes since v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT@archlinux/ * Fixes compilation error reported by the kernel test robot. Changes since v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1K3bf+dtNnVe7DG@archlinux/ * The `evm_init_hmacs` has been merged with `evm_init_hmac` (as suggested by Mimi Zohar). * The commit message has been updated to match the patch changes. Changes since v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ * The `call_int_hook_xattr` macro has been inlined into the `security_inode_init_security` hook (as suggested by Paul Moor, Mickaël Salaün and Casey Schaufler). * The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is processed based on compiled LSMs (as proposed by Casey Schaufler). * Various typos and cosmetic changes has been fixed (as suggested by Mickaël Salaün) * A MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR test has been wrapped in a WARN_ON_ONCE macro (as suggested by Mickaël Salaün). --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++--- security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 9 +++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 ++-- security/security.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index ec119da1d89b4..0ba396f08c4f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode, +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 4ec80b96c22e7..8a2762f7e75f5 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -229,15 +229,15 @@ * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function - * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller - * being responsible for calling kfree after using them. + * is expected to allocate the value via kmalloc, with the caller + * being responsible for calling kfree after using it. * If the security module does not use security attributes or does * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode. * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory. * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object - * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux). + * @name will be set to a name suffix (e.g. selinux). * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value. * @len will be set to the length of the value. * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set, diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f8b8c5004fc7c..6d9628ca7c246 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -61,5 +61,6 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); +int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name); #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 708de9656bbd2..06639f3cfb383 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return rc; } -int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattrs, char *hmac_val) { struct shash_desc *desc; @@ -396,7 +396,12 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return PTR_ERR(desc); } - crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); + for (int i = 0; lsm_xattrs[i].value != NULL; i++) { + if (evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattrs[i].name)) + crypto_shash_update(desc, + lsm_xattrs[i].value, + lsm_xattrs[i].value_len); + } hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val); kfree(desc); return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 23d484e05e6f2..35a060a6124c5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name, return found; } -static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) +int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) { return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false); } @@ -852,8 +852,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 79d82cb6e4696..6cdd3fdc08fbc 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ #include #include -#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 +#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR \ + ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0)) /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) @@ -1093,9 +1097,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) { + int initialized_lsms = 0; + int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; - int ret; + struct security_hook_list *hook_ptr; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; @@ -1105,15 +1111,30 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, - &lsm_xattr->name, - &lsm_xattr->value, - &lsm_xattr->value_len); - if (ret) + hlist_for_each_entry(hook_ptr, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + ret = hook_ptr->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, + &lsm_xattr->name, + &lsm_xattr->value, + &lsm_xattr->value_len); + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + continue; + if (ret != 0) + goto out; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(initialized_lsms >= MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR || + !lsm_xattr->name || + !lsm_xattr->value)) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + lsm_xattr++; + initialized_lsms++; + } + if (!initialized_lsms) goto out; - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); + evm_xattr = lsm_xattr; + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr); if (ret) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);